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Abstract 
Beyond game worlds: story-ing storied space is about stories in software and 
design. The study opens with reflections on dilemmas posed by what it calls ‘the 
seduction of simulated worlds’, the use of game making software to re-create 
Australian Indigenous cultural worlds. An apparently simple problem of participation 
in a digital approach to telling stories and communicating identity reveals potential 
dilemmas in the wider fields of participatory culture and new literacies, participatory 
design and contemporary approaches to designing. The thesis weaves a research 
narrative around six publications that form the basis of the theoretical research study 
that problematises contemporary notions of ‘participation’ and ‘participatory culture’ 
from the perspective of Paulo Freire’s (1972) critical pedagogy.  
The aim of the thesis is the ‘re-materialisation’ of software as a storied artefact in 
practices that are concerned with culture and story telling using digital technologies 
in general, although the specific focus is on software designed to create game worlds. 
This research argues that many of the stories that contribute to Ricœur’s ‘dynamic 
living background’ of stories are those of design, implemented in material artefacts 
and they are not taken into account, or rather, as the research shows, these material 
stories are effectively ‘disappeared’ by stories we tell ourselves about design, digital 
technologies, software and participatory culture. 
The research contributes to current theories of design and participation with digital 
technologies by drawing on Ricœur’s (1984) concept of the threefold mimetic 
process and including digital artefacts as material ‘characters’, or storied ‘things’ as 
Hodder (2012) calls them, which contribute to the story-ing of the world. The 
research demonstrates the importance of this understanding in projects that seek to 
include diversity, particularly in post-colonial and indigenous contexts. By applying 
a theoretical framework informed by Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy (1972) and 
taking a methodological approach informed by critical hermeneutics, Paul Ricœur’s 
‘third path’, the research illuminates opportunities for what it refers to as the ‘hope-
full’ endeavour: engaging in criticality and problem posing in order to build on 
insights and enable transformation. 
iv Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour 
List of included publications 
Publications included as part of this thesis submission are reprinted in their original 
published format1 with references lists and notes intact. All publications included 
were written during the period of candidature2. 
Turner, J. (2006a). Destination space: Experiential spatiality and stories. ACM 
International Conference Proceeding Series (Vol. 223, pp. 87-94). ACM. 
Turner, J., & Bidwell, N. J. (2007b). Through the looking glass: Game worlds as 
representations and views from elsewhere. In M. Gibbs & Y. Pisan (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 4th Australasian Conference on Interactive Entertainment 
(pp. 1-8): RMIT University. 
Turner, J. (2008). The little grey cat engine: Telling small stories (Demo). Paper 
presented at the 20th Conference of the Computer-Human Interaction Special 
Interest Group (CHISIG) of Australia on Computer-Human Interaction: Design 
OZCHI ‘08, Cairns, Australia. 
Turner, J., & Browning, D. (2009). Designing spatial story-telling software 
Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Australian Computer-Human 
Interaction Special Interest Group: Design: Open 24/7 (pp. 153-160): ACM. 
Turner, J. & Moyes, G. (2012) Performing design: Game design, practice, praxis and 
the theatre of the impressed. Colab Journal of Creative Technologies, (3). 
Retrieved from https://ctechjournal.aut.ac.nz/paper/performing-design-game-
design-practice-praxis-theatre-impressed/ 
Turner, J. (2015). African gamer: Whose story is it anyway? In N. J. Bidwell & H. 
Winschiers-Theophilus (Eds.), Intersections of Indigenous and traditional 
knowledges and technology design (pp. 33-66). Santa Rosa, CA: Informing 
Science Press. 
                                                
 
1 I normally publish under the nom de plume truna aka j.turner, which tends to result in some erratic bibliography 
labelling (some of my ACM publications for example are listed under ‘Turner, TAJ’). For convenience, the 
current thesis uses the standard author and initial format (Turner, J., which is used in the University e-prints 
resource). 
2 This work is submitted as a thesis by publication (see QUT MOPP 14.1.1, 2006-2008) as approved at 
confirmation (October, 2008) according to the QUT regulations at that time, which stated that a Thesis by 
publication is “in the format of published and/or submitted papers, where such papers have been published, 
accepted or submitted during the period of candidature; and where the quality of such papers is appropriate to 
PhD-level research. For the purpose of this Regulation, papers are defined as journal articles, book chapters, 
conference papers and other forms of written scholarly works which are subject to a process of peer review 
similar to that of refereed journal”. The thesis also conforms to the QUT Faculty of Education specific guidelines 
at the time of confirmation (2008), which stated: “Candidates who undertake their PhD thesis by publication in 
the Faculty of Education must publish five papers of which three must be single-authored. At least three of the 
five papers must be accepted for publication at the time of thesis submission and two of these must be single-
authored”. In order to ensure that the thesis conforms to both sets of regulations, six publications are included. 
Additional publications 
The following publications were also completed during candidature but are not 
included as part of the current thesis submission, although some are referenced in the 
course of the analysis and discussion. The publication Redisplacement by design 
(Bidwell, Radoll & Turner, 2007) is included as Appendix A. 
Turner, J. (2006b). To explore strange new worlds: Experience design in 3 
dimensional immersive environments - role and place in a world as object of 
interaction. Paper presented at the 18th Australian Conference on Computer-
Human Interaction: Design: Activities, Artefacts and Environments OZCHI ‘06, 
Sydney, Australia. 
Turner, J. & Bidwell, N. J. (2007a). Mirror, mirror: Claiming digital places of the 
mundane mapping culture. Paper presented at the SIMTECH International 
Workshop on Social Interaction and Mundane Technologies, Melbourne, Vic. 
Bidwell, N. J., Radoll, P., & Turner, J. (2007). Redisplacement by design. 
interactions, 14(2), 12-14. doi:10.1145/1229863.1229878 
Turner, J., Browning, D., & Bidwell, N. J. (2008). Wanderer beyond game worlds. 
Leonardo Electronic Almanac, 16(2 - 3), 18. 
Browning, D., Erp, M. van, Bødker, M., Bidwell, N. J., & Turner, J. (2009). 
Designing for naturally engaging experiences. In T. Gross, J. Gulliksen, P. 
Kotzé, L. Oestreicher, P. Palanque, R. O. Prates, & M. Winckler (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 12th IFIP TC 13 International Conference on Human-
Computer Interaction: Part II (pp. 961-962). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-
Verlag. 
Bidwell, N. J., Turner, J., Holdsworth, J., Colin, L., & Shay, M. (2007). Heritage & 
habitus: Designing to support situated, living knowledge. Proceedings of the 
Joint Workshop: Mobile Interaction with the Real World (MIRW 2007) and the 
5th Workshop on HCI (MGuides 2007) (pp. 27-32). 
Turner, J., Browning, D., & Moyes, G. (2012). Performing design analysis: Game 
design creativity and the theatre of the impressed. Proceedings of The 8th 
Australasian Conference on Interactive Entertainment: Playing the System (pp. 
1-10). New York, NY: ACM. 
Turner, J., Thomas, L., & Owen, C. (2013). Living the indie life: Mapping creative 
teams in a 48 hour game jam and playing with data. Proceedings of The 9th 
Australasian Conference on Interactive Entertainment: Matters of Life and 
Death (pp. 1-10). New York, NY: ACM. 
vi Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour 
List of works and designs  
completed during candidature 
The current thesis presents a theoretical analysis and challenge to contemporary 
understandings of game making software use in participatory practice. The included 
publications reference a series of practice-based outcomes and design explorations. 
The following projects were also completed during the period of candidature; they 
are discussed in the submitted publications and form part of the overall research 
narrative. 
2007: nQuumbar Graffiti Engine  
Design concept, Creative Director and Industry evaluation: Jane Turner (truna aka 
j.turner). Programming: Michael Shay. 
Torque Game Engine (TGE) add-on – the nQuumbar engine allows the player to 
explore a TGE game world and leave marks of their presence and passing on the 
landscape. The Graffiti engine prototype was partially supported by a Teaching and 
Learning grant from James Cook University. The JCU project lead was Nicola 
Bidwell and it was supported by Jason Holdsworth and Colin Lemmon. 
  
Images are taken from Graffiti-engine – Torque Game Engine participant tool, Next 
Level Festival, Brisbane, Australia, October 2007, using the way-finding world 
produced by Redback Games and designed by Nicola Bidwell, JCU as part of the 
way-finding project. 
Project website: http://pinksofa.making-games.net/?page_id=19  
Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour vii 
2006 – 2009: Tabernacle 
Design concept, Creative Director: Jane Turner (truna aka j.turner). 
Half Life Mod – Tabernacle V1 Team: Glen Gugliotti – Environment Artist (terrain) 
and Team Lead, Jonathan de Araujo – Environment Artist (buildings), Ryan 
Veenstra – Character and Environment Modeller (buildings), Zac Fitz-Walter – 
Character Modeller, Ashley Guy – Concept Artist (characters), Glen van den Bergen 
– Level Scripter, Simon Joslin – Writer, Justin Mullins – Sound Engineer, Victor 
Creecy-Roberts – Sound Engineer, Gabriel Couper – Asset Modeller 
  
Tabernacle images: Page from Cosmas Indicopluestes’ Christian Topography 
showing world maps and Tabernacle terrain guide. 
Tabernacle explores the relationship between the map and the three-dimensional 
visualisation enabled by high-end game engines. The project is named after the 6th 
century tabernacle maps of Cosmas Indicopleustes in his Christian Topography. 
Tabernacle highlights the problematic disjuncture between the modern Cartesian 
map structures of the engine and the mapping traditions of non western cultures. 
The project exposes assumptions about the maps which underpin 3D game worlds, 
and the autocratic tendencies of world construction software. A key outcome from 
the Tabernacle project was the ways in which available game engines constrained 
the team’s ability to represent a very different culture with a different 
conceptualisation of space and maps. The project was presented at Perth Digital Arts 
and Culture in 2007 and reiterated using a different game engine in 2009. 
Project website and archive: http://pinksofa.making-games.net/?page_id=21  
viii Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour 
2007 – 2008: Strolls Project 
Design concept and first iteration: Jane Turner (truna aka j.turner). Project website 
and Google Mashup: David Browning. 
The original stroll was created to share a snapshot of life in a Brisbane suburb with 
Finnish students (AU goes to FI, curated by Ann Morrison) and the later public 
collection of the ‘strolls’ ‘mash-up’ website was a collaboration between myself and 
David Browning. The Strolls Project was an exploration of potential to share 
experience of place. The project was an early design exploration as part of the Little 
Grey Cat Engine project but it took on a life of its own. The emphasis on the walk 
and taking of image stills (as opposed to the straightforward video) is based on a 
notion of partaking of the environment with technology. The process involves a 
strange and distinct embodiment as the maker must stop and choose each subsequent 
shot in order to build up the final animated sequence. The viewer becomes subtly 
involved in the maker’s decisions. 
  
Still screenshots from Kampong Trail Stroll (Singapore) by Peter Friedlander and 
Anzali Fish Market Stroll (Iran) by Rumbode. 
 
Project archive website: http://pinksofa.making-games.net/?page_id=23  
Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour ix 
2008: The Little Grey Cat Engine (greyCat) 
Design concept and Creative Director: Jane Turner (truna aka j.turner) 
Production team: Zac Fitz-Walter, Craig Stewart, Letitia Power, Hamish Lancaster 
and Peter Riez. 
The little grey cat engine (greyCat) is part of a series of projects which explores 
software that can enable access to the potentially empowering nature of represented 
space and game design. GreyCat is the result of research into the culture of the 
software itself in order to provide participatory environments that enable the telling 
of ‘small stories’ – stories and experiences that are those of the everyday or those of 
a cultural perspective other than that prioritised by most world-building software or 
game engines. GreyCat offers a simple framework that allows participants to use 
their own image materials (photographs for the most part) as a basis for spatial 
exploration of their own places. 
 
  
Screenshots of the user interface for greyCat showing photo-media insertion and use 
of hotspot to add dimensionality. 
 
Project website: http://pinksofa.making-games.net/?page_id=17  
x Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour 
Table of Contents 
Keywords ................................................................................................................................................. ii	
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. iii	
List of included publications ................................................................................................................... iv	
Additional publications ............................................................................................................................. i	
List of works and designs  completed during candidature ...................................................................... vi	
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................................... x	
List of Figures ...................................................................................................................................... xiii	
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ xiv	
Note on spelling and terms ..................................................................................................................... xv	
Statement of Original Authorship ........................................................................................................ xvii	
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................ xviii	
CHAPTER 1:	 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1	
1.1.2	 Beyond game worlds ......................................................................................................... 3	
1.2	 Beginnings ...................................................................................................................................... 7	
1.2.1	 Directions .......................................................................................................................... 9	
1.2.2	 The problem of disappearance and dematerialisation ..................................................... 12	
1.2.3	 Rematerialisation for transformation ............................................................................... 14	
1.3	 Significance: Story-ing storied space ........................................................................................... 15	
1.3.2	 The seduction of simulated worlds .................................................................................. 20	
1.4	 Towards re-materialising digital artefacts and design .................................................................. 23	
1.4.1	 Research perspectives ...................................................................................................... 26	
1.4.2	 Theoretical framework .................................................................................................... 27	
1.4.3	 Methodologies for the hope-full endeavour .................................................................... 29	
1.5	 Thesis Outline .............................................................................................................................. 30	
1.5.1	 Publications ..................................................................................................................... 31	
1.5.2	 Chapter overviews ........................................................................................................... 33	
CHAPTER 2:	 THE IMPORTANCE OF STORIES AND THE DILEMMA OF 
DISAPPEARANCE ............................................................................................................................. 35	
2.1	 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 35	
2.2	 Stories ........................................................................................................................................... 37	
2.2.1	 Mimesis, stories, identity and artefacts ........................................................................... 37	
2.2.2	 Asymmetrical storied worlds ........................................................................................... 41	
2.2.3	 Transforming stories ........................................................................................................ 44	
2.3	 Storied worlds .............................................................................................................................. 47	
2.3.1	 Story-ing storied space: Game worlds, constructed worlds ............................................ 49	
2.3.2	 Code is deep, design is wide ........................................................................................... 56	
2.3.3	 Design as mimesis ........................................................................................................... 61	
2.4	 Games as software and new media .............................................................................................. 66	
2.4.1	 Media as software culture ................................................................................................ 67	
2.4.2	 Cultural technologies ....................................................................................................... 73	
2.4.3	 Culture as use .................................................................................................................. 77	
CHAPTER 3:	 METHODOLOGIES ................................................................................................. 85	
3.1.2	 Towards the hope-full endeavour .................................................................................... 87	
3.2	 Critical hermeneutics .................................................................................................................... 89	
3.2.2	 Hermeneutic methodologies ............................................................................................ 92	
Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour xi 
3.2.3	 Critical hermeneutics ...................................................................................................... 96	
3.2.4	 Critical hermeneutics and the hope-full endeavour ........................................................ 99	
3.3	 Critical Hermeneutics in Practice .............................................................................................. 105	
3.3.1	 Critical pedagogy as (critical) hermeneutic interrogation ............................................. 106	
3.3.2	 Design and hermeneutics .............................................................................................. 111	
3.3.3	 Designed artefacts and hermeneutics ............................................................................ 120	
3.4	 Software and design as research object ...................................................................................... 128	
3.4.1	 Hermeneutic approaches: The Digital Songlines publications ..................................... 129	
3.4.2	 Hermeneutic approaches: Little grey cat ....................................................................... 129	
3.4.3	 Hermeneutic approaches: African gamer ...................................................................... 130	
3.4.4	 From hermeneutics to practice: Performing design ...................................................... 130	
CHAPTER 4:	 BEGINNINGS – THE DIGITAL SONGLINES ENVIRONMENT ................... 133	
4.1.1	 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 133	
4.1.2	 Background and reflections ........................................................................................... 135	
4.1.3	 Designer stories ............................................................................................................. 137	
4.1.4	 Material stories and place .............................................................................................. 138	
4.2	 Destination space: Experiential spatiality and stories ................................................................ 141	
4.3	 Through the looking glass: Game worlds as representations and views from elsewhere .......... 150	
4.4	 Design directions, new dilemmas .............................................................................................. 159	
CHAPTER 5:	 DILEMMAS IN PRACTICE .................................................................................. 161	
5.1.1	 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 161	
5.1.2	 Designer stories ............................................................................................................. 162	
5.2	 The little grey cat engine: Telling small stories ......................................................................... 165	
5.3	 Designing spatial story-telling software .................................................................................... 168	
5.4	 New directions: Material dilemmas ........................................................................................... 177	
CHAPTER 6:	 AFRICAN GAMER ................................................................................................. 181	
6.1	 Introduction and overview ......................................................................................................... 181	
6.2	 Editor’s Introduction .................................................................................................................. 184	
6.3	 African gamer: Whose story is it anyway? ................................................................................ 185	
6.3.1	 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 185	
6.3.2	 Stories about the ‘other’: Death by myth ...................................................................... 187	
6.3.3	 Stories and identity ........................................................................................................ 192	
6.3.4	 Stories and voice ........................................................................................................... 194	
6.3.5	 Technologies of play ..................................................................................................... 195	
6.3.6	 Stories of things ............................................................................................................. 197	
6.3.7	 Stories in representing spaces and places ...................................................................... 202	
6.3.8	 Stories of progress ......................................................................................................... 204	
6.3.9	 Multiple stories in things, systems and infrastructures ................................................. 205	
6.3.10	Stories that create others by making things ................................................................... 209	
6.3.11	Othering by inclusion .................................................................................................... 211	
6.3.12	Owning meaning in making things for play and stories ............................................... 215	
6.3.13	Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 218	
6.4	 Gamer References ...................................................................................................................... 218	
6.4.1	 Works and Media .......................................................................................................... 223	
CHAPTER 7:	 PERFORMING DESIGN ........................................................................................ 225	
7.1	 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 225	
7.2	 Performing Design: Game design, practice, praxis and the theatre of the impressed ................ 227	
7.2.1	 Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 227	
7.2.2	 Proem – on the creative act of making games ............................................................... 227	
7.2.3	 Introduction: Making the interactive work known as a game ....................................... 228	
7.2.4	 The nature of the beast: Art meets science? .................................................................. 230	
7.2.5	 Game design and education: The performing design project background .................... 232	
7.2.6	 The emerging sector ...................................................................................................... 235	
xii Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour 
7.2.7	 Creative designing and the theatre of the impressed ..................................................... 235	
7.2.8	 Sweding interactive works as praxis ............................................................................. 237	
7.2.9	 A place for design .......................................................................................................... 238	
7.3	 References .................................................................................................................................. 241	
CHAPTER 8:	 REFLECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: PEDAGOGIES OF THE 
IMPRESSED…… .............................................................................................................................. 244	
8.1	 Reflections .................................................................................................................................. 244	
8.1.1	 Beyond functional literacies: the right to story and story-ing ....................................... 245	
8.1.2	 Beyond the black box .................................................................................................... 252	
8.1.3	 Beyond design ............................................................................................................... 256	
8.2	 Implications ................................................................................................................................ 260	
8.2.1	 Beyond literacies of use ................................................................................................ 261	
8.2.2	 Beyond permission to design ........................................................................................ 268	
8.2.3	 Beyond participation within design ............................................................................... 279	
8.2.4	 Beyond functional criticality for design ........................................................................ 288	
8.3	 Beyond game worlds: Re-materialising design for the hope-full endeavour ............................. 297	
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................... 299	
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................................... 325	
Appendix A Redisplacement by design .................................................................................... 325	
Appendix B Statements of Contribution of Co-Authors .......................................................... 329	
Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour xiii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Digital Songlines Environment: Virtual Warrane: Indigenous traditional terrain of the 
Cadigal under construction in game engine - TGE screenshot with (adapted) early 
colonial map overlay (ACID, 2007). ...................................................................................... 1 
Figure 2. Untitled painting by Vincent Serico showing Indigenous map symbols. Camps and 
trails in the country are reflected by ancestor camps in the sky (Detail - permission 
ACID art gallery). ................................................................................................................... 1 
Figure 3. Diagram showing Gadamer’s hermeneutic cycle with augmentation phases and 
direction towards understandings ......................................................................................... 94 
Figure 4. Critical theory, according to Habermas, applies a methodological analysis to a 
situation in order to explain and reveal. ................................................................................ 97 
Figure 5. Ricœur’s ‘third path’ or critical hermeneutic methodology which combines critical 
theory and hermeneutics ..................................................................................................... 104 
Figure 6. Freire’s critical methodology as hermeneutic process ......................................................... 108 
Figure 7. The designer process according to Schön ............................................................................ 115 
Figure 8. Diagram showing how the hermeneutic methodologies discussed in the current 
chapter articulate into the publications ............................................................................... 132 
Figure 9. Opening paragraph, Surseance (2012) Minecraft modding – The ultimate guide for 
beginners. ............................................................................................................................ 274 
 
xiv Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour 
List of Abbreviations 
ACID Australasian CRC (Cooperative Research Program) for 
Interaction Design 
ANT Actor-Network Theory 
 
DEM Digital Elevation Models 
 
DSE ACID’s Digital Songlines Environment 
 
HCI Human Computer Interaction 
 
ICT Information & Communication Technologies 
 
IXD Interaction Design 
 
IXD4D Interaction Design for Development 
 
PD Participatory Design 
 
SDK Software Development Kit 
 
STS Science, Technology and Society studies 
 
TGE Torque Game Engine 
 
TK Traditional Knowledges 
Beyond game worlds: Story-ing storied space & the hope-full endeavour xv 
Note on spelling and terms 
This thesis uses the general term ‘digital games’ to refer to computer and video 
games. Some authors use the term videogames (without the space) in order to 
highlight the distinction between older discussions about digital games, and more 
contemporary discussions, which are informed by the pervasive presence of these 
particular software artefacts in contemporary western post-industrial society. 
When discussing digital story telling, i.e. the practice of using new media to 
tell personal stories, this thesis uses the term ‘digital story telling’. Some authors 
cited use ‘storytelling’, without the space. Fan fiction is a further term which is used 
by different authors with and without the space, some authors use ‘fanfiction’ as a 
single word, others use ‘fan fiction’. Quotations from authors in support of 
discussion have maintained the original author’s preference. 
In a similar vein, many of the research methodologies (both theoretical and 
practice-based) referred to and discussed in the thesis specify their distinction 
through use of capitalisation, for example, Critical Theory, Critical Design, or  
Participatory Design, however the current thesis does not use capitalisation unless 
citing authors who do or referring to the author’s conceptualisations of their own 
labels. 
The term ‘pedagogies of the impressed’ was actually the title of a talk, as I 
recall, given by Colin Lankshear in the Faculty of Education, QUT, sometime during 
the early years of the current century. The title remained in my mind but I can find 
no further reference to the talk itself in order to give Colin due credit in the normal 
way. 
The thesis is about software, it is not about post-colonial and indigenous 
peoples per se, rather the work analyses the stories in digital games and game 
making software as they are illuminated through juxtaposition with different ways of 
being and knowing. A particular dilemma in the current study is the difficulty of 
distinguishing between the dominant norms of what Barad (2007) calls Western 
onto-epistemologically informed culture and cultures that are not informed by this 
perspective, or rather, cultures that are shaped through this perspective (as opposed 
to being members). Post-colonial commentary opts for ‘post-colonial and 
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indigenous’ as a description or ‘post-colonial and Indigenous’ (capitalised) in 
recognition of the claiming of the name by first nation communities. For example, 
Indigenous Australian communities prefer capitalisation or the more specific 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander description. Labels act to obscure the diversity 
of different indigenous communities whilst providing an identity for mobilisation. 
The southern African Khoisan people consist of two groups, the San and the Khoi, 
who share physical and linguistic characteristics but the somewhat derogative term 
‘bushmen’ is used by members of the Khoisan as an act of claiming a unique 
identity. The term ‘post-colonial’ is also problematic. There is no ‘post’ colonial; the 
effects of colonialism remain and continue to have ramifications. The expression 
‘developing’ carries disturbing colonialist connotations of ‘becoming like us’; the 
term ‘third world’ is equally problematic with its hierarchical associations. 
Terminology in this instance is fraught with implications. However, it is also a 
labelling that arises in the self same view from the centre that is critiqued throughout 
the current work in order to illuminate the way that designed software artefacts also 
tell stories. The current thesis uses the general term ‘post-colonial and indigenous’ 
unless discussing a specific community. As the subject of the thesis is software and 
its stories, the thesis has opted for the somewhat cumbersome ‘non western non post-
industrialised cultures’ where possible, although this terminology is also framed by 
announcing what people are not, as opposed to who they actually are. In the context 
of the current work, this use of terminology serves to underline the research goal of 
unmasking the hidden stories in software and design, but I do feel that an apology for 
this strategy is in order. 
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happened. 
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Figure 1. Digital Songlines Environment: Virtual Warrane: Indigenous traditional terrain of the 
Cadigal under construction in game engine - TGE screenshot with (adapted) early colonial map 
overlay (ACID, 2007). 
Figure 2. Untitled painting by Vincent Serico showing Indigenous map symbols. Camps and trails in 
the country are reflected by ancestor camps in the sky (Detail - permission ACID art gallery). 
There is a word, an Igbo word, that I think about whenever I think 
about the power structures of the world, and it is ‘nkali’. It’s a noun 
that loosely translates to “to be greater than another.” Like our 
economic and political worlds, stories too are defined by the principle 
of nkali: How they are told, who tells them, when they’re told, how 
many stories are told, are really dependent on power. Power is the 
ability not just to tell the story of another person, but to make it the 
definitive story of that person (Adichie, 2009, [9:31]). 
 
To interpret our reality through schemas that are alien to us only has the 
effect of making us even more unknown, ever less free, ever more solitary3 
(Márquez, 1982, para. 7). 
 
The encoding of technical images, however, is what is going on in the 
interior of this black box and consequently any criticism of technical 
images must be aimed at an elucidation of its inner workings. As long 
as there is no way of engaging in such criticism of technical images, we 
shall remain illiterate (Flusser 1983, p. 16). 
 
                                                
 
3 Also translated as “The interpretation of our reality through patterns not our own, serves only to 
make us ever more unknown, ever less free, ever more solitary”. In the original Spanish: La 
interpretación de nuestra realidad con esquemas ajenos sólo contribuye a hacernos cada vez más 
desconocidos, cada vez menos libres, cada vez más solitarios. 
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Beyond game worlds is a thesis by publication and self-reflection as an on-
going process, a critical hermeneutic journey. The thesis consists of theoretical 
chapters and publications (completed during candidature) woven together to create a 
research narrative that clarifies the importance of stories in the phenomenal world 
and demonstrates the already ‘storied’ nature of game making software and 
technologies, and the ramifications of using this already storied space in non western 
non post-industrial contexts. Having examined the artefacts produced by design, the 
research ends with a return to design and examines some of the stories design tells 
itself about itself. The study adopts the critical pedagogy approach of Paulo Freire, 
which demands that the hidden and assumed be unveiled and examined, and 
combines Freire’s demand for critical awareness with Paul Ricœur’s concept of the 
mimetic process or the stories, story-ing and re-story-ing of the world. Drawing on 
the critical hermeneutic methodologies of Ricœur, the research analyses what it calls 
‘the disappearance’ of software as a designed artefact and presents its argument that 
software should be understood as a designed material artefact in participatory 
practices that pertain to meaning-making, particularly in post-colonial and 
indigenous contexts, and that a possible way into this understanding is through re-
framing design itself as a storied, materially entangled subject for Freirean criticality. 
Posing problems about design in this way unveils implications for design practices 
which profess critical approaches. 
1.1.1 Chapter overview 
The introduction provides a formal overview of the field and focus of the 
research and the research purpose of disentangling and revealing the ways in which 
design and its material artefacts contribute to Ricœur’s (1984) pre-figured, storied 
world. Section 1.2 tells the overall story behind the work in order to contextualise the 
publications included in the thesis and clarify the change in research direction from 
critical analysis of game making software and design in order to enable participatory 
practice and practice-based outcomes, to the current theoretical work and discussion 
of implications. Section 1.3 introduces the context of the study, the use of game 
worlds beyond their designed purview as sites of play, and argues for the 
significance of the research and its contribution to theories of participatory culture, 
new literacies and design. Section 1.4 presents the theoretical perspective and a brief 
outline of the problem of disappearance. Finally, section 1.5 provides an outline of 
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the publications included in the corpus and an overview of the remaining chapters of 
the thesis. 
1.1.2 Beyond game worlds 
Beyond game worlds is a critical hermeneutic research work; it is about the 
journey and development of actionable self-reflection as an ongoing process. The 
end result is a theoretical research thesis about ‘stories’, power relationships, and 
software; particularly, software that is used to make other software artefacts such as 
game making software, and design as a story-ing process. Critically, as the quotation 
from Nigerian author, Adichie (2009) points out, not all stories have equal voice and 
some, as Colombian novelist and Nobel Prize winner Gabriel Garcia Márquez 
observes, have the power to translate stories from those with less voice into even 
more ‘alien’ and ‘other’. This study argues that many of these stories are material in 
nature, hidden from view in designed digital artefacts and as such, are rarely included 
in critical analysis or considered as important in practices that purport to unveil 
meaning and enable participation. This hiding from view, or disappearance, leaves 
any practice that purports to use digital technologies without acknowledging the 
materiality of the medium open to Flusser’s (1983) accusation of ‘illiteracy’. Delving 
into the material outcomes of design as a critical literacy further serves to provoke 
discussion on dilemmas arising in notions of criticality in design itself. 
The research described here is both inter-disciplinary and theoretical. It 
combines perspectives from critical pedagogy, critical literacy practices and ‘new’ 
literacy practices that focus on literacies enabled by digital technologies; Human 
Computer Interaction (HCI) or interaction design (IXD), particularly design practice 
that announces inclusion of participants in the process and reflects on the nature of 
designing itself such as Participatory Design (PD) and ‘post-colonial’ design are 
included. The aim of the thesis is the ‘re-materialisation’ of software as a designed 
artefact in practices concerned with culture and story telling using digital 
technologies, although the specific focus is on software designed to create game 
worlds. The goal is the re-materialisation of criticality and Ricœur’s hope-full 
endeavour in design practices. 
The study takes inspiration and its theoretical framework from Freire’s critical 
pedagogical approaches to literacy and meaning making (Freire, 1972; Freire, 1994; 
Freire, 1998; Freire & Macedo, 1987). Freire’s critical pedagogy is ‘materialised’ by 
the adoption of a material culture approach that recognises that material artefacts are 
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active and dynamic in the storied world. The study extends this critical perspective to 
interaction and HCI design practices by heeding the reflection and potential of 
alternative sensibilities of post-colonial design approaches (Irani, Vertesi, Dourish, 
Philip & Grinter, 2010; Merritt & Bardzell, 2011; Merritt & Stolterman, 2012; 
Philip, Irani & Dourish, 2012) and focusing on the artefact with the humanistic intent 
of the emerging design practices such as Participatory Design (PD) practices 
(Simonsen & Robertson, 2012) and ‘de-colonising’ design approaches (Bidwell, 
2014). The use of ‘stories’ as a term that includes culture and meaning making is 
inspired by Brewer and Dourish’s (2008) discussion on storied spaces and post-
colonial commentary, which highlights asymmetrical power relationships in ‘stories 
told’. The idea of stories and story-ing draws on Ricœur’s concept of mimesis, 
narrative and its role in construction of identity and meaning. 
We are, as Ricœur (1984, 1991) says, ‘tangled up’ in stories; stories told by 
individuals and cultures that emerge out of lived experience (and story making) that 
arises out of a background of stories; an inchoate storied environment, which in turn 
continuously absorbs stories being ‘told’. This entangled mess of stories is dynamic 
and active; stories arise out of the already storied cultural world and then become 
part of the entanglement of stories, further contributing to what Ricœur calls the 
mimetic process or cycle. This mimetic process is, according to Ricœur (1984), a 
three-fold dynamic cycle of pre-figuring, configuring and re-configuring, whereby 
knowledge and subjective meaning making is mediated by reality or the storied 
world and subsequently re-mediates through on-going activity or story-ing. The 
mimetic cycle is vulnerable to the effects of asymmetrical power relations. Some 
stories are more powerful than others; they arise in dominant cultural contexts and 
confirm and legitimise particular cultural perspectives, marginalising others (Bhabha, 
1994; Fanon, 1963; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988; Thiong’o, 1986). Many of the stories 
that contribute to the tangle are invisible; obscured by accepted perspectives and the 
stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, as Geertz (1973) puts it. This research 
argues that many of the stories that contribute to Ricœur’s ‘dynamic living 
background’ of stories are those of design, implemented in material artefacts and 
they are not taken into account, or rather, as the research shows, these material 
stories are effectively ‘disappeared’ by stories we tell ourselves about design, digital 
technologies, software and participatory culture. 
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In order to substantiate this argument and expose the ramifications of this 
disappearance, the research focuses on a small but potentially potent aspect of 
Ricœur’s dynamically storied world: the stories in software normally used to make 
games and simulations. These digital worlds are increasingly featured and discussed 
in theories and practices that announce participatory culture opportunity (Jenkins, 
2006; Knobel & Lankshear, 2007; Sotamaa, 2005; Squire, 2008; Squire & Jenkins, 
2011) or the active contribution and production of culture on the part of those who 
might traditionally be understood as consumers (Bruns, 2008; Jenkins, 2006). 
Participatory cultural practice with digital games is noted as a specific instance of 
participatory design practice (Anthropy, 2012a; Ehn, 2008) which seems to dismiss 
the traditional idea of ‘the designer’ and usurp the role. This research focuses on this 
participatory culture as it is manifest in theories of new literacies or new forms of 
literacy made possible by digital technologies and participatory design, a design 
approach that endeavours to actively involve all stakeholders in the design process. 
This thesis critically examines these particular ‘storied spaces’ (Brewer & 
Dourish, 2008) in the light of ‘participatory’ projects that explore the potential of 
game making software to tell cultural stories and enable the voices of the 
marginalised and non-powerful to be heard. In this way, the research follows insights 
that were instigated by the juxtaposition of the Cadigal community lands in the game 
engine (Fig. 1) and Vincent Serico’s painting of traditional indigenous journeying 
(Fig. 2), which problematise the relationship between designer’s pre-figured story 
worlds, or their tacit knowledge, as Schön (1983) puts it, and the designed tendencies 
of the software that are deeply imbricated with the materiality of digital technologies. 
The research proposes that participatory approaches have proven to be 
powerful in the western post-industrialised context, where participants are 
themselves ‘party’ to the entangled storied world of design and artefacts. However, 
in non western non post-industrial contexts, the power ‘to make meaning’ with 
participatory digital technologies proves to be asymmetrical and is shown to enact 
inappropriate translation and interpretation of cultures whose traditional ways of 
being and meaning making are not those of the western mode. In the context of post-
colonial and indigenous meaning-making, the storied artefact has the potential to 
interpret indigenous knowledges through the perspectives of the culture of its designers; 
in effect, the artefact can become what Márquez (1982) calls ‘an alien schema’. 
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Further, where design itself is shown to be complicit and entangled with its own 
material outcomes and the digital artefact is shown to be storied and heavily imbricated 
in a western onto-epistemic perspective (Barad, 2003, 2007) with its trajectories in the 
scientific and technological aspirations of the European Enlightenment, then enabling 
access to design without any critique or unveiling of its assumptions and stories is also 
highly problematic. As Bidwell, Radoll and Turner (2007) argue, participatory design in 
non western, non post-industrial contexts should not be framed by enabling access to 
design as ‘stakeholders’, but should be re-framed as enabling the power of design as 
‘owners’ or title holders4. The former may be construed as conciliatory with shades of 
Fanon’s (1963) colonialist stewardship, the latter is in keeping with Freire’s (1972) 
dictum that demands that those in marginalised positions are empowered to create their 
own meaning, in their own voices, according to their own beliefs and ideologies. As 
the 2004 UNESCO position paper (2004, p. 14) on the plurality of literacies asserts, 
“Individuals and groups in subordinate positions may construct their own forms of 
literacy in their own language(s), articulating their own – officially unacknowledged 
– meanings, knowledge and identity.” 
Freire’s critical pedagogy and his critical literacy practice potentially condemn 
any participatory practice that does not attempt to transform reality and facilitate 
action on the basis of critically informed awareness, and Ricœur (1970) is critical of 
those critiques that only dismantle and expose without enabling some kind of action 
or hopefulness. The current study suggests that where the culture of design and 
assumptions about the role of designing creates such dilemmas, then it is also to 
design that we should turn in order to find a way to hand over design itself. And so, 
having critiqued participatory theories and practices for the apparent disappearance 
of software as storied artefact, the thesis returns to Freire’s critical pedagogical 
approach and critical literacy practice as a potential way of re-materialising the 
digital artefact in order to unveil its storied nature. The thesis ends with a reflective 
chapter which discusses the implications of insights gained during the critical 
hermeneutic process. These implications are considered in the areas of new literacies, 
participatory culture, participatory design and use of ‘criticality’ in design.  In this 
way, the research addresses the ‘disappearance of design’ in participatory and new 
                                                
 
4 I use the term ‘ownership’ with hesitation as it incorporates concepts of possession and proprietary 
rights that are deeply entangled in western post-industrial stories, however, it is precisely as a result of 
the legacies of the term in western contexts that it seems the term best suited to the discussion. 
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literacy theories, and makes a case for a renewed understanding of design and its 
material outcomes as a powerful and active contributor to Ricœur’s (1984) pre-
figured storied world which, once revealed, is open to the transformative action that 
Freire demands. 
1.2 BEGINNINGS 
Ricœur (1991) observes that we are entangled in stories which do not begin (or 
end) cleanly but which are dynamic and active. Stories start before we are born, we 
enjoin them; they mediate the ways we construct ourselves from within them; we add 
our own strands to them and they continue weaving, diverging and evolving creating 
a continuous inchoate skein of stories. This thesis is about the stories and voices 
embedded in digital games, software designed for play, and the importance of 
understanding design and designing as contributors to Ricœur’s entangled storied 
world through their material outcomes. As such it has an entry point, if not a 
beginning. In keeping with Ricœur’s (1970) call for clearer subjectivity in critical 
analysis, the current research story begins with the researcher herself. 
As both practitioner and researcher in interaction design and particularly game 
design, I work across many disciplines. I have academic and practical backgrounds 
in the visual arts, anthropology, artificial intelligence, language and literacy 
education and Interaction Design (IXD) and Human Computer Interaction (HCI)5; 
the sum of which provide the background for my current focus on game design and 
culture. I started working with digital technologies in 1979 and I have been engaged 
with digital technologies in educational contexts since 1986. I have been making 
games and using game-making as a story-telling medium since the late 1970s and I 
have been involved in teaching game design to educators and design students since 
the early 1990s. I approach my design teaching as a critical literacy practitioner; that 
is, while much of my work is situated in the scaffolding of students in terms of 
functional skills, or literacy, this is framed within a critical perspective that 
encourages them to engage in interpretation of meaning.  
 As a designer and educator (of literacies and design) I believe my core 
responsibility is to enable my students and project participants to explore both 
                                                
 
5 HCI and IXD are both concerned with the design of digital technologies and the experience of the 
designed artefact in the world. HCI is generally regarded as an academic discipline while IXD is more 
concerned with the design craft although this distinction is by no means considered fixed. 
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functional and critical design skills in order to understand how design ‘works’ in the 
world so that they can make their own meaning as critically aware individuals, as 
Freire (1972) has put it: to become beings for themselves. The current program of 
research focuses on an issue that has ramifications for this goal of critically aware 
meaning-making: the de-materialisation of software and disappearance of its stories, 
and the corollary: the lack of understanding of design as a meaning-making activity, 
which is also entangled in stories and materiality. 
The current research story is a long one. The research itself has been conducted 
part-time over a number of years and the narrative presented is woven around a 
number of publications completed during my current doctoral candidature. My own 
research process is therefore more visible than is typical in a thesis, as are the re-
alignments of focus as I homed in on exactly what was underlying my initial 
concerns and early insights. When I started this research, I was working as a games 
and interaction design researcher for the Australasian CRC for Interaction Design 
(ACID). I was involved in a number of projects but one in particular, the Digital 
Songlines Environment or DSE, seemed to be problematic because of the way in 
which the act of design as a process and the nature of software as a designed 
outcome were taken for granted. At the time, my concern was an investigation into, 
and unveiling of, the close relationship between design as practice and the 
‘expectations’ of designing constructed in the software itself. I felt that the DSE 
goals of telling Australian Indigenous stories and transmitting their Indigenous 
Traditional Knowledges (TKs), using a high-end commercial game engine to create a 
simulation of community lands, were potentially confounded by the already storied 
space of the software used to construct the world. The two spatial representations 
(Fig. 1 and Fig. 2) offer an example and highlight the nature of the dilemmas that 
acceptance of design as a process can create. Australian Indigenous representation of 
space (Fig. 2) was not used as a design parameter during DSE world construction; 
instead the design team went to great effort to source an appropriate ‘accurate’ map 
(Fig. 1) for a pre-colonial time period in order to provide simulation of the traditional 
landscapes. Thus a non western non post-industrial way of being and knowing 
country was translated into the predominant post-industrial manner of representing 
the world. This translation was further exacerbated because the Indigenous 
communities told their stories to the design and development team, who then acted as 
a conduit and implemented the stories within the simulated worlds of the DSE. 
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I was very much influenced by the critical ‘software culture’ approaches of Lev 
Manovich (2001) and Matthew Fuller (2003), which seemed to me to offer the most 
fruitful avenue to apply my critical literacy background to the potential dilemmas 
that the DSE project presented and I reflected on ways to dismantle the exclusive 
relationship between the designed expectations of the software (Fuller, 2003) and the 
designer process. Inspired by the representation of the western mode map (Fig. 1) 
and theories that propose that space can become place through meaning making 
(Casey, 1996; Dourish, 2006b; Tuan, 1977), I explored the potential to include 
participants as meaning makers within the simulation itself and, with my co-authors 
(Bidwell, Turner, Holdsworth, Lemmon & Shay, 2007; Turner & Bidwell, 2007a; 
Turner & Bidwell, 2007b; Turner, Bidwell & Browning, 2008), proposed a number 
of potentially inclusive design ‘experiments’ that appeared to have the potential to 
enable story tellers to add their own information to a simulated world.  
This approach resulted in designs described in the publications included in the 
current corpus or referenced within the discussion: nQuumbar or the Graffiti engine 
(Turner & Bidwell, 2007a; Turner & Bidwell, 2007b), Tabernacle (Turner et al., 
2008) and the Mobile mnemonics project (Bidwell et al., 2007). These design 
experiments were based on the early understanding that the indigenous story tellers 
were disenfranchised because of inabilities to participate in the implementing of their 
own knowledge within the simulated world that the ACID development team 
constructed. However, a design prototype called the Little grey cat engine (or 
greyCat) (Turner, 2008; Turner & Browning, 2009, see Chapter 5: this volume), 
which allows use of photographic material as a navigable environment, offers a 
moment of critical insight and raises issues that demand further interrogation. From 
the perspective of design as a problem solving activity, greyCat offers what Jenkins 
(2006) might call ‘a participatory opportunity’. Knobel and Lankshear (2007) might 
add that greyCat allows ‘ordinary people’ to make their own meaning and produce 
‘quality’ products. However, from the perspective of software, understood as a 
cultural artefact (Manovich, 2001), greyCat and the designing of the software offers 
a further reflective opportunity and heralds what might be called ‘the real problem’ 
that the current research seeks to unveil and expose for critical analysis. 
1.2.1 Directions 
The juxtaposition of the western mode map, based on an early colonial map in 
order to achieve some ‘authenticity’ of the landscape, pre-colonisation (Fig. 1), next 
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to the indigenous ‘maps’ that indigenous artist Vincent Serico includes in his 
paintings (Fig. 2), is a salutary critical moment. It raises questions about the nature of 
authenticity: whose map is ‘authentic’, what does authentic mean? And from whose 
perspective is this meaning constructed (Wood, Fels & Krygier, 2010)? These 
questions problematise the subsequent choice of representation medium (a 3D game 
engine or SDK designed to enable simulated interactional worlds) and flag what 
Hayles (2004) might call the deeper questions about what lies beyond the surface of 
the represented worlds. 
A software artefact is more than surface; this is particularly the case in rich 3D 
simulations. The DSE worlds were all made with the Torque Game Engine 
(GarageGames, 2007), a software artefact in its own right. These software 
frameworks vary but will typically include functionality that enables the inclusion of 
graphic assets, audio assets, collision detection, scripting, animation, artificial 
intelligence, memory management and other functions pertinent to the probable 
design expectations. The scripting functionality essentially consists of pre-built sets 
of code that allow the game maker to add functionality to a game asset. The amount 
of pre-built scripts available vary from engine to engine and as a general rule, sooner 
or later a game maker will have to code their own in whatever programming 
language the engine itself prescribes. Torque, for example, uses a general purpose 
programming language called C++. What this all means is that a game engine is 
essentially an active creator database of digital objects. 
Assets in the DSE series are constructed in 3D modelling packages such as 
Maya (Autodesk, 2005) or Lightwave 3D (NewTek Inc., 2005). All of these game 
engines and modelling software are carefully designed in order to make rich three 
dimensional game worlds according to expected and established professional design 
standards. In effect, much of the meaning making is already present in the software; 
it is already storied through design. 
This raises questions about unveiling meaning and assumptions in the software 
and the designing of the digital world. Such questions are resonant with critical 
literacy concerns, which assume that any vehicle that communicates using the codes 
and conventions of a society can be interrogated in order to better understand power, 
inequality and injustice in human relationships (Freire, 1972; Luke & Freebody, 
1997; McLaren & Lankshear, 1993). 
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Reflecting on the design and the materiality of greyCat invites a further set of 
questions about the dynamics of the relationship between designers, their material 
outcomes (in this case, software) and Ricœur’s (1984) already storied world. While 
potentially ‘more accessible’ in terms of functional skills, meaning-makers are not 
‘starting from scratch’ as Manovich puts it (2001); participation is with the already 
designed and created. It is enabled by design and the designed affordances of the 
software; this enabling is further embedded in a particular set of stories and histories 
of the software artefact. From a perspective of post-colonial analysis and 
commentators such as Bhabha (1994) and Thiong’o (1986), who assert that a 
conversation between the culture of the coloniser and the colonised is invariably 
framed through the language of the more powerful, the simplistic logic of ‘everyday’ 
materials that greyCat offers merely side steps the glamour of the 3D game engine 
but still uses digital technologies such as the camera, the smartphone and the 
computer itself. GreyCat remains a software artefact that requires hardware to run. 
Hardware is also a designed artefact that ‘works’ as a result of established systems 
and infrastructures (Star, 1999). The software remains an aspect of the cultural 
context of the designing and the histories, values and design philosophies of the 
context. It is still heavily imbricated in the material artefacts of western post-
industrialised culture. 
These questions and insights herald a turn in the research narrative and a 
realisation that any software-focused critical literacy must take design and materiality 
into account when considering post-colonial contexts. Artefacts are made and so 
become active in the cultural process (Tilley, Keane, Küchler, Rowlands & Spyer, 
2006). As I show in the African gamer publication (Turner, 2015, Chapter 6, this 
volume), encounters with digital technologies in post-colonial contexts are encounters 
with multiple layers of stories, beyond the single digital artefact. An encounter with a 
digital artefact is an encounter with a trajectory of technological designing and 
development that has its roots in the values and systems of the Enlightenment project 
(Flynn, 2007; Pumpa, 2008; Turner & Bidwell, 2007a; Turner & Bidwell, 2007b). For 
example, the data used to generate the DSE game world map includes the prime 
meridian, which is a basis for the technological ‘mapping’ of GPS satellites and 
which is unchanged since it was established by Sir George Airy in 1851 at 
Greenwich, London during the height of Britain’s ‘imperial century’. As Schön 
(1983) attests, the cultural world of the designer thus includes the already designed. 
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The already designed creates design expectations and contributes to designing. To 
paraphrase Ricœur (1984) and reframe his mimetic process or cycle of pre-figuring, 
configuring and re-configuring, the story is already present in the world and so 
predates and pre-figures the nature of designing. 
In effect, the problem for indigenous cultures is not only access to digital artefacts 
and ability to use them to make meaning; it is deeply embedded in the artefact itself 
through design. This insight deeply problematises notions of participatory design and 
participatory culture and so-called ‘new’ literacies. Where Jenkins’ (2006) work on 
convergence culture and participation admits that everything that an interactive 
environment allows an interactor to do is designed, one must also add along with Fry 
(1999) and Willis (2006) that a great deal of what the designer does as part of the design 
process is pre-structured by the cultural designing of design itself. 
1.2.2 The problem of disappearance and dematerialisation 
The concept of the cultural designing of design itself raises further questions. 
These are questions about how software and design actually communicate meaning 
or how they ‘work’. Such questions seem to present a case for the application of 
critical literacy approaches in design practice. There is a well-established body of 
work arising in critical literacy that applies itself to literacies and meaning making in 
digital environments, the practice of new literacies (Coiro, Knobel, Lankshear & 
Leu, 2008; Kellner, 2000; Knobel & Lankshear, 2007; Lankshear & Knobel, 2008; 
Leu, Kinzer, Coiro & Cammack, 2004), or literacies made possible by digital 
technologies (Buckingham, 1993). As a pervasive new media form in contemporary 
culture the digital worlds of computer and video games are featured and discussed in 
theories of new literacies and participatory culture (Sotamaa, 2003; Squire, 2008; 
Squire & Jenkins, 2011). 
These participatory approaches emphasise the potential of interactive digital 
worlds for meaning making and the production of meaning as potentially 
empowering. However, as the current research shows, theories of new literacies and 
participatory culture tend to focus on the affordances of the designed artefact and 
expertise (Squire, 2008) in its use. This focus on use actively brackets design and de-
materialises the digital artefact as a material outcome of design in favour of a focus 
on what can be done with the software. Indeed, Squire (2008) advises against any 
focus on the production side of digital artefacts. Macnamara (2010b, p. 337) sums up 
this emphasis when he announces: “Computers are becoming invisible. We spin 
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folklore about them and weave myths like previous generations did about ships and 
trains, but they are simply devices for getting to places.” 
Macnamara’s aphoristic claim is telling; it heralds the problem that the current 
research calls ‘literacies of use’, the effective disappearance of the artefact and the 
bracketing of design itself as a service that creates opportunity for activity and 
meaning-making. For those who are members of the culture that produces the 
artefact, the question of ‘how it works’ is part of their overall cultural experience; 
part of their pre-figured world and their ‘literacy environment’ (Lankshear & 
Knobel, 2006, 2008). However, as the current thesis argues, when the artefact in 
question is transplanted into another culture, the entangled cultural stories that allow 
it to ‘work’ are profoundly problematic and overlooking the materially designed 
nature of software does much to perpetuate inequality and silence those whose 
stories do not fit within its cultural parameters. How a car, or digital technology, 
actually ‘works’ in this sense is more than functionality of the machine; it is the 
manner in which a cultural artefact embodies cultural systems and values. In post-
colonial and indigenous contexts, this silencing can be understood as a continuation 
of the legacies of colonialism and the story-ing effects of colonial cultural systems. 
The manner in which designing and its design artefacts contribute their own 
stories to the mimetic process is also silenced and made invisible. A consequence is 
that we do not see the way that design actively creates the world; instead the focus is 
on activity (re-presentation of landscapes and simulated worlds for example) enabled 
by the designed artefact. In sum, ‘how design works’ is conflated with the functional 
descriptions of design as a problem solving process that produces ‘artefactual’ 
outcomes. Tonkinwise (2004) muses on the phenomenon of use and de-
materialisation in terms of wider cultural ramifications and cites Arendt’s (1958) 
commentary on homo faber (the concept of man the maker), pointing out that if we 
make ourselves human by making things, then there is potential tragedy in finding 
satisfaction in terms of activity using things. We are already caught up in these 
stories and the disappeared voices of design and designing.  
What this disappearance means in post-colonial and indigenous contexts, or 
those that reference them, is that any opportunity to intervene or transform is 
misunderstood, and any critical activity focuses on opportunities of use. This 
emphasis leads to situations such as those described by Warschauer (2004) where 
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designed artefacts are parachuted into non western non post-industrial contexts 
because their use is seen as being advantageous. 
There is a dreadful tension embedded in this assumption. As African gamer 
(Turner, 2015, Chapter 6, this volume) points out, the dilemma with these views is 
that they position indigenous cultures and post-colonial groups on the outside. 
Technologies are seen as enhancing their opportunities to become ‘equals’ or, 
alternatively, as destructive of their ‘precious’ ‘other’ cultural knowledge. They are 
positioned as users of artefacts, not makers and designers themselves. In addition, 
any inclusion within the design process frequently re-enacts what Dourish (2015) has 
called ‘the cultural narrative’ of design practice; a disappearance of design as a story-
ing activity. In a materialised version of Ricœur’s (1984) mimetic cycle, they have 
become story receivers, perhaps interpreters, and not story tellers and the cycle is 
broken. As Márquez (1982) puts it, their reality is interpreted through alien schemas, 
not of their own making. 
1.2.3 Rematerialisation for transformation 
Freire’s (1972) critical pedagogy demands that assumptions in knowledge are 
unveiled and examined. An important feature of Freire’s critical pedagogy is that 
people bring their own knowledge and experience into the process in order to unveil 
hidden assumptions and reveal the way that these assumptions work to frame reality. 
For Freire, this is particularly necessary in situations where conditions exhibit 
inequality and so should be acted upon and transformed. Freire’s critical pedagogy 
focuses on the dynamic story-ing activity between Ricœur’s pre-figured world and 
the configuring and meaning making of individuals and communities.  
Freire’s project thus seeks opportunity for praxis (action and realisation) in 
conversation and communication. His critical awareness seeks to address and unveil 
the ways that knowledge about and knowledge in the world works. Freire is also very 
clear on where in the process of meaning making this active engagement should 
happen. He insists that critical awareness is realised through reflection and action, 
not through reflection post-action. Freire insists that the inclusion of “the subjects of 
transformation” after reflection will continue to frame them as “ambiguous beings” 
(1972, p. 98) who are participants within the structure allowed, rather than 
empowered as active aware agents of transformation. Freire adds: “It is my 
contention that they will merely imagine they have reached power.” 
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As actively storied objects, material artefacts become part of Ricœur’s (1984) 
on-going dynamic mimetic process, affirming their designed purpose and the values 
and philosophies that underpin it. This is no less the case when the artefact is a 
digital artefact, or when the artefact is an apparently immaterial artefact such as the 
software that is so important in meaning making in the theories of participatory 
culture and new literacy. Fuller (2003, p. 19) puts this succinctly when he observes 
that: “Each piece of software constructs ways of seeing, knowing, and doing in the 
world that at once contain a model of that part of the world it ostensibly pertains to 
and that shape it every time it is used.” Conceptualisations about using the 
affordances of the software (whether the ‘easily accessible’ Little grey cat engine or 
a high-end game engine as in the case of the Digital Songlines Environment) 
effectively echo and reiterate Macnamara’s (2010b) metaphor of the car, a designed 
artefact that is conceived in terms of what it can enable in a society or culture; the 
vehicle is no more than a means of transport – or an enabler of literacy practice and 
meaning-making. The focus on the ‘vehicle’, the outcomes of design, makes 
invisible the fact these artefacts are designed, made, delivered and consumed prior to 
any action. 
This artefactual fact allows us to rephrase some of Freire’s condemnation of 
pseudo-action in a somewhat disturbing way. Where Freire (1972) proposes that 
‘knowledge’ should not be delivered and consumed but engaged with actively, what 
can we say of the designed material artefact that is delivered and consumed? Freire’s 
active engagement connects knowledge to action; it claims that those who are 
critically aware of their situation are able to work towards changing it, to become as 
he says, ‘beings for themselves’. However, if the ‘knowledge’ is delivered in the 
form of Flusser’s (1983) black box, already implemented in material form, then 
surely this is an opportunity post-action? The artefact can thus be understood as 
‘allowing’ participation though use rather than any participation in its design and 
making. Here Freire’s contention, albeit arising in a different context, that 
participants will “merely imagine that they have reached power” (1972, p. 97) 
resonates uncomfortably. 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE: STORY-ING STORIED SPACE 
The contribution of the research is three-fold: In the first instance it shows how 
an understanding – or lack of understanding – of the digital artefact as a material, 
storied object has ramifications when the object is used as a vehicle for digital story 
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telling, particularly in non western, non post-colonial cultural contexts, where stories 
might represent knowledge and meaning making that is vulnerable to being 
overwhelmed by the ‘louder’ voice of the artefact itself. Secondly, the research looks 
at the ways in which contemporary understandings of the artefact de-materialise or 
‘disappear’ its materiality and so further problematises potential use for non western 
cultural groups. However, any research that claims Paulo Freire’s (1972) critical 
pedagogy as its framework cannot be called complete without at least sketching 
some opportunity for action. Nor would it be comfortable to engage in critical 
theorising without some potential for affirmation and the hope-full when the specific 
critical approach is influenced by Ricœur. So, finally, having disentangled some of 
the stories that we tell ourselves about digital artefacts, the study explores potential 
opportunity for critical practice and design and, in so doing, reveals some profound 
implications for criticality in design methodologies. 
The research program thus contributes to current theories of design and 
participation with digital technologies by broadening the bailiwick of Ricœur’s 
(1984) mimetic process to include digital technologies as material, storied 
contributors to the story-ing of the world that are then open to critical analysis. By 
interrogating the storied artefactual nature of digital games through the lens of 
critical pedagogy, the research demonstrates the importance of this material – storied 
– perspective in projects that seek to include diversity, particularly in post-colonial 
and indigenous contexts. The critical insights into the disappearance of the digital 
artefact offer insights for any practice that intends to include diversity or foster 
meaning making opportunity. The reframing of critical pedagogy approaches as a 
means of unpacking and revealing the ‘designerly’ intent and assumptions of a 
digital game offers future directions for practitioners. 
1.3.1 Defining terms: Design and participation 
The research problematises the terms ‘design’ and ‘participation’ in the light of 
projects that use digital games and digital game making software as sites for meaning 
making. Where a ‘game’, at the most nominative descriptive level, is something that 
is ‘played’ (Huizinga, 1949; Suits, 1967), a digital game is a game whose material 
existence and process depends in some shape or form on digital technology. Digital 
games are essentially software artefacts that depend on a physical technological 
artefact to function, and are subsequently a part of the wider artefactual reality of 
physical technological artefacts. 
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These software artefacts are designed. They are constructed using designed 
development kits or SDKs, they ‘exist’ in designed technological artefacts. Various 
nominal definitions of ‘design’ describe it as the creation of plans or drawings that 
show the look or function of an artefact before it is constructed. According to the 
Design Institute of Australia, a designer is a professional who serves industry by 
developing solutions to commercial needs. This view of design is essentially 
pragmatic (Coyne, 1995) in that it evaluates its process and products in terms of the 
success of practical outcomes. In the specific design field of digital games where the 
artefact is software that depends on hardware to function, this pragmatic 
understanding emphasises the design of input/output devices and platforms at one 
level, for example, the goal of high fidelity photo-realistic representation in digital 
games. In terms of the actual software, game design in the pragmatic view is 
concerned with attributes of gameplay: core mechanics, aesthetic qualities, and 
systems that support and engage player activity. Outcomes are measured in terms of 
user (player) satisfaction and engagement. This understanding of design as service is 
pernicious, but encapsulates an overt goal of commercial software design expressed 
in Norman’s (1988) dictum that the software should be invisible and not distract (the 
user) from successful completion of the task. This view frames prospective 
consumers as users, people who will take the software artefact once completed and 
published and who will then be able to make their own use of it. In this traditional 
view of design, users are typically included in the design process at a stage of its 
development when it is sufficiently conceptualised to be tested. It also positions the 
designers as implementers of (artefactual) solutions to ‘problems’, e.g. how to make 
efficient word processing software, how to make a ‘better’, more enjoyable, 
commercially successful game, which leaves questions about any cultural 
assumptions in the framing of the process un-asked.  
This lack of criticality in the framing of the design process and its cultural 
assumptions is the focus of design practices such as ‘critical design’ (Dunne, 1999; 
Dunne & Raby, 2001; Dunne & Raby, 2013), which use speculative design concepts 
and artefacts to challenge pre-figured stories about designed artefacts and their roles 
in everyday life. However, critical design is aimed at using design practice to make 
consumers more critical of their lives surrounded by objects (Bardzell & Bardzell, 
2013); it is evocative rather than practical, and it addresses an audience that must 
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already be integrated into the pre-figured story of the design culture in order to take 
away intended meaning. 
The practice of critical design and similar design approaches heralds a concern 
with ‘what design actually does’. Increasingly, the fields of IXD and HCI are 
intersecting with the critical literacy concerns of understanding the socially 
constructed concepts within their artefacts. There is a well-established movement 
towards repositioning IXD and HCI as ‘anthropologically’ informed disciplines, that 
is to say, disciplines that understand designers work with – and for – a range of 
people and cultures (Erickson, 1995). However, when this anthropological 
methodology is undertaken in non post-industrial contexts, it is often in the hope of 
new markets or well-intentioned problem solving (Donaldson, 2008). Here, design as 
a problem solving service is reframed as ‘design for development’ (IXD4D), but it is 
not infrequently founded on the same design processes that have become established 
in the western post-industrial context. Donaldson is, as she says, ‘wary’ because the 
idea of design ‘for development’ announces an advantage in becoming developed 
and in so doing patronises cultures as ‘under developed’. Donaldson (2008) argues 
that much IXD4D design work, however well intentioned, tends to be short term, 
dependent on time frames outside the design situation (designer’s time and financial 
schedules). Further, these design efforts ‘from afar’ are often remote (a situation 
where the designers are given the design problem and work on it from their home 
country), or ‘parachute design’ (design from afar with occasional visits). Warschauer 
(2004) observes further issues, not the least being the way that life opportunity is 
equated with technological access. The notion that technologies will improve 
asymmetrical life opportunities and that western post-industrial design can 
ameliorate complex issues in post-colonial contexts does much to further frame the 
recipients of this ‘bounty’ as not capable in their own ways; it creates a homogenous 
single story of the recipient culture and it fails to acknowledge the tools, skills and 
resources that people already possess (Warschauer, 2004). More importantly, the 
technology as curative position fails to recognise technology design is more than a 
problem solving ‘service’, but that it also embeds culturally constructed ‘pre-figured’ 
narratives, ideals, values and assumptions along with that same problem solving 
process. 
While the cultural assumptions of the design process itself are not typically 
critiqued (Jahnke, 2012), contemporary design practice does recognise that it needs 
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to become more culturally expansive. The awareness that design is culturally situated 
(Suchman, 2002, 2011) results in approaches that endeavour to engage participants 
as stakeholders in the design from the early stages of conception. These design 
approaches are grouped under the term ‘participatory design’ (PD) (Simonsen & 
Robertson, 2012). The emphasis is on opportunity for potential users to have voice in 
the design process rather than positioning them as end-users and asking for feedback 
once the process is nearly complete. Participatory design approaches focus on the 
process of designing and giving participants a role in this process. The approach 
evolved in ‘highly politicised’, ‘homogenous’ (Merritt & Stolterman, 2012) 
Scandinavian counties in the 1970s and, as a result of this, has tended to emphasise 
ideological issues, rather than cultural. As Simonsen and Robertson (2012, p. 2) say, 
a core feature of PD should be “an unshakable commitment to ensuring that those 
who will use information technologies play a critical role in their design”. 
Participatory design is well intentioned and extremely powerful in post-industrial 
contexts, where it deals with participants who are members of the design culture 
themselves. 
Where participatory design is an approach that endeavours inclusion of 
stakeholders within the formal design process, conceptualisations of ‘participatory 
culture’ are more typically concerned with post-production uses of designed 
software. The central premise is that a participatory culture has what Jenkins, 
Purushtma, Weigel, Clinton and Robison (2009) call ‘low barriers’ to civic 
engagement and artistic expression. Participatory culture is enabled by social 
connectivity, epitomised by network connectivity, and communities of practice who 
share and support between themselves. New technologies and new software tools 
allow users to manipulate and transform media, remixing aspects to suit, sharing and 
collaborating via online forums of various descriptions. There is a sense that 
participatory culture ‘matters’ (Jenkins, 2006). The affordances of network 
connectivity and the growth of support portals means that communities such as game 
modders (people who use existing digital games and refashion or alter them) have a 
potential voice that reverberates back into more formal design practice. That is, as 
Ehn (2008) suggests, such participatory practices result in a designing for (design) 
use after design. 
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1.3.2 The seduction of simulated worlds 
The complex entangled stories of design and materials and their invisibility in 
theories of participatory cultures and literacies are becoming increasingly important 
to disentangle. The designed artefact – the software, used as a focus for the current 
research – is increasingly being explored for potential use beyond entertainment. 
Digital games are seen as an increasingly important new media form. Flew (2005, p. 
101) argues, “The global interactive games industry is large and growing, and is at 
the forefront of many of the most significant innovations in new media.” This idea of 
digital games as the contemporary digital media form means that they are 
increasingly viewed as important aspects of an overall technological environment. 
For example, in highly technologised countries such as South Korea and Singapore, 
the gaming industry is actively supported and encouraged by government policy 
(Peichi, 2008) as an important aspect of an overall economic agenda that prioritises 
globalisation opportunities afforded by networked technologies. In an effort to gain 
government support, Lemos and Martini’s report (2010) on Brazilian LAN houses 
(Local Area Networks typically set up to allow the playing of multi-player games) 
also argues that while access to technology and networks is purposed towards 
playing of games, the opportunity has wider implications for the nation’s global 
profile. The game making industry is thus implicated in wider discussions about 
technological progress (see Turner, 2015, Chapter 6, this volume) and has 
ramifications in the area of post-colonial theory. This is of particular importance in 
those design practices that are situated in non western non post-industrial contexts 
and which endeavour to include their participants in the designing of digital artefacts. 
In these contexts, the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire has an important role and 
potential contribution to ensure that underlying assumptions are unveiled and 
critiqued in order to make meaning in context as critically aware participants.  
As a pervasive new media form, the digital worlds of games are increasingly 
featured and discussed in theories of participatory culture (Jenkins, 2006; Sotamaa, 
2003) and new literacies (Coiro et al., 2008; Knobel & Lankshear, 2007; Squire, 
2008). In post-industrial contexts, such explorations have proven to be powerful and 
we see new literacy framed by the phenomenon of use as participatory culture 
(Jenkins, 2006) or a literacy of expertise and performance (Squire, 2008). Such 
approaches emphasise the potential of interactive digital worlds for meaning making 
and the production of meaning. New literacy research (Squire, 2008; Squire & 
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Jenkins, 2003; Squire & Jenkins, 2011) positions the digital game as an object that 
‘belongs’ to a particular generation and so emphasises how engaging its use can be in 
the educational situation. Gee (2003) makes a substantive correlation between the 
design of games and the engaged approaches to learning. Advances in the 
development of game making software and the relatively easy availability of it also 
tends to announce an appropriate expressive form for a particular generation and an 
opportunity for ‘voice’ and meaning making (Anthropy, 2012) in the manner of 
digital story telling (Lambert, 2012). There is also a move to use games as an 
expressive form, beyond their appeal in the IT and programming classes, and we see 
educators exploring the making of games as creative activity in composition and art 
classes (Divéky & Bieliková, 2009) and for critical thinking and problem solving 
activities (Kirriemuir & McFarlane, 2003). 
In the area of culture and virtual heritage, digital game making software is 
appropriated as an interactional environment, applauded for its simulation and 
representational qualities (Aarseth, 2005). For example, Eric Champion’s (2005) 
work in virtual heritage uses 3D simulations of archaeological environments in order 
to engage tertiary students with history. These representational qualities are also the 
subject of participatory game making projects that foster the making of culturally 
specific games featuring stories, characters and environments that belong to that 
culture, for example, Otsì:!! Rise of the Kanien’kehá:ka Legends (Kahnawake 
Survival School, 2008-2009). This game tells the story of an Iroquois hunter on a 
mission to stop a monster from destroying his village. The game is made by 
Kahnawake students taking part in a series of workshops as part of a program 
initiative by the Montreal-based Aboriginal Territories in Cyberspace (Lameman, 
Lewis & Fragnito, 2010). The aforementioned Digital Songlines Environment 
(section 1.2) is a further example of this idea that culture can be re-presented through 
simulation. 
A further example is Upper One Games’ (2014) Kisima Inŋitchuŋa (Iñupiaq for 
Never Alone) that tells the story of Nuna, a member of the Iñupiaq of Alaska and her 
arctic fox. The story is taken from a tribal folk tale and the game is narrated in 
Iñupiaq with English subtitles. The game itself was made by Upper One Games in 
conjunction with the Cook Inlet Tribal Council (CITC). It was instigated by CITC 
CEO Gloria O’Neill’s vision of dismantling stereotypical media portrayals of 
indigenous peoples and the enthusiasm of professional game designers. As a project, 
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Kisima Inŋitchuŋa is beautifully seductive: the story is poignant and evocative, the 
voice-over is heartfelt, and the imagery is beautiful. However, the use of digital game 
making software in Digital Songlines Environment, Kisima Inŋitchuŋa and Otsì:!! 
raises questions about the hidden ‘assumptions’ embedded in the software itself.  
In post-colonial contexts where situated knowledge is re-framed by 
colonialism, a critique of this story-ing is vital. Thiong’o (1986) attests to this in his 
indictment of a mind-set that has already internalised the language and values of the 
colonising nation and so adopted both the language and the underlying values of its 
onto-epistemic practices. An emphasis on use of and participation with digital 
technologies does not unveil the depth of meanings and values embedded in digital 
artefacts. Contemporary literacy practice reframed to include new media and 
discussed as new literacy practice is in danger of actively continuing and supporting 
the abstracted approach to knowledge that Haraway (1991) calls the ‘view from 
nowhere’ with all the dangers to cultural value that Thiong’o (1993) describes with 
his notion of ‘the view from the centre’. 
Such exportation of practice can, Luke (2004) observes, have material 
consequences. As Mayo (1995) notes, colonialism is not just the imposing of one 
nation’s rules and order upon another nation, it is also ‘cultural invasion’; cultural 
invasion that can change Ricœur’s pre-figured world and the literacy environment 
asymmetrically. In post-colonial and indigenous contexts, the right to make meaning 
and to tell one’s own story is problematised (Adichie, 2009; Bhabha, 1994; Said, 
1978); it is further problematised by the introduction of technologies that purport to 
allow meaning making and the contemporary emphasis on new literacies as literacies 
of use. 
In critical literacy practice in sites that involve digital artefacts, whether in new 
media or not particularly new media, it is important to recognise participatory culture 
and its meaning making as a culturally situated practice that includes its material 
artefacts and the design culture that produces them. To bracket the process of 
designing digital artefacts as a practice distinct from social usage and cultural context 
is an act of disappearance that becomes problematic when the designed artefact is 
transported into another cultural context, particularly a context such as the Australian 
Indigenous cultures that are the participants in the Digital Songlines Environment 
project (ACID, 2006) described in the introduction to the current chapter (section 
1.2) or the Namibian Ju/’hoansi described in the African gamer publication (Turner, 
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2015, Chapter 6, this volume). In such contexts, design and the values and 
philosophies of design as they are implemented in designed artefacts matter. In these 
contexts, literacy practices that announce use of digital technologies are failing the 
critical literacy goals of unveiling meaning. 
1.4 TOWARDS RE-MATERIALISING DIGITAL ARTEFACTS AND 
DESIGN 
Artefacts are made and so become active in the cultural process (Tilley et al., 
2006). For some commentators, such as Arendt (1958), the using of objects and 
making of artefacts define us. Objects and designed, created artefacts are deeply 
entangled in our daily existence, from the basics of shelter and growing, making, 
finding or preparing food, to the more culturally complex objects and artefacts used 
for ritual and play. Woodward (2007, p. 4) claims that culture itself should be 
understood as being “something created and lived through objects” and that studying 
culture as being created and lived through objects (and artefacts) scaffolds 
understanding of social structures, systems and meaning. He adds that objects can be 
seen as “a crucial link between the social and economic structure, and the individual 
actor”. Cultural objects and created artefacts not only offer biographies and ‘tell stories’ 
about the culture that produces them (Kopytoff, 1986; Prown, 1982), but they are 
entangled in the story telling process. Material objects are more than receptacles of 
cultural concepts, values and meaning making, they are part of the cultural conversation 
and co-creator in its dynamic. As Tilley et al. (2006) observe, cultural values, ideas and 
meaning making are represented, reproduced and legitimised actively through the 
medium of cultural objects. Material artefacts are dynamic in cultures, through making, 
interacting, consuming and living with things; people also make themselves and their 
cultural realities. Hodder (2012) argues that material artefacts – things – are more than 
merely entangled; they are so deeply entangled that any attempt at disentanglement can 
only ever result in a partial trail. Ingold (2007) makes a resonant observation with his 
term ‘meshwork’, which denotes a knotted, tangled and almost impervious mess that 
defies organisation into neat categories. Taking heed of such observations, the current 
research seeks only to offer ‘a partial trail’ and an endeavour ‘towards’ potential action 
in the Freirean (1972) sense of emancipation and empowerment. 
To reiterate the above, the aim of this research endeavour is an interrogation of 
a prevalent attitude to our technological artefacts in order to expose and critique the 
pre-figured story-ing that is inviting Arendt’s potential tragedy of use (see section 
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1.2.2). The purpose of this critique is to reveal the hidden assumptions, values and 
ideas in digital games and move ‘towards’ rematerialising the digital game as a 
storied artefact. The idea of the critique is not the problem solving of Horkheimer 
(1982) and Habermas (1971) but the problem posing of Freire (1972). The research 
goal is also inspired by Freire’s hopeful project, looking ‘beyond game worlds’ in 
order to unveil the storied artefact and its designing in order to enable its re-story-ing 
from a position of critical awareness. 
To paraphrase Adichie’s (2009) statement that is used as a banner for this 
introductory chapter, if stories are told by others about another person, how they are 
told, who tells them, where they are represented, and in what form is ultimately about 
power. Understanding the different stories within a digital object – in this thesis – the 
digital game – is about unpacking these layers of stories so that we can perhaps see 
Adichie’s other statement enacted (2009, [17:40]):  
Stories have been used to dispossess and to malign, but stories can also be 
used to empower and to humanise. Stories can break the dignity of a people, 
but stories can also repair that broken dignity. 
This research is not about using software; it is about the ‘power of design’ itself, the 
phenomenon of disappearance and the de-materialising of design (and its outcomes) 
as a deeply entangled weave of stories. The goal of this untangling of stories is to 
find potential ways and means to ‘hand over the power of design’ (Bidwell, Radoll & 
Turner, 2007, Appendix A this volume).  
As a thesis by publication, undertaken over a long period which includes 
salutary moments of critical insight and subsequent re-framing of the thesis problem 
(from critical analysis of software to theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of 
disappearance to the critique of criticality in design), the research weaves a narrative 
around four chapters of publications: 
- Critique of the digital game as designed artefact (the Digital Songlines 
Environment publications). These two publications are included as 
examples of what could be called ‘software critique’. They expose the 
importance of understanding the way that design acts to story the 
designed artefact and subsequently, expectations about its affordances. 
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- Practice-based approaches (the Little grey cat engine). A pair of 
publications that act as material for the reflections on the dilemmas of 
literacies of use and participation within design. 
- Material analysis in a particular case that demonstrates the deeply 
entangled nature of the stories and which problematises the concept of 
‘use’ in post-colonial contexts (African gamer). 
- Discussion of a project that took place in a design education context 
(the Performing design publication), which invites reflection on the 
abduction of criticality in the service of design. 
These six publications provide the material for the theoretical chapters: a formal 
review of the literature (Chapter 2) on post-colonial stories and story-ing framed by 
Ricœur’s concept of the mimetic process and the storied nature of software itself 
framed by Manovich’s (2001) work on the forms and characteristics of new media; a 
methodologies chapter (Chapter 3), which discusses the critical hermeneutic 
approach taken; and a final discussion (Chapter 8) of the implications for critical 
literacy practice and participatory practices as well as understandings of criticality in 
design methodologies. 
In this way, the research addresses what the thesis refers to as ‘the 
disappearance’ of the designer and the designed artefact in theories that argue for 
digital games as potential ‘new literacy’ environments (Coiro et al., 2008; Gee, 2003; 
Knobel & Lankshear, 2007; Squire & Jenkins, 2003; Squire, 2008) and participatory 
design approaches that pose criticality but which tend to abduct the idea of criticality 
and put it to work as an aspect of service to design. The research advises that, while 
such theories and resultant participatory practices have proven to be powerful in 
post-industrial contexts, they are profoundly problematic in non western non post-
industrial contexts because of the way that digital artefacts embody meaning 
invisibly. Digital artefacts also serve to structure reality. The digital artefact, the 
outcomes of design, proves to be an apt candidate for a critical hermeneutic research 
study.  
Once the manner in which the artefact becomes a storied object is understood, 
the opportunity for meaning-making or re-story-ing – even de-story-ing – the artefact 
from a plurality of perspectives becomes possible. In keeping with both Freire’s 
critical philosophy and Ricœur’s (1970) recommendation to balance a critical 
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analysis with hopeful imagination, the thesis finally turns (or returns) to design as a 
potential site for Freire’s (1972) problem posing.  
In this way the research, while theoretical in itself, provides opportunities for 
transformative practice (Mertens, 2004) and some measure of an interpretation of 
affirmation as Ricœur might advise; or to return to Freire (1972), a means of 
transforming the structure and facilitating action. As the central protagonist in 
African Gamer (Turner, 2015, p. 60), Cwi Nqane, says, “Everybody should have a 
chance to play.” This thesis adds to Cwi Nqane’s hope-full statement and 
recommends that everyone should have an understanding of the designed artefact and 
design so that they can make their own playful meanings and design their own 
artefacts for that play.  
1.4.1 Research perspectives 
The thesis presents an interdisciplinary, critical and a ‘toward’ transformative 
(Mertens, 2004) research work. A transformative research endeavour takes the 
traditional critical research project’s challenges and applies them rather more broadly 
than their roots in Marxist critique allow (Cannella & Lincoln, 2009). So where 
critical research aims at revealing mechanisms of oppression in order to contribute 
directly to liberation, transformative research applies the same questions to multiple 
realities and inclusion of those for whom the realities exist. Mertens (2003) includes 
a diversity of theories under the umbrella of transformative research, for example, 
gender theory, race theory, and feminist perspectives. The distinction between the 
two forms is the distinction between research design and participatory research 
design. Mertens (2004) argues for more stakeholder input and a more subtle 
understanding of diversity, for example, that not all women in a particular 
community are the same. This appears a simple enough assertion on the face of it, 
but of vital importance when, for example, assuming gender issues might be 
equivalent between different cultures (Moreton-Robinson, 2000). While the current 
study is not in itself a participatory research study, the overall objective is to re-
materialise design and its digital artefact in order to enable such studies. In order to 
achieve its goals, the research uses the critical hermeneutic methodology of Paul 
Ricœur (see Chapter 3, section 3.2) and builds on a theoretical framework of Paulo 
Freire’s critical pedagogy. 
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1.4.2 Theoretical framework 
Ricœur (1970) stipulates that critical inquiry and analytical interpretation 
without subjectivity is missing, or perhaps disappearing, opportunity for reflection 
and therefore action. As I have already stated in the introduction to the current 
chapter (section 1.2), as a designer and educator with a background in critical 
literacy, I believe my core responsibility is to enable my students and project 
participants to make their own meaning as critically aware individuals. This 
subjective personal starting point is influenced by Paulo Freire’s (1972) critical 
pedagogy and the central tenet that we are first and foremost human beings with the 
world and that the task of the ‘educator’ is to engage with the experiences of all 
parties in the dialogue in order to foster creativity and subjective meaning making.  
Freire’s educational philosophy is founded in his experience and practice in 
informal literacy education in his homeland, Brazil. He was inspired by Fanon’s 
(1963) call to establish education in previously colonised nations that was 
simultaneously new and contemporary, but was also ‘anti-colonial’ in the sense of 
being more than an extension of the culture of the coloniser, and arising out of the 
post-colonial nation. Freire’s project is essentially liberatory. He argues that the goals 
of education should be a creative and hopeful project where knowledge and meaning 
emerge through participative inquiry in the world as experienced. For this to happen, 
Freire advocates breaking what he calls ‘the culture of silence’ or acceptance of 
assumed realities as given. For Freire, the concept of breaking is inclusive of all 
stakeholders, be it in educational contexts or political. He warns against false 
participation, or the illusion of being engaged. He says (1972, p. 44): 
Teachers and students (leadership and people), co-intent on reality, are both 
subjects, not only in the task of unveiling that reality, and thereby coming to 
know it critically, but in the task of re-creating that knowledge. As they 
attain this knowledge or reality through common reflection and action, they 
discover themselves as its permanent re-creators. In this way, the presence of 
the oppressed in the struggle for their liberation will be what it should be: 
not pseudo-participation, but committed involvement. 
Freire’s work is influential, and while his own practice took place in adult literacy 
education projects in Brazil in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the concept of looking 
‘beyond’ the surface into meaning has been taken up in diverse fields but particularly 
in contexts where there are perceived inequalities and asymmetrical opportunity, 
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such as the post-colonial and indigenous contexts that are foregrounded in the current 
work. As Freire (Shor & Freire, 1987) argues, the idea of critical pedagogy is a 
means to challenge assumptions and power relations, a dream of social 
transformation and equal access to voice in the world. It is essentially political and 
liberatory in its intent.  
A central tenet for Freire is that critical awareness is attained through action on 
the part of the participants, who must be active agents of transformation rather than 
‘permitted’ or ‘allowed’ to engage with the transformational act. This central tenet is 
problematised when the designed material artefact is included as a critical literacy 
object. It is dismembered in part by the form of the story telling or story creating and 
the ways in which the artefact used for story telling is already ‘storied’ and what 
Willis (2006) has called the designing of design. Questions about ramification of 
form arise quite visibly when, for example, oral stories are transferred into another 
medium (Bidwell, Reitmaier, Marsden & Hansen, 2010). When the histories, 
language traditions, oral traditions, philosophies and knowledges of indigenous and 
post-colonial peoples are transferred into a simulated representation of their own 
worlds, however, the translation is less visible. As the example of the two images of 
space and place (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2) show, it requires critical analysis and reflection to 
see ‘beyond the surface’ of the supposed authenticity presented by the game world. 
As a theoretical framework, Freire’s endeavour is echoed in the concerns of 
those design approaches that announce a ‘post-colonial’ sensibility and a recognition 
that design merely parachuted into non western contexts is also a transposition of 
ways of being and meaning making. Post-colonial design approaches are 
distinguished by recognition that the designed artefact is both storied in terms of its 
cultural values and, as consequence, that artefacts have ‘story-ing’ capacity. Post-
colonial design approaches represent an ‘alternative sensibility’ (Dourish & 
Mainwaring, 2012; Irani & Dourish, 2009; Irani et al., 2010) that has its roots in 
critical analysis of the ways that colonial enterprise and its encounters are more than 
imposition of hegemony but embed the rationale of colonial stewardship replete with 
western values. 
As a designer, I believe Freire’s work also has value and importance in the 
practice of design and designing, although it needs to be re-envisioned to include 
artefacts; it needs to be re-materialised. In order to achieve this, the study turns to the 
work of Augosto Boal, a friend and colleague of Freire’s in Brazil. Boal’s work, like 
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Freire’s, is a critical awareness project. However, where Freire (1972) takes ‘the 
word’ as his toolset, Boal (1995, 1998, 2000) uses the tools of performance and 
drama. In his Theatre of the oppressed workshops, Boal insists that the ‘fourth wall’ 
of the stage should be torn down and that the spectators should become what he calls 
‘spect-actors’, entering the stage and exploring the structure of the work in order to 
make their own meaning. The Performing design publication (Turner & Moyes, 
2012, see Chapter 7, this volume) explores the possibility of applying Boal’s 
techniques to the designed artefact. 
This theoretical framework and its liberatory intent underlies the research 
methodology and the thesis’ exploration of stories and artefacts, and the dilemmas 
and issues exposed when a storied artefact is re-storied without regard to its already-
storied nature. It also demands final reflection on the nature of criticality in design. 
1.4.3 Methodologies for the hope-full endeavour 
The dilemma of a critical research endeavour, and particularly one that is 
situated in ‘post-colonial’ contexts, is that the ‘critique’ as typified by the theories of 
Habermas (1971) and others with roots in the ‘Frankfurt School’ of critical theory, 
can become ‘mired’ as Philip, Irani and Dourish (2012) say, having “nowhere to go” 
(Ingold, 2014, p. 383). The problems posed by projects such as the Digital Songlines 
Environment described earlier (see section 1.2) demand a more hopeful – or hope-
full – methodology and opportunity for transformation and action. Like critical 
research, transformative research is based on two foundational questions. It seeks to 
understand who is privileged or legitimised; and as a corollary, to understand who is 
opposed, silenced or disenfranchised (Cannella & Lincoln, 2009). Critical research 
also searches for the historical origins of asymmetries and how they become 
accepted norms. Cannella and Lincoln announce four key aspects of critical and 
transformative research. The first aspect is the goal of exposure of the invisible 
structures that add to and support asymmetrical power relationships or to “illuminate 
the hidden structures of power deployed in the construction of its own power, and the 
disempowerment of others” (Cannella & Lincoln, 2009, p. 55). Secondly, critical 
perspectives inquire ‘deeply’ into forms that shape social life and individual decision 
making. For Cannella and Lincoln, and somewhat tellingly for the current research, 
these forms are primarily understood as present in language. Thirdly, critical research 
engages with issues of gender, race and poverty as social constructs produced by 
asymmetrical systems of access and power. Fourthly, critical perspectives seek to 
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interrogate “relations shaped by conquest” (2009, p. 56), the lasting effects of 
colonialism on the cultural experiences of the colonised (Bhabha, 1994; Fanon, 1963; 
Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988, Thiong’o, 1993). Critical research then, is research that 
has the aim of understanding, uncovering, illuminating a situated problem, in order to 
enable transformation. In the current study, the aim is to critically examine not the 
surface language that Cannella and Lincoln advocate, but the structures of the digital 
artefact; its design and designing, and its material nature that contribute to it as a 
form. The current work posits that this emphasis is equally important. As Tilley et al. 
(2006, p. 3) insist, the study of “the material dimension is as fundamental to 
understanding culture as is a focus on language”. 
In the case of the software artefact and its designing that is the focus of the 
current research, the goal is essentially hermeneutic: the examination of a material 
artefact in order to understand beliefs, attitudes, ideas, assumptions and values. In 
view of this focus on material culture with the aim of uncovering its designed nature, 
with the announced intent of enabling transformative opportunity, the 
methodological approach taken is Ricœur’s (2008) critical hermeneutic approach to 
finding both explanation and understanding (Roberge, 2011) in order to enable the 
hopeful, or, as the current work has opted for in order to emphasise its importance 
and validity: the hope-full. As Ricœur writes (2008, p. 18):  
The task of hermeneutics … is twofold: to reconstruct the internal dynamic 
of the text, and to restore to the work its ability to project itself outside itself 
in the representation of a world that I could inhabit. 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE  
Beyond game worlds is a thesis ‘by publication’, undertaken part-time over a 
period of several years. As the introduction to the current chapter (section 1.2) 
clarifies, the study has undergone a change in direction from an analysis of the 
culture of design with a view to designing software, to a theoretical work that 
interrogates disappearance as a phenomenon, and a search for ways out of the 
tangled stories that design (and its disappearance) engenders. This research narrative 
is presented in its entirety in the current thesis. The research endeavour of unveiling 
the storied nature of the artefact; the goal of finding ways “to hand over the power of 
design” (Bidwell, Radoll & Turner, 2007, p. 13), in non western non post-
industrialised contexts frame the scope of the research. It also frames and demands 
the final critical hermeneutic approach taken. 
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1.5.1 Publications 
The research program, instigated by a perceived ‘design problem’, commenced 
with an initial project that proposed the design and exploration of software that 
enabled participation more ‘easily’ and that offered the potential of a navigable game 
world type space but did not demand the software skills of the professional game 
engine and 3D modelling software. The early publications written during 
candidature, two of which are included in the thesis as chapter four, (Turner, 2006a; 
Turner & Bidwell, 2007b), focused on critical interrogation of digital games as 
designed storied spaces with the intention of using the analysis in order to inform 
design. An outcome of this design project is the subject of two6 publications that are 
also included in the current thesis (Turner, 2008; Turner & Browning, 2009) in 
chapter five. The designing of the software, intended to ameliorate participatory 
opportunity however does not disassemble the storied nature of the digital artefact; it 
merely side-steps the glamour of the 3D game engine. Such design outcomes do not 
hand over the power of design itself. This handing over of the power of design is the 
subject of a third short publication (Bidwell, Radoll & Turner, 2007, see Appendix 
A) that announces the re-focusing of the research. 
The publications in chapters four and five thus frame the dilemmas that the 
thesis actually focuses on: the deeply embedded stories in software, as a material 
artefact, and the problem of how to ‘hand over’ design. When software is understood 
as a deeply storied artefact, and design itself is problematised as a practice with its 
own stories, when design is designed as Willis (2006) puts it, then any practice-based 
or action-based research is confounded by the issues discussed in this current 
chapter.  
So, the potential of engaging in design itself as a process is shown to be 
confounded by hidden assumptions about the nature of design (section 1.2.2). For 
example, inviting the Australian Indigenous communities who contributed to the 
DSE worlds to participate in the design process earlier does not dismantle the values 
that design brings into the situation. Nor would such an approach find it easy to 
engage critically with the artefact itself. A more traditional ethnographic approach, 
                                                
 
6 The inclusion of a short demo paper in this chapter is actually a result of the rules for a thesis by 
publication which stipulates a certain number of sole authored publications. As Smith (1999) might 
observe and as Haraway (1991) laments, we are all caught up in the wider stories of the established 
norms of professional and scholarly protocols. 
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popular in the social sciences and increasingly popular in HCI (Dourish, 2007) that 
investigates the ways the potential participants might make and design their own 
meaning, perhaps a study that focused on Australian Indigenous games and culture, 
assumes the mantle of scholarly distance and is prone to the same criticisms that 
Haraway (1991) makes in her discussions about technological research. Smith (1999) 
alerts to the underlying colonialist themes in any research that arrives in post-
colonial and indigenous context ‘from the outside’; similarly, Bidwell (2014) 
observes that any de-colonisation of design must also include a de-colonisation of the 
researcher’s own processes. 
These insights frame the turn towards the critical hermeneutic approach that 
the research adopts. Chapter six consists of the African gamer publication (Turner, 
2015) that clearly announces itself as ‘an armchair’ piece. That is, while the research 
is inspired by an encounter between a Ju/’hoansi person and a technological artefact, 
it refuses any pretence to being about the Ju/’hoansi themselves. African gamer is a 
theoretical interrogation of artefactual stories in the light of the encounter. It focuses 
on the storied artefact itself and it uses the responses to the incident in order to reveal 
underlying assumptions about technological progress and indigenous cultures, or the 
multiple ways in which the stories we tell ourselves about technology act to 
perpetuate distinctions between ourselves and the other. 
The dilemmas of ‘doing post-colonial research’ also frame the current study’s 
focus on critical analysis of disappearance of the artefact as a phenomenon within 
contemporary theories of new literacies, participatory culture and participatory 
design. In the spirit of Freire’s (1972) principle of unveiling meaning from the basis 
of individual subjective experience and Ricœur’s (1970) insistence on recognising 
the subjective impetus for any critical inquiry, my own background as a critical 
literacy practitioner who has migrated into design through educational practice, 
demands that I interrogate the theoretical tools that should be supportive of the 
overall research endeavour. This same background and the subjective perspective of 
an educator engaged in the practice of scaffolding tertiary students into a critical 
understanding of design, and game design in particular, also demands that the critical 
research finds a place for a ‘hermeneutics of affirmation’ (Kearney, 1996). The 
research therefore includes a final publication in chapter seven (Turner & Moyes, 
2012) that reports on a small informal teaching project in a tertiary context that 
applies Boal’s (1979) exploration of critical pedagogy in the space of theatre. 
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Reflecting on the implications that the Performing design project brings to light 
enables a final moment of problem posing that can open the way forward for future 
practice. 
1.5.2 Chapter overviews 
Chapter one has provided an overview of the thesis, the background to the 
thesis and the research story. It has presented the dilemmas that the thesis addresses 
and the theoretical perspective that underpins the research as well as a brief overview 
of the methodological approach taken.  
Chapter two supports the submitted publications with a formal review of the 
literature on post-colonial stories and story-ing framed by Ricœur’s concept of the 
mimetic process. Having discussed stories and asymmetrical stories, this second 
chapter continues to look at the storied nature of software by taking Manovich’s 
(2001) work on the forms and characteristics of digital media, particularly in terms of 
its participatory opportunities. Chapter two ends with a discussion about software 
culture and culturally storied software, highlighting the dilemmas of assumptions 
about software use in contexts where the storying is already problematically 
asymmetrical.  
Chapter three provides an overview and rationale for the methodological 
approach (see section 1.4.3). The chapter offers an introduction to critical theory, 
hermeneutics and Ricœur’s critical hermeneutics. It discusses the hope-full 
endeavour in Ricœur’s work and examines the manner in which Freire’s critical 
pedagogy can be understood as both critical and hopeful. In order to clearly articulate 
the multiple ways in which a critical hermeneutic approach is vital, chapter three is a 
response to the tendency for design practice to abduct methodologies (Dourish, 
2006a); it goes into critical methodologies and critical hermeneutic methodologies in 
detail in order to clarify the way that critical pedagogy can be understood as critical 
hermeneutics in action, and that design can be understood as a hermeneutic activity. 
This chapter ends with a brief overview of the ways in which a critical hermeneutic 
approach has been applied in the publications and the overall thesis.  
The publications themselves have already been described (section 1.5.1). 
Chapter four consists of two publications written early in the thesis which open the 
conversation. Chapter five consists of two publications which focus on a designerly 
solution. Chapter six is a critique of perspectives on indigenous cultures and 
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technologies and chapter seven consists of a single journal article which explores use 
of a critical literacy technique applied to game design.  
Chapter eight, the final chapter, draws the whole research narrative together. In 
this final chapter, I reflect on the insights gained from the included publications and 
consider the implications of those reflections in new literacy practice, participatory 
culture, participatory design and design practices which claim criticality. 
Because of the way in which the researcher journey is at once a compilation 
and a reflection on externally published works, the overall thesis as a document is 
very much a critical hermeneutic work, a pilgrim’s progress if you will. This journey 
is ultimately productive in the sense that the evolution and iteration that characterise 
the different projects discussed in the publications and their conceptual foundations 
are made visible and open to hermeneutic reflection. The format also creates a sense 
of disjointed reading for those who prefer to more traditional straight line of the 
monograph and the framing materials in chapters one, two and three are more 
thoughtful and considered than the earlier reflections presented in the publications. 
Readers who favour the more direct route might prefer to move from chapter three to 
the final chapter and refer back to the publications themselves as they follow the 
reflective process on the conceptual issues that each included publication raises in 
turn. 
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Chapter 2: The importance of stories and 
the dilemma of disappearance 
The encoding of technical images, however, is what is going on in the interior of this 
black box and consequently any criticism of technical images must be aimed at an 
elucidation of its inner workings. As long as there is no way of engaging in such 
criticism of technical images, we shall remain illiterate (Flusser 1983, p. 16). 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Beyond game worlds is a research endeavour inspired by the use of digital 
game making software to relate cultural stories and make meaning, particularly the 
temptation of using game making software to tell place-based stories and stories that 
arise in cultures which have an asymmetrical power relationship with predominant 
western post-industrial culture. In order to explain the ramifications of this context, 
this chapter offers an overview of Ricœur’s mimetic process, the story-ing cycle of 
pre-figuring, configuring and re-configuring the world that we are all entangled in. 
The next section shows how this mimetic process is vulnerable to disruption in post-
colonial contexts where the more powerful voice of the colonising culture creates 
asymmetrical mimesis. Asymmetrical mimesis, the story-ing of the world by the 
more powerful, lies behind Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy, which demands that 
hidden meanings are unveiled in order to enable action and transformation on the 
part of those stories are marginalised through the process. 
Having clarified the importance of stories, the discussion turns to digital games 
and game making software. Where a ‘game’, at the most nominative descriptive 
level, is something that is ‘played’, a digital game is a game whose material 
existence and process depends in some shape or form on digital technology. Digital 
games are essentially software artefacts that depend on a physical technological 
artefact to function and which are subsequently a part of the wider artefactual reality 
of physical technological artefacts. They are storied spaces, to use Brewer and 
Dourish’s (2008) term, which owe their specific existence to a wider pre-figured 
world of artefacts and socio-technological systems.  
These artefacts embody cultural values, ideas and meaning making (Star, 1991; 
Bowker & Star, 1999). These cultural values are then reproduced and legitimised 
actively through the medium of cultural objects (Tilley, 1993; Miller & Tilley, 
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1984). In turn, culturally storied objects become part of the pre-figuring (Ricœur, 
1984) environment and thus active contributors to the ways in which we 
conceptualise our experiences. As ‘things’, artefacts represent both the ontic or the 
physical and the real, and the epistemic. Barad’s (2007) critique of science suggests 
that they are inescapably onto-epistemic in that they embody both the ontological 
(the person in the world) and the epistemic (the understanding of knowledge making 
that the person has) at the same time. Artefacts embody the designer’s (typically) 
tacit understanding of the ‘way the world works’ (Schön, 1983) but they are 
presented as ‘objects’ that can be used and subverted for the user’s purpose. In effect, 
the design and making of artefacts is framed as a ‘service’. In software design (and 
hence digital game design) invisibility is an overt goal of this service. As design 
theorist Donald Norman (1988, p. xi) says: “Good designs fit our needs so well that 
the design is invisible, serving us without drawing attention to itself.” The 
ramification of this designed invisibility is that we do not see how design itself 
contributes to the stories we tell ourselves about our world. More problematically, 
the stories that we tell ourselves about software actively hide stories about design 
and designing. 
Having shown how important the act of story-ing the storied world is in post-
colonial context, this chapter analyses what it calls the phenomenon of 
‘disappearance’ of software as a material artefact and the subsequent invisibility of 
design and designing as a story-ing act that contributes to Ricœur’s pre-figured 
world. The discussion unpicks some of the threads that give rise to this phenomenon 
of disappearance and its ramifications in the context of participatory theories of new 
media, especially new literacies and notions of participatory culture that are 
concerned with meaning-making made possible by digital technologies, such as the 
digital games that are the central artefact analysed in this thesis. The chapter argues 
that while such literacy practices have proven to be powerful in both formal and 
informal educational contexts in the post-industrialised context, the ‘black-boxing’, 
to take Flusser’s (1983) term7, of materiality and design in non western and non post-
industrial contexts and the power ‘to make meaning’ with digital technologies proves 
to be another – material – version of Thiong’o’s (1993) ‘view from the centre’.  
                                                
 
7 Flusser’s black box is a somewhat literal description: his concern is the camera and the production of 
images. 
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2.2 STORIES 
The simplest definition of ‘story’ is a sequence of events or an account of 
people and events. A story can be told as a recounting of personal experience or as a 
creative activity. Stories create individual identity (Ricœur, 1984), cultures (Geertz, 
1973) and confirm a sense of nationality (Bhabha, 2013). As author Thomas King 
puts it, “The truth about stories is that that’s all we are” (2003, p. 2). The stories we 
tell ourselves, and others, define our identities. Stories we tell about others have the 
power to define and delineate or identify ‘others’ (Adichie, 2009; Fanon, 1963; Said, 
1978; Spivak, 1988, Star, 1991). Stories of people and events become the history of a 
culture; some stories offer a framework of meaning making for a culture (Geertz, 
1973). Stories define possibilities; they establish parameters and shape meaning. 
King (2003) observes that “stories are dangerous” in deference to their power to 
create and legitimise. Stories present views, which, as Thiong’o (1993) explains, 
exhibit underlying asymmetrical access to power. 
2.2.1 Mimesis, stories, identity and artefacts 
Stories are a central feature in Ricœur’s examination of the ways in which we 
make sense of ourselves as situated human beings. For Ricœur this inseparability is a 
product of narrative8, or stories. Paul Ricœur’s philosophy is founded in his interest 
in giving an account of the fundamental capabilities and vulnerabilities of people 
living their daily lives; he was interested in what it means to be human in the world 
and queried (1991) those theories of understanding cultural phenomena that seemed, 
to him, to offer abstract systems which float on the surface of the world without 
connection to subjective experience. Ricœur’s project in his three volume work Time 
and Narrative (1984, 1985, 1988) is an account of human time and identity, as 
experienced, based on his thesis that ‘narrative is the guardian of time’. His argument 
is that we situate ourselves temporally through narrative. In this he has an essentially 
hermeneutic goal; he writes, “To explain more is to understand better” (Ricœur, 
1984, p. x). For Ricœur, much of this understanding depends on the way we actively 
create our own identities (and subsequently those of others) in the situated, located 
world. He suggests this understanding is a three-fold dynamic process that he calls 
the mimetic cycle. He takes the term mimesis from Aristotle, who problematised 
                                                
 
8 In the original French, Ricœur’s three volume work Time and Narrative is expressed as Temps et 
Récit, the latter noun is typically translated as arising from the verb ‘narrate’ – but has more in 
common with recite or recounting. 
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Plato’s dictum that mimesis is the imitation of nature. In his Poetics, Aristotle points 
out that a tragedy, such as the Iliad, could not merely be an imitation of nature but 
should, instead, be considered the imitation of an action. Aristotle’s mimesis is not 
without dilemmas, as Dowling’s commentary (2011) on Ricœur observes. A play 
such as Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar can be understood as an imitation of actions 
that took place in history, but how does one understand the action in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream? The answer to this, according to Ricœur, is to free the concept of 
mimesis from any narrow conceptualisation of an artwork (or perhaps an artefactual 
work) as representational, and to reposition the artwork as merely a stage, a single 
continuous process of mimesis. Mimesis, in this view, is dynamic, Ricœur writes 
(1984, p. 33), “Imitation or representation, therefore, must be understood in the 
dynamic sense of making a representation, of a transposition into representative 
works.” Ricœur defines three stages of this re-presentation that work together in 
continuous dynamic dialogue: Mimesis1, Mimesis2, and Mimesis3. 
The first level of Ricœur’s mimesis, what he calls Mimesis1 is the ‘pre-
figured’. This is the pre-narrative environment of the sociocultural world, the 
already-storied. To adapt an example from Dowling (2011), and take the car that 
Macnamara (2010b) uses as a metaphor for digital technologies (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.2.2): if one sees that a neighbour has acquired a new Jeep Cherokee, it is 
not merely a new vehicle and a means of transport for A to B; a Jeep represents 
status in contemporary culture, the Jeep commercials equate this status to freedom 
and escape from the quotidian. It has (purposefully) become a symbol that stands for 
a range of other cultural knowledge about the situated world. If in turn, we see the 
Jeep in a work of fiction, a film for example, the storied nature of the vehicle is 
understood, confirmed and re-affirmed through its use. The second order of 
understanding, when the symbol is re-used in order to make sense of events is 
Ricœur’s second mimetic stage, or Mimesis2.  
Mimesis2 is the act of configuring the story, or narrating in Ricœur’s terms. 
This is a central stage for Ricœur. He proposes that narrative (stories) configures the 
pre-configured word through re-presentation of its symbols. He further argues that 
because we are surrounded by (immersed in) the pre-figured world, we also 
configure ourselves through story-telling using the elements that are given by the 
prenarrative, pre-figured world. Ricœur describes the act of configuring meaning as 
not only essential to identity but the active process that forms identity and keeps it 
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anchored in time. Ricœur insists that we actively narrate ourselves; that we possess 
what he calls ‘narrative identities’. Taking his cue from Aristotle’s notion of a plot as 
being a process that creates unity of action or coherence, Ricœur argues that the 
individual creates order out of the diverse elements through ‘emplotment’ or the 
inclusion of causality. Aristotle’s argument is based on his observation that ‘ordinary 
life’ is made up of a meaningless string of action and events, but a narrative uses plot 
or emplotment in order to frame the meaningless string into something ordered and 
coherent. A contemporary Jeep commercial (CumminsRoss Agency, 2014) exploits 
this configuring in order to sell the brand. The commercial depicts two women 
reading out their post-dinner fortune cookies. The first fortune reads, “Now is the 
time to stand tall,” and its recipient jokes “Good thing I bought new shoes.” The 
second fortune cookie announces, “Now is the time to unleash your life force,” to 
which the reader responds, “Good thing I bought a Jeep.” This is highly contrived 
configuring (and indeed, the purpose of the commercial is to add actively to the pre-
figured world) but it exemplifies Ricœur’s interest and purpose in his Mimesis2 
stage. The individual makes sense and plots or ‘emplots’ their personal story and 
identity in terms of the pre-figured, pre-narrative environment. Emplotment 
organises the bits into a totality and makes a story out of the synthesis of the 
heterogeneous elements. Ricœur says (1991, p.21), “The plot serves to make one 
story out of the multiple incidents or, if you prefer, transforms the many incidents 
into one story.” Stories told then go out into the world and contribute to Ricœur’s 
third stage of mimesis, Mimesis3. 
A story (narrative) has an audience, even if it is only an audience of self. For 
example, the way we make sense of our own individual actions during the course of 
a day. This is what Ricœur calls the re-figuration stage. Narrators also receive and 
interpret the narrations of others and the culture they occupy. The individual is 
neither only the story teller, nor the subject of the story but rather the interpreter, 
interpreted and recipient of interpretations. These interpreted narrations then 
contribute to further narrative interpretation and thus contribute actively to the on-
going situated dynamic. Being both situated in the world and dynamic, stories of 
identity start before the individual story and continue beyond the individual story. 
Ricœur sees an ongoing interaction between individual tellers and the cultural world 
they occupy. We make ourselves through narrating but we also receive the narrations 
of others and the culture we occupy. These received narrations then contribute to our 
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own narrative imagination and thus form the narrations we give. As Ricœur (1991, p. 
30) writes, “The individual can be said to be ‘tangled up in stories’ which happen to 
him before any story is recounted.” If the act of emplotment is creating a sense of 
self and consistency, ordering an entanglement of stories, then questions can be 
asked as to ‘who’ is doing the actual narration (Venn, 1999). There exists a ‘who’ as 
in the individual who has the experience of the actions and events, and a ‘who’ as in 
the mediated self-inscribed in the emplotment and narration of the events, and the 
‘who’ of the environment that situates the pre-figuring of the individual narration. As 
the example of the CumminsRoss Jeep commercial demonstrates, these tangled 
stories and the entangled voices within them are vulnerable to manipulation because 
of the way that they use the pre-figured world and layer hidden meanings. 
Ricœur is comfortable to extend his concept of the narrated self to the situation 
and cultural context that is part of the entanglement. The individual’s life and story is 
also a part of stories told by others, created through “intersections between numerous 
stories” (Kearney, 1996, p. 6) and the coherent sense of self as a temporal being is 
bound up with others and the cultural and community context. As Ricœur says 
(1988, p. 247), the coherent self “refers to a self instructed by the works of a culture 
that it has applied to itself”. To paraphrase Adichie’s statement (2009) that is used as 
a banner for this thesis (see Chapter 1, section 1), this means that stories depend on 
power relations. How they are told, who tells them, and how many stories are told, 
depends on power. 
Stories are also ‘materialised’ in things. Artefacts are made and so become 
active in the cultural process (Tilley et al., 2006). For some, such as Arendt (1958), 
the using of objects and making of artefacts define us (see Chapter 1, section 1). 
Objects and designed created artefacts are deeply entangled in our daily existence, 
from the basics of shelter and growing, making, finding or preparing food to the 
more culturally complex objects and artefacts used for ritual and play. Woodward 
(2007, p. 4) claims that culture itself should be understood as being “something 
created and lived through objects” and that studying culture as being created and 
lived through objects (and artefacts) scaffolds understanding of social structures, 
systems and meaning. He adds that objects can be seen as “a crucial link between the 
social and economic structure, and the individual actor”. Cultural objects and created 
artefacts not only offer biographies and ‘tell stories’ about the culture that produces 
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them (Kopytoff, 1986; Prown, 1982) but they are also entangled in the story telling 
process.  
Material objects are more than receptacles of cultural concepts, values and 
meaning making; they are part of the cultural conversation and co-creator in its 
dynamic. As Tilley et al. (2006) observe, cultural values, ideas and meaning making 
are represented, reproduced and legitimised actively through the medium of cultural 
objects. Material artefacts are dynamic in cultures, through making, interacting, 
consuming and living with things, people also make themselves and their cultural 
realities. As actively storied objects, material artefacts become part of Ricœur’s 
(1984) on-going dynamic mimetic process, affirming their designed purpose and the 
values and philosophies that underpin it (Hodder, 2012). This is no less the case 
when the artefact is a digital artefact, or when the artefact is an apparently immaterial 
artefact such as the software used to make game worlds. However, identifying and 
demonstrating any asymmetries, or unequal power relationships embedded within 
material artefacts, is problematic.  
2.2.2 Asymmetrical storied worlds 
In post-colonial contexts, such as the Australian Indigenous context that gives 
rise to the current study (see Chapter 1, section 1.2) the pre-figuring of the world is 
asymmetrical; the voice of the coloniser dominates. The effect of colonialism on 
colonised culture is not only an economic and authoritative invasion; it also involves 
a re-story-ing of Ricœur’s pre-figured storied world. In a world where we have seen 
empires apparently recede and new nations formed as a result, post-colonial theories 
do not assert colonialism has gone; they focus on the legacies of colonialism. The 
colonialist endeavour has consequences for the colonised, particularly in terms of the 
ways that the colonisers export their own worlds into a colonial context (Bhabha, 
1994; Fanon, 1963, Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988; Thiong’o, 1986). The act of colonising 
is thus what Moreton-Robinson (2005) calls an act of epistemic violence towards the 
pre-figured world of the colonised. That is, the colonised and their cultures are 
reframed in terms of the coloniser’s understandings of civilisation and progress; they 
are ‘rescued’ from a non-civilised state. Fanon (1963) describes the colonial 
encounter as a destructive one where the identity of the ‘native’ or ‘other’ is created 
by the coloniser. Culture that exists ‘pre-civilising’ is deemed of value as an 
anthropological opportunity to understand the past. Thus the voice of the powerful 
does much to construct and define the colonised and subjugated as a homogenous 
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group. That is not to say that the colonised do not contribute to the pre-figured world. 
Fiss (2009) points out that French colonisation of Africa did not only mine for raw 
materials but also brought back ‘exotic’ objects and artefacts, which then rejuvenated 
and enriched western culture. The problem is that the pre-figuring is asymmetrical 
and that the coloniser’s stories become more heterogeneous (Star, 1991) through the 
inclusion of aspects of the colonised culture while the colonised are left with a single 
story through conflation of the exported exotic and their culture, and so marginalised 
as the ‘other’ (Spivak, 1988). To paraphrase Freire (1972), for the colonised, 
participation in the world is ‘not of their own making’. 
Edward Said’s study (1978) on the artificial boundaries between East and West 
critiques the stereotypes created by imposition of a coloniser-colonised mentality, 
focusing on the Middle East. Said recognises that it is not a case of one imperialist 
colonising culture imposing itself on the colonised, but rather on the complexities 
arising as a result of the colonisation and subsequent effects of the colonising as a 
heterogeneous activity. Said’s point is that the distinction between coloniser and 
colonised is a construct that has as much effect on the identity of the coloniser as the 
colonised. There exists a relationship, albeit an asymmetrical one, in which the 
coloniser’s ways of being and knowing are confirmed as “superior... in comparison 
with all the non-European peoples and cultures” (1978, p. 7). The colonised are 
framed as ‘the other’ and become the object that contributes to the same onto-
epistemic project that emerged during the late Renaissance. The voice of the story is 
multiple, dispersed through disciplines. It is, as Said (1978) argues with reference to 
Gramsci’s (1971) notion of consent, hegemonic because it works through ideas and 
institutions; it is subtle and legitimised via assumed validity of the goals of science 
and reason. This kind of cultural power is difficult to disentangle because it resides 
within multiple systems even those such as the anthropological endeavour to 
understand other cultures or the museum archival endeavour to ‘save’ other cultures 
that include a rationale of care and compassion.  
Bhabha (1994) sees some optimistic opportunity in this tangle or ‘ambiguity’ 
as he calls it. Where Said problematises the binary distinction of coloniser – 
colonised, Bhabha focuses on the ways that the on-going dynamic hegemonic 
relationship acts to structure and inform the self-image of the colonised (Chakrabarti, 
2012). For Bhabha, this on-going informing is framed as hybridity and like Ricœur, 
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Bhabha’s work in post-colonial studies announces a dynamic relationship between 
stories and the experienced world.  
For Bhabha the very hybridity of story is permanent potential subversion, but it 
is also permanent potential coercion because it creates this ambivalence; Gupta 
(2013) refers to it as a ‘love-hate’ relationship. This ambivalence arises out of the 
need for those with power to construct an image of the subject (the colonised) that 
subsequently frames and reframes the culture of the authority and then continues to 
assert the validity of the constructed image. However, as this process is repeated and 
acquired by the subordinate culture, it is also reframed from the perspective of that 
culture. Ricœur’s (1984) pre-figuring is enacted asymmetrically. As Bhabha writes 
(1994): 
[Authority] acquires its meaning after the traumatic scenario of colonial 
difference, cultural or racial, returns the eye of power to some prior archaic 
image or identity. Paradoxically, however, such an image can neither be 
‘original’—by virtue of the act of repetition that constructs it—nor 
identical—by virtue of the difference that defines it.  
Resistance is not overt or a distinct counter-voice but arises out of a process of what 
Bhabha calls mimicry. Bhabha’s use of the idea of mimicry is influenced by his 
reading of the psychoanalytic theories of Lacan for whom mimicry is not mere 
imitation but rather a kind of camouflage. In post-colonial contexts where the 
authority and power of the coloniser are evident and manifest, the colonised aspire to 
that power; they learn and adopt the same systems and they appropriate the onto-
epistemic values and intellectual habits. In short, they camouflage themselves within 
the post-colonial environment. In so doing, the colonised becomes a problematic 
other, no longer the clearly categorised colonised but now exhibiting similarity. The 
legitimising systems and assumptions of the colonised are threatened by the ‘same’ 
but ‘different’ and ‘aspiration’ is denigrated as ‘mimicry’. 
Where Ricœur’s dynamic relationship between the story telling self and the 
storied world is an essentially functional phenomenon, Bhabha’s is problematised by 
power relationships and this invention of a permitted ‘other’. His overall intent is to 
do more than recognise the ‘unchallenged centrality’ of post-colonialism but rather 
to find a location for those commentators writing from within post-colonial contexts. 
Other commentators are less conciliatory and demand more radical action. Spivak’s 
(1988) searing indictment of what ‘visibility’ means in post-colonial contexts argues 
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that while those who understand and can articulate their conditions might find 
opportunity, there are others who “accept their wretchedness as normal” (Spivak, 
2011, para. 3). Thiong’o (1986) argues for a reclaiming of identity, which at once 
recognises the post-colonial condition as an aspect of experience and demands an 
equal focus and recognition of the ways of being and knowing of the colonised. 
These positions demand that hidden stories are unveiled in order to enable what 
Freire (1972) calls ‘transformative action’ and opportunity for voice and access to 
power; not a mere amelioration of asymmetry, but a reclaiming of the pre-figuring of 
the world. 
2.2.3 Transforming stories 
Freire’s educational philosophy was inspired by Fanon’s (1963) call to 
establish education in previously colonised nations that was simultaneously new and 
contemporary but which was also ‘anti-colonial’ in the sense of being more than an 
extension of the culture of the coloniser but actually new and arising out of the post-
colonial nation. As Freire (Shor & Freire, 1987) argues, the idea of critical pedagogy 
is a means to challenge assumptions and power relations, a dream of social 
transformation and equal access to voice in the world. It is essentially political and 
liberatory in its intent. Freire’s critical pedagogy is also situated and located in the 
world; it exists in the physical context of experience and has what he calls ‘temporal-
spatial conditions’. His theories arise from his own experience of adult literacy 
education, teaching rural groups in Brazil the basics of functional literacy in the 
1960s; as such, Freire focuses on the word, language and the text. Freire’s critical 
pedagogy has been widely influential, particularly in adult education and community 
programs and his ideals of education for liberation underpin educational and 
community projects that seek to enable some kind of transformation of inequality 
and asymmetrical access to power (Chacoff, 1989; Lambert, 2012). There is an echo 
of Freire’s critical pedagogy in United Nations documents that stipulate equal access 
to literacies and acknowledge the validity of a plurality of literacies (Morin, 1999; 
UNESCO, 2004). His work has inspired others to apply a critical pedagogy approach 
in their own fields, particularly (for the current thesis) in theatre (Boal, 2000) and 
school-based literacy education (Luke & Freebody, 1997). His principles of 
participation and dialogue are a contributing influence (Gregory, 2003) in the 
practice of some forms of participatory design. 
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Freire (1972) proposes that knowledge cannot be ‘delivered’ and ‘consumed’ 
but must be engaged with actively. For Freire, knowledge arises in the world as a 
result of being and experiencing the world (Roberts, 2000). Knowledge is not an 
abstraction about the world but a result of interaction and human practice. Freire is 
insistent that action in the world (and interaction) is a prior requirement to knowing. 
He writes, “First of all I have to act. First of all I have to transform. Secondly, I can 
theorize my actions – but not before” (Freire, 1971, p. 2, cited in Roberts, 2000, p. 
37). Taking this position on knowledge means that Freire critiqued traditional 
educational practices of the time (the ‘banking method of education’) as positioning 
participants (students) as mere receptacles or containers to be ‘filled’ with 
established knowledge constructs. In his view, this ‘banking’ model of education 
prioritises memory over subjective experience and so resists dialogue and criticism. 
It thus becomes a form of oppression where ‘reality’ is ‘taught’ selectively and 
‘mythologised’ through emphasis on the selection of some knowledge and the 
disappearance of other ways of being and knowing. Participants are positioned as 
being ‘in need of assistance’ to access this knowledge; they are moulded to fit the 
established view of society, rather than being allowed to participate actively as 
themselves within society.  
This moulding is enacted through the delivery of knowledge and skills, such as 
the functional aspects of literacy and the ability to read and write, where such 
functional skills are abstracted from the world of experience. As Lankshear (1993, p. 
91) points out, the goals of delivering functional literacy skills are more concerned 
with the wider utilitarian goals of a functioning society: “The aim is to incorporate 
(marginal) adults into established economic and social values and practices. 
Functional literacy has been concerned as a means to an end.” Functional literacy 
then is essentially patronising or ‘mean-spirited’, as Lankshear puts it. While the 
goals of enabling and ensuring that all members of a socio-cultural group have basic 
abilities to function within the wider community, they are effectively positioned as 
being in need of only the basics in order to be ‘useful’ to the established wider 
concerns of that community. In effect social reality and the status quo dictate the 
parameters of what it means to ‘function’. 
Freire’s response is a participatory approach that takes both the knowledge of 
the participants and their social realities as material. Thus, a central feature of 
Freire’s critical pedagogy is that people bring their own knowledge and experience 
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into the process, as opposed to looking to formalised canonical bodies of knowledge 
for the provision of answers. This participatory approach is also sometimes referred 
to as a ‘problem posing’ approach (Freire, 1972, p. 52) because it insists that 
participants reframe themselves as active creative beings who are encouraged to 
contribute and value their own experience of reality; to become actively engaged as 
knowledge producers themselves. The materials of experience are included as sites 
of meaning making and compared to predominant ideologies, they become problem-
posing opportunity (McLaren, 1999; Shor, 1992) that allows for critique. Critique 
and analysis reveal hidden assumptions and the ways that these hidden assumptions 
act to produce conditions of experience. For Freire, this is particularly necessary in 
situations where conditions exhibit inequality and so should be acted upon and 
transformed. He writes (1972, p. 48): 
The truth is, however, that the oppressed are not “marginals,” are not living 
“outside” society. They have always been “inside” the structure which made 
them “beings for others.” The solution is not to ‘integrate” them into the 
structure of oppression, but to transform that structure so that they can 
become “beings for themselves”. 
In Freire’s critical pedagogy, the idea of becoming a being for oneself is inextricably 
linked with creativity and dialogue. Dialogue between all participants is a vital 
mechanism through which experienced realities are unveiled and made available for 
critique. Criticality enables creative power through imagination of possibility; this 
creative power is connected to an unveiling of realities and perception of the 
possible. Once the possible is imagined, action is also possible.  
For Freire, this active engagement connects knowledge to action. Knowledge 
thus engaged can become action; people who are critically aware of their situation 
are able to work towards changing it. His approach is “deeply contextual” (Chacoff, 
1989, p. 49); it prioritises the situated experience of the participant as the central 
perspective from which assumptions about the world can be unveiled and examined. 
Freire’s approach is essentially generative: he commences with the individual’s own 
subjective experience; the words and worlds of their daily lives. These individual 
(and community) experiences are then reflected upon in the light of received 
knowledge about the world. Shor’s (1992, p. 129) commentary on critical pedagogy 
offers a list of sites where knowledge should be examined: “[h]abits of thought, 
reading, writing, and speaking… first impressions, dominant myths, official 
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pronouncements, traditional clichés, received wisdom, and mere opinions”. Freire’s 
approach to these sites of knowledge insists that they are understood as dynamic; that 
culture itself is not a static set of customs, beliefs and attitudes but rather that culture 
is a dynamic process. These sites of ‘knowledge’ and the dynamic process resonate 
in essence with the phenomenal world that Ricœur (1984) calls the pre-figured 
environment or, in terms of the current research, the storied world. 
2.3 STORIED WORLDS 
The idea of a storied world is essentially a phenomenal one; it is situated in 
experience in the world, rather than a reflection on experience of the world. Ricœur’s 
work and his essentially phenomenological concept of mimesis owes much to the 
philosophies of Heidegger and his reversal of the Cartesian separation of mind and 
body and his recognition that – in order to be a thinking human – one must first be. 
As Heidegger writes (1962, p. 46): 
With the “cogito sum” Descartes had claimed that he was putting philosophy 
on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined when he began his 
“radical” way was the kind of being which belongs to the res cogitans, or – 
more precisely – the meaning of Being in the “sum”. 
And subsequently, the corollary is that in order to ‘be’, one must be ‘somewhere’. 
Heidegger went on to say, “‘Being-in’ is thus the formal existential expression for 
the Being of Dasein9, which has its Being-in-the-world as its essential state.” 
Heidegger’s conceptualisation of Dasein, existence based in a state of ‘Being-in-the-
world’ – being there – is instigatory of theories of place. As Malpas observes (2012, 
p. 22) in his commentary on Heidegger: 
Dasein still encompasses the essence of the human, but it does so precisely 
because of the way in which the being of the human finds its essence in the 
being of place – in the belonging together of being and topos.  
In theories concerned with storied worlds, space is distinguished from place, or 
rather, space has the potential to become place because of stories. In the western 
view, stories belong in places that become place because of stories told (Tuan, 1977; 
Dourish, 2006b). Heidegger proposes that place and therefore ‘being human’ is the 
                                                
 
9 Dasein is a German word that means ‘being there’ or presence. German: da – there and sein – being, 
translated as existence. Heidegger uses the term as a counterpoint to Descartes’ focus on 
consciousness or mind. 
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result of dwelling and making. As the description10 of his now famous three bedroom 
‘hut’ in his 1951 lecture (1971, p. 160) announces, “Only if we are capable of 
dwelling, only then can we build.” Ingold (2000) takes Heidegger’s conceptualisation 
of being somewhere (dwelling) and its relationship to creating (building) further and 
argues that it is not an instantiation of human creativity upon the world but rather 
should be understood as an on-going emergent dynamic between creativity and the 
world. The philosopher, Casey (1993, p. 14) confirms that stories are ‘the stuff’ of 
places because, as he writes, “To be is to be in place.” He suggests that western 
thought exhibits a tendency to classify place and sense of place as the result of 
human modification of space and so reduces notions of place to activity; that 
experience of place is post activity. Casey’s perspective is that place is not separate 
from lived experience and that being and place belong together; being somewhere is 
primary and it enables knowing. Casey reverses the supposed relationship of place 
being equal to ‘space’ plus ‘meaning’ and reframes it as ‘place is equal to meaning’. 
In his words (1996, p. 18), “Local knowledge is at one with lived experience” and 
“To live is to live locally, and to know is first of all to know the places one is in.” 
Thus theories of place and place making are understood as arising in experience of 
place. 
The dilemma for projects such as the Digital Songlines project (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.2), where the design concept is transmission of experience, is that digital 
place cannot be ‘visited’ or experienced in an embodied sense, let alone inhabited. 
As Jenkins announces (2004), they are not places per se but are better understood as 
‘spatial stories’. Lammes (2008) confirms this when she argues that a useful way of 
understanding simulated worlds is through the lens of de Certeau’s (1984) distinction 
between the constructed environment of the city, the designed ‘story’ of the architect 
and planner, and the daily experience of the urban inhabitant who ‘occupies’ rather 
                                                
 
10 Heidegger muses (1971, p. 160), “Let us think for a while of a farmhouse in the Black Forest, which 
was built some two hundred years ago by the dwelling of peasants. Here the self-sufficiency of the 
power to let earth and heaven, divinities and mortals enter in simple oneness into things, ordered the 
house. It placed the farm on the wind-sheltered mountain slope looking south, among the meadows 
close to the spring. It gave it the wide overhanging shingle roof whose proper slope bears up under the 
burden of snow, and which, reaching deep down, shields the chambers against the storms of the long 
winter nights. It did not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it made room in its 
chamber for the hallowed places of childbed and the "tree of the dead"-for that is what they call a 
coffin there: the Totenbaum and in this way it designed for the different generations under one roof 
the character of their journey through time. A craft which, itself sprung from dwelling, still uses its 
tools and frames as things, built the farmhouse." 
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than creates the structure and who engages in ‘practises’ in order to make their own 
experience. 
For de Certeau (1984) the on-going mutual engagement discussed by 
commentators like Heidegger and Casey is problematised by the fact that the site of 
occupation in the post-industrial world is already structured11 and that any story-ing 
or place-making will always be a subversion of the urban planned scape. De 
Certeau’s urban inhabitants also experience the invisible designing of their 
environment. They live within the work itself and rarely attain a bird’s eye view of 
the whole, as he writes (1984, p. 93): 
The ordinary practitioners of the city live “down below”, below the 
thresholds at which visibility begins. They walk – an elementary form of this 
experience of the city …. Whose bodies follow the thicks and thins of an 
urban “text” they write without being able to read it. These practitioners 
make use of spaces that cannot be seen; their knowledge of them is as blind 
as that of lovers in each others arms. 
De Certeau also recognises that stories are part of this movement through invisible 
structure. However, the stories created by movement are fragmented and fragile, 
“shaped out of the fragments of trajectories and alterations of spaces” (1984, p. 93). 
While de Certeau’s interest is everyday life as practised in urban spaces, his logic has 
direct import in the projects which are the central concern of the current research: the 
designed and constructed digital spaces of game worlds. 
2.3.1 Story-ing storied space: Game worlds, constructed worlds 
Brewer and Dourish’s critique of ‘storied space’ (2008) examines the multiple 
ways in which digital technologies are framed by metaphors of space and spatiality, 
which serve to construct conceptualisations of space, as much as describe them. The 
authors point out that space itself is a cultural construct; predominant post-industrial 
western conceptualisations of space and place arise in historical antecedents that 
serve to both frame and scaffold subsequent assumptions. To return to the two 
images (see Chapter 1, Fig. 1 and Fig. 2) that inspire the current thesis, the ‘accurate’ 
western mode map is a representation of the world that arises in the concerns of 
objective science to measure and classify according to its understandings of universal 
                                                
 
11 De Certeau uses the terms ‘space’ and ‘place’ rather differently to other commentators. For de 
Certeau place is the potential or as Creswell (2013) puts it, the empty grid. Space is created by 
practice. 
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principles. Maps present a reality (Wood et al., 2010) of past and present culture; 
they construct rather than reproduce the world. The history of the contemporary 
western map has its roots in the earliest colonial endeavours of trade and settlement 
in the shape of portolan charts, navigational charts based on compass directions and 
estimated distances observed by sailors at sea, and Roman cadastral maps that show 
boundaries and land ownership. Technologies that materialise spatial constructions 
also present and serve to continue stories of power; early colonisers claimed land on 
the basis of the map rather than the physical territory, lands claimed on paper before 
they were occupied (Harley, 1988). Vincent Serico’s art work (Fig. 2), while actually 
already re-storied through use of board and acrylic paints12, represents knowledge of 
country and place (Rose, 1996) more in keeping with Casey’s (1996) re-configuring 
of Heidegger’s spatial process, where a relationship is prioritised through the use of 
motifs and symbols. 
Digital games, the storied spaces of the current work, have long been defined 
in terms of spatiality because at the simplest level, the player must navigate and act 
upon a spatial representation (Aarseth, 2007; Jenkins, 2004; Jenkins & Fuller, 1995; 
Manovich, 2001; Stockburger, 2007; Wolf, 1997). All games, whether digital or not, 
exploit space, whether it is the phenomenal ‘space’ of Huizinga’s magic circle 
(1949) of players and Suits’ (1967) lusory attitude; the physical space of a playing 
area (sports field, game board, card table) or the metaphoric (Leino, 2013) image 
space of digital games. 
Designing digital games is the design of a story ‘space’ (Crawford, 1984) 
wherein interactor activity is enabled. In some games this activity might be ‘play’ 
abstracted and stripped down to its essentials, the frenetic puzzle-based activity of 
Pajitnov’s (1984) Tetris for example, where the space of the game is a single framed 
screen with its falling tetrominoes. In Tetris activity is based on quick response to the 
world and movement of the pieces as they fall. Other digital games offer richly 
detailed three-dimensional representation of locations, these range from 
Tolkienesque fantasy worlds to worlds that reference the real such as Bethesda’s 
(2008) Fallout 3 set in a post-apocalyptic Washington DC, or Ubisoft’s (2009) 
                                                
 
12 Australian indigenous art is actually a ‘storied’ artefact. Painters like Vincent Serico only began 
painting on board and canvas in the late 1960s. The story told is that a school teacher called Geoffrey 
Bardon, working with children in Papunya, observed adults telling stories whilst drawing symbols in 
the sand. He encouraged them to put these physical depictions onto board and canvas. 
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Assassin’s Creed II, which is set in Renaissance Italy and includes sections of 
Florence and Venice. These richly detailed worlds, made by large teams of 
developers and taking years to complete, often exploit photo-reality as a stylistic 
approach. Photo-realistic game worlds are designed and made to appear as realistic 
as possible, image reference is photographic data, in some cases involving sending 
the development team to the real world site. For example, Ubisoft’s (2008) Far Cry 2 
team were sent to the Kenyan savannah for two weeks in order to “make the game 
feel like you were really there” (Stuart, 2008). The potential for photo-realistic 
representation and the affordances of game making software to implement simulated 
realities is the inspiration behind virtual heritage and cultural transmission projects 
such as ACID’s (2006) Digital Songlines Environment or DSE (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.1). 
These contemporary digital game worlds are ‘sculpted’ by designers (Jenkins, 
2004) in order to create experiences for interactors. The represented spaces are 
storied in multiple ways. The first layers of story visible to the player are the 
essential information stories that announce the way the player navigates the world. 
Where other common software applications are defined by the task world that they 
enable, for example, word processing, accounting, drawing or video editing, software 
predicated to play is typically defined in terms of the main player action required to 
move through the game world (jump, shoot, sneak, run) and win the game. This 
player action or the core mechanic of the game is considered central to the 
experience of play; it describes the way that the player navigates the game world, or 
as Rouse (2005, p. 310) puts it, “what the players are able to do in the game-world, 
how they do it, and how that leads to a compelling game experience”. For the game 
designer, the core mechanic is what Rouse calls the ‘guts’ or backbone of the game 
because of the way that a core mechanic or combination of mechanics create 
expectation on the part of the player and are a major consideration in the designing 
of the game world. As Adams (2003) observes, game worlds are made for play, 
houses do not need to offer shelter, unless the game itself requires that the player 
seeks shelter. The aforementioned Assassin’s Creed II (Ubisoft, 2009), which 
provides a world in which the play can engage in parkour (or free-running) versions 
of the traditional platform mechanic, offers buildings to climb and carefully 
positioned parkour ‘ingredients’ in order to balance playability with believability. 
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This balance between believability and playability enables what Murray (1997) 
calls ‘the active creation of belief’ on the part of the interactor. It defines the 
distinction between digital games and other forms of application software. When we 
make games, we create what Walton (1990) calls ‘props’ for the imagination, we 
design to enable player activity within a digital environment with a clearly 
articulated game goal, or set of goals, whether it is a simple ‘beat a high score’, a 
complex quest to save a fictional kingdom, or even a more toy-like ‘build a home for 
your game objects’. Where Rouse (2005) asserts that the core mechanic describes 
what the player does and how, establishing the player as the protagonist in the game, 
Murray clarifies the way in which this player activity is differentiated from other 
forms of software use. The player is not a software user in the formal sense, he or she 
actively engages within the story world of the game. Laurel (1993) frames 
engagement as participation within the environment when she discusses video games 
and calls them a ‘natural result’ of the computer’s “capacity to represent action in 
which the humans could participate” (1993, p. 1). Her own response to this interaction 
as engagement is a suggestion that the theatrical stage is an appropriate metaphor. 
This is not to say “that the audience joins the actors on the stage,” Laurel says, rather 
that “they become actors” (1993, p. 17). In this view, the interactors are re-situated as 
participants within the representation. Laurel’s concept is powerful; later in the work 
she clarifies the usefulness of her metaphor with regard to its potential to use 
Aristotle’s distinction between story as told and story as enacted. Nevertheless, 
Laurel also demands (1993, p. 17) an invisible computer; the interactor is a 
performer, not a choreographer or playwright: 
In a theatrical view of human-computer activity, the stage is a virtual world. 
It is populated by agents, both human and computer generated, and other 
elements of the representational context (windows, teacups, desktops, or 
what-have-you). The technical magic that supports the representation, as in 
the theatre, is behind the scenes. Whether the magic is generated by 
hardware, software or wetware is of no consequence; its only value is in 
what it produces on the ‘stage’. In other words, the representation is all 
there is. 
Murray’s (1997) active creation of belief and Laurel’s (1993) stage is implemented 
by the game world designers within an environmental narrative or story world that 
further acts to create a kind of cultural complicity between the player and the 
designer (Turner, Browning & Bidwell, 2008). The environmental narrative will 
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provide the essential mise en scene of the game world, which clarifies the role for the 
player and which supplies the game objects and characters. These environmental 
narratives range from the familiar locations of the typical urban environment, where 
kitchens offer knives and food, to expectations drawn from player experience with 
other media forms: American western one-horse towns with saloons and gunslingers, 
dark gothic castles with probable vampires, dark cyberpunk future cities that echo 
the fatalism of 1940s film noire and re-envision their characters in decayed future 
cities. 
For the designer, the primary design story might be a material one, a choice of 
technological platform (mobile, computer, console, web or perhaps layered on the 
real world), but in contemporary game development such choices are often 
predicated on the type of studio or team make-up. Smaller studios will often focus on 
the mobile market that has the advantages of shorter development times, easy 
distribution and a tendency to more casual game designs that can be picked up, 
played and put down again. Decisions about technological platform are also 
minimised through wide-spread adoption of software development kits (SDKs) or 
game engines that are capable of multi-platform releases, that is, a developer can use 
the SDK to produce for different platforms without returning to the basic code. 
Some of these SDKs are minimal frameworks or simple software tools, for 
example, Kilmas’ Twine game making software and the Little grey cat game making 
software (Turner, 2008, see Chapter 5, this volume) offer simple pre-structured 
frameworks in which game makers can implement individual designs but which, like 
application software such as Microsoft’s Power Point, are indelibly framed by the 
limitations of the designed affordances. Other game making tools are more complex, 
allowing for a much wider range of design opportunity. There are a variety of such 
game engines; they range from the freely available, such as Unity Technologies’ 
Unity Game Engine, to proprietary in-house frameworks such as Halfbrick’s Mortar 
Engine. Game engines also vary in terms of components but generally speaking the 
game engine includes a rendering engine (for the game graphics), a physics engine 
(for simulation of systems) and tools to add elements such as sound, scripting, 
animation, or artificial intelligence (AI). 
As software frameworks, game engines make the task of realistic looking and 
behaving digital world construction feasible. This is the temptation for creation of 
worlds such as the Digital Songlines Environment (DSE) (see Chapter 1 section 1.2) 
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and other virtual heritage projects. Because game engines provide a software 
framework for richly detailed representation of three dimensional digital spaces, they 
also appear to be well suited to the goals of virtual heritage projects that intend to 
represent culture within an authentic environment. As Flynn (2007, p. 349) remarks, 
“One of the central cornerstones of cultural heritage is authenticity.” Game engines 
offer a kind of ‘authenticity’ in terms of the surface of the representation. An engine 
also includes a perspective and potential player viewpoint; it will also scaffold the 
planned interaction. These latter aspects of the software framework, the point of view 
and activity in the digital world, are potentially problematic in projects like the DSE, 
which endeavour to provide a voice for non western cultures to tell their own stories 
and represent their experience to others through the simulated world. However, 
designing a world for an interactor is the creation of an experience (Squire, 2006); 
the majority of these experiences are framed as quests and hero’s journeys (Jenkins 
& Fuller, 1995; Jenkins, 2004) because of the ways in which game designing creates 
an experience for a player who is, in effect, invariably the central protagonist by 
virtue of the role provided for them through the design. Indeed, Turner & Bidwell 
(2007b, see Chapter 4, this volume) query whether it is actually possible to not 
design a story world using a game engine for the western ideal of heroic conquest. 
Aarseth (2005) argues that the digital worlds of computer games depend on 
simulation, not story (by which he means the formal narratives of literature as 
recognised in the western canon). Simulation for Aarseth is opportunity and process; 
a strategy that allows an interactor to explore, test, verify and so make their own 
meaning. Within these simulations, Aarseth argues, everything the interactor sees 
and uses is framed by activity and so embodies cognitive engagement. Gee’s (2003) 
analysis of games as environments that present and example educational qualities 
offers a similar thesis. Where Aarseth declares the need to understand action within 
games as exploration of the potential of the defined structure, Gee dissects the 
structure from the perspective of an educator and principles of cognition and finds no 
less than 36 learning principles present in what he calls ‘good’ games, by which he 
means those that are well designed, a tautology that problematically confirms the 
disappearance of design discussed further in the current chapter (see section 2.4.3).  
Gee’s principles are grouped under a number of headings of interest to 
educational researchers and resonant with educational practice in formal contexts. 
They range from concepts about semiotic domains, situated meaning and learning, 
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practice opportunities and collaborative opportunities. A further category, the 
concept of cultural models, or the sets of values and beliefs that arise out of cultural 
experience, is also discussed. Here Gee, like Aarseth, suggests that a simulated game 
world offers opportunity to reflect and evaluate but that such reflection can have 
import on the self-identity of the interactor. For example, Gee cites his six year old 
son discovering that he could play a ‘good’ character and be successful in the game 
and play a ‘naughty’ character and still be successful in terms of the simulated game 
world and its goals. An opportunity is thus opened to understand the cultural 
experience of another person. Gee observes (2003, p. 146) that these ‘cultural 
models’ are a kind of social shorthand or “stories or images of experience that people 
can tell themselves or simulate in their minds, stories and images that represent what 
they take to be ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ cases or situations”. Game characters are, 
however, not real; they are crafted and designed. So, while Gee’s son may indeed 
gain insights into difference and motivation on an abstract level, he can never gain 
insight into the actual experience of the character beyond the back-story provided in 
the game world. Rather, the actual engagement is with Ricœur’s (1984) mimetic 
process, implemented in the game itself through design. 
The design of a rich photo-realistic simulation is also informed by the notion of 
presence where the goal of offering experience through simulation is the goal of 
creating a sense of ‘being there’; and where richly detailed simulation and interactor 
action confirms presence. As Turner (2006b) argues, a combination of rich detailed 
simulated environment and enabling of interactor activity is the essence of the design 
logic of the game engine. It is also the essence of the logic of game design where, as 
Murray (1997, p. 110) says, the goal is to enable ‘the active creation of belief’. With 
this expression, Murray makes a clear statement of interactor activity and assumed 
contribution to any represented world story: 
We do not suspend belief so much as we actively create belief. Because of 
our desire to experience immersion, we focus our attention on the 
enveloping world and we use our intelligence to reinforce rather than to 
question the reality of the experience. 
Critically a digital simulation is a designed and constructed artefact; the experience 
to which Murray refers is designed and made for interaction. However, such 
navigable presentations also provoke questions about the nature of the world as 
software and the manner in which cultural expectations are embedded in the 
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designing of such worlds; whether representation itself will invariably transform a 
place into a space and reverse Tuan’s insights on place making (1977). These are 
questions about design. 
2.3.2 Code is deep, design is wide 
Digital worlds are created in programming; they are coded (Hayles, 1999; 
Manovich, 2001; Fuller, 2003). Code is not the ‘word’ that Freire (1972) focuses on; 
it is more than surface; as Hayles puts it (2004), code is ‘deep’. Where language and 
textuality invite abstractions that echo the Saussurian separation between signifier 
and signified and which enable a critique of the experienced world in terms of the 
metaphor of language, programming as a communication system seems to be open to 
the same analysis. However, programming is not the same as language. A software 
program – written in code – is material performance; as Kittler (1995) observes, it 
exists with the digital artefact. The corollary is also true: the digital artefact exists 
together with code. Hayles (2004) alerts us to the distinction when she describes the 
dilemma of hypertext; text at a recognisable level in that it is read by a user but 
instantiated in code that is performed by the digital machine. This machine 
performance is based on the electronic polarities of binary code where each 
individual symbol is represented by sets of 1s and 0s. Binary is a translation medium 
and a design choice that has become ‘established’ and assumed in contemporary 
digital machines, although use of binary is not actually essential, merely extremely 
efficient when compared to the decimal systems of early mainframes such as ENIAC 
(1946). Binary thus embodies an elegance of abstraction down to its most essential. 
Indeed, Leibnitz, credited with the discovery of the binary number system in 1679, 
believed that binary numbers were symbolic of the Christian conceptualisation of 
creation ex nihilo or creation out of nothing (Lai, 1998). Binary digits are allocated 
characters, text, number or symbol and sequences of binary digital thus formed 
produce the actual digital code that can be used to write operations, present image 
and enact calculation. Hayles describes this as a layering not unlike an Oreo cookie, 
where an analogue bottom (the electronic polarities of binary) sits under a “frothy 
digital middle” (2004, p. 75) and both are topped with analogue layer in the shape of 
representation. This representation, a bitmapped or metaphoric image, is also the 
result of careful design that creates a relationship between things that are not directly 
equivalent. As Johnson (1997) observes, the ‘computer window’ only bears a 
superficial resemblance to a real window. It is all software designed to enable some 
 Chapter 2: The importance of stories and the dilemma of disappearance 57 
kind of activity. The game worlds that are the subject of this study, like the DSE, 
might be framed as windows into a world of experience are nevertheless software 
constructs. 
In the first instance the base structure of the SDK used to create DSE 
simulation, the Torque Game Engine (TGE), is that of the database; a collection of 
discrete items structured according to a classification system. Databases, no matter 
how organised are essentially collections of items structured to allow various 
operations. Manovich (2001) argues that the digital database that allows users to 
perform actions such as search, navigate, view and re-mix is the cultural form of 
digital or new media. The logic of the database arises out of the same western onto-
epistemic tradition that Bowker and Star (1999) describe as classification, the 
standardisation of the phenomenal world into systematic categories in order to 
explain the world and re-present it in order to enable action. Digital simulation 
engines are collections of digital items represented as world. An interactor explores 
the database through a software interface that differs from that of more mundane 
software only by virtue of its metaphor. A metaphor, no matter how detailed and 
‘faithful’ to its original, is not isomorphic to the original. It calls upon the original 
but at the same time repurposes it according to cultural usage. For example, as 
Brewer and Dourish (2008) observe, a metaphor of space not only pervades 
technological discourse but also embodies a western notion of space and spatiality. 
While Aarseth might be correct in his assertion (2005) that a simulation enables the 
interactor to explore and test their understandings, to creatively make their own 
meaning, the very concept of categorisation inherent in the database structure means 
that any interactor is making their own meaning from within. In short, interaction is 
pre-structured by the design of the database. 
Within the game engine database, objects such as people, animals, trees and 
even rocks and boulders are created in software that generates apparent 
dimensionality through use of mathematical gridlines. Animated life is implemented 
via geometry. Flynn (2007, p. 350) observes that this acts to ‘force’ a notion of space 
“as mathematical division and container for objects” and suggests that such 
‘geometric appropriation’ of nature is a direct result of the Italian Renaissance 
interest in application of mathematical certainty. These geometrically appropriated 
objects are then added to the database and the interactor is invited to explore them 
via what Manovich (2001) calls the database operation of navigable space. As 
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Manovich observes (2001, p. 219), in digital media, the “library is replaced by 
cyberspace; narrative is equated with travelling through space; all kinds of data are 
rendered in three dimensions through computer visualization”. For Manovich, this is 
not a return to Alberti’s certezze (mathematical certainty) and the careful 
mathematical construction of representation that it inspired, but a return to ancient 
Greece where space was not conceived as a totality but rather was a mere container 
for objects. He writes (2001, p. 220): 
The virtual world created with this technique is a vacuum containing 
separate objects defined by rigid boundaries. What is missing from computer 
space is space in the sense of medium: the environment in which objects are 
embedded and the effect of these objects on each other.  
As simulations made with databases of digital objects, game world environments are 
software-purposed to interactor experience through activity. They offer the interactor 
a ‘task universe’ just like the more mundane software designed for word processing 
or image editing. In task-oriented software, the environment typically reveals itself 
through the task universe. For example, a word processing program offers a user 
enough visible information to clarify the task universe, the blank page that is to be 
written on. The user then engages with the task as they understand it and seeks 
aspects of the understood task such as different operations such as line breaks, 
editing or layout. Such design generalises aspects of the task in order to create a 
coherent task universe for the user and make the software (and the hardware) itself 
invisible (Norman, 1988); the digital artefact merely a ‘window’ into the task world. 
This approach to software design ‘works’ because the designers and users operate as 
members of the task culture, that is to say, they all share an understanding of the 
rules in context.  
This context even extends to the representational level and the idea of authentic 
representation; here too, a cultural view predominates. Alpers’ (1983) critique of 
representation is telling. Alpers’ analysis of the 17th century Dutch ‘art of describing’ 
problematises terms like ‘faithful’ and ‘accurate’ as being descriptions of knowledge 
which is at once a confirmation of knowing and progress and a description of culture 
addressed to itself. In contrast to the mathematical approaches to representation that 
emerged in the Italian Renaissance period where the viewer is positioned as an 
abstract ‘point of view’, Alpers argues that the Dutch approach includes a sense of a 
physical viewer present and looking at the work. She writes (1983, p. xxv): 
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… the world depicted in Dutch pictures often seems cut off by the edges of 
the work or, conversely, seems to extend beyond its bounds as if the frame 
were an afterthought (and not a prior defining device); a formidable sense of 
the picture as a surface (like a mirror or a map, but not a window) on which 
words along with objects can be replicated or inscribed; an insistence on the 
craft of representation… 
Bolter and Gromala (2003) take issue with Norman’s emphasis on functionality and 
the pragmatic approach to design that it assumes. They argue that the pragmatic 
design approach, while useful, is incomplete and that “if we only look through the 
interface, we cannot appreciate the ways in which the interface itself shapes our 
experience” (2003, p. 9). Bolter and Gromala differentiate between the role of the 
designer in the construction of pragmatic software and the role of the designer in the 
creation of interactor experience; the design of experience they claim is the creation 
of a reflective environment wherein the interactor learns more of themselves. The 
former designing allows for the designer to disappear because the shape of the task is 
known, the latter demands the designer is overt in their choreographing of the 
experience. However, in simulated worlds, the idea of ‘task’ is problematised to the 
extent that the ‘task’ is not the goal-oriented task world of word-processing or the 
like, with their direct mapping from the operations of the real activity onto the 
operations of the digital activity. The design of a simulated world demands a rich 
story world (Crawford, 1984), and a careful crafting of interactor activity, (see 
Turner, 2006a; Turner, 2006b; Turner & Bidwell, 2007a; Turner & Bidwell 2007b) 
and the simulation is both the site and the object of interaction. A simulated world 
like ACID’s Digital Songlines Environment is at once a task space (visit the 
Gunggari) and an experience opportunity (visit the Gunggari). 
In the DSE iteration Irene’s World (ACID, 2006a), for example, the arrival 
near the old camp by the billabong is a choreographed sequence. The arrival point is 
fixed; the interactor is teleported to the same spot every time. The traditional 
‘welcome to country’ that is triggered when the interactor leaves the arrival point and 
moves towards the camp was originally a response to a request to cross into another 
community’s lands. However, in the simulation there is no sense of journeying. The 
interactor arrives like a tourist (Oliver, 2001); their visit scaffolded by the privileges 
of mobility (Croucher, 2012; Sheller & Urry, 2004). The world designer has 
considered the experience through the eyes of the ‘visitor’; a non-indigenous identity 
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is assumed and experience is scaffolded in ways that are not unlike those provided 
for visitors to Tsumkwe, Namibia who have access to electricity and internet at the 
Tsumkwe Lodge, discussed in African Gamer (see Turner, 2015, and Chapter 6, this 
volume). Like the tourists who visit Tsumkwe and who perhaps take an organised 
excursion to Cwi Nqane’s ‘living museum’ where they can engage with Kalahari 
Bushmen living ‘traditional lifestyles’, visitors to the DSE worlds find their activities 
enabled and purposed; mediated by the design. 
The essential action described by Murray (1997) is layered onto the world by 
the designers as potential operations. The DSE worlds use the established software 
conventions of menus categorised by task groupings, for example, the editing menu 
or the table menu in the ‘Heads Up’ format. This format, the ‘Heads Up Display’ or 
HUD takes its metaphor from another mobility vehicle, the fighter jet. The design is 
based on a concept of ambient information, always available but not obstructing 
interactor navigation. Such information interfaces are (typically) extrinsic to the 
world; non-diegetic interactor information that aids their trajectory through the 
experience. So, the basic HUD in Irene’s World offers a compass in the shape of a 
gum leaf and an indication of inventory (e.g. the interactor can find a boomerang to 
throw at the mob of kangaroos). An object of interest triggers a further non-diegetic 
symbol that indicates more information is available. Once triggered, this additional 
information reverts to the metaphor of the book or the museum didactic; a pop-up 
window offers the name of the item in the community language and an audio byte of 
the word in isolation plus additional information pertinent to the object such as 
history or use. There is no sense of the personal history that the practice of oral story 
telling allows, objects and people are removed from the place of their stories; traces 
of life and experience are flattened and what was once place becomes space, as 
Flynn (2007, p. 350) laments, referencing Walter Benjamin’s (1936) reflections on 
the disappearance of the ‘aura’ of the original: “The separation of the object from 
history also erases a sense of enchantment and wonder.” If the visitor is disenchanted 
with such a flattened homogenised experience, then for the Indigenous communities 
who contributed to the DSE, the sense of enchantment and wonder is not only 
‘erased’ it is reframed and translated, once again, into an alien schema. Their story is 
represented and formatted through the software and the design habits common to the 
creation of simulated worlds. To return to the question that instigated the current 
work, ‘Whose story is this anyway?’ we can now respond with the answer: the story 
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arises in the pre-figured world of the designer expressed through the designing of the 
artefact. 
2.3.3 Design as mimesis 
Designing, as Schön (1983) observes, is essentially a tacit process for 
professionals. Design ‘solutions’ arise out of the designer’s previous experience and 
‘repertoire’, which act as a background to a new solution to a new design problem. 
Designers and makers of artefacts are themselves members of a culture and the 
artefacts they create are, as Manovich (2001) argues, deeply social. Digital artefacts 
arise in culture; they are developed by groups of people who have cultural values and 
whose values are expressed in the design of the digital artefact. This, in turn, creates 
expectations about design and gives rise to an interest in the process of designing and 
the way that design itself ‘happens’ through action (Schön, 1983). Schön’s research 
into the ‘creative practitioner’ dismantles the design process itself. He proposes that 
design solutions are actually ‘situated’ and ‘located’ knowledge applied to the 
problem. The designer makes sense of the design problem through the lens of their 
own (culturally located) experience. In effect, design is entangled in its own stories.  
In digital environments, particularly digital games, the way that the software 
allows for multiple modalities (Manovich, 2001), image, text, or audio, and the 
manner in which these modalities are frequently combined with navigational 
possibilities (a choice of pathways through the environment) leads theorists 
(Crawford, 1984; Costikyan, 1994; Kress, 2003; Knobel & Lankshear, 2007; Squire, 
2008) to define digital artefacts in terms of their interactivity and their design as 
experience. For example, Aarseth (1997) sets up a distinction between texts as read 
and what texts are read from. He argues the ‘reader’ in a linked digital text is 
engaged in ‘non-trivial’ effort and that meaning occurs through his or her activity. 
Kress’s evaluation of new media literacy as multimodal makes a similar distinction 
when he argues that texts have a material aspect, a site of appearance, and that where 
the page (of a book) is ordered by the logic of writing, the screen as site is “ordered 
by the logic of the image” (2003, p. 48). Kress proposes that, “Writing is the 
ordering of elements (syntactic/grammatical and lexical) in the conventionalised 
sequences of syntax; image is the ordering of elements (‘depictions’) in a more or 
less conventionalised and spatially simultaneous ‘display’” (2003, p. 20). Digital 
games are, for Kress, multimodal forms dominated by the image. Both Aarseth and 
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Kress frame interactivity with the digital artefact as active meaning making enabled 
by the affordances of the digital medium. 
Redström (2005) observes that these affordances are often mistaken for the 
artefact itself. For example, Kress opines that we see a trend away from the 
dominance of writing and the constraints of the codex form towards other forms of 
literacy enabled by digital technology. He announces that these affordances offer the 
opportunity for the ‘reader’ to become a designer. That is, for Kress, ‘reading’ 
changes from being interpretation of a written text to an act of imposing order on the 
display of multimodal forms. He suggests that this is “reading as design” (2003, p. 
50). He also recognises that the display and its potential navigational pathways are 
the results of design. So, the placement of images alongside text and the options for 
the interactor to move through the digital work are the work of design; in digital 
games, the ‘reader’ navigates using visual clues. Design then, in this view, produces 
surface. 
Kress recognises that design is a producer of cultural objects. His project, in his 
analysis of reading and meaning making in an era where digital technologies and the 
screen predominates, is an argument to re-frame literacy to include other forms of 
meaning making. He attests that design has a role in this change and that its role is 
powerful, comparing design (of digital screens) with writing. He writes: “Design is 
prospective not retrospective, constructive not deconstructive, utopian and not 
nostalgic” (2003, p. 50). Kress thus confirms design as a problem solving activity. 
He pursues his argument (2003, p. 49): 
Design does not ask, ‘what was done before, how, for whom, with what?’ 
Design asks, ‘what is needed now, in this one situation, with this 
configuration of purposes, aims, audience, and with these resources, and 
given my interests in this situation? 
While advocating for ‘a design turn’, Kress maintains the definition of design that is 
used by formal design establishments; that design is a profession that serves through 
innovation (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.1). When he observes that, “Design does not 
ask …” Kress pinpoints a core conceptual issue that the current study seeks to 
uncover. 
Donna Haraway (1991) might observe that design does not ask ‘what was done 
before’ because it does not feel it needs to. Design, and particularly the design of 
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technological artefacts that arises in the engineering laboratory, has what Haraway 
calls the certainty of objectivity. This certainty is based on a premise that its 
methodologies are untainted by subjectivity and so produce verifiable truth and fact 
as outcome. Haraway describes this objectivity as ‘an external disembodied point of 
view’ that abstracts knowledge in the goal of being universally applicable. For 
Haraway, it is the claim of objectivity that is problematic – its supposed “view from 
nowhere” that claims to be able to rationalise everything equally and universally. She 
writes (1991, p. 583), “All Western cultural narratives about objectivity are 
allegories of the ideologies governing the relations of what we call mind and body, 
distance and responsibility.” These stories about objectivity are further problematised 
for Haraway because they act to include ‘other stories’, particularly located 
subjective experience, as materials but never as equally valid systems of knowledge. 
What this means is that minority voices are essentially made invisible in the process. 
They are re-created as subjects of inquiry. Spivak (1993) refers to this as 
identification. Like Haraway, Spivak criticises the asymmetrical power relationships 
inherent in the prioritising of the objective ‘view from nowhere’ when she says 
(1993, p. 61), “When a cultural identity is thrust upon one because the center wants 
an identifiable margin, claims for marginality assure validation from the center.” 
The mismatch itself is not the actual problem; it is merely its visible surface. 
The disjunction is beyond the surface of the representation. Haraway’s (1991) 
critique of the ‘view from nowhere’ is particularly apposite in terms of the use of the 
western mode map that was used as a basis for the construction of simulated 
community traditional country in the Digital Songlines Environment. Topological 
data in Songlines is generated from GPS coordinates. Country, as physically 
experienced, is recreated through the artefacts of technological designing. This does 
much to emphasise and confirm the onto-epistemic superiority of the western view. 
The manner in which designing and its design artefacts contribute their own stories 
to the mimetic process is also invisible. A consequence is that we do not see the way 
that design actively creates the world. In sum, ‘how design works’ is conflated with 
the functional descriptions of design as a problem solving process that produces 
artefactual outcomes. What this disappearance means in post-colonial and indigenous 
contexts, or those which reference them, is that any opportunity to intervene is 
misunderstood, or perhaps misplaced. 
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Schön’s (1983) insights into the design process have been inspirational in 
educational projects that emphasise meaning-making and learning. For example, 
Kafai’s work on making games as educational opportunity (Kafai, 1995; Kafai, 
2006; Peppler & Kafai, 2007) proposes that the designerly process and the way that 
design deals with unclear and messy problems (as opposed to neat, clear and self-
evident problems), offers a useful model for educators in schools and educational 
contexts where the constraints of teaching to a correct answer, or presenting a 
problem that has only one solution, only serves to constrain creativity. Schön’s work 
heralds a recent interest in what is sometimes referred to as design thinking (Cross, 
2011); the idea that problems and issues that require solutions are often ‘messy’ and 
so more amenable to tacit designerly processes rather than formal ‘scientific’ 
problem solving processes. There is much that is Freirean about this intent, the idea 
that students are problem solvers in their own right, able and capable of applying 
their own knowledge to the situation, and engaging creativity in order to imagine and 
hence actively create knowledge. 
However, the process of design is abstracted away from its outcomes and 
analysed as a process that produces things that are then used. This emphasis on 
process exacerbates the idea of design-as-service (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.1). This 
understanding of design is pernicious and situated in an assumed western post-
industrial context. Squire (2008, p. 658) highlights this as an issue in his overview of 
the use of digital games as literacy and meaning-making environments: 
How far do we go in insisting that students understand “the production” of 
media? How many English teachers would be considered literate in writing, 
if understanding the economics, politics, and social ramifications of book or 
newspaper publishing were considered a prerequisite to teaching English? 
Further, such projects, by attempting to tie to the commercial games 
industry, may risk focusing on issues (profitability, market share) while 
overlooking others (underrepresented voices). 
Squire’s point is that the ‘business’ of designing and making games is exactly that it 
is a commercial endeavour. His description of the business of game design having 
‘its own legitimisation procedures’ is in fact an oblique reference to the world of 
design as service predicated to consumerist outcomes. However, in so bracketing the 
art and craft of designing digital games, Squire effectively disappears any 
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opportunity to include design and its material outcomes as a subject for critical 
literacy practice. 
The relationship between the designer’s experience that Schön (1983) 
describes and the designed expectations of the software (Fuller, 2003) creates a 
somewhat exclusive relationship (Turner, 2006a; 2006b). Indeed, as Snodgrass and 
Coyne (1996) suggest, the exclusivity is tantamount to enjoining a language 
community and agreeing to prescribed formal rules of production. Jahnke (2012) 
argues that this dependence on formality does much to confirm the tradition of 
design as a service and actively brackets and negates any recognition of design itself 
as a culturally, meaning-laden activity. Design, as Fry argues (2001) exists “at a 
fundamental level that its divisions of knowledge and practice conceal”. What this 
means, as Willis (2006) observes, is that design legitimises itself through the 
continuous affirmation of its (concealed) assumptions that arise from its being 
situated in the world. Willis (2006, p. 80) puts it thus: “This adds up to a double 
movement – we design our world, while our world acts back on us and designs us.” 
When it comes to the designing and making of digital games, game design still 
tends to conform to the traditional “product development, marketing, communication 
and technological fetishism” (Boekraad & Smiers, 1998, p. 61). Definitions of digital 
games predicated to player activity drive the development cycle and the commercial 
benchmarks of success. Game development studios cater to their audiences and 
assess works in terms of sales. Players and consumers thus catered to continuously 
re-affirm this design methodology by consuming those products they expect to enjoy 
and the cycle becomes self-perpetuating, effectively prescribing the creative act and 
framing the designing of games as a service to the players13. In terms of game design 
as a sub-set of design itself, what this means, as Turner and Moyes (2012, see 
Chapter 7, this volume) observe, is that designers, especially new game designers in 
tertiary contexts, see themselves a players and exhibit a tendency to re-make the 
works they enjoy. To adapt Ricœur’s (1984) framing of the creation of identity, the 
designers design from within the pre-figured culture. They configure their designing 
as members of the culture; they create and implement the known as they know it, and 
                                                
 
13 At the time of writing, this cycle and the expectations of ‘established’ audiences is a facet of the 
phenomenon known as Gamergate or GG, where certain groups find their identity threatened by a 
contemporary phase in design to explore digital games for activities beyond play, and have reacted 
viciously, denigrating the presence of female designers and the interests of anyone who is not a player 
of such specific commercial formats (see Golding, 2014). 
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so become complicit in the re-configuring. This complicity is particularly 
problematic when the design materials are software artefacts. 
2.4 GAMES AS SOFTWARE AND NEW MEDIA 
Digital games are software. Their material existence is perceived as intangible 
by virtue of their construction in code; code, programming or digital instructions that 
run on hardware and appear to be immaterial. In essence, software consists of the 
instructions that tell the physical artefact or computational device how to perform its 
expected tasks. Software is typically contrasted with hardware, the physical machine. 
Contemporary14 software is apparently intangible; having no existence outside of 
machine process but the physical digital artefact without software is a lifeless thing 
and the soft/hard-ware distinction obscures the fact that neither can be used without 
each other, creating what Kittler (1995) calls ‘a false duality’. This false duality 
problematises software by conceptualising it as immaterial and separating it from the 
essential physical artefactual site of its existence. As Abbate (2008) observes, the 
‘magic’ of the machine’s operations are hidden from view along with the 
infrastructures that support it, at least, as Star (1991) comments, until it breaks down. 
Software is, as Fuller (2008, p. 3) says, invisible, “a tool, something that you 
do something with”. Ryan (2004, p. 415) makes a resonant observation when she 
says: 
Computers are machines that can run a variety of programs, through which 
they can perform a variety of tasks. The behavior of digital objects, such as 
texts, images, and sound, is therefore regulated by an invisible code, the 
machine-language instructions of the supporting software.  
A defining quality of software (from a user perspective) is that it is perceived as 
interactive: software reacts to input, whether a simple ‘run’ command to start or the 
more complex actions of a user inputting text into a word processing program. Even 
apparently autonomous software such as those processes that regulate room 
temperature requires input, in this instance in the form of a temperature gauge. Other 
software is designed to respond to human input, and indeed, as is discussed earlier in 
this chapter (see section 2.3.2), software interactivity or response to input is typically 
designed so that the software itself becomes invisible in order to allow the software 
                                                
 
14 Early programming was tangible in the sense that instructions were given to the machine in the 
form of punched cards not dissimilar to those used in Fairground organs. 
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user to complete the task (Norman, 1988). Types of software fall broadly into the 
categories of application software, e.g. the software programs designed for a task, be 
it a general task, such as word processing, or a specific task, such as accounting; 
system software or programs that initiate, run and overview digital systems and 
networks, and tools or software that is used to create and build new software. For all 
their emphasis on play, challenge and experience, digital games can be understood as 
instances of application software and the digital game-making programs that are 
discussed in this thesis and the included publications are instances of software tools. 
2.4.1 Media as software culture 
Software, Manovich (2013) warns, has enabled the global information society. Its 
presence underpins the process of globalisation (distribution, management, production, 
storage and consumption) and ideas about contemporary society (knowledge society, 
information society, network society) but software itself remains ‘invisible’. As he 
announces in his introduction to Software takes command (2013, p. 8): 
Paradoxically, while social scientists, philosophers, cultural critics, and 
media and new media theorists have by now seem to cover all aspects of IT 
revolution, creating a number of new disciplines such as cyber culture, 
Internet studies, new media theory, and digital culture, the underlying engine 
which drives most of these subjects—software—has received little or not 
direct attention. Software is still invisible to most academics, artists, and 
cultural professionals interested in IT and its cultural and social effects.  
Manovich’s earlier work (2001) on digital culture and ‘new media’ theory 
argues for the understanding of the digital as media, that is, as a communication 
channel. He takes his cue from his understanding of McLuhan’s assertion that all 
media, and subsequently, all digital technologies are extensions of embodied 
existence and extensions of the five physical senses. McLuhan (1994, p. 57) writes: 
All media are active metaphors in their power to translate experience into 
new forms. The spoken word was the first technology by which man was 
able to let go of his environment in order to grasp it in a new way. 
With this statement, McLuhan is developing a framework of analysis that he 
announced in 1954 when he said, “NOBODY yet knows the language inherent in the 
new technological culture; we are all deaf-blind mutes in terms of the new situation” 
(McLuhan, 2011, p. 16). Writing in the very early days of digital technologies, 
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McLuhan’s work is often seen as prescient of the then incunabular15 
‘communications revolution’ brought about by developments in communications 
networks, digital technologies and production processes. His media was reframed as 
‘new media’ when its technology migrated to digital platforms and Walter Baer’s 
(1971) vision of two-way communication flow was implemented through digital 
network technologies. Manovich’s early project, aptly called The language of new 
media, written during the 1990s16 in the period of the exponential growth of internet 
use and home computer ownership, takes McLuhan’s statement as challenge and 
announces the software database as a symbolic form of digital technology 
(Manovich, 2001, p. 65): 
New media calls for a new stage in media theory whose beginnings can be 
traced back to the revolutionary works of Robert Innis and Marshall 
McLuhan of the 1950s. To understand the logic of new media we need to 
turn to computer science. It is there that we may expect to find the new 
terms, categories and operations that characterize media that became 
programmable. From media studies, we move to something which can be 
called software studies; from media theory — to software theory.  
Manovich’s intent is a theory of new media that emphasises the stuff that makes this 
‘new’ distinct from previous media and makes it possible; the software and hardware 
that constitute its environment. As a result, Manovich talks (2001) about new media 
in terms of software: 
Its overall method could be called “digital materialism.” Rather than 
imposing some a priori theory from above, I build a theory of new media 
from the ground up. I scrutinize the principles of computer hardware and 
software, and the operations involved in creating cultural objects on a 
computer, in order to uncover a new cultural logic at work. 
                                                
 
15 The early main frame electronic computers of the 1950s era, Microsoft’s ‘Mainframe Era’ (Harper 
et al., 2008), were already being networked and initial concepts of packet networking already 
proposed, with early contracts awarded by the US Department of Defence as early as the 1960s, 
reputedly in response to the launching of Sputnik (1957) and Paul Baran’s 1964 report on distributed 
communications. 
16 The book was published in 2001 but it is made up of a series of essays published between 1992 and 
1998. Discussing his work in 2007, Manovich regrets that he did not call it the ‘languages’ of new 
media. 
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For Manovich, this ‘digital materialism’ results in describing the qualities or 
key trends underlying new media software. He describes five principles. Primarily17 
new media objects exist as data, they are numerical representations where image and 
text are both programmable code18. Thus, a written text, a media form also 
constrained to materiality in that its communication activity depends on a surface, 
parchment, paper or wall, is translated into binary code through allocation of bit-
strings to each individual letter and symbol. Once the object is translated into 
numerical representation, it becomes programmable, that is, it is available to the 
application of an algorithm and forms of manipulation (enlarge text in a digital 
document for example). 
New media objects, because they are programmable code, exhibit what 
Manovich calls modularity. A new media item is made up of these data elements 
(e.g. pixels, images, text, or audio); elements exist independent of each other and so 
can be re-used or modified independently. The example of inserting a media clip in a 
digital document is offered; the clip becomes a part of the whole but maintains its 
independence and is still able to be edited with the program that created it. This 
independence of elements created in code has some ramifications in terms of 
Manovich’s third principle (or trend), because such new media items become 
available for ‘automation’. By this he means that the new media author is able to use 
templates or algorithms, automating opportunities, in order to select the pieces to 
create a work rather than to create ‘from scratch’. He says (2001, p. 125), “The 
creative energy of the author goes into selection and sequencing of elements, rather 
than into their original design.” 
Manovich admits that, “Software does not directly prevent its users from 
creating ‘from scratch’.” However, he flags the fact that his new media creators are 
users, people who use software. They are not designers. Like Huizinga (1949), who 
positions the act of crafting as prosaic and distinguishes it from ‘the creative 
impulse’, Manovich’s users can play (with software) without worrying about the 
artefact itself. He explains (of creating web pages), “Now anybody can become a 
creator by simply providing a new menu, i.e. by making a new selection from the 
                                                
 
17 An early article by Manovich actually posits this ‘primary’ principle as a state or affordance rather 
than a principle (Manovich, 1999) and situates the next four principles as resulting from the 
transcoding into programmable data. 
18 Manovich is writing during the late 1990s. The wide range of media, image, text, audio etc. that is 
programmable in the contemporary era was not as visible. 
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total corpus available” (2001, p. 123). For Manovich this is an expression of the 
ways that software itself can encode cultural norms in their design. He argues (2001, 
p. 124) that, “What was once a set of social and economic practices and conventions 
now become encoded in the software itself. The result is a new form of control, soft 
but powerful.” 
Manovich’s fourth principle in the set arises out of the modular and automation 
nature of new media: new media items can exist in multiple versions; they do not 
possess unique identities; they can be adjusted, tweaked, resized and modified. 
Indeed, the same data can be used to construct an infinite number of different forms 
but still maintain its original coherence. Manovich connects this variability to 
creative possibility once again, likening the potential for creativity to the practice of 
the DJ, once a player of songs and perhaps even a curator whose choice might follow 
a theme or mood (romantic songs for a wedding, the inevitable disco for the 
reception party), the contemporary DJ-as-artist selects and combines elements from 
different works, copy and paste style, so producing something new from the 
combination of the parts. For some commentators (Cazden et al., 1996; Cope & 
Kalantzis, 2009; Kress, 2003) this principle of variability is the focus of theories that 
announce the navigation of new media as a design activity in and of itself. In digital 
games this modularity and the selection opportunity enabled by the automotive 
nature of new media is seen in game modifications, or ‘mods’. Modding is the act of 
altering a game in order to make it different to the original version. Such mods can 
range from simple patches that enhance functionality of the game to partial 
conversions, for example, adding new items, weapons or characters, to total 
conversions, where new story lines are created in new worlds. 
Finally, Manovich’s fifth principle is the one which is most in tune with 
McLuhan’s thesis (1994) that the medium is the message (or ‘massage’19) or that 
form also communicates content. It derives much from McLuhan’s idea that new 
technologies mediate older technologies and in so doing, alter them. These 
alterations have ramifications for society. For example, Macnamara’s (2010b) car 
that is used as an allegory for digital technology (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.2), takes 
the basic technology of movement from A to B of older transportation and makes it 
                                                
 
19 McLuhan initially uses this phrase in an earlier work and punned on the word ‘message’ changing it 
to ‘mass age’ and ‘massage’. The title of his 1967 work The medium is the massage, is reputedly 
based on a printing error. 
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obsolete but it also changes ideas about what it means to be mobile by ushering 
notions of ‘personal mobility’ and ‘freedom’ – perhaps even returning to a sense of 
adventure that pre-automobile public transport might have relegated to days of yore. 
Car ownership also changes conceptualisations about urban life, making the suburbs 
and the shopping mall the new ‘centres’ of the city. 
According to Manovich then, new media encourages transcoding, the 
translation from one format to another. At one level this is the practice of digitising 
books (the Guttenberg project for example) or making collections of digital stories 
for the purposes of community and cultural heritage (Lambert, 2012). This is the 
principle that superficially might seem the most practical, the most prosaic; it is 
frequently cited as ‘saving’ or democratising through global availability. As Bolter 
and Gruisin remark (1999, p. 45), the digital medium “is offered as a new means of 
gaining access to these older materials, as if the content of the older media could 
simply be poured into the new one”. However, transcoding is also the principle that 
can be understood as having the most profound effects in terms of cultural meaning 
and subsequent translation of meaning. To return to Manovich (2001, pp. 64-65): 
The computerization of culture gradually accomplishes similar transcoding 
in relation to all cultural categories and concepts. That is, cultural categories 
and concepts are substituted, on the level of meaning and/or the language, by 
new ones which derive from computer’s ontology, epistemology and 
pragmatics. New media thus acts as a forerunner of this more general 
process of cultural re-conceptualization. 
Where once one might have had to make a journey to Britain to see the Hereford 
Mappa Mundi (c. 1285), one of the largest medieval maps still in existence (158 cm 
by 133 cm), or perhaps purchase an expensive reprint20, a user can now search and 
explore the image of the map via the auspices of digital technologies. However, 
beyond this, the principles of digital technology and new media mean that the image 
can be sourced and used in a document; they mean that parts of the images can be 
sourced, magnified in detail in other writers’ works where the whole is dissected and 
                                                
 
20 For example, P.D.A. Harvey’s 1996 book on the Hereford world map is currently listed by Amazon 
at $176.65 for the hardback copy (with coloured plates one assumes). The Giclee art print ranges in 
price from $112.50 to $338.33. Paper and the technologies of print are perhaps suffering a reversal as 
McLuhan might observe to an earlier era where cost makes them élitist. 
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carefully laid out for the author’s purpose21. Beyond this a user can search, save and 
modify the work, adapt and take its parts to make a collage of medieval maps; the 
original map, painted on vellum, has become a database of parts. The map, which has 
Jerusalem at the top in keeping with the wider cultural narrative of the time, can be 
turned and orientated in accordance with the current (western, post-industrial) map 
making practice that prefers North at the top. 
Such explorations enact far more than playing with a data version of an 
original, they actually transcode the original cultural meanings, the story presented 
through the image. As Manovich (2001, p. 64) argues: 
The ways in which a computer models the world, represents data and allows 
us to operate on it; the key operations behind all computer programs (such as 
search, match, sort, filter); the conventions of HCI — in short, what can be 
called computer’s ontology, epistemology and pragmatics — influence the 
cultural layer of new media: its organization, its emerging genres, its 
contents. 
The apparently simple act of playing with a storied image raises a number of 
questions. Has the image been de-storied (by virtual of the repositioning of 
Jerusalem to its ‘accurate’ eastern position) or has the image been re-storied and 
remediated (Bolter & Gruisin, 1999) by virtue of its transcoding into digital form – 
after all this is a recognised process in medieval map making where hand painted 
maps are copies of older maps, each copy changing or having details added22 or 
removed – and the digital version has enabled a similar process. Or has the image of 
the medieval map, itself representing storied space (Turner & Bidwell, 2007a, 2007b, 
see Chapter 4, this volume), become more storied and made personal for the user, 
now a collaborator and participant in the representation of the image. Or, indeed, to 
return to the theme of story-ing the already storied space of digital games which are 
themselves spatial image, has the map been de-storied and subsequently re-storied 
into something completely alien to the intent of its authors because its original stories 
no longer make sense in its new form? 
                                                
 
21 See Jim Siebold’s Cartographic Images [website], Monograph #226 http://cartographic-
images.net/Cartographic_Images/226_The_Hereford_Mappamundi.html  
22 Commentary on the Richard of Haldringham’s Hereford Mappa Mundi observes that it must have 
been made in the locality because Hereford is so faithfully represented.  
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What if the map in question is not a European medieval map – a product of a 
culture with which some western users as re-makers do at least have some affinity – 
but an Australian Indigenous map? If, as in the Digital Songlines Environment 
project (see Chapter 1, section 1.2 and Chapter 4, this volume) this is taken and 
transcoded into the digital does the subsequent remediated artefact still tell the stories 
of the original in a different way or has it reframed the stories to a western view?  
What if the designer engages the map makers in the project so that they can 
transcode their own stories into this digital medium, what are the ramifications then? 
Are they able to story the digital in their own way or will the culture of the software 
itself affect the story-ing and, as Manovich (2001, p. 64) says, “influence the cultural 
layer of new media: its organization, its emerging genres, its contents”? This is the 
central ‘problematic’ addressed in the current thesis: the question of whose story it 
becomes and how software design assumptions act to translate meaning.  
2.4.2 Cultural technologies 
Manovich’s concept of transcoding has much in common with other theories 
about digital technology as new media. For example, Bolter and Gruisin’s (1999) 
notion of new media as remediation, the idea that digital media constantly uses and 
alters previous media whether it be visible or invisible, creating ‘mosaics’. Echoing 
McLuhan, they argue (1999, p. 15) that what “is new about new media comes from 
the particular ways in which they refashion older media and the ways in which older 
media refashion themselves to answer the challenges of new media”. 
These views on software as media have been interpreted as being impact views 
(Eglash, 2006), or having a technological deterministic tone (Lievrouw & 
Livingstone, 2006) because of the way in which they implicate digital media as part 
of a cultural process. Manovich is certainly clear on the fact that digital media as 
software presents what he calls ‘a cultural interface’. However, whilst having 
situated his critique of software as ‘digital materialism’, Manovich avoids the 
artefact, preferring to examine the media form that the artefact affords. Thus he 
argues that every media form brings with it ideas about ways of being and knowing, 
they re-present the onto-epistemic perspectives of their designers. In turn, these 
perspectives then become absorbed into the ways that people who use such interfaces 
make sense of their worlds and subsequently further contribute to future design 
iterations (Schön, 1983). Manovich (2001, p. 115) also attests to the contribution that 
media make to expectations: 
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Existing cultural forms such as printed word and cinema bring their own 
powerful conventions of organizing information. These forms further interact 
with the human-computer interface conventions to create what I called 
cultural interfaces — new sets of conventions used to organize cultural data. 
Finally, such constructs as screen (and the corresponding representation 
tradition along with its counterpart, the simulation tradition) contribute 
additional layer of conventions. 
Bolter and Gruisin (1999) are also careful to clarify their stance on technologies as 
social products, pointing out that a technology is not merely the artefact or artefacts 
that add up to its presence but also consists of the way it is used. So, for example, the 
World Wide Web (WWW) is not only Berners-Lee’s protocol implemented on 
packet-switching networks of computers in order to access text and data files, it is 
also constructed by the activities of those who add to it: 
These uses are as much a part of the technology as the software itself. For this 
reason, we can say that media technologies are agents in our culture without 
falling into the trap of technological determinism. New digital media are not 
external agents that come to disrupt an unsuspecting culture. They emerge 
from within cultural contexts, and they refashion other media, which are 
embedded in the same or similar contexts (Bolter & Gruisin, 1999, p. 17). 
Technologies, as MacKenzie and Wajcman (1986) point out, ‘matter’: they are an 
aspect of the human condition; from technologies of food growing, hunting, 
preparation; technologies of warmth and shelter; technologies of mobility to the 
perhaps telling contemporary understanding where a mention of ‘technology’ 
assumes the digital. Artefacts, both made and ‘found and used’ are entangled with 
our lives. The problem with impact views on technology or the attribution of agency 
to a technology is that, as MacKenzie and Wajcman (1986, p. 2) say, “[It] contains a 
partial truth.” 
Digital technologies do indeed permeate contemporary post-industrial society. 
What has been called the third computing era of the 1980s and 1990s (Harper, 
Rodden, Rogers & Sellen, 2008), the personal computer and access to networked 
communications systems that inspired commentaries such as Bolter and Gruisin’s 
and Manovich’s, is evolving into a ubiquitous phase where digital technologies 
pervade an extraordinary range of artefacts and systems. Even a visit to the shops (in 
a post-industrial culture) involves multiple encounters. For example, a local shop 
might use a digital system to check its stock. This system is automated via digital 
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processes to ensure that popular items are restocked, less popular items are dropped 
from sale, and items are ordered automatically. Purchasing is part of a digitally 
enabled process: items are bar-coded, barcodes are scanned, and cash registers 
calculate and tally both financial and stock tallies. If a purchase is made using a card, 
the card is scanned and personal accounts are re-calculated accordingly. Such 
calculations are available directly via a contemporary smartphone, so finances can be 
checked and perhaps opportunity allows indulgence in something extra. During time 
spent in the store, cameras record shoppers’ movements, making data available that 
is then used to make decisions on optimal presentation of items to encourage 
purchasing behaviours, or to trace perpetrators of unacceptable behaviours. If the 
shopper drives to the shop, then encounters are multiplied: a contemporary vehicle 
will warn the driver that he or she has not put on a seat belt, that the door isn’t shut 
properly, it will inform them how much fuel they have, and how many kilometres 
they have driven. As roads are negotiated, traffic lights operate using timers that are 
carefully set according to data on traffic flow; some traffic lights have cameras that 
collect data and send it to a centralised service. These systems are invisible to us, 
until as Star (1991) observes, they break down and we find ourselves waiting for the 
card scanner to reboot or trying to negotiate a busy junction when the lights have 
failed. 
These encounters during a small domestic chore are merely fleeting instances 
or the tip of the iceberg. Digital technology underpins multiple systems that might 
become relevant during the single trip in the contemporary urban environment. 
Schools, hospitals, airports, and the full gamut of social services are imbricated in a 
use-relationship with digital technologies. As Manovich says (2013, p. 15), “I think 
of software as a layer that permeates all areas of contemporary societies.” 
The dilemma that Manovich’s software culture theory presents here, for this 
thesis, is perhaps best summed up in his use of the term ‘contemporary’. It raises 
questions about what contemporary might mean in the first instance within culture 
and society. Ideas about ‘contemporaneity’ can also be seen in those discussions that 
position younger people against older people and present notions of ‘digital natives’. 
The concept of the digital native is the basis for Prensky’s digital migrant theory 
(2001) that has given rise to a number of labels, e.g. The Net Generation (Tapscott, 
1998), Screenagers (Rushkoff, 1999), Millennials (Oblinger, 2003) and Homo 
Zappiens (Veen & Vrakking, 2006), and assertions that young people not only learn 
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differently, for example, by searching rather than absorbing, but are different from 
the previous generation. For example, they are perceived as ‘being better’ at multi-
tasking, and see no separation between playing and learning (Veen & Vrakking, 
2006). Jenkins’ (2001) overview of his theory of participatory culture and 
convergence uses the image of a high school student “watching baseball on a big-
screen television, listening to techno on the stereo, word-processing a paper and 
writing e-mail to his friends” (2001, p. 93). The convergence-ees or -ers are the 
young people of post-industrial culture. Further, as the current thesis discusses (see 
Turner, 2015, Chapter 6, this volume) the term ‘contemporary’ assumes post-
industrial, western, highly technologised – or even mediatised – cultures. It positions 
other differently technologised communities as outsiders; non-members and 
ultimately non-contemporaries. This is turn becomes part of a wider discussion about 
the so-called digital divide, the idea that access to digital technology – and its 
software – is vital in terms of economic growth and standards of living; this is not a 
simple differentiation between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ (Warschauer, 2004), 
but a complex framing of the other as distinct.  
In addition, in discussions about ‘storied space’ such as Manovich’s key 
qualities and his affirmation of ‘the database’ as symbolic form, we immediately 
encounter potential mismatches between ‘contemporary’ post-industrialised, western 
cultural habits with their legacies in the Enlightenment and ways of meaning making 
and knowing that do not share those same legacies, such as the Australian indigenous 
communities. As Christie advises (2004, p. 11), there exists a “problematic 
disjunction between the structured information to be found on a computer, and the 
integrated, holistic, lived and performed knowledges of Aboriginal people on 
country”. Nakata (2002) also observes that such approaches tend to form knowledge 
of ‘Others’ that are quite discontinuous with indigenous historical contexts. Here, 
there is indeed potential to transpose stories into Márquez’s ‘alien schemas’ (Bidwell, 
Radoll, & Turner, 2007; Turner, 2006a; Turner, 2006b; Turner & Bidwell, 2007a; 
Turner & Bidwell, 2007b; Turner et al., 2009). 
More problematically, particularly when it comes to the notion of ‘story-ing’ is 
the notion of access to software embedded in Manovich’s five qualities of 
programmable data, automation, variability and transcoding described earlier. While 
Manovich does indeed announce ‘programmability’ as a central distinction between 
digital and previous media forms, he is quick to dismiss actual programming as a 
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means of access, focusing on the cultural interface and the software (programs) used 
“to author and access new media objects” (2001, p. 65), pointing out that “software 
does not directly prevent its users from creating from scratch” (2001, p. 125), but 
that the design of the software interface makes it ‘natural’ to follow the logic of 
selection. This is not software creation or authorship but software use. 
2.4.3 Culture as use 
Since Manovich’s 2001 account of software was published and since Bolter 
and Gruisin (1999) explored the nature of new media, digital technology has become 
more pervasive. The network the authors were using as a communications medium 
has become more available to more people via ubiquitous multiple platforms (Harper 
et al., 2008), in contemporary post-industrial urban environments, at least. 
Manovich’s later work (2013) picks up where The language of new media stops and 
much of his theoretical evolution in this latter work is an attempt to include the 
ramifications of social networks in his theory of software, he explains (2008, p. 193): 
… instead of dealing with separate media design applications, we now have 
to consider larger media environments which integrates [sic] the functions of 
creating media, publishing it, remixing other people’ [sic] media, discussing 
it, keeping up with friends and interest groups, meeting new people, and so 
on.  
Manovich’s five qualities: numerical representation (new media objects as data), 
modularity, automation, variability and transcoding, are now available for multiple 
re-mix opportunities in a networked environment. Remix culture, Manovich claims, 
is in the process of defining the era. The combination of different media forms, 
appropriated from both old and new media, are re-fashioned via the auspices of the 
digital medium. The software designer’s emphasis on enabling task, and the resultant 
characteristic of automation, allows users to make their own meaning with 
transcoded media. For other commentators, this remix culture is about participation 
and media convergence. 
This is the central theme in Jenkins’ (2006) attempt to understand shifts in 
contemporary culture brought about by digital media. Where Manovich advocates 
for a theory of software, Jenkins is more interested in cultural process and 
particularly the cultural process enabled by digital technologies and ubiquitous 
communications technologies. Here it is not the software that matters but the ways in 
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which people connect and collaborate to produce the remixing. For Jenkins, this is a 
democratisation of media. He takes his cue from Pierre Lévy’s (1998) notion of 
‘collective intelligence’, a concept that proposes the phenomenon of group 
intelligence as something that emerges through collaboration, collective efforts and 
competition. Jenkins announces (2006, p. 27): 
New forms of community are emerging, however: these new communities are 
defined through voluntary, temporary, and tactical affiliations, reaffirmed 
through common intellectual enterprises and emotional investments. … These 
communities, however, are held together through the mutual production and 
reciprocal exchange of knowledge. As Lévy writes, such groups “make 
available to the collective intellect all of the pertinent knowledge available to 
it at a given moment.” More importantly, they serve as sites for “collective 
discussion, negotiation, and development,” and they prod the individual 
members to seek out new information for the common good.  
Jenkins’ media convergence is ‘exhibit A’ for the potential of a new kind of 
collective intelligence, a concept that has its roots in philosophies that position mind 
over matter and body. Jenkins describes convergence as “the flow of content across 
multiple media platforms, the cooperation between multiple media industries, and the 
migratory behaviour of media audiences who will go almost anywhere in search of 
the kinds of entertainment experiences they want” (2006, p. 2). He defines it as not 
just transcoding but actually bringing together (converging) older media forms. The 
authors are not just the new media artist that Manovich tends to direct his work 
towards but the contemporary consumer of media. In his view, media convergence is 
an on-going process that is not so much a displacement as an interaction, blending or 
even a collision. It is more than technological process where a new media form 
remediates a previous form, for Jenkins (2006, p. 3), “Convergence represents a 
cultural shift as consumers are encouraged to seek out new information and make 
connections among dispersed media content.” 
This convergence is recognised as part of the technological process, 
Manovich’s primary quality of media where everything can become data, but it is 
also part of the economic processes of cultural production; the integration of 
entertainment industries where a single interest will now control production across 
multiple media forms such as film, books, music, the internet, toys – and games. Out 
of technological and economic convergence new information environments arise and 
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consumers become adept at what Jenkins calls ‘social or organic convergence’. The 
phenomenon of multiple screen use where someone might be writing on one screen, 
have a social media feed in the background or on another screen, say a smartphone, 
streaming music on another device and even (for some of us) have a further screen in 
the background that happily burbles away and keeps them company with day time 
television, itself broadcast courtesy of a converged media corporation. This is no 
longer the third computing era but is indeed Microsoft’s fourth computing era 
(Harper et al., 2008), where a single user has access and employs multiple devices 
within a ubiquitously digital environment. 
Manovich’s qualities (the modularity and variability of media and its 
availability to automation) are recognised as features of a convergence process by 
Jenkins. Where Manovich focuses on the affordances of the software, Jenkins looks 
to the affordances for social construction. For Jenkins this is cultural convergence, a 
process where a dynamic tension arises between economic convergence and social 
convergence as he describes it (2001, p. 93): 
…the explosion of new forms of creativity at the intersections of various 
media technologies, industries and consumers. Media convergence fosters a 
new participatory folk culture by giving average people the tools to archive, 
annotate, appropriate and recirculate content. Shrewd companies tap this 
culture to foster consumer loyalty and generate low-cost content.  
While Jenkins recognises that there is a difference between top-down, corporate and 
bottom-up or grass roots activity in his cultural convergence, he sees this as working 
in the consumer’s favour. As culture becomes more convergent, these consumers, or 
as Bruns calls them (2008) ‘produsers’, are actually essential to new media 
production because they create the content. Such users (apparently) have power and 
voice. Jenkins (2004b, p. 37) argues that they can ‘talk back’: 
Convergence is both a top-down corporate-driven process and a bottom-up 
consumer-driven process. Media companies are learning how to accelerate 
the flow of media content across delivery channels to expand revenue 
opportunities, broaden markets and reinforce viewer commitments. 
Consumers are learning how to use these different media technologies to 
bring the flow of media more fully under their control and to interact with 
other users. They are fighting for the right to participate more fully in their 
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culture, to control the flow of media in their lives and to talk back to mass 
market content.  
This is participatory culture then for Jenkins, the re-mix opportunity that 
Manovich (2001, 2013) observes is seen as ‘a wind of change’ and a potential 
onslaught of democracy, “enabling new forms of participation and collaboration” 
(Jenkins, 2006, p. 245). Indeed, Jenkins’ final process of convergence is that of 
global convergence, citizenship of McLuhan’s ‘global village’ (1989) and global 
hybridity where Japanese comics and anime styles cross-pollinate western comic 
styles to produce global heroes and heroines. Here, the artefact that is the focus of 
this thesis is fore-fronted as an important example, where Manovich uses the image 
of the DJ, Jenkins (2006, p. 137) offers game modders: 
Grassroots convergence is embodied, for example, in the work of the game 
modders, who build on code and design tools created for commercial games 
as a foundation for amateur game production, or in digital filmmaking, 
which often directly samples material from commercial media, or adbusting, 
which borrows iconography from Madison Avenue to deliver an 
anticorporate or anticonsumerist message. Having buried the old folk 
culture, this commercial culture becomes the common culture.  
Jenkins’ presentation of participatory culture is hopeful, albeit ensconced in a very 
specific milieu of mediatised, post industrial culture where access to technology is an 
assumed aspect of life-style and privilege. He positions the changes wrought by 
media convergence to the grand narrative of the enlightenment project, offering a 
new Renaissance. He writes (2001, p. 93): 
The first Renaissance was a period of political and social instability, and the 
old monastic order crumbled. Today, media convergence is sparking a range 
of social, political, economic and legal disputes because of the conflicting 
goals of consumers, producers and gatekeepers. These contradictory forces 
are pushing both toward cultural diversity and toward homogenization, 
toward commercialization and toward grassroots cultural production.  
It is perhaps statements like this that led to an earlier theorist of the potential of 
social networks, Howard Rheingold, to refer to Jenkins as “the McLuhan for the 21st 
century” (Jenkins, 2006). However Jenkins’ project in Convergence is more about 
documentation of multiple instances of re-story-ing that he sees in contemporary 
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technologised culture and about the tensions within the cultural processes, for which 
Manovich’s software is merely a vehicle.  
Jenkins’ conceptualisation of participatory culture, and his discussion of the 
tensions between contradictory forces (top-down vs. bottom-up), defines 
participation against a notion of passive spectatorship and as a product of social 
interaction. In essence, it is a participation in the process of consumption where 
media producers and consumers no longer occupy separate roles but where “we 
might now see them as participants who interact with each other according to a new 
set of rules that none of us fully understands” (2006, p. 3). He highlights the fact that 
not all participants in this new relationship enabled by digital technologies are 
created equal, but argues that there is potential for power and voice.  
There is a problematic and simplistic reductionism in this and other statements 
about access to power. As Fuchs (2011) declares, Jenkins’ definition of participation 
lacks any critical depth in that it assumes a general attainment of power through 
some kind of momentum. That is to say, if ‘everyone’ can re-mix, mod, and mash-up 
aspects of media through structures and networks enabled by technologies, then they 
have a presence which in and of itself changes the relationship between consumers 
and producers. However, this idea of participation ignores the fact of ownership and 
corporate structure that might indeed allow for a new model of production in order to 
incorporate ‘participatory’ activities but does not actually include these participants 
in its decision-making about infrastructure implementation, investment or product 
development and resourcing practices. It ignores the material reality of digital 
technology. Manovich’s (2001) re-mix opportunities positions participants as 
functional participants, they are active but their activity is often post-production and 
their designing is designed for (Ehn, 2008). They are participating after the major 
decisions have been made, at least, if one considers the ‘major’ decisions to be those 
that determine the shape and form of infrastructures (e.g. network parameters or 
software operating systems).  
Macnamara suggests that this hybridisation where media “adapt, share content, 
partner and evolve” (2010a, p. 7) allows the status quo to continue within an 
emergent system. For Macnamara, the essence of the grassroots collaboration is the 
interactive affordance of the digital form. He cites software culture commentator 
Johnson’s work on emergence (2001) and the key distinction that Johnson argues 
defines digital media forms and gives them the potential to enable bottom-up, grass-
 82 Chapter 2: The importance of stories and the dilemma of disappearance 
roots participation and therefore voice. That is, in older media, for example, 
broadcast television, the audience typically receives the messages sent out with 
minimal opportunity for response. The rules that control the direction of the 
messages are imposed by the content creators. In digital media, frequently defined in 
terms of interactivity (Johnson, 2001), content flow is two way and the ‘rules’ are 
typically ‘self organising’. 
Like Jenkins, Macnamara situates evolution of the mediascape as cultural 
practice not technological. He does allow that the current system and its 
technological infrastructure affords the emergence of grass roots collaboration and 
practices, meaning that the emerging mediascape is happening in participation with 
the same users that Jenkins documents in his work. Macnamara also cites Lévy’s 
(1997) concept of collective intelligence (2010a, p. 10): 
Much of the content of what are called emergent media and public 
communication practices in this paper is created through grassroots 
collaboration harnessing ‘collective intelligence’ … and distributed through 
social networks. As such, these developments are largely self-organising, 
bottom-up, unpredictable and uncontrolled in the way that media and public 
communication have been controlled in the first media age. 
While he is more prosaic than Jenkins about changes as a result of ‘emergent media 
practices’, ultimately Macnamara’s cultural emergence is in keeping with the goals 
of public communication and shared creativity. It is about human communication 
within culture. He cites Merholz (2005), the commentator who shortened John 
Barger’s term ‘weblog’ to ‘blog’, who says (of the second generation web), “It’s an 
attitude, not a technology”, echoing Huizinga’s (1949) assertion that it is not about 
the marbles but the game. The artefact itself is disappeared or rather relegated to 
being Macnamara’s (2010b) ‘device for getting to places’. 
This is all very well if one is a member of the culture out of which the artefact 
in question arises. The problem is that, while ‘it’ might indeed be about cultural 
process and Merholz’s ‘attitude’, the technology is an already storied artefact; it is 
already deeply entangled in the pre-figured story-world of post-industrial, mediatised 
cultures. However, it doesn’t cease to exist just because it is no (apparently) longer 
necessary to ‘weave myths about it’. Rather than ceasing to exist, the invisibility of 
the artefact as a part of the storied world only serves to confound any attempts to 
unveil its hidden assumptions and values. If, as Manovich says, “we are no longer 
 Chapter 2: The importance of stories and the dilemma of disappearance 83 
interfacing to a computer but to culture encoded in digital form” (2001, p.76), and if, 
as Kittler observes (1995) and this research argues, software is only one aspect of the 
digital artefact, then the emphasis on participation through use is seriously 
problematised.  
As Jenkins (2006, p. 133) admits in his discussion of participatory culture and 
the opportunity to make meaning using digital artefacts, nearly all user activities in 
interactive environments are “prestructured by the designer”. The rules that Jenkins 
declares (2006) as being ‘not fully understood by everyone’, are culturally 
constructed, they are not aspects of the artefact but aspects of activity enacted using 
digital artefacts. In sum, the artefact itself has disappeared in favour of use and 
activity with the artefact and any empowerment remains firmly constrained to use. 
The artefact as hardware-software thing has become Macnamara’s (2010b) vehicle 
that enables agency in terms of mobility; it has become Flusser’s black box. 
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Chapter 3: Methodologies 
[T]he artifact is less a text to be read than a story to be told. (Wright 1993, p. 245) 
This chapter offers an overview of the methodologies that underpin the 
research. It provides an explanation of the application of these methodologies in the 
submitted publications (Chapters, 4, 5, 6 and 7) that guide the reflections on 
implications in the final chapter of this research (Chapter 8). As a theoretical 
research thesis, the methodologies chapter is substantive and more in depth than a 
practice-based or implemented research thesis might allow. I have not merely 
focussed on the core methodological approaches, the combination of Ricœur’s 
critical hermeneutics and Freire’s critical pedagogy, but have mapped out the stories 
of their antecedents, clarifying Horkheimer’s critical theory and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics as well as the Gadamer – Habermas discussion that led directly to 
Ricœur’s ‘third path’. This is important in the light of the final implications offered 
in chapter eight that critique the abduction of methodologies in design practices.  
3.1.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discusses software as a cultural artefact, focusing on 
Manovich’s (2001) analysis of software as ‘the cultural glue that underpins 
contemporary society’ and his elaboration of the characteristics of software as a 
designed artefact. The discussion concludes with reflections on the way this cultural 
glue works as a storied cultural artefact and problematises assumptions about design 
and participation, particularly in non western, non post-industrial contexts where the 
storied world and Ricœur’s pre-figured environment is already asymmetrical. For a 
designer and critical pedagogy practitioner like myself, Manovich’s ‘software 
culture’ analysis lacks a critical dimension. He describes, albeit eloquently, and does 
not offer any opportunity for action. This description without praxis opportunity does 
much to re-create Flusser’s notion of the ‘black box’ (1983); it prioritises use of 
digital technologies without the need to understand how such technologies actually 
‘work’ as cultural products. 
Flusser’s black-box (1983) and his challenge to literacy is becoming 
increasingly important to reveal, particularly in the case of software normally 
designed for the purposes of play that is being used ‘beyond’ its original purview and 
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explored for its potential in educational areas and for cultural transmission. The aim 
of the current research endeavour is an interrogation of a prevalent attitude to our 
technological artefacts in order to expose and critique the pre-figured story-ing that, 
from a Freirean perspective, is open to his contention (1972) that without critical 
awareness, dialogue and participation from within the story-ing act, is the creation of 
an illusion of power. The research argues that any opportunity for Freirean 
transformation and action must be based in understandings of the way that design 
works to produce culturally storied artefacts. Without this critical awareness, 
transformative action is either impossible or at least misguided.  
The goals of transformative research are essentially humanistic, they should 
represent… 
…the capable germ to promote an endogenous development of the 
evolutionary spirit of internal critical consciousness, where religion and 
science are complementary. Respect, solidarity and cooperation should be 
global standards for the entire human development with no boundaries 
(Ruano 2013, para. 2). 
However, even the most humanistic of intentions can be confounded if 
Haraway’s (1991) view from the centre is not recognised. As Thiong’o (1993) has 
observed, even empowered African voices expect to frame their work in the language 
– and in the material modality – of the coloniser. In post-colonial contexts, a higher 
value is placed on the language of the coloniser and access to publishing for post-
colonial subjects, particularly in academic disciples (Bidwell, 2014), and demands 
what Bhabha (1994) calls mimicry of the coloniser’s ways of knowing. In post-
colonial situations, stories told exhibit multiple contradictions as a result of the 
colonial project. For example, Mishra and Hodge’s critique of post-colonialism in 
literature (1991) cites the Australian indigenous writer who recognises the paradox of 
both writing in the language of the coloniser and apparently erstwhile ‘master’ and 
the simultaneous problem of writing as an ‘Aboriginal’, a category provided by the 
coloniser23.  
Similarly, Tuhiwai Smith (1999) demands a respect for a plurality of 
approaches in her critique of western methodologies, pointing out that a 
                                                
 
23 The naming of communities from ‘the outside’ and the re-claiming and empowered use of a once 
dismissive term is discussed in Turner (2015, see Chapter 6, this volume). 
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methodology that has legacies in the western tradition of objectivity, however well 
intentioned, has the effect of denigrating different approaches that do not conform to 
its established parameters. Smith’s goals are not the dismantling of methodological 
principles themselves but the claiming of the right for indigenous and post-colonial 
peoples to frame their own research in their own ways. Smith’s critique is salutary 
since any research that proposes indigenous or post-colonial ‘subjects’ is in danger of 
re-affirming some kind of hegemonic relationship.  
Nevertheless, Ruano’s call and its humanistic intent is an ideal goal for the 
current research which, while lacking a plurality of voices, includes perspectives 
from the fields of education, design and material culture in order to unveil meaning 
and contribute to knowledge. Smith’s (1999) challenge to western methodologies 
defines the site of the research itself. As a white, Anglo-Saxon researcher, it is 
appropriate that the focus is on the artefacts that arise within the mimetic process and 
culture to which I belong, and the scope of the research itself is limited to those 
artefacts and the implications of their storied nature. A hermeneutical approach that 
takes Ricœur to heart announces that this is all I can do because I am myself 
entangled in the on-going mimetic cycle of the storied world. However, as Ingold 
observes (2014, p. 383), to remain steadfastly within the confined ‘theatre’ of my 
own discipline and critique of my own discipline inevitably dooms the work to 
having, as he says “nowhere to go”. 
These insights frame the methodological approach and define the scope of the 
current work. In sum, the current study is interdisciplinary (albeit an essentially auto-
interdisciplinarity) with opportunity for transformation as an outcome. This requires 
that the research itself takes a theoretical stance. A theoretical research endeavour 
does not apply a theoretical framework to a specific problem in the sense of 
researching it on the ground; rather the research takes a ‘step back’ in order to reflect 
on underlying assumptions, unveiling them, to use Freire’s (1972) expression, so that 
the entangled stories of the pre-figured (research) environment can be teased apart 
and so allow for critical insights and lay the groundwork for potential praxis and 
what is referred to here as the ‘hope-full’ endeavour.  
3.1.2 Towards the hope-full endeavour 
The use of Freire and critical pedagogy as a theoretical framework for the 
current research (see Chapter 1, section 1.4.2) firmly situates the current research 
within a critical research paradigm as a pathway to transformational research. Like 
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critical research, transformative research is based on two foundational questions. It 
seeks to understand who is privileged or legitimised; and as a corollary, to 
understand who is opposed, silenced or disenfranchised (Cannella & Lincoln, 2009). 
Critical research also searches for the historical origins of asymmetries and how they 
become accepted norms. Cannella and Lincoln announce four key aspects of critical 
and transformative research. The first aspect is the goal of exposure of the invisible 
structures that add to and support asymmetrical power relationships or to “illuminate 
the hidden structures of power deployed in the construction of its own power, and the 
disempowerment of others” (Cannella & Lincoln, 2009, p. 55). Secondly, critical 
perspectives inquire ‘deeply’ into forms that shape social life and individual decision 
making. For Cannella and Lincoln, and somewhat tellingly for the current research, 
these forms are primarily understood as being present in the abstract and immaterial 
world of language. Thirdly, critical research engages with issues of gender, race and 
poverty as social constructs produced by asymmetrical systems of access and power. 
And fourthly, critical perspectives seek to interrogate “relations shaped by conquest” 
(2009, p. 56), the lasting effects of colonialism on the cultural experiences of the 
colonised (see also Bhabha, 1994; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988; Thiong’o, 1993). 
Critical research then, is research that has the aim of understanding, uncovering and 
illuminating a situated problem, with the explicit intention of enabling 
transformation. To this goal of unveiling, Freire’s critical pedagogy approach adds 
the distinction of problem posing against problem solving. The distinction is 
important; where the critical is powerful and revealing, it tends to the judgemental 
and non-actionable. Critical pedagogy and problem posing is hope-full or potentially 
actionable in that it offers opportunity to build upon understandings and continue to 
transformative action. 
In the current study, the aim is to examine critically not the surface language 
that Cannella and Lincoln advocate, but the structures of the digital artefact; its 
design and its material nature that contribute to it as a form. The current work posits 
that this emphasis is equally important. As Tilley et al. (2006, p. 3) announce: 
…the study of the material dimension is as fundamental to understanding 
culture as is a focus on language (formalized in the discipline of linguistics 
and linguistic anthropology) or social relations (formalized in sociology and 
social anthropology) or time (archaeology and history) or space (geography) 
or representations (literary and art historical studies) or a focus on relations 
of production, exchange and consumption (economics). Material culture 
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studies may be held simultaneously to intersect with and to transcend the 
special concerns of these and other disciplines. 
Barad (2003, p. 801) is less conciliatory when she writes, “Language has been 
granted too much power” and asks: 
How did language come to be more trustworthy than matter? Why are 
language and culture granted their own agency and historicity while matter 
is figured as passive and immutable, or at best inherits a potential for change 
derivatively from language and culture. 
Barad’s query resonates in a growing interest in materials and materiality in the 
world and the manner in which we are ‘deeply entangled’ as Hodder (2012) puts it, 
with a world that is full of things. Culture is manifest in more than language and 
communication, it is manifest in ‘things’ (Hodder, 2012), ‘stuff’ (Leonard, 2010), 
‘objects’ (Harman, 2010) and, in the current research, artefacts, objects shaped 
through human intervention, craft and design.  
3.2 CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS 
Smith’s (1999) critique of any criticality that arises in established (western) 
tradition is an important place to start a work that has announced goals of ‘towards 
transformational opportunity’. Smith alerts us to the prioritising of what she calls ‘the 
western gaze on the Other’, embedded in even the most apparently well-intentioned 
research methodologies. She notes that even the existence of ‘post-colonial’ research, 
for all its announced sensitivities to the positioning of indigenous and post-colonial 
peoples, is open to accusation of re-inscribing the privileges of western academics; 
once again confirming the assumed superiority of western ways of being and 
meaning making. In this, Smith echoes Thiong’o’s (1993) discussion that 
problematises the expectations of African writers to establish credibility from within 
the discourses, languages and communication modes of the coloniser. Further, her 
insights act to highlight the dilemmas of critical theory and the critical hermeneutic 
approach. 
3.2.1 Critical theory 
The ‘idea’ of critical theory as Geuss (1981, p. 2) puts it, is “a reflective theory 
which gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and 
emancipation”. At its heart lies a critique of ideology, or ideologies, which are 
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perceived as conditioning systems that at once describe and prescribe assumed norms 
within any socio-cultural context. Geuss suggests that this general view of ideology 
is descriptive; ideology in the broad descriptive sense refers to the range of beliefs a 
cultural group may hold about religion, behaviours and attitudes. However, an 
ideology can be pejorative. It embeds notions of cultural control; the beliefs that can 
be described act to structure asymmetrical power relations within a cultural group 
(Geuss, 1981). An ideology can also be ‘positive’ in the sense that beliefs and values 
within any given culture often answer the needs of that culture for meaning and 
identity. Both the pejorative and positive forms of ideology tend to the prescriptive; 
that is ideologies that underpin cultural systems and so construct a controlling 
influence are usually articulated through ideologies that answer the apparent needs of 
a cultural group. Smith’s (1999) aforementioned critique of research methodologies 
embodying the western gaze offers an example of the way in which a ‘positive’ 
ideology (an understanding that research should be about life enhancement) is 
enmeshed with more controlling ideologies (in order to be understood and validated 
as research, the work must conform to established norms and procedures). Pejorative 
and positive notions of ideology may not always be either good or bad in and of 
themselves but they can become one or the other depending on context and the 
cultural group. The prescriptive nature of ideologies can therefore be critiqued and 
their coercive performance unveiled, thus enabling ‘liberation’ as Horkheimer (1982, 
p. 244) writes, of people “from the circumstances that enslave them”. 
The roots of critical theory lie in Horkheimer’s (1982) critique of positivist 
approaches that are based on a Cartesian separation of mind and body that allow for 
an objective investigator and transcendent methodologies, views from nowhere as 
Haraway (1991) puts it. Horkheimer (1982) challenges any possibility of a view 
independent of embodied humanity and the experience of being. He argues that it is 
naïve (Corradetti, 2012) to assume the possibility of impartiality and separate social 
facts from an equally social interpretation. Instead, Horkeheimer insists that any 
observer must be understood as being a member of society and culture themselves, 
their analysis invariably formed by the socio-cultural system to which they belong. 
For Horkheimer, the socio-cultural milieu of post-war Europe produces 
dominant forms of knowledge that demonstrate legacies in the Enlightenment project 
and the pursuit of ‘reason’. In his later writing with Adorno (Horkheimer & Adorno, 
1987) he is overt in a direct critique of Kant’s enthusiasm for the project that 
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‘liberates’ and ‘enlightens’ through emphasis on human reason as a means of 
discovering truth. Rather than enabling access to truth, Horkheimer and Adorno 
propose that the focus on knowledge itself is at the expense of a focus on what they 
call ‘value’, or the meaning of that knowledge to experience. The Enlightenment 
project is focused on technology and progress they say; it seeks to overturn 
dependence on myth in favour of the scientific method and discovery of facts. 
However, all knowledge is historical; even scientific ‘facts’ are mutable and evolve 
over time as new discoveries are made. Further, all knowledge is also political and 
ideological because, being produced by historically situated observers; it cannot be 
detached from power relations within the society that produces it.  
Horkheimer’s critique points out that if the traditional method, established in 
the scientific enthusiasm of the Enlightenment assumes a transcendent and impartial 
observer, it is only ever capable of reflecting its own view of the world and 
discovering what it believes can be discovered; essentially mythologising itself. The 
emphasis on objective truth, set up to counter myth, becomes myth. The goals of 
critical theory are also about ‘discovery’ but the endeavour is the unveiling of these 
myths. In critical theory, knowledge is not something that is accumulated; knowledge 
is something that can – and should – be used. 
However, with this tenet, critical theory finds itself entangled in its own stories. 
So, where critical theory has the goal of action in its aims to unveil the hidden in 
order to emancipate and enable social justice, the theory falls afoul of its own critical 
methodology that results in descriptive statements. Such descriptive statements are 
essentially non-derivable (Corradetti, 2012), in that a critique does not easily resolve 
itself into any clear potential action. For example, in the case of the current research 
that critiques the storied nature of software as cultural artefact, the unveiling of the 
storied nature of software actually does much to create a situation where 
participation is seriously problematised and so has the potential to proscribe use of 
digital artefacts and software in non western, non post-industrial contexts. Such 
proscription would be anathema to any transformative opportunity. 
In addition to this theory-practice dilemma, the very location of critical theory 
in the historical trajectories of European thought deeply problematises any potential 
action towards emancipation because of the way in which notions of what such 
‘emancipation’ might actually mean are framed by the experience of the theorist. As 
Geertz observes (1973), it is not possible to describe or evaluate and critique an 
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ideology without framing the critique from the writer’s own ideological perspective. 
Smith (1999) alerts us to the ramifications of this dilemma in post-colonial contexts 
when she observes that even researchers with the best ‘liberatory’ intentions are 
often bringing their own onto-epistemic values, and indeed, their own moral values, 
to bear on the situation in need of emancipation. 
In the specific case of digital technologies and contemporary understandings of 
the advantages and potential emancipatory opportunities that they might bring (see 
Turner, 2015, Chapter 6, this volume), Warschauer (2004) is particularly clear when 
he condemns practices that introduce digital technologies into post-colonial contexts 
without consideration of what is meant by ‘emancipation’ or the ways in which the 
western view equates life opportunity with ‘access’ to technologies at the expense of 
the onto-epistemologies – the ways of being and knowing – of the subjects24.  
In the light of such dilemmas, Ricœur (1991) proposes that critical theory must 
be enacted alongside a hermeneutic approach, one where interpretation is also 
reflective and subjective. He writes (1991, p. 114), “In short, in hermeneutical 
reflection – or in reflective hermeneutics – the constitution of the self is 
contemporaneous with the constitution of meaning.” 
3.2.2 Hermeneutic methodologies 
Hermeneutic methodologies are essentially interpretive. The hermeneutic 
tradition has its roots in interpretation of canonical religious texts such as the Bible, 
the Talmud or the Vedas. Aristotle’s On Interpretation lays the groundwork for a 
formal secular approach to hermeneutics in the western tradition of philosophy 
because it represents an endeavour to deal with the relationship between language 
and logic in an explicit formalised manner.  
Contemporary hermeneutic methodologies, and the ‘art’ of interpretation 
(Kinsella, 2006), can be said to start with Heidegger’s phenomenological position 
and his reversal of the Cartesian dictum (1962). Heidegger situates knowledge in the 
world and stipulates that, in order to be a thinking human, one must first ‘be’; in 
order to be; one must be ‘somewhere’. Heidegger thus rejects detachment from the 
world. This state of ‘being in the world’ or Dasein requires that the phenomenon of 
                                                
 
24 The recent foundation of internet.org with its vision of “connectivity as a human right”, embedded 
in a carefully walled garden of accessible material, provides a rather salient example of the kinds of 
issues that can arise when ideologies of emancipation are not critiqued and examined carefully. 
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experience of being is understood ontologically. Heidegger’s phenomenology rejects 
the objective position that gives primary reality to the physical world, and the 
‘simple’ subjective position. Instead, the phenomenological perspective argues that it 
is impossible for one to exist without the other (Winograd & Flores, 1986). It further 
demands that an understanding of being in the world is fundamental to all existence 
(Thomas, 2006). The dilemmas of the impossible views that face critical theory are, 
in Heideggerian hermeneutics, made part and parcel of the interpretation.  
Central to any hermeneutical interpretation is the notion of the hermeneutic 
circle. The hermeneutic circle (Heidegger, 1971) is the process through which 
interrogation seeks to understand its object in terms of its parts; an understanding that 
must reference the whole object. This becomes cyclic as the interrogator moves from 
the individual parts and back to the whole, in ever deepening circles. In this circle, 
the interpreter’s understanding of the whole is invariably established with reference 
to understandings of the individual parts which make up that whole and the 
understanding of the parts is further clarified with reference to the whole in which 
the parts reside. Understanding is thus a dynamic process whereby the interpreter 
continuously moves back and forth between the parts (the specific) and the whole 
(the wider world or the general). Heidegger offers an example of this in his 
discussion of the origin of the work of art (1971). He asserts that the artist and the art 
work can only be understood in reference to each other and that neither the artist nor 
the art work can be understood without reference to a general idea of art itself. Art, 
as a general idea, is further defined in reference to the specific instances of art and art 
maker. Heidegger writes (1971, p. 18):  
Thus we are compelled to follow the circle. This is neither a makeshift or a 
defect. To enter upon the path is the strength of thought, to continue on it is 
the feast of thought, assuming thinking is a craft. Not only is the main step 
from work to art a circle like the step from art to work, but every separate step 
that we attempt circles this circle. In order to discover the nature of the art that 
really prevails in the work, let us go to the actual work and ask the work what 
and how it is. 
Heidegger describes this hermeneutic circle or process as dynamic cycles of 
self-reference that effectively situate all understandings gained within the context of 
previous understandings. Gadamer (1975) further develops the concept of the 
hermeneutic process by reconceptualising it as an ongoing or iterative process which 
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allows new meanings to be incorporated in the cycle. Gadamer essentially adds a 
remediation stage to Heidegger’s ‘back and forth’ whereby the process is 
continuously changed and augmented (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Diagram showing Gadamer’s hermeneutic cycle with augmentation phases and direction 
towards understandings 
The first thing this augmentation enacts is recognition of Heidegger’s 
ontologically embodied contributor. Gadamer observes that the process of 
interrogation (questioning) is always made partial by the circumstances of the 
questioner; they are at once attempting to reconstruct the original context of the 
object of interrogation whilst being a part of the storied world that the object of 
interrogation itself presents. All that is available is what Gadamer calls ‘a fusion of 
horizons’; the original historical context of the interpreted object is elusive because 
the questioner remains embedded within the same context. Any explanation must 
always be partial because of this and instead interpretation should aim for a ‘fusion 
of horizons’, that is, an acceptance of the impossibility of a total unambiguous 
explanation and a focus on augmentation of meaning as an achievable goal. Gadamer 
thus reframes the hermeneutic approach as interpretation with the goal of 
understanding, beyond interpretation. He writes (1975, p. 367), “Part of real 
understanding … is that we regain the concepts of a historical past in such a way that 
they also include our own comprehension of them.” Gadamer’s conceptualisation of 
the fusion of horizons is essentially dialogic. It resists any idea of discovery of 
absolute knowledge and replaces it with an idea of understanding achieved through 
conversation with the object of inquiry.  
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In this way, Gadamer makes a break with hermeneutic tradition (Kinsella, 
2006), which is focused on a terminal understanding; a final interpretation and 
description. Gadamer notes (1975, p. 304) that “the circular movement of 
understanding runs backward and forward along the text and ceases when the text is 
perfectly understood”. Rather than accept this terminal ‘perfection’ of the process of 
interpretation, Gadamer takes Heidegger’s notion of the dynamism of the 
hermeneutic process and the phenomenon of the observer’s participation with the 
circle in order to allow for a dialogue between early and subsequent cycles of the 
circle. As Kinsella (2006) puts it, the circle is ‘constantly augmented’ by new 
information. The art of interpretation thus becomes a search for meaning from 
experience.  
The search for meaning in Gadamer’s hermeneutics depends on his 
understanding of language as the constituent medium for subjective meaning making. 
He writes, “Language is the universal medium in which understanding occurs” 
(1975, p. 407). Any construction of meaning or opportunity for reflection is both 
through language and within language and the result of some kind of translation 
between the interpreter and the interpreted. Gadamer continues to declare (1975, p. 
407) that, “All understanding is interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in 
the medium of language that allows the object to come into words and yet is at the 
same time the interpreter’s own language.” The understanding thus allowed is 
simultaneously distanced by time and made co-existent in time, particularly for 
Gadamer in the case of the written word, hermeneutics’ original object. Here, 
language and meaning are made available to the present from the past and historical 
meaning remediated within the present. Understanding is framed by a search for 
meaning and a fusion of horizons. Gadamer avers (1975, p. 413), “The horizon of 
understanding cannot be limited either by what the writer originally had in mind or 
by the horizon of the person to whom the text was originally addressed.” 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach then, includes and frames interpretive 
inquiry as part and parcel of its accounts of phenomena as they appear in the world to 
an interpreter who is also embodied in the world. This historical hermeneutical 
approach seeks understanding and, by virtue of its approach, embraces ambiguity 
(Kinsella, 2006). As such, the approach is often used in cultural analysis where the 
goal is not the validation of analysis but a wider understanding of what the analysis 
‘means’. Geertz explains, “Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings, 
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assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses, 
not discovering the continent of Meaning and mapping out its bodiless landscape” 
(Geertz, 1973, p. 20). 
3.2.3 Critical hermeneutics 
There is a problematic tension for any hermeneutic methodology here, as has 
already been noted with reference to Smith’s (1999) indictment of ethnographic 
research. Gadamer’s hermeneutics insist that the human is understood as situated in a 
historical world and all understanding proceeds from what precedes it; 
understandings might change and evolve but they are invariably entangled in the 
historical context of the interpreter. This means that criticality cannot be objective or 
separate itself from its traditions and assumptions and prejudices (Gadamer 1975). 
Any critique is therefore a ‘meta-critique’ or a critique of critique itself (Ricœur, 
2008; Roberge, 2011). A meta-critique is critique for its own sake without action, or 
a universal hermeneutics with ‘nowhere to go’. 
Habermas (1988) takes issue with Gadamer’s position as making any 
hermeneutical understanding ‘absolute’; accepting potential of hermeneutic 
interpretation whilst actively bracketing the accepted fact that it might in and of itself 
be an ideological stance. As Roberge (2011, p. 7) observes in his commentary, any 
notion of asymmetrical power relations or “contorted communication” as a result of 
ideology is missing. Gadamer’s approach, in Habermas’ view, has no opportunity for 
critical evaluation and reflection on value. In advocating a fusion of horizons and 
dialogue between interpreter and interpreted within the world, he (Gadamer) accepts 
being bound by tradition, legacies of thought and accepted ways of being and 
knowing. Piercey (2004, p. 261) frames the problem succinctly when he says of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, “Critique does not undermine tradition, but depends on it.” 
For Habermas (1971) this dependence is deeply problematic because it places 
tradition above critique, whereas tradition can be understood as being directed by a 
variety of ideological interests. It shies from any opportunity to explain; without the 
explanatory dimension, there is no opportunity to transform or change. For instance, 
Geertz’s comment on the goal of cultural analysis (1973) as non-positivist endeavour 
remains grounded in an ideology that prioritises a certain understanding of the nature 
of knowledge and accountability of its validity according to the western tradition, 
and does not question whether or not this understanding could be challenged.  
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Habermas (1988) advocates action and transformation as a goal within a wider, 
applicable theory of communication and, more importantly, use of this critique to 
unveil the very nature of tradition itself and its ideologies. Critique and interpretation 
should be for some purpose; they should aim for explanation, and should be 
scaffolded by recognition of the legitimising structures and systems that shape power 
relations within society. Habermas thus seeks to engage notions of value and ethics 
in the process of interpretation and apply more rigorous methodological tools in 
order to be able to critique not only the critique itself but the meta-critique as a socio-
cultural, ideologically bound endeavour. To take one of classical hermeneutics’ 
religious texts as an example, a hermeneutic reading of the Bible should indeed focus 
on interpreting meaning as a historical phenomenon in dialogue with the reader, but a 
critical interpretation must also recognise and analyse the ways in which this 
meaning is articulated in the world of experience and the multiple ways in which 
both interpretations and the text itself act to legitimise social structures and power 
relations. A critical interpretation must both reveal and explain (Fig. 4). 
 
Figure 4. Critical theory, according to Habermas, applies a methodological analysis to a situation in 
order to explain and reveal. 
Habermas, like Gadamer, also insists on language as a fundamental. However, 
where Gadamer sees language as a medium for understanding, Habermas sees it as a 
potential medium for participatory action (1984, p. 99), “The concept of 
communicative action presupposes the use of language as a medium for a kind of 
reaching understanding, in the course of which participants, through relating to a 
world, reciprocally raise validity claims that can be accepted or contested.” In this, 
Habermas seeks a positive opportunity for what he calls ‘communicative rationality’, 
a critical form of reason that will enable reflection on the contextual world. With this 
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theory of communicative action, Habermas is endeavouring to reclaim the rationality 
of the Enlightenment, eschewed and denigrated by Horkheimer, and prepare the 
ground for democratic collaboration within the public sphere. Action arises in 
dialogue between people and the objects of interpretation.  
This optimistic view of collaboration is at best confounded by Habermas’ 
optimism of a ‘reciprocity’ that allows claims to be accepted or contested. The idea 
that all participants might have access to ‘power-free’ communication is a 
problematic assumption that denies the experienced world of those whose stories are 
marginalised and deemed ‘irrational’. For example, as Verran (1998) demonstrates in 
her discussion of land ownership negotiations between Australian Indigenous 
communities and the Australian governmental institutions, how can there be any 
reciprocity on equal terms when the very concept discussed is only prioritised by one 
of the participant groups? Further, the asymmetrical nature of the post-colonial 
context and constructions of marginalisation (Spivak, 1993) mean that ‘reciprocity’ 
is always on unequal terms. In many ways, Habermas is guilty of attempting to re-
introduce the self-same dilemma of universality that he accuses Gadamer of 
erroneously subscribing to and affirming the rationality of the view from nowhere. 
This debate between Gadamer and Habermas does much to instantiate and 
confirm a divergence of critical theory from its roots in Marxist analysis and 
Horkheimer’s ‘classical critical theory’, moving it towards a fusion with the 
interpretive goals of hermeneutics and a re-focusing of its concerns from economic 
systems to communication systems. This has two consequences for critical theory: 
the first consequence is, as Thompson (1983) has argued, an overriding emphasis on 
language and the ways in which language can be understood as shaping social 
structures with all the subsequent interest in discourse and critique that is typical of 
the post-structuralist school of thought, represented by thinkers like Foucault, 
Barthes and Derrida. The second consequence of this debate is the rise of critical 
hermeneutics as an accepted methodology.  
Critical hermeneutics draws on Gadamer’s hermeneutics (1975) and its 
acknowledging of the self entangled inextricably in a storied world, which in turn 
brings prejudices to the interpretive act. As a ‘theoretical marriage’ (Kinsella, 2006) 
critical hermeneutics starts with the general principles of Gadamer’s hermeneutic 
approach, the goal of understanding from an inevitably situated and located storied 
world of experience, the primacy of communication and dialogue and the acceptance 
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of ambiguity, and to this it adds the critical dimension. The critical dimension, with 
its roots in Horkheimer and Habermas, is founded in determination to find freedom 
from ideologies which are, as the previous chapter (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2) has 
argued, laden with asymmetries. However, critical theory, interpretive hermeneutics 
and the fusion of the two into critical hermeneutics have the same intrinsic dilemma: 
the ideological constitution of reality (Roberge, 2011) and the entangled dilemma of 
subjectivity and the nature of ‘tradition’ itself, which could be said to include a 
‘tradition of critique’. It is worth returning to Smith’s (1999) observations on the 
priority of the western gaze and her demand for centring methodologies within the 
subjective experience of non western non post-industrial cultures themselves: even 
the most well intentioned criticality with the most genuine passion for emancipation 
and liberatory praxis is confounded by the historicity of its ideology.  
3.2.4 Critical hermeneutics and the hope-full endeavour 
Ricœur’s critical plus hermeneutic approach has much in common with 
Gadamer’s. This resonance is particularly visible in his notion of the mimetic process 
(see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1) and the way in which this does much to unpack the 
details of Gadamer’s fusion of horizons. However, Ricœur tries to find a space for 
“critique within hermeneutics” (2008, p. 287) and find a ‘third path’ (Piercey, 2004) 
between the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the critique of ideology demanded by 
Habermas (Fig. 5). His argument is based in his humanistic belief and his advocacy 
for any philosophical reflection to arise in both understanding of the past and 
optimism about a liberated future. Ricœur advises (2008, p. 299) that “it is the task of 
philosophical reflection to eliminate deceptive antinomies that would oppose the 
interest in the reinterpretation of cultural heritages received from the past and the 
interest in the futuristic projections of a liberated humanity”. In order to achieve this, 
Ricœur insists that Gadamer’s hermeneutics must work with Habermas’ criticality, 
otherwise both become “no more than … ideologies”. 
Ricœur suggests that Habermas’ critique of ideology is a hermeneutic exercise 
because it resides in Habermas’ ‘theory of interests’, which is in and of itself a theory 
that depends on a tradition of classification. The goal of the critique of ideology only 
makes sense because we are already entangled in the storied world of a tradition of 
hermeneutics. The idea of emancipation from ideology is ‘an interest’ (Habermas, 
1971) and a critique of ideology assumes a hermeneutic opportunity. Habermas’ 
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indictment of tradition is made possible through tradition. Ricœur observes (2008, p. 
298) that: 
Critique is also a tradition. I would even say that it plunges into the most 
impressive tradition, that of liberating acts, of the Exodus and the 
Resurrection. Perhaps there would be no more interest in emancipation, no 
more anticipation of freedom, if the Exodus and the Resurrection were 
effaced from the memory of mankind. . . . 
In ‘true’ hermeneutic form, Ricœur also seeks understanding. In order to achieve this 
he explores what he calls the symbolic dimensions of language and communication, 
the word-image (or for the current work, the storied world).  
Rather than placing faith in structuralist (and subsequent post-structuralist) 
explanations of communication and language as a universal system that can be 
interrogated and ‘mapped’ as Geertz (1973) puts it, through scientific logic (for 
example, in the work of Saussure and Lévi -Strauss), Ricœur (1970) situates meaning 
in culture and time. As Pellauer (2007) explains, Ricœur’s interest is in changes in 
meaning in both time and in cultural context. Communication, now understood as the 
central focus of critical theory, can usefully be described in terms of universal 
attributes and affordances. However, such descriptions result in a kind of ‘vertical 
slice’ or a synchrony that negates history in favour of universal explanations. Ricœur 
attempts to re-assert the importance of history and culture as creators of meaning-
filled communication symbols. Symbols within any communication system are 
complex and composite; they frequently contain double meanings (Ricœur, 1970) 
that are comprehended through context and reflection. They demand interpretation 
and reflection rather than analysis.  
For example and apropos the idea of a critical theory that assumes prejudice 
and ‘falsehood’, Ricœur argues that the very essence of a critical theory is caught up 
in the history that stories the way critique sees its own role (2008, p. 267): 
To recover a less univocally negative sense of the word prejudice (which has 
become virtually synonymous with unfounded or false judgment), and to 
restore the ambivalence that the Latin word praeiudicium had in the juridical 
tradition prior to the Enlightenment, it would be necessary to question the 
presuppositions of a philosophy that opposes reason to prejudice. These are, in 
fact, the very presuppositions of a critical philosophy; it is for a philosophy of 
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judgment – and a critical philosophy is a philosophy of judgment – that 
prejudice is a predominantly negative category. 
This then, for Ricœur, is the dilemma exposed in Habermas; that in order to critique 
the positivism of the Enlightenment, he has inadvertently re-inscribed and 
legitimised the spirit and methodologies of the Enlightenment. “What must be 
questioned,” Ricœur writes (2008, p. 267), “is the primacy of judgment in man’s 
behaviour toward the world.” He continues to problematise a critical theory that 
endeavours to emancipate and ‘liberate’ as Horkheimer (1982) might claim and 
Habermas intends to scaffold through his emphasis on a critical theory of 
communication, as one which sets itself up as being able to make judgement. 
Without reflection and realising that the meaning of judgement itself arises in a 
notion of knowledge and explanation with roots in Descartes, the claim that 
objectivity is not only possible becomes the only plausible way of understanding 
being. As he says (Ricœur, 2008, p. 267):  
[T]he only philosophy that sets up judgment as a tribunal is one that makes 
objectivity, as modeled on the sciences, the measure of knowledge. Judgment 
and prejudice are dominant categories only in the type of philosophy, 
stemming from Descartes, that makes methodical consciousness the key of our 
relation to being and to beings. 
Here is the point where Gadamer’s hermeneutic approach is important to critical 
theory. However, Ricœur is not content merely to apply Gadamer’s hermeneutics, he 
demands criticality and reflection (2008, p. 274): 
Wherever there is a situation, there is an horizon that may contract or expand. 
… At one time it was thought that the concept of horizon could be accounted 
for by assimilating it to the methodological rule of placing oneself in the 
other’s point of view: the horizon is the horizon of the other. It was thus 
thought that history had been aligned with the objectivity of the sciences: to 
adopt the other’s point of view while forgetting one’s own, is that not 
objectivity? Yet nothing is more disastrous than this fallacious assimilation. 
For Ricœur, critical interpretation without subjectivity is only one aspect of 
interpretive inquiry and critical theory. It represents what he calls the ‘hermeneutics 
of suspicion’. The latter being a term coined by Ricœur in order to capture what he 
viewed as a commonality in the works of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche. While having 
different concerns, Ricœur (1970, p. 356) suggests that all three have, as a basic goal, 
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the unmasking of “the lies and illusions of consciousness”. While applauding the 
intent, Ricœur finds that the subjective self of embodied experience is missing. What 
he means is that the hermeneutics of suspicion lack reflection that includes the 
situated and located presence of the interpreter and their relationship with the 
situated and embodied object of interpretation. Ricœur’s phenomenological 
hermeneutic approach is highly influenced by the phenomenology of Heidegger and 
Husserl but he seeks to include an idea of reciprocity between the cognisance of 
being in the world and the ontological actuality of being in the world. Ricœur is in 
complete agreement with Heidegger’s premise of Dasein, the experience of being. 
However, he finds the philosophic process that Heidegger uses, the ‘hermeneutic 
circle’, problematic because it acts to close itself away from the subjectivity of being.  
Ricœur sees Heidegger’s circle and the interrogations of those who use it, as 
reductive (Simms, 2003). While respecting meaning within the object of 
interrogation, it does not expose the histories of the object in the world. Indeed, it 
acts to make those histories and myths less visible, actively concealing their meaning 
through the process which only reveals what can be understood. In essence, Ricœur 
argues that ontological premise is thwarted by the demands of tradition itself and its 
‘distancing’. He asks (1970, p. 30), “For would I be interested in the object, could I 
stress concern for the object … if I did not expect, from within understanding, this 
something to ‘address’ itself to me.” 
The self to whom Ricœur refers is not the rational self of Descartes but is a self 
that is in a continuous dialogue and on-going interpretation with the world; a self 
constructed with the world through the mimetic process (see Chapter 2, section 
2.2.1). Gadamer’s hermeneutics allow this already emploted self to augment and add 
ontological experience in order to achieve understanding but his approach to 
interpretation has potential to become what has been called a vicious circle (Kinsella, 
2006). While Gadamer allows for augmentation in order to find meaning, he 
prioritises the subjective being who understands. Once understanding is gained, there 
is nowhere to go other than to return to the object of interpretation and engage anew. 
Habermas’ critique and tendency to judgement through analysis and explanation on 
the other hand, does much to dismantle self-hood in favour of explanation of the self 
entrapped within a system. Ricœur sees opportunity for dialogue between these two 
positions and disputes the opposition between understanding and explanation. He 
explains (2008, p. 125), “When I do not spontaneously understand, I ask you for an 
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explanation: the explanation you give me enables me to understand better. 
Explanation is here no more than an understanding developed through question and 
answer.” In this way, Ricœur opens the hermeneutic circle, creating an ‘arc’ or 
indeed a ‘hermeneutic spiral’ (Jahnke, 2012) whereby continuous questioning and 
reflection is introduced and understanding itself is to be comprehended as a dynamic 
relationship with the object of interpretation. Understanding thus gained by way of 
explanations has the potential to open up new opportunities and ‘new worlds’ which 
in turn allow the self to grow. “Understanding has less than ever to do with the 
author and his or her situation. It wants to grasp the proposed worlds opened up by 
the references of the text,” explains Ricœur (2008, p. 160).  
Fornäs (2013) suggests that what Ricœur does in the creation of a hermeneutic 
spiral is to make the process of interpretation more open and to reframe the focus of 
the process from a circle that moves between the parts and the wholes to a “complex 
spiral movement” (2013, p. 511) that continuously moves forward whilst swinging 
between a number of different poles such as object and subject, production and 
reception, and text and context. Within this open ended hermeneutic spiral, 
Gadamer’s (1975) ambiguity is magnified and expanded to include contextually 
produced ambiguities, for example Haraway’s (1991) problematises the ‘god trick’ in 
the disciplines of science and technology that operate by virtue of refusing 
subjectivity, by situating the disciplines and their positivist methodologies in the very 
specific context of western gendered ways of being and knowing. Fornäs (2013) 
observes that recognising this essential hermeneutic dilemma in disciplines which 
are, at first sight, anti-hermeneutical is deeply confounding and redolent with critique 
for its own sake. 
Ricœur’s answer to the dilemma is a combination of the hermeneutics of 
suspicion (the critique) with what has been called (Kearney, 1996) a ‘hermeneutics 
of affirmation’ (Fig. 5). His interpreter is an onto-epistemic being who is cognisant 
of their being in the world and capable of reflection on what this being entails. 
Ricœur explains (2008, p. 19): 
I want neither to ignore the epistemological phase, which involves 
philosophy’s dialogue with the human sciences, nor to neglect this shift in 
the hermeneutical problematic, which henceforth emphasizes Being-in-the-
world and the participatory belonging that precedes any relation of a subject 
to an object that confronts him. 
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By this Ricœur means interpretation as recollection and affirmation of meaning to 
the self who acts within a storied world and who is capable of explaining the stories 
as they unfold with a view to understanding.  
 
Figure 5. Ricœur’s ‘third path’ or critical hermeneutic methodology which combines critical theory 
and hermeneutics 
The self is always actively embedded in the storied, historical world. He writes 
(2008, p. 5), “Directly or indirectly, history is always the history of men who are the 
bearers, the agents, and the victims of the currents, institutions, functions, and 
structures in which they find themselves placed,” thus re-iterating his 
conceptualisation of the mimetic process that constructs identity (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.2.1). The ‘task’ of hermeneutics is very much about possible worlds and 
potential. He says (2008, p. 18), “The task of hermeneutics … is twofold: to 
reconstruct the internal dynamic of the text, and to restore to the work its ability to 
project itself outside itself in the representation of a world that I could inhabit.” 
Ricœur (1974) adds that experiencing, understanding and interpretation is not merely 
a method of inquiry, it is a mode of being. 
In this way, his interpretive approach allows and encourages hopeful 
endeavour; it is hope-full in this sense. Indeed, it is for this reason that Ricœur’s 
hermeneutics are often found in theological analysis and qualitative practice-based 
psychology research (see for example Salner, 1999). In a critical – transformative – 
study, such as the current thesis that does not only offer an analysis but which also 
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includes reflection on opportunity to find some way to enable action, a combined 
hermeneutics of suspicion and affirmation is apposite25. Indeed, given that the 
theoretical framework arises in Freire’s (1972) critical approach with its goals of 
humanisation and emancipation, moving beyond the hermeneutics of suspicion is 
inevitable. 
3.3 CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS IN PRACTICE 
Kögler (2008) states that the methodological heart of critical hermeneutics is 
the claim that all acts of interpretation are already interpreted because of the way in 
which we are all entangled in the already storied world. Hermeneutics gives us the 
general approach and grounds to “understanding and interpreting symbolic 
expressions, including texts, actions, images, and practises” (Kögler, 2008, p. 152). 
From critical theory we have the idea that this understanding and interpretation 
serves a purpose whereby any meaning is assumed to arise in a world already 
entangled in ideologies and power relations and it can be examined and exposed. We 
are already storied through our engagement in this world or “unavoidably 
impregnated by social power practices” as Kögler (2008, p. 153) puts it. However, 
whether arising in the hermeneutics of suspicion or Ricœur’s hermeneutics of 
affirmation, the idea of critical theory and critical hermeneutics is actually about 
‘hope’; the idea that we can critically examine those stories and structures from 
within somehow in order to achieve empowerment and self-potential. This insight 
frames criticality as a form of resistance and hermeneutics as a means of achieving 
criticality. However, without some kind of action in the world, the hope-full idea is 
‘hopeless’, as Freire (1994, p. 9) avers: 
[H]ope, as an ontological need, demands an anchoring in practice in order to 
become historical concreteness. That is why there is no hope in sheer 
hopefulness. The hoped-for is not attained by dint of raw hoping. Just to 
hope is to hope in vain. 
                                                
 
25 Salner (1999) advises that Ricœur’s hermeneutical approach is important in any research that 
depends on qualitative interpretation because his approach insists on recognition that the interpreter is 
also already interpreting and interpreted. For example, a record of an interview is reviewed in the 
researcher’s memory and in thorough documentation. This is then reflected upon and studied in order 
to find meaning. Salner observes that there are accordingly a number of ‘selfs’, the ‘self’ present in 
the interview is not the same self who reads and reflects. The research does not happen in isolation 
from the world. However, it includes the context and world of the researcher that gives rise to the need 
to research in the first place, and the experience of the researching.  
 
 106 Chapter 3: Methodologies 
Freire’s statement demands that any hope-full project is grounded in practice in the 
world. 
3.3.1 Critical pedagogy as (critical) hermeneutic interrogation 
The work of Brazilian educator and theorist, Paulo Freire, has already been 
introduced in the current research (see Chapter 1, section 1.4.2) as providing the 
theoretical framework for the research endeavour as a whole. Freire combines critical 
theory with education in order to help his participants recognise power relationships 
and invisible authority structures and systems that support them with the goal of 
connecting knowledge to power and enabling constructive action (Giroux, 2010). His 
critical pedagogy demands that people critique their experiences of the phenomenal 
world, after the approach articulated by Habermas (1988), where critique becomes a 
tool to unveil the ideologies that serve to structure meaning. As Morrow and Torres 
(2002, p. 4) point out in their discussion of the resonances between Freire and 
Habermas, Freire’s work in education and his critical pedagogy recreates the political 
concerns of Habermas in “concrete interactions and practices”. 
In particular, the central tenet in Freire’s critical pedagogy is taken up as a 
challenge for the current research. If, as Freire (1972) attests, critical awareness is 
attained through action on the part of engaged and active participants, this 
conscientização, as Freire calls it, must arise through action on the part of agents 
who are active and not merely permitted or allowed to be engaged. As has already 
been discussed (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.3), Freire’s critical pedagogy has much 
resonance with Habermas’ injunction against the meta-critique of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics because he focuses on situations where conditions exhibit inequality 
where, for Freire, a mere fusion of horizons is inadequate. A fusion of horizons in the 
Gadamerian sense might confirm the historicity of the lived experience; it might 
clarify the situated location of understandings and establish a dialogue and common 
language, as Kinsella (2006) phrases it, between the object of interpretation and the 
interpreter. However, in an asymmetrically storied context (see Chapter 2, section 
2.2.2) such as the contexts that Smith (1999) alludes to in her work and the very 
visible South American inequality that gives rise to Freire’s practice, interpretation 
from within tradition can only result in what Bhabha (1994) has called mimicry. 
Such phenomenal, lived situations demand the criticality with a view to praxis and 
reconfiguring towards social justice that Habermas advocates. Freire and Habermas 
have similar intent (McLaren & Lankshear, 1993) and both place language and 
communication at the centre of their work. There is, however, a great deal of Ricœur 
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in the Freirean endeavour; Rossatto (2004) notes that Ricœur’s clarification of the 
dynamic active relationship between the interpreter, the interpreted and the re-
interpretation has much in common with Freire’s desire to encourage human beings 
to educate themselves and re-construct their own sense of their identity through both 
understanding and historical explanation. Where Ricœur clarifies the entangled 
nature of the mimetic process (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1), Freire recognises that it 
can be re-directed and re-created by critically aware beings (Fig. 6).  
As a literacy educator, Freire situates his enacted critical hermeneutic practice 
in language and communication. Where Gadamer (1975) argues that language is the 
medium for interpretation, Habermas (1988) proposes that the system of language 
and communication itself should be the object of interpretation, and Ricœur 
recommends that language interpenetrates history and is at once medium, mediator 
and re-mediator of meaning, Freire’s critical hermeneutics becomes educational 
practice and language and the word both medium and object in the process of 
attaining critical awareness. For Freire (1972, p. 60), understanding the nature of the 
word must be action: 
As we attempt to analyze dialogue as a human phenomenon, we discover 
something which is the essence of dialogue itself: the word. But the word is 
more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, 
we must seek its constitutive elements. Within the word we find two 
dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is 
sacrificed—even in part—the other immediately suffers. There is no true 
word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus, to speak a true word is to 
transform the world. 
Freire does not only enact and make concrete critical hermeneutics in his philosophy 
of education; he initiates critical hermeneutics as a learning practice in and of itself.  
Traditional learning, knowledge transmission and delivery, is, for Freire, a ‘banking 
concept’ where “knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves 
knowledgeable upon those whom they consider know nothing” (1972, p. 46). In his 
literacy classrooms, the materials of meaning are not delivered or presented (or 
deposited) but are generated by the students as participants. People bring their own 
knowledge and experience into the process of learning the functional tools of 
literacy, a field that is potentially problematised by virtue of what it means to 
‘function’ within any given social reality (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3). Participant 
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knowledge and experience is used in order to create problem-posing opportunity 
(McLaren, 1999), which allows for dialogue and critique. Dialogue between all 
participants is a vital mechanism through which experienced realities are unveiled 
and made available for critique. Criticality enables creative power through 
imagination of possibility; this creative power is connected to an unveiling of 
realities and perception of the possible. Once the possible is imagined, action is also 
possible.  
 
Figure 6. Freire’s critical methodology as hermeneutic process 
The distinguishing aspect of Freire’s critical pedagogy as practice is his insight 
that any opportunity for praxis must start from a position of critical awareness of any 
current temporal situation. Further, that participation and dialogue should never be “a 
concession nor a gift” but must be a “precondition”. He stipulates (1972, p. 98): 
It is absolutely essential that the oppressed participate in the revolutionary 
process with an increasingly critical awareness of their role as Subjects of the 
transformation. If they are drawn into the process as ambiguous beings, partly 
themselves and partly the oppressors housed within them—and if they come 
to power still embodying that ambiguity imposed on them by the situation of 
oppression—it is my contention that they will merely imagine they have 
reached power. 
With this statement Freire is advocating a grass roots participation ideal; one where 
the potential asymmetricality of dialogue is continuously fore-fronted as an on-going 
tension to be dealt with. As he says (1972, p. 108), “Because liberating action is 
dialogical in nature, dialogue cannot be a posteriori to that action, but must be 
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concomitant with it. And since liberation must be a permanent condition, dialogue 
becomes a continuing aspect of liberating action.” 
Freire’s critical pedagogy with its goals of understanding, explanation and 
action are similarly explored in Augusto Boal’s work (see Turner & Moyes, 2012, 
Chapter 7, this volume). Boal’s workshops in theatre have their roots in Freire’s 
critical literacy work but where Freire focuses on the word, Boal takes the toolset of 
drama and focuses on the embodied action (Wardrip-Fruin & Montfort, 2003). 
Boal’s goal is critical awareness through engaged activity and generative meaning 
making. His meaning making, however, proposes physical action and re-enactment 
and his site of meaning is the stage and theatre; a context where Freire’s passive 
absorption of power relationships through the word becomes visible as spectatorship. 
Boal’s spectatorship is also problematised through passivity coerced by the system 
itself. He critiques the assumption of the underlying form that gives the audience the 
illusion of feeling that they themselves are enjoying the pleasures and pains of the 
character on the stage. The illusion of ‘participation’ is the result, Boal suggests, of 
the separation of artefact making (in this case the production of a performance) from 
the ideological values of the culture in which the ‘performance artefact’ arises. He 
argues (2000, p. 46): 
Aristotle’s coercive system of tragedy survives to this day, thanks to its great 
efficacy. It is, in effect, a powerful system of intimidation. The structure of the 
system may vary in a thousand ways, making it difficult at times to find all the 
elements of its structure, but the system will nevertheless be there, working to 
carry out its basic task. 
There is a tempting resonance here between the analysis put forward in the current 
thesis, encapsulated by Jenkins’ (2006) observation that the constraints on 
interactivity are both technological and designed (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3), and 
Boal’s structuring by the playwright or Poet (taking Aristotle’s term). Boal puts it 
thus (2000, p. xxi), “The Poet wears the trousers and says what goes. The Spectator 
is still cast as an old-fashioned wife.” 
Boal’s solution is the breaking of the relationship between the actors on the 
stage and the audience. He insists that the ‘fourth wall’ of the stage should be torn 
down and that the spectators should become spect-actors, entering the stage and 
exploring the structure. Boal frames this as more than participation, he argues for 
‘invasion’, ‘rebellion’ (against the playwright) and transformation of representations 
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so that they are no longer those of the ‘designer’ but those of the audience (Boal, 
2000). Boal implements this invasion through various techniques designed to alienate 
spectators and remind them that they are experiencing a representation. In his 
workshops, Boal offers spectators scenarios or short scripted sessions he calls ‘forum 
theatre’ in which spectators are invited to subvert the action and either call foul on 
the depiction or even join the performance. Boal’s goal is not merely on the spot 
improvisation; rather it is the goal of creating opportunity for dialogue about 
experience. 
Critical hermeneutics re-imagined as a critical pedagogy and practice is radical 
and not unproblematic when its intent is transferred into other contexts. Blanca 
Facundo’s retrospective critique (1984) of Freire and her personal experience of 
using his methods in the United States announces that in order to understand Freire’s 
theories of critical pedagogy, the reader has to be Latin American, Catholic, Marxist 
and an Educator (Facundo, 1984). Indeed, Freire hints at much the same in his 
preface to Pedagogy of the oppressed (1972, p. 17) when he admits that “this 
admittedly tentative work is for radicals. I am certain that Christians and Marxists, 
though they may disagree with me in part or in whole, will continue reading to the 
end.” Blikstein (2008) concurs, pointing out that to understand Freire one must visit 
the poorer regions of Northeast Brazil and experience the poverty, oppression and 
abysmal life conditions firsthand. This situated-ness of Freire’s critical pedagogy has 
sometimes resulted in the criticism that Freire’s practical critical hermeneutics can do 
more harm than good, for example Bowers (Bowers & Apffel-Marglin, 2005) argues 
that Freire’s emancipatory project, which asserts that all participants are equals in the 
critical project, is ultimately responsible for denigrating and dismissing indigenous 
practices with disastrous results in terms of eco-sustainability. There is a very 
difficult tension here, exacerbated by Freire’s overt legacies in Marxism and his 
theoretical debt to Habermas and critical theory with its ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ 
(Ricœur, 1970) and its tendency to judgement. 
It is timely perhaps to return to Smith (1999) and her critique of western 
methodologies, which place western constructions of knowledge at the centre and 
notice that critiques, such as Bowers’, are themselves situated in a western post-
industrial onto-epistemic understanding of the world. As Moreton-Robinson says of 
Australian Indigenous communities and the disappearance of the voices of women in 
conversations about indigenous self-determination in Australia (2005, p. 66), “We 
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must participate in a society not of our making under conditions not of our 
choosing.” However, there is an even more dreadful tension in the prospect of not 
enabling participation in the hope-full-ness of the critical hermeneutic endeavour.  
3.3.2 Design and hermeneutics 
Design, as a practice, also acts to envision the world through a process that 
demands thinking about problems and exploring ‘problems’ in context. However, 
design envisions through the creation of artefacts rather than through 
‘communication’ in Habermas’ terms. The fact that design also ‘communicates’ is 
indeed a central dilemma in terms of how design actually communicates meaning 
and where such ‘communication’ might be understood as being situated. Various 
dictionary definitions of design evidence a general understanding of design as the 
creation of a plan or blueprint for the construction of an object (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.3.1). Depending on the field, design as a general term can include the actual 
making of an artefact (a software designer and graphic designer construct the 
envisioned artefacts). Design has functional attributes (well designed); it has 
aesthetic attributes (a beautifully designed artefact); it has economic and social 
attributes (designed for living), and often evidences values in terms of its audiences, 
both consumerist values and ethical values. This latter attribute is one of the reasons 
that design is often seen as a ‘problem-solving’ activity in both the pejorative sense 
(how can we make this design more seductive) and a positive sense (how can we 
design for the elderly). 
Design is thus a descriptive noun, an abstract idea of designing something and 
a verb, which describes the process of making something. A dilemma that Archer 
articulates in his argument for ‘design as a discipline’ (1979), which is later clarified 
in a chapter bearing the same title by Cross (2006), is that design problems are 
distinguished from logical problems by virtue of their being embedded in the 
embodied world of experience and ‘design as problem solving activity’ requires that 
the designer engages in research about the phenomenal world of experience. This 
results in a curious conflation between design methods and methodologies (ways of 
doing design) and design research (ways of understanding what design actually does 
in the world and how it achieves its goals). 
The act of designing is often understood as a pragmatic process (Coyne, 1995); 
one which, as cultural theorist Huizinga (1949) asserts, merely creates objects with 
practical purpose that can then be used or experienced. One Australian professional 
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body announces quite clearly that design is a service and a designer is a professional 
who serves industry by developing solutions to commercial needs (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.3.1). In his monograph on play and creativity, Huizinga is very clear on the 
role of the maker and creator of objects and artefacts as somewhat prosaic labour 
(1949, p. 166) when he says, “The architect, the sculptor, the painter, draughtsman, 
ceramist and decorative artist in general all fix a certain aesthetic impulse in matter 
by means of diligent and painstaking labour.” This is an idea of design ‘as service’; 
Huizinga confirms this when he adds (1949, p. 169), “The picture immediately 
changes when we turn from the making of works of art to the manner in which they 
are received in the social milieu.” 
For the early design theorist, Archer, this is the historical context wherein 
design loses both position and voice. According to Archer, who unconsciously 
echoes Gadamer’s notion of the ‘distance’ created by the act of writing down (see 
section 3.2.3). Writing as a practice arises out of the evolution of the Arts and 
Humanities; it is a reflective process that is, by its very nature, distanced from its 
object because it is about the object. Science on the other hand, Archer observes, 
claims the measurement of the object, the internal logic of its manifestation. For 
Archer, these territories leave the making and creation of objects on the outside. He 
explains (2005, p. 10) that, “What is left is the artefacts themselves and the 
experience, sensibility and skill that goes into their production and use.” Echoing 
both critical theory and hermeneutics’ response to the positivism of the 
Enlightenment, Archer (1979, p. 17) announces his intent as a design theorist:  
I was concerned to find ways of ensuring that the predominantly qualitative 
considerations such as comfort and convenience, ethics and beauty, should 
be as carefully taken into account and as doggedly defensible under attack as 
predominantly quantitative considerations such as strength, cost and 
durability. Moreover, it is demonstrable that the assumptions upon which 
even the quantitative considerations are based can never be wholly value-
free, and I wanted these assumptions to be at least acknowledged in the 
design process. 
Archer’s call is for understanding design as a ‘third area’ of academic endeavour, 
one which has its own methodologies and research discourses. This design discipline 
represents, for Archer (1981, p. 35), “a way of looking at the world and imposing 
structure upon it”. Indeed, for Archer, this discipline has its own active form of 
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‘communication’ that is distinct to the modes of articulation of science and the 
humanities. As he writes (1979, p. 18):  
[W]e believe that human beings have an innate capacity for cognitive 
modelling, and its expression through sketching, drawing, construction, 
acting out and so on, that is fundamental to thought and reasoning as is the 
human capacity for language. Thus design activity is not only a distinctive 
process, comparable with but different from scientific and scholarly 
processes, but also operates through a medium, called modelling, that is 
comparable with but different from language and notation. 
Archer’s notion of ‘communication’ or articulation of meaning is also distinct (1979, 
p. 19):  
Being literate means having the ability to understand, appreciate and value 
those ideas which are expressed through the medium of words. From 
reckoning and figuring comes the idea of numeracy. Being numerate means 
being able to understand, appreciate and value those ideas that are expressed 
in the language of mathematics. It was from literacy that the rich fabric of the 
Humanities was woven. It was from numeracy that the immense structure of 
Science was built. But what of wroughting and wrighting? 
Archer’s emphasis is on what might be called the functional literacy aspects of 
design, with all of the issues inherent in the concept of functionality. His ideal of a 
discipline appropriate form of communication for design re-inscribes what Habermas 
(1971) might call an ‘interest’ because of the way that his call confirms established 
areas of tradition and traditional notions of knowledge and research outcomes. 
Archer’s advocacy for a design discipline is dependent on a definition of research 
derived from tradition and particularly the traditions of science where such research 
“must be knowledge directed, it must be calculated to produce new knowledge, or be 
intended to test, and maybe refute, existing knowledge” (Archer, 1995, p. 11). As 
Findeli (2001, p. 6) remarks, design is a victim of the self same onto-epistemologies 
that predominate in the contemporary western post-industrialised world, presenting 
“an outdated implicit epistemology of design practice and intelligence, inherited 
from the nineteenth century”. 
Nonetheless, Archer also does much to establish practice-based research, 
research that pursues and reveals through making and “through the medium of 
practitioner activity”. As he observes (1995, p. 11):  
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There are circumstances where the best or only way to shed light on a 
proposition, a principle, a material, a process or a function is to attempt to 
construct something, or to enact something, calculated to explore, embody or 
test it. 
The problem with Archer’s emphasis on logical approaches to research through 
practitioner activity is that design ‘problems’ are frequently complex (Cross, 2006) 
and located in social and cultural circumstances, which means that there is no simple 
‘solution’ nor even indeed a clear problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
Schön (1983) re-focuses the dilemmas produced by design’s resistance to 
formal methodologies of science by applying a hermeneutical perspective that 
recognises the social embeddedness of meaning. Where Gadamer sees any 
hermeneutic understanding as linguistically mediated ‘conversation’ with the fixed 
and petrified text, and Habermas advocates the centrality of dialogic action as a 
means of critique, Schön focuses on finding, explaining and understanding meaning. 
In the practice of design, the idea of Gadamer’s dynamic and augmentable 
hermeneutic circle is appropriated as process. Schön (1983, p viii), like both 
Gadamer and Ricœur, argues that practitioners bring pre-understandings into design 
situations: 
I begin with the assumption that competent practitioners usually know more 
than they can say. They exhibit a kind of knowing in practice, most of which 
is tacit.... Indeed practitioners themselves often reveal a capacity for 
reflection on their intuitive knowing in the midst of action and sometimes 
use this capacity to cope with the unique, uncertain, and conflicted situations 
of practice. 
Schön’s work enacts the hermeneutic process, or rather, sees how the hermeneutic 
process is actually enacted in the world. Schön’s research into the ‘creative 
practitioner’ dismantles the design process itself. He proposes that design solutions 
are actually ‘situated’ and ‘located’ knowledge applied to the problem. The designer 
makes sense of the design problem through the lens of their own (culturally located) 
experience. Designers according to Schön (1983, p. 43) “engage in a reflective 
conversation with the situation”. The designers themselves may not be fully aware of 
the way that the past is re-iterated in their process, Schön declares that it is an 
‘essentially’ tacit process, one that is understood and embodied in the designer’s 
experience and background. Schön suggests that a designer will call on this tacit 
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knowledge in order to approach a current design situation. He proposes (1983, p. 
138), “The familiar situation functions as a precedent, or a metaphor, or... an 
exemplar for the unfamiliar one.” Here, complex problems are encountered through 
intuition that is a result of experience. He argues for an understanding of “an 
epistemology of practice implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes which some 
practitioners do bring to situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value 
conflict” (Schön, 1983, p. 49). 
 
Figure 7. The designer process according to Schön 
Schön’s main argument is that design (as a professional discipline) depends on 
what he terms ‘reflection-in-action’. His tacit process resists technical rationality but 
rather, as Winograd and Flores (1986) have also argued, depends on a Heideggerian 
notion of the hermeneutic circle enacted with objects in the world. Heidegger’s 
ontologically situated being in the world (see section 3.2.2) extends to action in the 
world and with the world. As Winograd and Flores suggest (1986) in their call to 
understand design and designing as hermeneutical activity, the world is not 
contemplated from a position of rationality, rather it is engaged with as something 
familiar for situated reasons. They offer Heidegger’s (1962) example of the hammer 
to explain. That is, Winograd and Flores explain, we do not (usually) reflect on 
hammers per se, rather our ability to act in the world is a familiarity with hammering. 
Heidegger himself writes (1962, p. 84), “The thing at hand which we call a hammer 
has to do with hammering, the hammering has to do with fastening something, 
fastening something has to do with bad weather.” Involvement in the world is 
involved and practical (something needs to be fixed); it is pre-figured through 
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experience (something heavy will fix this); and it is located and situated (the usual 
‘ready to hand’ ‘hammer’ in my own home is actually a lump of hard wood).  
Snodgrass and Coyne (1996) take Schön’s work on the reflective practitioner 
as a starting point for their own discussion on the essentially hermeneutic nature of 
design, seeking to refine a philosophy of design and confirm design’s place in the 
domain of human and hermeneutical philosophy. In this they are at odds with 
Archer’s (1995) hopes for a logical methodology of design but in keeping with his 
desire (1979) to see practice fore-fronted as a means to unveil meaning. In particular, 
Snodgrass and Coyne interpret Schön’s (1983) notion of the reflective practitioner 
and reflection in action in terms of Gadamer’s (1975) iterative hermeneutic circle 
that allows itself to be augmented through experience and fusion of horizons (Fig. 7). 
As they note (1997, p. 22), “What Schön describes … is a clear and straightforward 
account of the working of the hermeneutical circle. The designer proceeds by way of 
a continuing inter-referencing of a projected whole and the particulars that make up 
the design situation.” The designer, to appropriate terms used by Gadamer (1975), 
engages in a fusing of horizons where the past continuously informs the present.  
In the disciplines of interaction design (IXD) and Human Computing 
Interaction (HCI), this methodology is seen as increasingly important in recognition 
of the fact that the designed artefacts that these disciplines make, are then put out 
into the world; they are, if you will, contemporary digital hammers. More 
importantly, these designed digital artefacts are understood, not in terms of their 
hammer-nature26, but in their readiness to hand, as Heidegger (1962) might observe, 
and their use in an already storied world of phenomenal experience. Winograd and 
Flores (1986) for example, recommend that an understanding of the human 
phenomenal world is important to approaches to computer design because of the way 
that the hardware and software exist in the world and are used by people. This is 
epitomised by Suchman’s work on copy machines at Xerox PARC (1987) that shows 
that without an understanding of the ways that people actually make meaning in a 
situated, located context, the design of technology can fail to achieve its goals. There 
is much that is useful in the hermeneutic approach to design, particularly the manner 
in which it re-emplaces the designing of artefacts in the world of embodied 
                                                
 
26 There is a saying, sometimes attributed to Mark Twain, that to a man with a hammer everything 
looks like a nail. This is not infrequently used as a critique of the pervasive nature of technology in 
post-industrial societies.  
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experience and enables a design approach that considers the existing social context. 
However, the re-imagining of Gadamer’s hermeneutics as design process also does 
much to reiterate some of the flaws in his hermeneutic approach, and, in 
Gadamererian style, augment these flaws. 
In the first instance, the seduction of Schön’s (1983) reframing of design as 
process and its subsequent abduction (Jahnke, 2012) into other areas (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.3.3) does much to enact the same error that Habermas (1988) accuses 
Gadamer of making; the horizon is limited by a dependence on the context and the 
‘tradition’ itself is left unexamined. To follow a trajectory from Archer, as design has 
understood itself as a discipline with its own methods and discourses, we have 
discovered that the kinds of contexts we deal with do not lend themselves to the 
logical traditions of science and turned instead to hermeneutic approaches that focus 
on process. However, in the course of this re-focusing of concerns, we have almost 
entirely conflated the act of designing with a theory of what it means to design and a 
philosophy about design in the world. Dourish (2006a) notes a number of dilemmas 
and misconceptions about methodologies and their relationships to theoretical 
frameworks that arise out of this conflation. He focuses on use of ethnographic 
approaches in particular, noting that while ethnographic methodologies (those that 
are situated in contexts) appear to be useful and provide the understanding of the 
phenomenal world that Winograd and Flores (1986) advocate; without a deep 
understanding of their interpretive nature and their grounding in social approaches to 
research, they are reframed as data collection in the service of logical outcomes. This 
becomes, as Dourish (2006a, p. 545) puts it, a case of “one discipline in service to 
the other”. What this means in practice is that issues of power relationships such as 
those discussed by Donaldson (2008) in design areas such as ‘design for 
development’ (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.1) are open to the same accusations of the 
western gaze that Smith (1999) describes.  
Once this is accepted, other dilemmas raise their heads. Snodgrass and Coyne 
(2006) observe that Schön’s designerly hermeneutic circle does much to create an 
exclusivity, very much after the manner of the Gadamerian circle, because ‘dialogue’ 
is informed by ideas and conditions from within the designer’s experience. This can 
be seen rather starkly in Simonsen and Robertson’s (2012) principles of participatory 
design (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.1) where they stipulate that those who will use the 
design outcomes are empowered to have some voice in its designing without needing 
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to ‘speak the language of professional design’. The idea is that participants from 
outside the designerly hermeneutic circle may not be aware of the languages and 
processes of design itself and so professional design practitioners in participatory 
situations must engage in mutual learning. This principle superficially resonates with 
Freire’s call for teachers to realise that, “There is, in fact, no teaching without 
learning. One requires the other,” (1998, p. 31). However, it is also perhaps the 
principle that is most open to interpretation and misunderstanding. After all, what 
does it mean to advocate for ‘mutual learning’ when at least one of the parties is 
(presumably) already a professional practitioner? The implication is that the designer 
will learn about the community ways of being and knowing in order to understand 
more about design themselves. Simonsen and Robertson explain (2012, p. 6): 
Mutual learning is an ongoing activity throughout the Participatory Design 
process. Users need knowledge of potential technological options as well as of 
how these options can be provided. Designers are the source of this 
knowledge, as well as of relevant design expertise. The designers need 
knowledge about the users, their practices and the use situation (often the 
work domain) in question. 
Freire might observe that the dilemma here is created by the inclusion of participants 
in the reflective process after the major decisions are made (see section 3.3.1). 
Participants thus drawn into the design process are made ambiguous beings, to take 
an expression from Freire (1972), by virtue of their inclusion in an endeavour that is 
already existent within the world and that has not fully engaged in reflection on its 
own nature, let alone what kinds of onto-epistemic philosophies that nature 
encompasses. 
Ricœur (1991) might well observe that it is high time the hermeneutical 
approach is enacted alongside a critical approach, which allows for understanding the 
constitution of meaning alongside an understanding of ideologies and interests as 
constructing the pre-figured world wherein meaning is constructed. Jahnke (2012) 
argues forcefully for the inclusion of Ricœur’s ‘third path’ in understanding 
hermeneutic approaches in design when he proposes inclusion of critical 
hermeneutics in design methodologies (Fig. 5). Jahnke further problematises the 
‘dominant problem-solving metaphor’ in design with reference to the lived 
experience of designing. Dourish (1999) also criticises this same problem-solving 
directive in the notion of the invisible computer (Norman, 1988) as a design goal as a 
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misunderstanding of the phenomenal, embodied relationship we have with the world 
and the material designed artefacts in the world. As he (Dourish, 1999) observes, it is 
hard to have a relationship with something that isn’t there. Ingold (2013) also 
observes that an understanding of design as a single act of ‘problem solving’ that 
subsequently produces artefacts in the world is problematic. He suggests that such a 
view paradoxically allows the construction of the counter argument that each designed 
artefact acts to at once solve a problem and create the problem of ‘how it is used’. Thus, 
the pragmatic framing of design as ‘action on the world’ and ‘solution to perceived need’ 
actually embodies further problems. Ingold offers a story of a breakfast with an 
uncomfortable chair, a table of awkward height, a difficult spoon and a recalcitrant bowl, 
all of which must be negotiated by the user in order to eat. Ingold muses (2013, p. 20): 
… in making everything for the best, should we conclude that [design’s] real 
purpose is quite the reverse: to set obstacles in our path that we are challenged 
through our own skill and ingenuity to overcome? Perhaps, far from 
specifying solutions, it is design that sets the rules of the game. 
Ingold is quick to point out that this an absurd way of understanding the designed 
world; that finding the table creates problems for use by being the wrong height is to 
imagine that the table is the solution to a problem (providing support for the bowl 
and spoon). A table is a historically storied artefact, a name for a thing that is 
generally used to put other things on, a convenient flat surface27. The identity of the 
table is pre-figured by the experience of the object in the world, configured through 
its use and then re-configured through its general presence in the world. Design too is 
an act of narrating with the cultural world as experienced. Design is thus emploted, 
to use Ricœur’s (1984) terminology, or, as Willis (2006) observes, design is 
designed. As Fry (2001) recommends in his discussions about the nature of design, it 
is time to interrogate the assumptions that design holds about itself. 
More importantly, through the lens of critical hermeneutics, the material 
artefacts created through the hermeneutical process of designing can be understood 
                                                
 
27 ‘Table’, Harper’s online etymology dictionary informs us, is a descriptive word which arises in the 
late 12th century meaning board or slab, arriving in English from Old French table meaning board, 
square panel, plank, picture and the late Old English tabele meaning writing tablet or gaming table. 
This latter use is derived from the Germanic tabal. Both the French and Germanic words derive from 
the Latin tabula, a board, plank, picture, painted panel etc., originally meaning a  ‘small flat slab or 
piece usually for inscriptions or for games’. 
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as carrying meaning that actively contributes to the pre-figured or storied world. Fry 
(2009, p. 34) attests to this when he writes “design is a world-shaping force” and: 
[D]esigned things of the world into which we are born, learn to understand, 
occupy and employ, themselves design very many of our capabilities, habits, 
perceptions, and desires. At the same time, in our being in this world, we act 
upon it and contribute to this making and unmaking (knowingly or 
unknowingly, again often by design).  
Design is thus in the process of becoming a discipline that is aware of the need for 
opportunity for action and a methodological approach to its own theoretical 
framework and ontological being in the world as well as an applied methodological 
framing of its practice. Ricœur’s critical hermeneutics offers opportunity to expand 
this self-reflection and turn it into a dialogue whereby we are not only reflected in the 
‘object’ but actively engaging with the stories of the object, which in turn become 
active story-ing contributors to the world and so re-story any engagement. A 
dilemma for this opportunity in the discipline of design is the material nature of its 
outcomes. This is of particular import when, as Redström (2005) notes, the design of 
contemporary technological artefacts is in the process of moving away from its 
materials, finding itself focusing more and more on the surface of the presentation 
and so becoming increasingly dependent on design assumptions already ‘fixed’ 
beyond the surface.  
3.3.3 Designed artefacts and hermeneutics 
Dourish’s (1999) observation directs attention towards the phenomenal, 
material nature of digital technologies as designed outcomes. Fry (2011, p. 6) 
confirms this when he writes “design expresses power materially and in ways that 
shape how people interact and ontologically prefigure their material culture and 
economy”. Digital technologies are material, in spite of the apparent intangibility of 
the software (see Chapter 2, this volume). The study of material culture, once the 
focus of the traditional disciplines of archaeology and anthropology, has also 
experienced a turn towards hermeneutic methodologies and more reflective 
perspectives that allow for interpretation of artefacts as storied things arising in 
storied worlds. A contemporary interest in technological artefacts and the ways in 
which they remediate cultural experience (Fuller, 2003; Kittler, 1995; Manovich, 
2001) has led to the appropriation of the idea of archaeology as a historical 
methodology in the emerging field of media archaeology (Huhtamo & Parikka, 
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2011). In turn, the bailiwick of material culture has been extended from its initial 
concerns with the past (archaeology) and culture (anthropology) into contemporary 
areas and now interleaves with the study of technologies and culture (Eglash, 2006), 
although still somewhat contiguously (Vannini, 2009). 
Material culture approaches are defined by Prown (1982, p. 1) as “the study 
through artefacts of the beliefs — values, ideas, attitudes, and assumptions — of a 
particular community or society at a given time”. The classic approach arises in 
archaeological research which, having nothing but the artefacts, endeavours to re-
create the human experience through their examination. Tilley et al. (2006) report 
that this classical approach extended itself to the ‘rescue’ and ‘salvaging’ of the 
remains of primitive culture in the wake of colonial expansion; many of the artefacts 
of concern being those ‘collected’ in museums and analysed in disciplines such as 
archaeology and anthropology. Material cultural interpretations thus have a history as 
supporting evidence for the values and epistemic priorities of the Enlightenment 
project. These ‘processual’ views are based in assumptions that prioritise 
methodologies that take the artefacts as evidence and which assume evidence is 
available from without (as opposed to within) the artefact’s social and cultural 
context. For example, Prown’s methodology (1982) is designed to uncover meaning 
in artefacts through a careful framework of description, deduction, speculation and 
formulation of hypothesis that can then be validated. He begins with the view that an 
artefact or created object is a manifestation of the beliefs and values of the culture 
that created it but proceeds to use the methodologies of science to construct 
explanations and impose a validation (from the perspective of archaeology as a 
science). Even science, as Barad (2007) observes, is a ‘particular’ view from within a 
particular culture; it is framed from within a Gadamerian horizon and embeds a set of 
interests as Habermas (1971) has argued. Miller and Tilley (1984, p. 2) point out that 
“a realisation developed that archaeological remains were not direct reflections of 
past activities but were distorted by differential preservation, discard and curation 
patterns”. 
Hodder puts it more forcefully when he says (Hodder & Hutson, 2003, p. 226):  
Western archaeologists working in non-industrialized societies, particularly 
in the post-colonial era, became increasingly confronted with the idea that 
the pasts they were reconstructing were ‘Western’ and with an articulate 
rejection of those pasts as being politically and ideologically motivate. 
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As post-colonial commentators (Bhabha, 1994; Fanon, 1963; Said, 1978; Spivak, 
1988; Thiong’o, 1993) have averred, this serves to continuously re-inscribe social 
inequalities and contributes to the asymmetrical storying of the world (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.2.2). This awareness leads to the evolution of what is termed ‘post-
processual’ archaeology or interpretive archaeology. Interpretive material culture 
recognises that previous archaeological approaches framed themselves as a means of 
‘discovery’, applying the dictums of Enlightenment positivist science to their object 
and thereby implicitly framing the culture that produced the object through their own 
western world view (Miller & Tilley, 1984; Tilley, 1993). The object itself is what 
Hodder (1991) terms ‘mute’; it cannot be interrogated directly but its assemblage of 
beliefs and values must be interpreted. That is, an artefact is silent because it is no 
longer in context. Heidegger’s hammer is silenced and made mute without the notion 
of hammering and the context of fastening something to make a shelter. Post-
processual archaeology argues for a phenomenological approach that allows for a 
more intuitive study of material things in terms of their meanings within cultures and 
recognises the perspectives of the interpreter as he or she engages with the 
interpretation. This approach to material culture is thus a hermeneutic methodology; 
it interprets subjectively and reflectively.  
Hodder’s approach to material culture owes a debt to Ricœur and his concept 
of the hermeneutic cycle or spiral manifest in the construction of identity through 
language. In particular, Ricœur’s proposition (2008) that if the text is word made 
concrete and so turns spoken communication into an interpretable, interpreted and 
interpreting object detached from its author, so too is social human action that 
performs in the world. Hodder (1994, p. 394) argues that as “the written word is an 
artefact, capable of transmission, manipulation, and alteration, used and discarded, 
re-used and recycled – ‘doing’ different things contextually through time”, so too are 
other material artefacts. Where Ricœur (2008, p. 160) announces, “Understanding 
has less than ever to do with the author and his or her situation. It wants to grasp the 
proposed worlds opened up by the references of the text”; the goal of material culture 
as hermeneutic inquiry hopes to ‘grasp’ the ‘disappeared’ worlds opened up by the 
reference of the artefact.  
Tilley extends the idea that an artefact can be ‘read’ in his work on material 
culture (1991). Taking his lead from the post-structuralist work of Derrida, Tilley 
(1991, p. 17) proposes that material culture is ‘written’ in the same manner as the 
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word is written and so “both result in the material fixation of meaning”. There is an 
echo of Archer’s (1979) appraisal of the discourse of artefact making in Tilley’s 
discussion as he continues to clarify the manner in which making (designing) is 
similar to the creation of a text via a distinct form of discourse (Tilley, 1991, p. 17):  
I decorate a pot by dividing up the empty space of the clay or write a letter by 
inscribing marks on a blank sheet of paper and at some time in the future you 
read and interpret the visual medium, able by virtue of the material fixation to 
read what I have produced. 
For Tilley material culture can be understood as a ‘solid metaphor’ where artefacts 
are not merely the product of activity (or even Huizinga’s ‘diligent labour’) but are 
the result of an active performance where people and objects co-create each other. 
The idea of co-creation is also present in perspectives on material culture that 
posit that material artefacts become active elements in the construction of social 
relations. For example, Renfrew (2004) argues for a concept of material engagement 
where material artefacts are understood as materialised symbols of the meaning-
making of a culture that act to mediate social relations. These approaches to material 
culture dismiss the hermeneutic view that material phenomena can be interpreted and 
take their theoretical framework from the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce and 
particularly his general theory of semiotics that does not privilege language (as in the 
discourse model) but offers a more general model that incorporates language, social 
and cultural practices, material culture (see Preucel & Mrozowski, 2010). 
Another perspective on material culture thus envisioned as active in cultural 
and social systems is the ‘material network’ approach typified by Appadurai’s (1986) 
proposal that artefacts can be understood as having their own phenomenal existence: 
an artefactual meaning can alter depending on its context. Kopytoff (1986) develops 
this concept in his notion of artefactual biographies wherein material objects gain a 
form of storied and story-ing identity. Bijker (1995, p. 6) continues this thread and 
defines the aforementioned context as being within the dynamics of social 
interactions where “one should never take the meaning of a technological artifact or 
technological system as residing in the technology itself” but instead study the way 
“technologies are shaped and acquire their meanings in the heterogeneity of social 
relations”. For those commentators who identify with Bijker (1995), material 
artefacts are usually identified as the result of human and social agency. However, 
once material artefacts are understood as embedded within a socio-cultural context, 
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the question of agency raises its head. So, where Tilley (1999) suggests that there is a 
co-creational aspect to our relationship with our designed artefacts, it is a result of 
the hermeneutic nature of existence and being in the world; theorists such as Olsen 
(2003) and Latour (1991, 2005) argue that material objects should be understood as 
having their own ontological existence within a structured world. In the former view, 
hammers become a part of the active performance of hammering, successful 
hammering and a well fixed roof then engenders further exploration of the hammer 
and further hammering opportunity. In the latter view, the hammer is the 
embodiment of the designer’s or maker’s intent; it is the inscription of that intent and 
as a result of its usefulness becomes an actor in the social world. Latour (2005) 
argues that this is common sense and ultimately pragmatic. As he says (2005, p. 71), 
if one can “maintain that hitting a nail with and without a hammer, boiling water 
with and without a kettle … are exactly the same activities” then “you are ready to 
transmigrate to the Far Land of the Social and disappear from this lowly one”. 
Rather, he proposes, most of us recognise that there are differences between his pairs 
of conditions and “so these implements, according to our definition, are actors, or 
more precisely, participants in the course of action waiting to be given a figuration”. 
Latour thus distances himself from hermeneutic understanding and indeed denigrates 
its validity in dealing with the world. He writes (2005, p. 145), “Listen: all this 
opposition between ‘standpoint’ and ‘view from nowhere’, you can safely forget. 
And also this difference between ‘interpretative’ and ‘objectivist’. Leave 
hermeneutics aside and go back to the object—or rather, to the thing.” 
Latour’s central point is that the supposed horizon that Gadamer proposes is a 
fallacy and that “actors themselves make everything, including their own frames, 
their own theories, their own contexts, their own metaphysics, even their own 
ontologies”. Latour proposes instead a relational view where the focus is in all of the 
actors with any network. He argues for description rather than explanation and rails 
against meaningless classification. There is a sense in which his ‘Actor Network 
Theory’ holds an echo of Smith’s (1999) indictment of research methodologies (see 
section 3.2) which re-inscribe traditional practices in spite of good intentions through 
their dependence on traditional categories and discipline boundaries. However, 
Latour’s disposal of the idea of a ‘view’ is confounded in the contexts that concern 
Smith where the pragmatic realities of such views are continuously re-inscribed in 
the phenomenal – and subjective – experience of the post-colonial subject. While the 
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inclusion of objects and artefacts as story-ing agents in culture is tempting and 
commentators like Star (1991) use some of the principles that Latour advocates in 
order to reveal asymmetricality, as Ingold (2008) notes, Latour’s anti-hermeneutical 
stance does much to flatten and make single dimensional the storied world. It creates 
a situation where artefacts and people are organised into networks of heterogeneous 
objects and all ‘interests’ (Habermas, 1971) are relegated to futile relativism.  
Arriving at materiality from the philosophy of technology and finding it now 
entangled in archaeology’s material concerns, Ihde (1998b) also takes issue with 
classical hermeneutics in the case of artefacts, particularly contemporary digital 
technologies, because of the emphasis on text (fixed language) and linguistically 
influenced understandings of material things. His thesis is that technologies can act 
to transform the contexts of experience and powerfully alter any horizons. He 
suggests that “Technologies can radically transform the situation, including one 
sense of one’s body” (1998a, p. 352). Ihde takes Heidegger’s hammer and extends 
the notion of hammering through Merleau-Ponty’s (Merleau-Ponty & Edie, 1964) 
idea of embodiment (the tool becomes an extension of the senses in the world; the act 
of hammering is also an act where the jarring of the hammer as it hits the nail is 
sensate). For Ihde, it is the materiality of the artefact that allows this embodiment and 
extension of the body. The materiality, however, does not merely extend but 
configures. As he declares (1998a, p. 352), the “hardness but not the coldness – of 
the nail is experienced through the hammer”. Ihde argues for ‘technological realism’ 
where we accept that we make our artefacts, which in turn make us. In this there is an 
echo of McLuhan’s (1994) argument that all media and technologies are extensions 
of embodied existence and the physical senses (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.1). Ihde, 
however, focuses on what this might mean in terms of potential knowledge creation. 
In later work he articulates what he calls a theory of ‘material hermeneutics’ (2005) 
or hermeneutics in science scaffolded by material technologies. Ihde’s expanded or 
material hermeneutics continues his earlier notion of embodiment through materiality 
and expands it to include technological instruments that change the very nature of 
scientific inquiry. For example, purely textual hermeneutics that inquire and attempt 
to describe the Viking invasions of Europe will find themselves interpreting 
descriptions mainly written by those who were able to write and for whom the 
Viking incursions were often traumatic (monasteries were not infrequently subject to 
raids). However, interrogating the materials themselves – Hodder’s mute artefacts – 
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unveils a very different story of slow settlement and acculturation made visible in 
burial objects, rural remnants and the like. Further, for Ihde, new scientific 
technologies, carbon dating, x-rays and so on, allow fresh forms of interpretation 
opportunity; they have the potential to augment the hermeneutic spiral. Ihde, like 
Latour, is interested in relationships but his focus is on histories of the inter-
relationships between artefacts and knowledge in order to understand how these 
technologies are embodied in practice. Our phenomenal experience is an 
interpretation of reality and our experience is ‘situated’ subjectivity. He proposes that 
science actually performs a “hermeneutics of things by turning them into scientific 
objects” (1998b, p. 139). His announced goal is to “find ways to give voices to 
things, to let them speak for themselves”. 
Ihde’s new expanded hermeneutics owes much to Ricœur’s third path between 
Gadamer and Habermas, particularly Ricœur’s dialectical approach to hermeneutics 
which, as Ihde notes, is neither contained in tradition (as in Gadamer’s hermeneutics) 
nor given over to the suspicion and doubt of Habermas, but rather offers opportunity 
for multiplicity; many voices and many conversations within the storied world. There 
is also a clear debt to Ricœur’s mimetic cycle and its temporal fixation of 
understanding and the phenomenon of being in the world. Ihde’s criticisms of 
hermeneutics are in a similar vein to Latour’s; he regards the traditional focus of 
hermeneutics on texts as partial, ignoring the potential hermeneutics of things and the 
manner in which these things play a role in the storied world. However, his goal in 
material hermeneutics or expanded hermeneutics is a re-framing of material cultures’ 
concerns with interpreting artefacts to concerns which interpret encounters with 
artefacts; somehow the nature of things themselves actually remains elusive.  
This elusiveness, and conceptualisations focus on artefacts as agents within 
network of relations, is perhaps what has given rise to contemporary work that takes 
its name from archaeology via the use of the term by Foucault and applies it to 
contemporary artefacts. Foucault’s archaeology is the term he used to describe his 
method and approach to examining history, scrutinising traces of the past in order to 
understand the present. The focus of ‘media archaeology’ is on technological 
artefacts, particularly those that belong to a history of contemporary technologies. 
Parikka (2013, p. 2) describes media archaeology as a “way to investigate new media 
cultures through insights from past new media, often with an emphasis on the 
forgotten, the quirky, the non-obvious apparatuses, practices and inventions”. In this 
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overall endeavour, Parikka’s media archaeology owes much to Manovich’s software 
analysis (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.1), Fuller’s (2003, 2008) ‘software studies’, and 
Kittler’s (1995) emphasis on the algorithmic groundings of computational 
technology. There is much that is overtly anti-hermeneutic in media archaeology 
(Parikka, 2011, p. 60) and against any interpretation but advocate a “cold gaze” 
where ‘messy’ entanglements are backgrounded in favour of what Ihde (2008) calls a 
‘new empirical turn’ where ‘archaeology’ reverts to its former descriptive analytic 
methodologies, which eschew interpretation in favour of method. As Parikka (2011, 
p. 64) explains, “any media analysis should be less about the content of a medium 
and more about the mathematical-statistical existence of a signal that does not per se 
make distinctions between message and noise in the hermeneutic sense”. The ‘new 
dialogue’ of materiality asks for ‘close reading’, not of text but of the actual 
processes of material inscription. For Wardrip-Fruin (2009, p. 4), writing about 
computer games and software from a media archaeological perspective, the processes 
of material inscription include design: 
Just as when opening the back of a watch from the 1970s one might see a 
distinctive Swiss mechanism or Japanese quartz assembly, so the shapes of 
computational processes are distinctive and connected to histories, economies, 
schools of thought. 
Wardrip-Fruin continues to explain that these expressions of design are connected to 
the wider storied world, where perhaps a watch is symbolic of a need to keep 
accurate time, and so express or ‘operationalise’ meaning through their shapes and 
design. Parikka (2011, p. 69) is enthusiastic, “in other words”, he writes, “the 
expressiveness of digital culture and its assemblages is not restricted to human 
authorship but to the various design solutions that gain a semi-autonomous agency”. 
Wardrip-Fruin (2009), like Manovich (2001, 2013) (see Chapter 2, section 
2.4.1) commences with the pervasive presence of digital artefacts in contemporary 
post-industrial culture; beyond their visible embodiment in the physical objects on 
the desk, lap or wrist and into the way that they are woven into society. He focuses 
on the code and designed processes that substantiate the ways that digital artefacts 
are encountered and engaged with in the world and argues for what he calls 
‘procedural literacy’ and the need to be fluent in the production of processes. 
Wardrip-Fruin demands interpretation beyond the surface of the black box. He writes 
(2009, p. 158), “Trying to interpret a work of digital media by looking only at the 
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output is like interpreting a model solar system by looking only at the planets.” In 
this call, Wardrip-Fruin is taking up a banner handed on from commentators such as 
Nelson (1987), who announced that ‘you must understand computers now’ in 1974 
and advocated wresting the power of software making from the ‘digital priesthood’, 
and Papert (1980), who proposed that software processes could be powerfully 
exploited as creative learning environments. Wardrip-Fruin (2009) is also very clear 
that a functional procedural literacy is only the beginning or partial step towards 
understanding software culture. Procedural systems are designed, as he says of the 
processually produced worlds of digital fictions and games, “They express the 
meanings of their fictional worlds through the design of every structure, the arc of 
every internal movement, and the elegance of difficulty with which the elements 
interact with one another” (2009, p. 157). Bogost (2007), another theorist in the 
specific software culture field of digital games, makes similar arguments in his 
discussion of the powerful assertions and implicit ideologies in digital artefacts as a 
representational media. The designing of software is indeed the creation of processes 
that then create player experiences but the designer is an ideological presence within 
the design; this presence can be critiqued from the perspective of wider political 
issues. Wardrip-Fruin (2009, p. 217) raises a challenge: 
I hope an increasing amount of work in digital media will turn toward 
investigation of processes and the potential for their interpretation – and that 
this will, together with increasing procedural literacy, help us make more 
informed decisions at the intersections of processes and politics. 
With this, Wardrip-Fruin establishes a hermeneutic intent of understanding (although 
he makes no direct mention of the methodology) within forensic media 
archaeological approaches and announces critical goals. He also establishes, for the 
current research thesis, the site of such critical hermeneutics in the intersections 
between artefacts and designing: to go beyond merely opening the black box but to 
delve into the entangled space where the black box is understood as a designed 
material artefact, which in turn is used to construct further designed artefacts. 
3.4 SOFTWARE AND DESIGN AS RESEARCH OBJECT 
The final section of this chapter offers an introduction to the ensuing chapters 
that are made up of the publications completed during candidature. It briefly sketches 
the way in which the research work in the publications has applied the methodologies 
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discussed (critical hermeneutics expressed through design practice and critical 
pedagogy). This section explains how the separate publications relate to each other 
and enact the hermeneutical spiral. Each of the publication’s chapters has its own 
introduction, background and reflections, and is only dealt with here in terms of the 
overall research narrative and Ricœur’s critical hermeneutic spiral. 
3.4.1 Hermeneutic approaches: The Digital Songlines publications 
The two publications submitted in chapter four of the current work, Destination 
space: experiential spatiality and stories (Turner, 2006a) and Through the looking 
glass: game worlds as representations and views from elsewhere (Turner & Bidwell, 
2007b) represent the beginnings of the hermeneutic spiral. The methodological 
approach in both of these publications is early reflection, they embody Geertz’s 
(1973, p. 20) suggestion that cultural analysis should be about “guessing at 
meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the 
better guesses”. Together these two publications represent a movement between the 
parts and the whole of the hermeneutic tradition re-envisioned by Gadamer (1975). 
As a pair of overlapping publications that were actually part of a wider set about the 
same problem (Bidwell, Radoll & Turner, 2007; Bidwell, Turner, Holdsworth, 
Lemmon & Shay, 2007; Turner, 2006b; Turner & Bidwell, 2007a; Turner, Browning 
& Bidwell, 2008) the two publications are parts of an iterative research process. The 
research presented is iterative in the Gadamerian sense in that each publication 
augments the understandings gained in the previous publication. The research is also 
iterative in the designerly sense because the discussions propose design ‘solutions’ 
that draw on the understandings and reflections gained during the reflective process 
(Schön, 1983). Both the publications assume a critical perspective and a search for 
both understanding and explanation as Habermas would advocate. They are also very 
much influenced by my own background in critical pedagogy and draw heavily on 
the Freirean critical endeavour that seeks the hopeful. Here Horkheimer’s (1982) 
‘circumstances that enslave’ are reframed as ‘design that expects’ and the initial 
hermeneutic circle evolves into the critical hermeneutic spiral that Ricœur 
recommends for the hope-full endeavour (Fig. 8). 
3.4.2 Hermeneutic approaches: Little grey cat 
Chapter five also consists of two publications: a short single page publication 
that accompanied a software demonstration: The little grey cat engine: telling small 
stories (Turner, 2008) and a full conference paper that discusses the design 
 130 Chapter 3: Methodologies 
considerations and theoretical concepts behind the designing of the software: 
Designing spatial story-telling software (Turner & Browning, 2009). The overt 
methodology in both of these publications is Schön’s (1983) hermeneutic cycle. The 
designing itself arises in reflections about the dilemmas exposed in the earlier 
hermeneutic phase where the implications and problems posed by the Digital 
Songlines Environment are instantiated in potential physical designed artefacts or 
Tilley’s (1991) ‘solid metaphors’. The two ‘grey cat’ publications and the actual 
software designed and described in both publications are reflected upon and so, in 
their turn, add to the hermeneutic spiral that commenced with the research presented 
in chapter four. In the process of designing the greyCat story telling framework (the 
software discussed), the importance of Freire’s critical pedagogy and its relevance in 
the design process was confirmed, thus opening up the research itself into the next 
phase of the critical hermeneutic spiral (Fig. 8). 
3.4.3 Hermeneutic approaches: African gamer 
Chapter six consists of a single book chapter called African gamer: Whose 
story is it anyway? (Turner, 2015). This theoretical research represents a further 
phase in the critical hermeneutic spiral. It follows on from reflections on dilemmas 
exposed in the earlier phases, particularly the dilemmas of designing as a 
hermeneutic process that does not question its onto-epistemic assumptions about the 
nature of design as a storied process and the material stories of designed artefacts. 
The critical hermeneutic methodology in African gamer, whilst remaining very much 
a designerly perspective, draws on the hermeneutic approaches of post-processual 
material culture, which seeks to understand the cultural values and assumptions 
embedded within the artefact. This critical material hermeneutic methodology is once 
again guided by the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire and his insistence on the 
possibility for praxis and transformation or the hope-full endeavour (Fig. 8). 
3.4.4 From hermeneutics to practice: Performing design 
The final publication constituting the overall critical hermeneutic spiral 
presented in the current work (Fig. 8) is actually an exercise in critical pedagogy in 
design education. As already discussed (see Chapter 1, section 1.5.1) and 
underscored in the current chapter (section 3.1.1), ‘doing’ post-colonial research is 
fraught with dilemmas when the researcher is herself already embedded in a western 
pre-figured environment. The final publication included in this thesis therefore 
focuses on the core themes of the overall research narrative within a situation that I 
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feel is within my own bailiwick. The Performing design publication (Turner & 
Moyes, 2012) included as chapter seven is an early attempt to enact critical pedagogy 
within design itself. The context is a small informal educational experiment within an 
Australian design education context. Such a context is perhaps a long way away from 
Freire’s situations of asymmetrical power relations, however, it offers an ideal 
context in which to unveil, not Freire’s ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ but what we call 
‘a pedagogy of the impressed’. The nature of Schön’s (1983) reflection-in-action as a 
hermeneutic process highlights the manner in which stories are re-iterated and re-told 
through design itself. The goal of the Performing design research endeavour is 
essentially Ruano’s (2013) humanistic goal enacted through the critical pedagogy 
approach of Freire (1972) and Boal (2000). As we argue (2012, para. 22): 
Boal’s work in liberatory theatre invites the audience to invade the stage and 
transform the images that are there. Design intrinsically transforms objects; 
it becomes a cultural engine. Once we see design as a cultural engine then 
we can also argue for cultural critique in the form of analysis of the affective 
domain of such objects, an understanding of their baggage and lineages and 
so critical practices around those objects. 
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Figure 8. Diagram showing how the hermeneutic methodologies discussed in the current chapter 
articulate into the publications
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Chapter 4: Beginnings – the Digital 
Songlines Environment 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of two blind peer reviewed publications. The two DSE 
papers included here were written and published during the current candidacy. 
Statements in support of contribution are available in Appendix B. Both publications 
were originally published in the standard two-column Association for Computing 
Machinery (ACM) format and are presented here in their original format for 
copyright reasons and to maintain the original intent of the writing, which is in part 
bound to the material requirements of ACM publishing conventions. For example, 
the eight page limit for a conference paper has some inevitable ramifications on 
style. Figures in the publications are not included in the thesis list of figures to avoid 
overmuch repetition of the same images. The original reference lists and paper 
headings and sub-headings are also left intact and not incorporated for the same 
reason. I have also resisted the temptation to review and edit any typographic errors 
that were missed in the reviewing process and production of camera-ready copies.  
The two publications in this chapter are the beginnings of the critical 
hermeneutic process (see Chapter 3); both arising from my experience working with 
the Digital Songlines Environment or DSE. The first publication is entitled 
Destination space: Experiential spatiality and stories (Turner, 2006a). This paper 
discusses game and virtual world conceptualisations of space. It reflects on the 
challenges that arise when digital game environments are appropriated for immersive 
experiences beyond the specificity of game-play, for example, as experiential 
opportunity for students in classrooms, or as cultural heritage. It sets out to explore 
Turner, J. (2006a). Destination space: Experiential spatiality and stories. 
ACM International Conference Proceeding Series (Vol. 223, pp. 87-94). 
ACM. 
Turner, J., & Bidwell, N. J. (2007b). Through the looking glass: Game 
worlds as representations and views from elsewhere. In M. Gibbs & Y. 
Pisan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 4th Australasian Conference on 
Interactive Entertainment (pp. 1-8): RMIT University. 
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two facets of this space in particular: the manner in which the space exhibits a 
designed condition for the forms of experiences that take place within it; and some 
explorations into ways in which these interactions can be understood in order to 
design ‘different’ experiences. The discussion is based on three case studies of 
projects that explore the stories, engagement and experiences within (and without) 
game world spaces. The paper reflects on the disappearance of the designer as a 
design habit. It muses on what this disappearance might mean when designing a 
cultural world for indigenous stories. As the first paper, Destination space is an 
example of early reflections on the nature of design and the dilemmas of simulation. 
It establishes some of the main concerns of the overall thesis, particularly the 
importance of stories and the disappearance of the designer and the cultural 
complicity required to engage players in interactive digital worlds. The paper is 
optimistic about the use of digital simulations to convey Australian Indigenous 
stories. It ends with a reflection on the potential of highly detailed simulations as a 
design solution to the problem of communicating experience. Destination space also 
includes a short description of a project that used a version of Boalian theatrical 
techniques (the History’s purchased page project). There is a pleasing sense of 
‘completion’ about this in terms of the overall research program as I later return to 
Boal’s critical pedagogy (1979) and his performance based approach to Freire’s 
(1970) demand to make the hidden visible. 
The second paper in this chapter, Through the looking glass: games worlds as 
representations and views from elsewhere (Turner & Bidwell, 2007b), interrogates 
the problem of representation in Digital Songlines and game worlds used for 
purposes other than play in more detail, from a designer’s perspective. This early 
research work begins to expose the problematic issues that the current thesis is 
concerned with: the habits and assumptions of game design and the danger of re-
enacting the colonial project. In this work, the focus on the materiality of the digital 
artefact is brought to the fore and problematised in terms of place making. Through 
the looking glass starts to unpack the priorities embedded in the western mode map; 
it reviews some older forms of map making and proposes a design solution to the 
distancing effects of the Cartesian map: the Graffiti engine. The work pursues the 
design solution (the Graffiti engine) and unpacks the way that the act of graffiti, or 
‘scratching’ on the world can be understood as place-making (see also Turner & 
Bidwell, 2007a). In Through the looking glass the analysis is informed by some 
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initial methodological explorations that took the critical geography approach of 
theorists like Harley (1980) and Wood et al. (2010) as a potential theoretical 
framework because of the ways in which the intent of critical geography resonates 
with Freire’s (1972) desire to unveil the hidden. This deconstructive approach is 
continued in the subsequent DSE publications. However, as the current thesis 
explains (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.2), the deconstructive approach was eventually 
found to be inadequate to ‘get to’ the materiality of the digital artefact and the 
practice-based design approach was found to be problematic because of the way it 
framed that same materiality and the role of the designer. 
As an overlapping pair of interconnected papers the two DSE papers embody 
Geertz’s (1973) statement on the nature of hermeneutic methodologies for cultural 
analysis (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2) as being ‘guesses at meanings’. The DSE 
papers follow Geertz’s advice, they represent the early inquiry and critical reflection 
that results in the current research as presented in this thesis. As I have stated, the 
first paper, Destination space, is very much early inquiry, it offers initial reflections 
and ideas that later were confirmed as critical insights and provide a background to 
the current thesis. Both of these early publications are written in a semi-formal style 
that (on reflection) lays bare my own researcher interest in Ricœur’s (1984) mimetic 
cycle, although at the time I had not yet read Ricœur’s work. The publications also 
reveal my designer (and story teller) desire to connect my reflections to Ricœur’s 
storied world in that they reference contemporary pop culture and use these 
references as metaphor and imagery. 
4.1.2 Background and reflections 
This research began as an analysis of software and design ‘habits’ manifest in 
software with a view to enabling participants to create their own stories using game 
world making software (Bidwell, Turner, Holdsworth, Lemmon & Shay, 2007; 
Turner, 2006a; Turner, 2006b; Turner & Bidwell, 2007a; Turner & Bidwell, 2007b; 
Turner, Browning & Bidwell, 2008). At the time, I was working as an interaction 
design researcher on a project that intended to share stories and ways of making 
meaning using software normally used to create fictional worlds for games, an 
Australasian CRC for Interaction Design (ACID) project called the Digital Songlines 
Environment (DSE). This was one of many projects under the ACID umbrella; a 
collaborative endeavour between ACID and the Australian Indigenous owned and 
operated company CyberDreaming. 
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The DSE project rationale was based on recognition of Australian Indigenous 
knowledges and stories as vulnerable intangible cultural heritage in need of 
preservation and protection, and commentators (Christie, 2004; Nakata, 2002) who 
observe that there is a problematic disjuncture between the archival approaches of 
the museum and the ways in which Australian Indigenous stories are inscribed in the 
landscape (Munn, 1996; Rose, 1996). The DSE project additionally recognised that 
handing such stories on to the younger generation might usefully exploit their 
experience with 3D worlds (digital games). A central design concept was that the 
simulated environment itself could become a kind of ‘toolkit’ for cultural heritage 
(Gard, Bucolo, & Wyeld, 2005; Leavy, 2007). The result was the Digital Songlines 
Environment, a 3D simulation of traditional country made with a commercial game 
engine. The project aimed to re-create the landscapes of the communities using a 
Software Development Kit (SDK) or 3D game engine and 3D modelling software 
with Digital Elevation Model (DEM) data sourced through Geoscience Australia. 
There were a number of iterations of these cultural worlds, each one created in 
conjunction with the community members and informed through discussion with 
community elders. The development team visited the traditional lands of the 
community and walked the country with community members in order to become 
engaged as makers in the stories that they were re-presenting in the digital spaces of 
the game engine. The partner organisation, CyberDreaming, was a caring and 
compassionate liaison and conduit voice in the development of all three projects 
produced under the DSE umbrella: Irene’s World (2006a), Vincent’s World (2006b) 
and Virtual Warrane (2007). The works produced as a result of the project were 
indeed evocative of the traditional landscapes. As one Gunggari community elder 
said of the representation of the area around Dalby near the Maranoa River where 
she had lived all her life: “I can almost feel the dust between my toes” (cited in 
Turner & Bidwell, 2007a, p. 3). The DSE project as an ACID project ended with the 
CRC itself in 2010, although CyberDreaming is continuing the overall endeavour 
with new partners in the form of Virtual Warrane II. As I have already mentioned in 
the front matter for the current thesis, it was a privilege to be involved with the DSE 
project. The worlds that the project produced are beautiful; the communities who 
engaged with the project are delighted to see their worlds recreated in contemporary 
technology. 
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4.1.3 Designer stories 
However successful, the DSE projects also reveal the dilemmas that the current 
thesis seeks to disentangle and unveil. In the first instance, the desire for simulated 
reality and the use of a professional or ‘high end’ SDK meant that the participants 
were put in the position of consultants or advisors (Pretty, 1995); they were no longer 
able to tell their own stories but had to have a production team design the telling on 
their behalf. The knowledge holders told their stories to the development team who 
then created the digital world and implemented the stories told in the world. The 
functional skill demands of the digital tool kit (Gard et al., 2005) such as 
programming, 3D modelling and audio production required a development team who 
acted as a conduit between the communities as knowledge holders and the digital 
artefact. The traditional knowledge and stories of the indigenous communities were 
translated by the designers and developers of the simulated world into the software. 
These functional skill sets are also heavily ‘storied’; they too are replete with culture 
and values. For example, as I discuss in Destination space (Turner, 2006a), the 
creation of a simulated world and prior experience on the part of both interactors and 
developers creates expectations about potential interaction within the world that 
might be at odds with the intended engagement. 
Critically, digital game worlds are not just encoded; they are designed within a 
cultural context and design as a culturally embedded practice has its own stories. As I 
argue (Turner, 2006a, p. 92): 
Space in game environments can be seen as culturally specific because such 
digital spaces are constructs, designed and authored with underlying 
conceptual models of intent. Such game spaces are viewed throughout this 
work as cultural colonized spaces, they are not only designed and developed 
as events spaces by authors but they are also developed in authored constructs 
enabled by legacies of hardware, software and operating systems. 
This perspective frames the early work presented in this chapter; it acts as a basis for 
the current research that argues that it is important to understand software as a 
material artefact, laden with cultural values. In Destination space I focus on the 
relationship between designers and their artefacts in the context of the DSE project. 
My aim at this stage was an interrogation of the relationship between design 
expectations and designed expectations within the software itself and to problematise 
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the idea that designers could design from a cultural perspective other than their own 
(see also Turner, 2006b). As I argue (2006a, p. 92): 
The environment or game space, the designer and the player form a triad of 
identities essential to the nature of the experience. This ‘ménage a trois’ 
becomes problematic when the world design goals are the constructions of 
experiences and perspectives unknown to the designer. 
The initial dilemma that the DSE project appeared to present was that the seduction 
of simulation, high fidelity 3D representation of community landscapes, and the 
nature of the development process and the software being used meant that the 
indigenous community knowledge holders could only act as informants and post-
design evaluators, external to the actual designing.  
At the time of writing, I had not yet made any connections between this issue 
and the work of Donald Schön on the designer process but reflecting on this early 
work subsequently led me to Schön’s (1983) analysis of professional practice as a 
culturally entangled process (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3 and Chapter 3, section 
3.3.2). Designers and makers of artefacts are themselves members of a culture and 
the artefacts they create are, as Manovich (2001) argues, deeply social. Digital 
artefacts arise in culture; they are developed by groups of people who have cultural 
values and whose values are expressed in the design of the digital artefact. This, in 
turn, creates expectations about design. The relationship between the designer’s 
experience that Schön (1983) describes and the designed expectations of the software 
(Fuller, 2003) creates a somewhat exclusive relationship (Turner, 2006a; 2006b). As 
I ask (Turner, 2006a, p. 91), “The question posed here is whose story? Is the dynamic 
between the visualization engine and the cultural context of the designer eternally 
fixed in a single perspective?” 
4.1.4 Material stories and place 
The second paper in this chapter, Through the looking glass (Turner & 
Bidwell, 2007b), while still early work, is more focused on the materiality of the 
software used to create the DSE worlds. The paper essentially assumes that the 
digital artefact (e.g. the DSE) exists in the world and explores a way of 
understanding it as a material artefact that has potential to be claimed by participants 
or the story tellers that are seen as being disenfranchised in the earlier work. At the 
time of writing, we were interested in distinctions between space and place (Casey, 
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1993; Cresswell, 2008; Dourish, 2006b; Tuan, 1977) and the potential to make place 
within a digital game world, in spite of design habits that position a player as a 
virtual tourist (Oliver, 2001). We felt that this latter design parameter was 
problematically at odds with Australian Indigenous views on country where 
knowledges and stories are instantiated in place and co-located with landscapes of 
experience (Rose, 1996; Verran, 1998). 
In this publication, we (my co-author and I) commence with a re-framing of 
digital game worlds as topographic re-presentations of the real. This re-framing is 
based on commentators such as Jenkins (2004) and Flynn (2003), who propose that 
the relationship between designed digital game worlds and the player has resonance 
with Michel de Certeau’s (1984) spatial practice where there is “an evident 
interaction between the experiences of the actors and their movement through the 
world” (Turner & Bidwell, 2007a, p. 3). Jenkins (2004, p. 124) describes such stories 
as “held together by broadly defined goals and conflicts and pushed forward by the 
character’s movement across the map”. 
This understanding of player activity in digital games leads us to looking at 
these worlds as topographic representations that can be analysed in the same manner 
as critical geographers and critical cartographers critique map making practice 
(Black, 1997; Harley, 1988; Wood et al., 2010) as culturally situated practice. From 
this critical cartography perspective, all maps, even the most apparently accurate, tell 
cultural stories or lie, as Monmonier (1991) puts it. We propose, after Suchman28 
(2002) that contemporary western maps (and map-like artefacts) offer a particular 
cultural perspective, one that pretends to a ‘view from nowhere’ or the ‘certainty of 
objectivity’ as Haraway (1991) puts it. Further, we propose that there is a culture 
clash between what we call ‘a view from somewhere’ and the cultural stories of 
Australian Indigenous communities. 
Recognising that a digital game world, such as the DSE, no matter how 
accurate the representation, or simulation to use Aarseth’s terminology (2005), offers 
a potential design pathway. Once a ‘map’ (re-presentation of the world) is recognised 
as a storied artefact then it is also open to subversion and re-making; maps can be 
claimed, they can be drawn on, they can be re-made from a subjective viewpoint. Or, 
                                                
 
28 Through the looking glass cites Suchman (2003) for this phrase. Other discussion in the current 
thesis written at later stages cites Haraway (1991). Both authors use the phrase to mean the so-called 
‘objective’ view. 
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as we argue in Through the looking glass, they can be reclaimed. As we say (2007b, 
p. 5), “The construction of a topological representation is a construct of both culture 
and power. Claiming the representation directly opens it to Freire’s call to allow the 
disenfranchised to ‘transform the structure’.” The problem of participation that was 
discussed in Destination space is clarified as a design challenge in Through the 
looking glass (2007b, p. 6): 
The challenge here is to enable the construction of a view from elsewhere 
within the constraints of the materiality of the medium. In addition, we seek a 
way of scaffolding such construction without the process of technology … 
which is a valuable goal but which has the potential to disenfranchise many of 
the memory holders, the owners of small stories, from the process. 
Through the looking glass ends with a description of a design prototype called 
nQuumbar or the Graffiti engine, which was inspired by an “ancient approach to 
leaving individual voice on the face of the physical world” (2007b, p. 6), the practice 
of leaving marks on the landscape, rocks and walls. As designers, our intent was to 
enable empowered participation within the simulated worlds of the DSE, or simply, 
to allow them to tell their own stories within the world and reclaim the virtual 
landscapes that were so carefully designed to be ‘authentic’ models of their 
traditional country (2007b, p. 6):  
Rather, markers of success are those moments where the virtual is 
reconfigured by its resonance with the real, those moments of interaction with 
the landscape that are the intimate stuff of traditional knowledge as well as the 
small stories of us all. Such intangible knowledge should remain intimate to 
its holders, the Graffiti engine endeavours to allow them to say: ‘Here, in this 
place’. 
 Chapter 4: Beginnings – the Digital Songlines Environment 141 
4.2 DESTINATION SPACE: EXPERIENTIAL SPATIALITY AND 
STORIES 
 
Originally published as:  
truna aka j.turner (2006a). Destination space: Experiential spatiality and stories 
ACM International Conference Proceeding Series (Vol. 223, pp. 87-94). ACM 
  
 
Original Abstract 
Because stories are important. People think stories are shaped by people. In fact, it’s 
the other way around. Stories exist independently of their players. If you know that, 
the knowledge is power. – Sir Terry Pratchett (1991) 
The z-axis is you seeing something from a different point of view without moving – 
Jack Turner (2006) 
This paper is about game and virtual world conceptualisations of space and some rich 
challenges that arise when we undertake the design of such environments for 
immersive experiences beyond the specificity of game-play. It sets out to explore two 
facets of this space in particular: the manner in which the space exhibits a designed 
condition for the forms of experiences which take place within it; and some 
explorations into ways in which these interactions can be understood in order to 
design ‘different’ experiences. The discussion is based on three case studies of 
projects which have explored the stories, engagement and experiences within (and 
without) game world spaces. 
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4.3 THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: GAME WORLDS AS 
REPRESENTATIONS AND VIEWS FROM ELSEWHERE 
Originally published as: 
Turner, J., & Bidwell, N. J. (2007b). Through the looking glass: Game worlds as 
representations and views from elsewhere. In M. Gibbs & Y. Pisan (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 4th Australasian Conference on Interactive 
Entertainment (pp. 1-8): RMIT University.  
 
Original Abstract 
This paper describes the rationale and subsequent development stages of a work in 
progress: a graffiti toolkit for rich spatial 3D environments and an actual world 
mnemonic collection enterprise using mobile technologies. The driving concept for 
the design of the toolkit is enabling participants to tell their own stories within the 
virtually represented landscapes of rich 3D spatial worlds, minimising the autocracy 
of software conditioning and recognising that such stories belong within a place, 
context. It is inspired by work which explores the possibilities of visualisation 
engines to transmit intangible culture. The use of graffiti as a means to give voice to 
those outside the official writing and recording of culture dates back to antiquity. As 
a practice, making marks on objects and the world holds the undercurrent of claiming 
the intangible or otherwise unreachable, a memory or voice which has no other 
platform. This project is informed by the social context of meaning and intangible 
culture and the manner in which interface design conditions the nature of stories. It 
takes the reader on a walk which connects the design of spatial worlds with the 
representation of landscapes through painting and maps in order to find ways to 
exploit “views from elsewhere” and enable connections between a lived sense of 
place with the navigable representations constructed within the screen. 
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4.4 DESIGN DIRECTIONS, NEW DILEMMAS 
This idea that (digital) space might afford a sense of place through meaning 
making (Casey, 1996; Dourish, 2006b; Tuan, 1977) inspired a number of further 
design experiments. The Mobile mnemonics project (Bidwell et al., 2007) was 
conceived as a mobile enhancement to the Graffiti engine prototype. This design 
concept seeks to connect the lived embodied experience of story tellers in place by 
harnessing the potential of a mobile app that could then communicate directly with a 
tool such as the Graffiti engine and enable participants to create their own materials 
without interpretation by a technical expert. The Mobile mnemonics device was 
never actually made in the original sense that we designed for. However, in 2008, the 
Google Earth Outreach team set up a project with the Amazonian Surui tribe that 
used the Open Data Kit for Android phones and enabled the tribe to represent their 
own knowledges and stories – their own subjective experience of the map – via 
Google Earth (Plotkin, 2009), rather than a discrete game world such as the DSE.  
The goal of allowing participants to access the storied space of a simulated 
world has merit in projects like the DSE. However, it does not actually dismantle the 
storied nature of digital space. It merely allows story tellers to use the designed space 
of the artefact. A return to Jenkins’ insight (2006) on the ‘prestructuring’ of 
participatory activity enabled by the designer offers a salutary moment (see Chapter 
2, section 2.4.3). Jenkins’ insight, Freire’s warnings (1972) against imaginary action 
(see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1) and a further design prototype called the Little grey cat 
engine or greyCat (Turner, 2008; Turner & Browning, 2009) offer important 
moments of critical insight and raise issues that demand further interrogation and a 
move away from design solutions towards a more critical hermeneutic approach to 
design itself. This prototype is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Dilemmas in practice 
Turner, J. (2008). The little grey cat engine: telling small stories (Demo). Paper 
presented at the 20th conference of the computer-human interaction special 
interest group (CHISIG) of Australia on Computer-human interaction: 
design OZCHI ‘08, Cairns, Australia.  
Turner, J., & Browning, D. (2009). Designing spatial story-telling software 
Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Australian Computer-
Human Interaction Special Interest Group: Design: Open 24/7 (pp. 153-160): 
ACM. 
5.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of two blind peer reviewed publications. Statements in 
support of contribution are available in Appendix B. Both publications were 
originally published in the standard two-column Association for Computing 
Machinery (ACM) format and are presented here in their original format for 
copyright reasons and to maintain the original intent of the writing, which is in part 
bound to the material requirements of ACM publishing conventions. Figures in the 
publications are not included in the thesis list of figures as there is much repetition of 
the same images. The original reference lists and paper headings and sub-headings 
are also left intact and not incorporated for the same reason. As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, I have also resisted the temptation to review and edit any 
typographic errors that were missed in the reviewing process and production of 
camera-ready copies. The first publication (The little grey cat engine, Turner, 2008) 
is not a stand-alone publication, it was submitted as a practice-based design 
prototype description or demonstration and the software prototype was presented at 
the conference (rather than the conceptual research). The second paper is the design 
research publication. 
This pair of papers is about a design solution to some of the dilemmas of 
participation observed in the earlier DSE papers. The little grey cat engine: telling 
small stories (Turner, 2008), is a conference paper that introduces the design 
background to the Little grey cat engine or greyCat software. Designing spatial 
story-telling software (Turner and Browning, 2008), is a longer paper that 
backgrounds the design and the design rationale in more depth. The 
conceptualisation of the design was informed by realisation that the Graffiti engine 
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design proposal (Turner and Bidwell, 2007a; Turner and Bidwell, 2007b, see Chapter 
4, this volume) is flawed in its goals of empowering those without voice and, while 
interesting in terms of design for participation, does much to confirm a kind of 
helplessness and exclusivity through the emphasis on using the simulated 
reconstruction of country created in the game engine. The greyCat design proposes a 
‘stripped down’ software that allows potential world creators to use their own 
materials, after the established manner of digital story telling practice (Lambert, 
2012), which advocates use of ‘common’ digital software such as simple movie 
making software and audio recording software as a platform for the making and 
sharing of ‘everyday’ life stories.  
These two publications, like the two DSE publications in the previous chapter, 
remain early work in the overall research narrative presented in the current thesis. At 
this stage, I was still framing the problems highlighted in the DSE papers (see 
Chapter 4) as design problems that could be ameliorated through design, which 
enabled participation and direct access to software for the purposes of story telling. 
However, the designing of a spatial story telling prototype and the background 
research led me to the work of Ricœur (1991), which has subsequently provided a 
way of re-attaching the theoretical perspective provided by Freire’s critical pedagogy 
(1972) to both design and its material artefacts. At the time, I also started re-reading 
the fictional work of Gabriel García Márquez, which led me to his (1982) Nobel 
prize speech that is used as an opening banner for the thesis as a whole (see Chapter 
1, section 1.1). 
5.1.2 Designer stories 
The design concept for greyCat engine was inspired by an earlier series of 
personal research projects (prior to my involvement with ACID and the Digital 
Songlines Environment or DSE) that used text to create navigable virtual spaces (see 
Turner, 1995, 1998, 2001) and recount spatial stories. Here, the affordances of the 
text-based environment (a MUD or Multi-User Dungeon) allowed a range of 
participants (from primary school students, to international students to in-service 
educators to adult AUSLAN speakers) direct and constructive access to world 
creation tools. Contrast this with the DSE project and its richly visualised simulated 
worlds replete with flora and fauna (Turner, 2006a, 2006b) where story tellers and 
knowledge holders are disenfranchised and reduced to Pretty’s (1995) ‘participation 
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by consultation’ despite the intent of the project rationale. As we write in Designing 
spatial story-telling software (Turner & Browning, 2009, p. 154): 
Explorations in the use of immersive visualisations and the software used to 
create them leave us asking questions about the nature of the inherited 
legacies of both code and representation within constructed worlds and the 
means to enable direct interactive participation on the part of the story-tellers 
themselves in the construction, where such interactive participation is 
distinguished in terms of agency and control in all aspects of the process. 
My response was a design concept and working prototype that stripped spatial 
functionality back down to a form of spatial navigation of an earlier era typified by 
two-dimensional, story-driven adventure games.  
Rather than insisting on three-dimensional movement and the illusion of 
simulated reality, greyCat takes the metaphor of ‘rooms’ and ‘pathways’ through 
digitised images. A simple interface allows participants to contribute their own 
images29, for example, digitised personal photographs or drawings. Such material 
objects are frequently themselves redolent of stories (Pahl & Rowsell, 2010) that are 
more than depiction and mnemonic; the image as artefact is more than a picture of 
memory but in and of itself becomes as storied object. For example, Tolia-Kelly’s 
(2004) analysis of visual culture in post-colonial migration contexts in Britain argues 
that photographs and mementos displayed in the domestic situation act to connect 
people to places once known and so assist in the creation of self identity. For the 
migrant who is disposed and removed from the landscape of their own culture and its 
pre-figured cultural stories (Ricœur, 1984), photographs are equated with other 
material objects and act to import something of the lost place.  
This use of the personal image is also an important aspect of the practice of 
digital story telling but where digital story telling emphasises the linear story 
construction of the film (Lambert, 2012), greyCat looks to offer a sense of spatial 
navigation via use of hyperlink style ‘portals’ or ‘hotspots’ placed on the image. The 
portal can be located anywhere on the image, for example on an object that might be 
important to the creator, or on a building in the image that has meaning for the 
creator. The idea is that the creator can make their own way through the image and 
                                                
 
29 The Little Grey Cat engine and the notion of using images collected by participants also owed much 
to another project called the Strolls project, which collected videos from participants made by walking 
through their local areas with a still camera. 
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‘walk’ another through the experience from their perspective. For example, a single 
photograph of a village seen from the beach used as part of a sequence offers a 
number of directions beyond the façade of the image. Choices can be made to 
construct a personal pathway; go up the path or direct the story towards a particular 
building in the foreground. 
GreyCat, as a design experiment, recognises that designing for a culture of 
which one is not a member is essentially an act of paternalism and so the design is 
not aimed at the same audience as the DSE project discussed previously (see Chapter 
4); it makes no claims as to ‘protecting’ and ‘preserving’, nor does it propose that it 
can enhance the experience of place that Tuan (1977) advocates as the goal of the 
humanist geographer. Rather, the goal of the project is to find a way to enable 
participants to become designers of their own spatial stories and to de-emphasise the 
production process of rich three-dimensional worlds. To paraphrase Freire (1972), 
greyCat is based on a premise of ‘transforming’ the structure so that people using it 
can ‘become beings for themselves’ in some small way.  
Thus the design rationale is in keeping with Ricœur’s (1991) conceptualisation 
of ‘narrative identity’ and his assertion that individuals order elements of experience 
and these are ‘emploted’, to use Ricœur’s term, and constructed as a whole in order 
to create a sense of self and temporal consistency. The design concept also owes 
shape to Ricœur’s thesis on memory (2004, p. 26), where he observes that, “We have 
nothing better than memory to signify that something has taken place, has happened, 
has happened before we claim to remember it.” As Hannoum’s (2005) commentary 
explains, according to Ricœur, one does not ‘just remember’; one remembers 
‘something’. However, while Ricœur’s narrated self is an important influence, the 
design is more concerned with memories and where memories take place. Here, 
Ricœur’s ‘something has happened’ is reframed as ‘something has happened here, in 
this place’. Add to this Tuan’s (1977) hopeful assertion that place making can be 
supported by understandings of our experiential relationship with the world and 
recognising the power of stories to create place, and we have the potential to re-
phrase the Graffiti engine desire to allow participants to say, “Here in this place” 
(Turner & Bidwell 2006b, p. 6) into a re-making of the same act. 
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5.2 THE LITTLE GREY CAT ENGINE: TELLING SMALL STORIES 
Originally published as: 
truna aka j.turner (2008). The little grey cat engine: Telling small stories (Demo). 
Paper presented at the 20th Conference of the Computer-Human 
Interaction Special Interest Group (CHISIG) of Australia on Computer-
Human Interaction: Design OZCHI ‘08, Cairns, Australia.  
 
Original Abstract 
The little grey cat engine (greyCat) is part of a series of projects which explore 
software which can enable access to the potentially empowering nature of 
represented space and game design. GreyCat is the result of research into the culture 
of the software itself in order to provide participatory environments which enable the 
telling of ‘small stories’ – stories and experiences which are those of the everyday or 
those of a cultural perspective other than that prioritised by most world building 
softwares or game engines. GreyCat offers a simple framework which allows 
participants to use their own image materials (photographs for the most part) as a 
basis for spatial exploration of their own places. 
 166 Chapter 5: Dilemmas in practice  
 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 5: Dilemmas in practice 167 
 
 168 Chapter 5: Dilemmas in practice  
 
5.3 DESIGNING SPATIAL STORY-TELLING SOFTWARE 
 
Originally published as: 
Turner, J., & Browning, D. (2009). Designing spatial story-telling software 
Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Australian Computer-
Human Interaction Special Interest Group: Design: Open 24/7 (pp. 153-
160): ACM. 
 
Original Abstract 
What does it mean when we design for accessibility, inclusivity and ‘dissolving 
boundaries’ – particularly those boundaries between the design philosophy, the 
software/interface actuality and the stated goals? This paper is about the principles 
underlying a research project called ‘The Little Grey Cat engine’ or greyCat. 
GreyCat has grown out of our experience in using commercial game engines as 
production environments for the transmission of culture and experience through the 
telling of individual stories. The key to this endeavour is the potential of the greyCat 
software to visualise worlds and the manner in which non-formal stories are 
intertwined with place. The apparently simple dictum of ‘show, don’t tell’ and the 
use of 3D game engines as a medium disguise an interesting nexus of problematic 
issues and questions, particularly in the ramifications for cultural dimensions and 
participatory interaction design. The engine is currently in alpha and the following 
paper is its background story. In this paper we discuss the problematic, thrown into 
sharp relief by a particular project, and we continue to unpack concepts and early 
designs behind the greyCat itself. 
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5.4 NEW DIRECTIONS: MATERIAL DILEMMAS 
In the earlier Digital Songlines Environment (DSE) project described in chapter 
four, the traditional knowledge and stories of the indigenous communities were 
translated by the designers and developers of the simulated world into the software. 
At first sight, this presents itself as a functional literacy issue, that is, the DSE story-
tellers lacked the functional skills required to construct their own game world assets. 
The community knowledge holders were no longer able to tell their own stories but 
had to have a production team design the telling on their behalf. The knowledge 
holders told their stories to the development team, who then created the digital world 
and implemented the stories told in the world. The skill demands of the digital tool 
kit (Gard et al., 2005), such as programming, 3D modelling and audio production, 
required a development team who acted as a conduit between the communities as 
knowledge holders and the digital artefact. 
However, this translation is more than the positioning of knowledge holders on 
the other side of a human conduit who simply transfer information from the physical 
world to a simulated version. In the first instance, the idea that software use is a 
functional literacy issue is deeply problematic. Functional skills are not so easily 
separated from critical meaning-making skills and underlying cultural assumptions 
and power relationships (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3). Post-colonial commentators 
like Thiong’o (1986) point out that choice of functional literacy skill set and 
language is in fact a choice of culture and values. Thiong’o’s critique is also valid in 
the case of software where multiple skill sets exist (programming, modelling or 
animating). These functional skill sets are also heavily ‘storied’; they too are replete 
with culture and values. The designing of greyCat recognises this, as we observe 
(Turner & Browning, 2009, p. 160): 
More importantly, we feel that the process of unpacking the design 
assumptions has been invaluable: if we are indeed to design for inclusivity 
and to dissolve the boundaries between design and users of designing, it is 
essential that we understand the cultural assumptions and legacies of the 
software itself. 
GreyCat is not tied to the dictates of Cartesian space and ‘accurate’ 
measurement in the same way that a game engine is; the software design does not 
expect (or demand) technical abilities and skills in the use of 3D modelling software 
(to create objects within the game world), or animation skills (to make the objects 
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appear life-like and ‘move’ convincingly), or programming (to create player 
instigated actions and world events). Instead, greyCat offers a framework that allows 
a story teller to ‘drag and drop’ their own materials, digital photographs and digitised 
images, and create a pathway through them in order to create a story with a spatial 
metaphor, rather than the simulation of a 3D world that the DSE prioritises. Photos 
can be abstract or replaced with any imagery, so it could easily be used by someone 
like the artist Vincent Serico to create a spatial, explorable version of his paintings 
(Fig. 2)30. From the perspective of design as a problem solving activity, GreyCat 
offers what Jenkins (2006) might call ‘a participatory opportunity’. However, more 
problematically, as Bidwell et al., (2007) observe, there is a difference between using 
design and having the power of design. GreyCat, as a design, remains a software 
construct that positions its users as consultants or informants. The design offers some 
additional opportunity for contribution, but it does not dismantle the design process. 
Nor does the work ‘hand over’ the power of design itself; rather it scaffolds easier 
access to its artefactual outcomes. 
GreyCat also vividly demonstrates Schön’s (1983) designer process and his 
argument that designers apply their tacit knowledge to their designing. The design is 
based on my previous experience in creating spatial worlds (the text-based projects 
that inspired the concept) and my own (much) earlier insights in projects that 
emphasised participation in terms of making worlds (Turner, 1995, 1998, 2001). This 
experience, and my own fondness for a particular genre of story-driven game design, 
creates Schön’s designerly perspective. In terms of Ricœur’s mimetic cycle (1984), 
the designing of greyCat arises out of my own (western, post-industrial) storied 
world; it represents the researcher’s pre-figured narrative environment. This pre-
figured environment includes assumptions about material artefacts and their presence 
in the world. 
The simplistic logic of ‘everyday’ materials merely side steps the glamour of 
the 3D game engine but still uses digital technologies such as the camera, the 
smartphone and the computer itself. GreyCat remains a software artefact that 
requires hardware to run. Hardware is also a designed artefact that ‘works’ as a result 
of established systems and infrastructures. The software remains an aspect of the 
cultural context of the designing and the histories, values and design philosophies of 
                                                
 
30 For example, a later project that is not included in this thesis uses a version of the greyCat concept 
to make children’s drawings into games. 
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the context. It is still heavily imbricated in the material artefacts of western post-
industrialised culture.  
Reflecting on the design and the materiality of greyCat invites a further set of 
questions about the dynamics of the relationship between designers, their material 
outcomes (in this case, software) and Ricœur’s (1984) already storied world. While 
potentially ‘more accessible’ in terms of functional skills, meaning-makers are not 
‘starting from scratch’ as Manovich (2001) puts it, participation is with and through 
the already designed and created. It is enabled by design and the designed 
affordances of the software; this enabling is further embedded in a particular set of 
stories and histories of the software artefact, for example, the histories of story driven 
game design that have their roots in early interactive works written on mainframe 
machines and that became accessible when the first ‘minicomputers’ started 
appearing in the mid 1960s. 
The already designed creates design expectations and contributes to designing. 
To paraphrase Ricœur (1984) and reframe his mimetic process or cycle of pre-
configuring, configuring and re-configuring, the story is already present in the world 
and so predates and prefigures the nature of designing. In effect, the problem for 
indigenous cultures is not only access to digital artefacts and ability to use them to 
make meaning; it is deeply embedded in the artefact itself. This insight deeply 
problematises notions of participatory design and participatory culture. For me, as a 
researcher, it demands a move away from any practice-based work and a return to the 
critical hermeneutic spiral. This re-turning to critical hermeneutics is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: African gamer 
Originally published as: 
 
Turner, J. (2015). African Gamer: Whose story is it anyway? In N. J. Bidwell & 
H. Winschiers-Theophilus (Eds.), Intersections of indigenous and traditional 
knowledges and technology design (pp. 33-66). Santa Rosa, CA: Informing 
Science Press. 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This chapter consists of a single book chapter31 called African gamer: Whose story is 
it anyway? (Turner, 2015). The publications that constitute the body of work of the 
current thesis analyse the digital artefact and its stories from a critical 
interdisciplinary perspective. The two Digital Songlines Environment (DSE) 
publications, submitted in chapter four, critique the design habits that construct the 
digital artefact. Chapter five reflects on a design ‘solution’ which accepts design as a 
potential problem solving activity. The current chapter, African gamer reflects on the 
potential for post-colonial subjects to ‘claim’ technologies through opportunity 
provided by more accessible technologies. 
The research that went into African gamer arises directly from the insights 
gained during the process of writing the DSE papers (Chapter 4). The two papers in 
chapter five, The little grey cat engine (Turner, 2008) and Designing spatial story-
telling software (Turner and Browning, 2009) are reports on a design response to the 
problematic described in the earlier papers. However, the Little Grey Cat engine, 
whilst minimal and cross-platform, remains a cultural construct (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.4.2). The logic of using commonplace personal images ‘sidesteps’ the 
glamour and seduction of the 3D simulated world but the digital artefact remains 
centre stage – as does the design intent of the artefact. The insight that the DSE 
papers leads to, that the digital artefact is problematically imbricated in the western 
onto-epistemic perspective, is taken up in the African gamer publication. 
                                                
 
31 The version included in this thesis is the submitted ‘camera ready’ version. Headings have been 
formatted to work within the overall thesis template. 
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As the analysis presented in chapter two (Chapter 2, section 2.3.3) argues, 
designers and makers of artefacts are themselves members of culture, the artefacts 
they create are, as Manovich (2001) says, profoundly social. They contribute to the 
pre-figuring context that gives rise to Ricœur’s (1984) conceptualisation of identity 
formed through narrating within an already storied world. Material objects are more 
than receptacles of cultural concepts, values and meaning making; they are part of 
the cultural conversation and co-creator in its dynamic. As Tilley et al. (2006) 
observe, cultural values, ideas and meaning making are represented, reproduced and 
legitimised actively through the medium of cultural objects (see Chapter 3, section 
3.3.3). Digital artefacts arise in culture, they are developed by groups of people who 
have cultural values and whose values are re-envisioned and inscribed (Schön, 1983) 
in the design of the digital artefact. 
African gamer (Turner, 2015) interrogates the digital artefact further. It 
continues the interpretive methodology and use of Ricœur’s critical hermeneutic 
spiral of the overall thesis and looks at the digital artefact in wider terms, beyond the 
artefact itself and at the networks and infrastructures that support it. As the chapter 
(African gamer) observes, the creation of infrastructures is both process and trace of 
activities. In post-industrial contexts, these designed infrastructures are so deeply 
imbricated that they are invisible and transparent for those for whom they operate, 
until they become visible when they break down (Star, 1991). In post-colonial 
contexts, however, they become “tarred with the visible and transparent mark of 
power” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 158). The chapter exposes this through a critical 
hermeneutic analysis of the kinds of stories that digital games tell. It asks whose 
stories are fore-fronted and which stories have ‘the loudest voice’. The discussion 
opens by looking more closely at the central character. It seeks to look behind the 
news reports in order to follow and unveil the ways in which post-colonial 
encounters frame indigenous (and post-colonial) peoples as ‘the other’. The 
discussion in African gamer critically analyses the ways in which someone with 
multiple stories is re-framed as a single homogenous other; the marginalised 
identification that Spivak (1988) so scathingly exposes. 
The process of writing African gamer directly resulted in the discussion in the 
current thesis, particularly the analysis of stories and post-colonial contexts that is 
discussed in chapter two (see Chapter 2, section 2.2). African gamer ends with some 
reflection on the potential of newly available game making technologies to allow 
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someone like the main protagonist to create their own meaning making using digital 
games. However, the current research study (as argued in the overall thesis) has done 
much to problematise this hope. 
The argument is made (in African gamer) in order to end the work with ‘a way 
out’ of the dilemma that digital technologies pose for story telling in post-colonial 
contexts. As the central protagonist of the piece, Cwi Nqane says (cited in Turner, 
2015, p. 66), “Everybody should have a chance to play.” However, this optimistic 
endnote is incomplete. It rather simplistically hopes, to take de Certeau’s (1984) 
commentary metaphorically, that the walkers might become architects themselves.  
 
Chapter 6: African gamer 184 
 Chapter 7: Performing design 225 
Chapter 7: Performing design 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter consists of a single journal article32 describing a small teaching 
‘experiment’ that took place in a tertiary course. This publication was actually 
inspired by the researcher’s teaching practice. The publication describes a technique 
implemented in the very western post-industrial context of an Australian tertiary 
degree course and is addressed to a discipline-based audience (Game design and 
research). The publication was not initially envisioned as being potential contribution 
to the current research study. However, the discussion in Performing design is an 
educator’s endeavour to disentangle some of the assumptions that arise during 
Ricœur’s (1984) mimetic processes concretised in design outcomes (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.3.3). In the end, a research study such as the current one is about actionable 
self-reflection. As I clarify in the first chapter and introduction to the research, I 
believe my core responsibility as an educator is to enable my students and project 
participants to explore both functional and critical skills in order to understand how 
design ‘works’ (see Chapter 1, section 1.2). 
Additionally, in the light of the announced desire (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.3) 
to provide outcomes that facilitate transformative practice (Freire, 1972; Mertens, 
2004; Ricœur, 1974), Performing design is included in this anthology of published 
work because the critical literacy practice described has potential to enable an 
innovative approach to a design literacy practice. Indeed, the Performing design 
research project in this context ensures a ‘full circle’ in terms of the overall research 
program: the Boalian technique of breaking the fourth wall in order to enable 
transformative opportunity, sits behind the process drama work described in the very 
first DSE paper, Destination space (Turner, 2006a, Chapter 4, this volume). 
The publication submitted in the current chapter is framed by the dilemmas 
posed in teaching game design as part of a service industry in Australia and the 
educational issues that arise when an apparently vocational course is transposed into 
an undergraduate degree context with its commensurate goals of critical thinking and 
                                                
 
32 Performing design is published in a web-based electronic journal and the original therefore embeds 
heading codes and body paragraph tags which can undermine a document template. The original 
publication has been re-formatted to fit into the overall thesis formatting conventions. 
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creativity. An earlier publication (Turner, Browning & Moyes, 2012) tells the story 
of the teaching and learning project. The paper presented here, Performing design: 
game design, practice, praxis and the theatre of the impressed (Turner and Moyes, 
2012), develops the discussion further in order to examine what criticality might 
mean in this context. Both papers are about an ‘educational’ design experiment that 
appropriates a Boalian transformation of the spectator into spect-actor. However, the 
‘would be’ ‘spect-actors’ involved in the project are emerging game designers. 
From the perspectives of the current thesis and the overall research goals, the 
intent of Performing design is not unproblematic. The analysis of game design 
practice in Australia critiques the fact that game design education does not tend to 
realise that it is actually a design discipline. The Performing design article discusses 
the work of Archer (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2), who emphasises design as a 
discipline area (Archer, 2005) and recommends that educational institutions where 
game design is taught frame themselves in terms of a design discipline. The focus in 
the paper is thus somewhat at odds with the overall objective of the current study. 
However, the Boalian technique that Performing design proposes has potential 
for a transformative practice, when taken out of the institutional framework. Further, 
this admitting of potential clash aside, the themes in Performing design echo the 
general goals of the current research study. The goal of the Performing design 
project is a transformative, hope-full goal in the Freirean sense. The use of the 
Boalian technique in a tertiary classroom represents an endeavour to promote critical 
thinking about design and to scaffold students into engaging with the artefacts they 
make as creative thinkers and makers, as opposed to remaining transfixed by the 
overt industry goals of innovation. 
Finally, as I discuss in the final chapter of the current volume (see Chapter 8), 
reflections on criticality as it is discussed in Performing design gives rise to the final 
reflections on criticality in design practices that announce the methodology in their 
approaches. 
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7.2 PERFORMING DESIGN: GAME DESIGN, PRACTICE, PRAXIS AND 
THE THEATRE OF THE IMPRESSED 
Originally published as:  
truna aka j.turner & Moyes, G. (2012) Performing design: Game design, 
practice, praxis and the theatre of the impressed. Colab Journal of Creative 
Technologies, (3). Retrieved from 
https://ctechjournal.aut.ac.nz/paper/performing-design-game-design-
practice-praxis-theatre-impressed/ 
 
7.2.1 Abstract 
This paper is a reflection on a design teaching project that endeavours to 
establish a culture of critical design thinking in a tertiary game design course. In the 
first instance, the ‘performing design’ project arose as a response to contemporary 
issues and tensions in the Australian games industry and game design education, in 
essence, the problem of how to scaffold undergraduate students from their entry 
point as ‘players’ (the impressed) into becoming designers. The performing design 
project therefore started as a small-scale intervention to inspire reflection in a wider 
debate that includes: the potential evolution of the contemporary games industry; the 
purpose of game design education; and the positioning of game design as a design 
discipline. 
Our position is that designing interactive playful works or games is victim of a 
tendency to simplify the discipline and view it from either the perspective of science 
or art. In this paper we look at some of the historical discussions on the distinct 
identity of games. Then we present an overview of the typical state of play in 
contemporary game design education which inspires the performing design project as 
an intervention or teaching technique. This leads us to question understandings of 
education and training and creativity and innovation. Finally we reflect on insights 
arising from the performing design project which lead us to support Archer’s call for 
a ‘third area’ that balances the monolithic practices of the two major academic 
disciplines.  
7.2.2 Proem – on the creative act of making games 
In 2010 Richard Perrin gave a talk at AmeCon, a UK based comics, anime and 
pop culture convention, entitled You can make video games. Perrin’s stated goal was 
help his audience realise that the creation of games was something accessible and 
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that they shouldn’t be daunted but dive in and experiment. The original talk was 
revised for two further presentations in 2011 and 2012. It was then the subject of a 
response by Aleksander Adamkiewicz (2012) who was apparently aghast that Perrin 
made the making of games sound easy and whose plaint was that simply saying 
everyone can make games is misleading because not everyone has the aptitude and 
that the talks were ‘irresponsible’. Adamkiewicz’s blog post caused a minor furore. 
Perrin posted a response on his blog entitled: Oh no, I insist (Perrin, 2012) in which 
he unpacked and explained his feelings about the contemporary state of game 
development and the desirability of, for want of a better description, democratising 
the means of production. 
Perrin’s passionate exhortation that game making is accessible to all (and 
indeed important to the evolution of the industry) is predicated on an understanding 
of game making as a creative act that, like other creative acts such as painting, 
writing, sculpture, has its beginnings in experimentation and hands on engagement 
with process. Adamkiewicz response is about the ‘quality’ of the same creative act, 
or rather about the potential to undermine the quality of the outcomes of that creative 
act as a formal industrial process which requires ‘aptitude’ to learn the skills 
required. Both views effectively disappear the art of game design in favour a single 
discourse arising from the dyadic tension between art and science. 
What is of interest in this discussion and for those of us who work in game 
design education are the unasked questions. What is this ‘creative act’? How do we 
scaffold our students into the creative processes of making those interactive playful 
works that we call games? How do we encourage them to comprehend the 
heterogeneity of the designed work and their role as designers and what does design 
mean when we talk about creativity? As a number of recent events and discussions 
show, the digital game form is accepted as a significant cultural artefact which is no 
longer isolated from other cultural forms but rather is seen as connected to other 
cultural and creative forms in a variety of ways (Keogh, 2012). It seems timely to 
reflect on pedagogical perspectives prevalent in those educational courses which are 
fostering the upcoming generation of game designers and makers. 
7.2.3 Introduction: Making the interactive work known as a game 
The videogame is the most rapidly evolving, exciting, subversive and feared cultural 
medium in the world today. (Escape from Woomera 2003) 
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This paper focuses on the context, tensions and issues around the designing of 
digital games from the perspective of games education, that is, the teaching of how to 
make games. In particular it is about the state of game design education and the 
manner in which it seems to be under pressure from assumptions about the dyads of 
education and training, creativity and innovation and art and science. We revisit and 
develop reflections which arise out of a recent project (Turner, Browning and Moyes 
2012). The ‘performing design’ project was originally devised as a teaching and 
learning exercise. We used a performance technique inspired by Augosto Boal in 
order to engage the participants, game design students, as critical meaning makers in 
works that they normally enjoy as players. The reflections that arise out of an 
apparently simple little educational technique are intriguingly resonant with the 
acceptance of the evolution of the digital game ‘as entertainment’ form into the 
culturally significant form that Keogh describes above. The opening story of the 
discussion between Perrin and Adamkiewicz is not an isolated one, more recently we 
see the same art vs. science discussion between Jonas Kyratzes and Ralph Koster 
(Kyratzes 2012; Koster 2012). As educators we feel there are important issues 
underlying such discussions. Koster uses the title ‘Two cultures’ in his response to 
Kyratzes’ plaint that game making is constrained by the engineering mindset, 
referring to the 1959 lecture by C.P. Snow whose central thesis was that the 
intellectual life of the whole of western society is constrained by the split into the 
two monolithic cultures of science and the humanities. Koster’s solution is that 
“more people need to stand in the middle, a foot on each side”. 
Our position is that designing interactive playful works or games is indeed a 
victim of a tendency to simplify the discipline and view it from either the perspective 
of science or art, disappearing the potential contributions of design as a culture in its 
own right. Thus, in this paper we look at some of the historical discussions on the 
distinct identity of games. Then we present an overview of the typical state of play in 
contemporary game design education which inspires the performing design project as 
an intervention or teaching technique. Finally we reflect on insights arising from the 
performing design project which lead us to support Archer (2005) and his call for a 
‘third area’ that balances the monolithic practices of the two major academic 
disciplines. 
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7.2.4 The nature of the beast: Art meets science? 
Digital games are digital systems or softwares that provide an opportunity out 
of which experience arises for a player and where that experience is generally 
expected to be predicated to an idea of ‘fun’ whether it be achieved via exploration, 
challenge or problem solving (See Bartle, 1996). Since Aarseth announced 
‘computer game studies year one’ (2001) many ‘rhetorics’ (Sutton-Smith 1997) or 
‘discourses’ have arisen around attempts to define the nature of such games leading 
Bogost to announce in his 2009 DiGRA keynote that ‘videogames are a mess’ 
(Bogost, 2009). Bogost’s discussion highlights the multi-modality of games and the 
digital game in particular and the slippery nature of the object. 
At the simplest level, such digital games are typically distinguished from other 
media by notions of interactivity and an idea that interactivity provides the interactor 
with some kind of agency and control over the process of playing. The earliest 
discussions on the distinctive form of digital games go as far as to announce the form 
as “a democratic artform for a democratic age” (Costikyan, 1994 / 2003, p. 195). 
Costikyan situates his claim in a short discussion about the nature of other media 
forms and the positioning of their audiences as non active in the construction of the 
work. He (2003, p. 195) also tells us that: 
Games provide a set of rules, but the players use them to create their own 
consequences. It’s something like the music of John Cage: he wrote themes 
about which the musicians were expected to improvise. Games are like that: 
the designer provides the theme, the players the music.  
Echoing Costikyan, Bolter and Gromala (2003) call for recognition of the 
interaction designer as choreographer of experience, differentiating between those 
interfaces which need to be transparent (Norman, 1998) in order to enact a task and 
those which should enable reflection in order to understand ourselves as context 
bound enactors. Their distinction between ‘windows’ and ‘mirrors’ seems to herald 
the Perrin – Adamkiewicz discussion that was used as a preamble to this paper in that 
it announces clearly that there are two potential pathways for the creative act. Thus in 
Bolter and Gromala’s (2003) windows model, the making of the object is in the 
service of the task universe and transparency. Software in this area is constructed to 
assist the user with other forms of creation, writing, music making, communicating 
even perhaps game making. The mirror portmanteau allows for the experimental and 
the interpretive or exploratory. Mirrors are works which invite interpretation and 
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reflection, their ‘task’ is that of the arts where the object is incomplete without 
meaning making on the part of the interactor. 
When we wonder where the making of interactive works called games fits into 
this dyad we again find problematic disjunctions. At a functional level, a 
commercially successful digital game embeds a task of sorts. A game may be created 
to engage the player in challenge, story, problem solving or socialising, some are 
purposed to compulsive behaviours in the name of fun. However, in task oriented 
software the construction of the environment typically reveals itself through the task 
universe (Shneiderman, 1998) and wider cultural assumptions become evident as the 
objects and actions within the task universe are decomposed. In game spaces 
however, the task universe is exactly that - a universe and the aim of the task 
universe is essentially player experience. Game world type environments require that 
the designer is with the player every step of the way and that their plans and designs 
reveal themselves piece by piece as the player progresses. The environment or game 
space, the designer and the player form a ménage a trois essential to the nature of the 
game. In these software design environments, the designer is indeed a choreographer 
and the performance they are constructing is one firmly based in a cultural 
perspective. In order to ensure player agency and Murray’s (1997) “active creation of 
belief”, the designer must be overt in exploiting a shared cultural context. Game 
environments and those environments that offer virtual spaces where participants can 
interact with the designed landscape are extraordinary in this on-going mediation. 
Poole (2000) recognises this when he discusses the nature of game realities and the 
careful, designed tailoring of reality in order to provide satisfying play and 
achievable challenges. This careful tailoring of reality, the shared cultural context is 
effectively Bolter and Gromala’s (2003) mirror where the interactor is in the position 
of bringing their own subjective meaning making to complete the work. These 
mirrors are the cultural contexts of many games, contexts such as the western 
ideologies and values that sit behind both utopian and dystopian game settings. 
However, to continue Bolter and Gromala’s (2003) metaphor, access to the 
interactive playful experience is via a window, in order to play a game, the player 
must be able to function. We see this aspect of game design in reviews of 
commercial games where usability issues are often cited as game experience flaws. It 
is this conflation of task and experience that leads Juul and Norton (2009) to 
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announce that the game and game play experience is inseparable from the interface 
and that the tension between usable design and experience as goal drives innovation. 
So, the making of games would seem to be a site where the tenets of both art 
and science meet and work together to create player experience. Koster’s ‘Two 
cultures’ discussion (2012) also affirms the need to ‘straddle the two disciplines’ and 
not take the side of either one in totality. Indeed as we discuss below, the majority of 
courses offered for those who wish to gain skills in the area of game making tend to 
build upon practices and discourses taken from these two fields. However, as we 
hope to show, we propose that the history of game making and the evolution of 
educational courses in game making tend to neglect a third possibility: the field of 
design. We also suggest that misunderstanding how important design as a discipline 
might be, is a result of further conflations and lack of granularity in the 
understanding of distinctions between education and training and creativity and 
innovation. 
7.2.5 Game design and education: The performing design project background 
Game design is not typically perceived as part of the field of design. As an 
educational course option it is often an add-on to a course which has evolved in a 
department with expertise in art and animation or science and technology. Indeed in 
the games industry, game designer is not an entry level position description but one 
that is earned by excelling at other work within the industry (Stevens, 2012). In the 
contemporary games industry, which is demonstrating a change of emphasis to 
smaller, agile teams, designers must also be able to turn their hand to other roles in 
order for the work to reach production. Thus game designer is not actually a clear 
role in the sense that one can become a game programmer or game asset modeller, 
the majority of traditional game industry designers are indeed Koster’s ‘straddlers’. 
In spite of all this, game design (as opposed to game development or art and 
animation) is offered as a potential pathway to graduate outcomes in many tertiary 
institutions as a third choice for those who do not wish to take the science option: 
programming, or the art option: animation. Game design courses frequently conflate 
design and development with production and marketing by structuring their 
curriculum around final capstone team projects with commercial potential. In these 
studio units, teams will be made up of students from different majors (or 
specialities), thus the programmers and the artists and animators and the game 
designers will be expected to work together to produce a playable game for 
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exhibition and portfolio. Such studio based capstone units are indeed applauded by 
many as ideal practice-based experience and skills confirmation for students intent 
on direct transition into the industry (Haukka, 2011) and while this may be true for 
those team members with programming and art or animation skills, the designer and 
the design process is not as clearly presented. 
The performing design project therefore started as a small-scale intervention to 
inspire reflection in a wider debate that includes: the potential evolution of the 
contemporary games industry; the purpose of game design education; and the 
positioning of game design as a design discipline33. In order to untangle issues that 
arise out of the current vogue in game design courses it is important to expose two 
core tensions at the outset and consider the distinction between ‘education’ and 
‘vocational training’. In the early days of the industry, game course offerings focused 
on game development and associated software skills. In essence they were vocational 
and prepared trainees for positions at various levels in terms of ‘craft’ or ‘trade’. 
Dyson (1998) offers a lucid description of the evolution of the software industry 
arising out of the same passion to “make and do” that gives birth to the ‘skilled 
artificer’ central to every civilisation. McCullough (1996) also observes that there is 
a growing correspondence between the digital tools and digital work with the 
traditional idea of ‘craft’. This understanding of craft and skills can be seen as being 
at odds with the academic understanding of ‘education’ where the goal is the 
fostering of knowledge and the creation of lifelong thinkers. Academic institutions 
have evolved since their origins in the medieval university systems where the 
offspring of wealthy families would study theology or philosophy, but while we now 
accept a university degree in computer science as a skill-based qualification, (one 
geared to potential employment rather than self-improvement), we see the fine line 
between education and training becoming extremely convoluted in an area such as 
game design. 
A second area of tension arises out of a modern understanding of the ‘skilled 
artificer’ and their role in industry. The spirit and the passion of making and doing 
                                                
 
33 Since our central purpose is not to present a review, but rather to invite further deliberation on such 
issues, and particularly about the future of game design as a design discipline, we have generalised our 
comments on tertiary game design courses. Many educational institutions are responding and adapting 
to the changing climate in the digital games industry and we look forward to continued discussion 
about the issues raised here. 
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that Dyson enthusiastically describes, is intricately involved with his call to see 
creative skills as a basis for innovation and industry. So, creativity is the act of 
conceiving (or imagining) something original. It is a term associated with the literary 
and the artistic, the creative genius. Innovation is to do with implementation of a new 
or novel concept. It has strong connections with the business of industry: an 
innovative idea may not be particularly creative but might well enhance a product. 
Creativity, which arises out of that same subjective experience, that is the (very 
general) goal of an education, does not have to be practical, or have an industry 
outcome. Creativity is about acquiring and refining a knowledge base and being able 
to engage with ideation and process (Locke, 2008). 
Such distinctions are important for us in unpacking reflections around the 
current project. The goal of the teaching process was to set the seeds of creativity, 
not instead of innovation, but in order to re-direct and subvert the accepted equation 
between innovation and industrial outcomes or products. As we discuss below, the 
interactive entertainment industry – the games industry – is in a state of change and it 
is our belief that this change gives us the opportunity to foster a much wider 
characterisation of the nature of digital games and playful design. This endeavour is 
partly about envisioning our technological futures, and partly concerned with 
fostering more opportunity for our students beyond filling a perceived skills gap 
(Haukka, 2011). In essence it is about re-envisioning the world of games as 
powerful, playful creative design. 
We propose that the evolution of the typical game design course is still in the 
process of recognising the potential of being a design discipline. It is essential that 
we as educators find ways to foster design thinking where “innovation is powered by 
a thorough understanding” (Brown, 2008) and where creativity is fostered in its own 
right as part of the design process. More importantly, such reflections on the legacies 
of terms discussed – education and training and creativity and innovation – and 
confusion around their meaning in the educational context indicate that it is timely to 
reflect on what we are doing as educators. To put it simply, we see a tendency in 
contemporary game design courses to present game design in isolation as a 
vocational skill that supports innovation rather than as a process that encourages 
creativity. Conversations around these issues are also of interest in terms of the 
emerging cultural sector that Keogh (2012) observes. 
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7.2.6 The emerging sector 
The emerging games sector is inclusive of those creative industries whose 
business is the making and selling of games but it also includes more experimental 
projects where the creative potential of the medium can be explored. This opening of 
the world of game making into a world where the objects made are accepted as 
contemporary cultural artefacts is often described as a shift away from a technology 
sector towards an arts sector (see Callaghan, in Eltham, 2011). We however propose 
that while this might be so, we would be extremely remiss to dismiss the potentials 
of design and designing as an affective voice and that the possibilities of the 
incunabular sector depend much on understanding design as a vital member. Indeed, 
our call is for more than design as a stakeholder in the games sector, it is for an 
understanding of critical design and its role in the potential of the contemporary 
game and interactive entertainment sector. 
Critical design is important if the sector is going to achieve more than a 
superficial growth because it challenges preconceptions and expectations, thus 
provoking new ways of thinking about the object, its use and the surrounding 
environment (Dunne, 1999; Raby, 2001). Innovation and creativity and critical 
design thinking are the foundation strengths of sites where the research and 
development (R&D) of future engagements with playful technologies are taking 
place. In both the R&D contexts where the outcome is a marketable product, and the 
more radical R&D, we see trans-disciplinary sites where outcomes might be 
serendipitous or evocative, design and designing has more substance as a role. 
Thus the idea of promoting design thinking and a critical understanding of the 
designed object, in our case the game and play, needs to be reframed and positioned 
as an essential aspect of the game design course. Here we find an appropriate focus 
for education where we can set expectations around thinking and critical analysis, not 
just within games or aimed at innovation in games, but in a critical design sense 
where creativity is valued and encouraged. 
7.2.7 Creative designing and the theatre of the impressed 
The first stage of critical design thinking is the ability to see ‘how something 
was done’; that is, to analyse from a designer perspective. This gives students the 
terminology and concepts with which to continue their design education. The 
students, being passionate players, are keen to narrate player experience. By 
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expanding and formalising their design vocabulary, we begin the process of moving 
their point of view from that of playing to that of designing (Ashton, 2010). So, then, 
how do we present the challenge of adopting a design mindset and introducing 
critical design when it is highly likely that the outcomes might be Lindsay Grace’s 
(2011) ‘uncomfortable’ play? 
Design thinking, according to its simplest definition, is a style of creative 
thinking-in-action around ill-defined problems in particular where empathy and 
creativity (as opposed to innovation) are emphasised. Design thinking is thus 
appropriate to the purview of education as it encourages process and ideation. 
According to Cross (1982) designerly thinkers solve problems by synthesis rather 
than the analysis predominant in scientific approaches. Critical design takes its 
adjective from critical theory where the base concept is “to liberate human beings 
from the circumstances which enslave them” (Horkheimer, 1982, p244). The idea of 
‘critical’ thus embeds approaches that are intended to reveal and question normative 
practices and dominant discourses. To be critical in this sense is about questioning 
the why and how of the accepted and to ‘liberate’ from the constraints of 
assumptions. In the case of game design, such assumptions about the meaning of 
design are impressed on the student cohorts via their experience of the works. That 
is, they continuously re-enact and confirm the accepted form. Here we realise that the 
usual approach of analysis (alone) is not adequate and that analysing games as 
creative works is only a first step towards critical design. Game analysis, and the 
normal habits of education such as reporting on analysis in written form, tends to be 
a re-enactment of those normative practices we are attempting to reveal. 
The very nature of re-enactment of the meanings, the core experiences of 
design from the designer’s perspective, brought us to a position already detailed and 
explored by Augosto Boal in his Theatre of the Oppressed workshops (1979), where 
the core notion is the uncovering of author-as-designer intent via a process of 
engaged activity. This approach has its roots in the early critical literacy work of 
Paulo Freire who taught functional literacy to peasants in Brazil, but who, in so 
doing, exposed the baggage and influence of the words used in order to bring about a 
consciousness of the established power relations (Freire, 1972). Freire’s 
methodology informs the work of Boal who engages with similar issues and contexts 
with the toolset of drama. Boal’s workshops focus on the positioning of the spectator 
as passive consumer of a work. His aim is to re-position spectator as ‘spect-actor’, 
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one who is engaged in the re-imaging of the piece in order to source that elusive 
authorial intent and expose the underlying assumptions structured by dramatic 
conventions. 
Boal’s work in liberatory theatre invites the audience to invade the stage and 
transform the images that are there. Design intrinsically transforms objects; it 
becomes a cultural engine. Once we see design as a cultural engine then we can also 
argue for cultural critique in the form of analysis of the affective domain of such 
objects, an understanding of their baggage and lineages and so critical practices 
around those objects. 
Given that games are defined as ‘interactive’ it might appear initially at odds to 
see our students as ‘a passive audience’ but playing an active part in the work is not 
the same as evaluating the assumptions of a work. Our students may not be ‘the 
oppressed’ of Boal’s work but they are certainly ‘impressed’ and consequently 
deserve a similar transformation process, especially one that announces ‘game 
playing’ as an essential aspect of the transformative process. We found an ideal 
vehicle to implement these concepts – or interventions – in the Youtube phenomenon 
of Sweding, the re-presenting of popular media. 
7.2.8 Sweding interactive works as praxis 
The world of games is in a kind of a trance. People are programmed to accept so 
little but the possibilities are so great. – Allegra Geller (Cronenberg, 1999) 
Sweding involves the ‘quick and dirty’ re-make and representation of a media 
object (typically a film). The practice originates in Hollywood as the central trope in 
a film about the mismanagement of a video rental outlet (Gondry, 2008). Sweding is 
transformative in Boalian terms as it focuses on the film as artefact and sees 
audiences re-enact the moments of a work that they see as meaningful from 
subjective experience (Kerr, 2009). In the Sweded film, we see Sweders enacting de 
Certeau’s creative opportunities or ‘tactics’ (1984) and affirming the shared 
experience of the work rather than the authorised version. The typical Swede is 
limited to the free Youtube upload and time constraints of a few minutes and the 
agreed form generally insists on a single take without editing and so must synthesise 
the experience of the work into a short span. There is much satire in the Sweded film 
where the use of exaggeration and ridicule becomes a shared code for the experience 
of popular culture. For our project, the practice of Sweding updates Boal’s 
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workshops in a form pertinent to the digital objects of our field. In the Sweded games 
that the students produce as outcomes of the project we see them moving beyond 
narration of player experience into a creative space where analysis of the work is 
‘played’ through and embodied with their own experience of the work. 
If, as Gaver says, designers must themselves be homo ludens, provocateurs, in 
order to “legitimise wonder, even encourage it” (Gaver, 2002, p. 3), then our logic is 
that they must also have a strong sense of the experience of designing, to be able to 
re-enact and so re-form the meanings of the works. What better way is there to 
achieve this than by physically enacting the designs they are analysing, by moving 
from ‘passive’ consumption to active appropriation and meaning making? As 
educators we are fostering the next generation of game designers who we trust will 
engage with the extraordinary possibilities of game design as the industry evolves 
into a cultural sector. 
7.2.9 A place for design 
We began this project with the notion that one way of fostering critical design 
thinking is via Brown’s call for innovation ‘powered by a thorough understanding’ 
(2008). A problem that we encounter is the meaning of ‘thorough’ in context. The 
majority of our student participants certainly have intimate familiarity with the 
games they play and can recite individual experience in detail. They are less skilled 
at the more designerly approach where the goal of understanding is not about tacit 
player appreciation of the whole experience but must focus on understanding the way 
that all the elements of the design work together. In common with the majority of 
game design courses (and game development courses) this goal is addressed via a 
variety of analytical approaches. The typical starting point is playing a wide selection 
of games and appraising them in terms of their elements eg mechanics, aesthetics, 
stories and use of technology34. Ashton’s work on students as players and designers 
offers an excellent discussion on this as an educational process. However while this 
stage is essential, it tends to be geared towards the outcomes described earlier: 
capstone projects or communication-based projects such as written reports, perhaps 
even design examples. We do not appear to have our own expressive form. And we 
immediately encounter issues in terms of the goal of synthesis where the normal 
                                                
 
34 A number of analytic systems are available, for example Jesse Schell’s ‘Lenses’, Marc Leblanc’s 
MDA framework, Morrison’s Game Design Canvas etc. 
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accepted form of expression is written theory or higher research based practice. This 
encounter is an ontological mismatch between the available educational practices and 
the educational goals. 
The ontological mismatch between the available educational practices and the 
road to critical design thinking in the area of game design arises out of the history of 
these practices and their legacies in that which Archer (2005) might refer to as the 
monolithic practices of the two major academic disciplines. Thus science at its core 
offers a tool set of empirical analysis, mathematical rigour, functionally and eternally 
applicable outcomes, while the Arts and Humanities offer an interpretive tool set, 
cultural depth and, hopefully, compassion and ethical understanding in context. The 
dyad of arts and science are a product of cultural history and remain representative of 
the moment when the powerful guilds lost their authority and their status as 
educational institutions in favour of the universities and their monkish goals. For 
Archer, this is the historical context wherein Design loses both position and voice. 
According to Archer, writing as a practice arises out of the evolution of the Arts and 
Humanities, it is a reflective process which is by its very nature distanced from its 
object because it is about the object. Science on the other hand, Archer observes, 
claims the measurement of the object, the internal logic of its manifestation. For 
Archer, these territories leave the making and creation of objects on the outside: 
“What is left is the artefacts themselves and the experience, sensibility and skill that 
goes into their production and use” (Archer, 2005, p. 10). 
Archer’s call is seductive; indeed we now see an implementation of this 
approach in the rise of practice-based and practice-led research. It is very pertinent to 
our goals of helping students to experience games critically and express their 
understanding. Exploring the possibilities of Boal’s techniques with these student 
cohorts does appear to have allowed them to enact their understanding in a manner in 
keeping with Archer’s conceptualisation of the third territory. Specifically, avoiding 
the distance from the work that writing about it can create offers an opportunity to 
build on analytical practice and to encourage Locke’s synthesis within the constraints 
of an undergraduate course. 
In our introduction we suggested that a key to ameliorating some of the issues 
apparent in typical game design courses (and indeed the national games sector) was 
to encourage design thinking and particularly the kind of design thinking that is 
driven by a thorough and critical understanding of the objects of the discipline. As a 
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contribution to the wider debate, we propose that this design thinking should be 
situated within an understanding of the ontological natures of our disciplines and 
contemporary tertiary settings where ‘critical’ is usually taken to mean ‘theoretical’. 
Secondly, the tensions between the dyads of innovation and creativity and 
education and training that are discussed in this paper seem to result in positioning 
design (and game design in particular) as a hybrid child, caught in the stresses 
produced by attempts to force the legacies of these dyads into the same space. As 
educators, we understand that nurturing creative skills, powered by critical 
understanding, requires a break with accepted norms, so an important practical 
outcome of any discussion that leads to better general understandings must be to 
reframe design as a core competency. Since creative skills are the basis for 
innovation and industry then as educators we need to find ways of fostering design 
thinking. In practice, we need to find ways of encouraging students to reposition 
themselves as critical designers. In this current project we have started to explore 
methods that afford a more reflective, self-directed approach. It is through this 
reflexive process of deepening the understanding and engaging with subjective 
meaning making as outcome that, as educators, we can redirect the accepted equation 
between innovation and industrial outcomes or products, and give a much-needed 
additional impetus to creativity where the designing can actually be about itself.  
The reflections that our performing design project have inspired are 
reminiscent of Susan Leigh Star’s allegory of power and networks in her story of her 
onion intolerance and a certain fast food franchise’s inability to comprehend it in any 
terms other than ‘vegetarian’ (Star, 1991). Game design education is the ‘misfit’ 
which attempts to straddle the two accepted cultures which dominate educational 
practices and which is therefore inevitably being seen as the ‘difficult customer’. It 
seems fitting that we stumbled upon Boal’s liberatory practice as a model to use for 
our teaching intervention in that his approach asks the subjects to transform 
established and accepted power relations and Design is defined as a transformative 
process. To return to those questions about design process and creativity we posed in 
the preamble, we suggest that one response is to foster the discipline of Design as a 
culture in our game design courses. 
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Chapter 8: Reflections and implications: 
Pedagogies of the impressed 
Stories have been used to dispossess and to malign, but stories can also be used to 
empower and to humanise. Stories can break the dignity of a people, but stories can 
also repair that broken dignity (Adichie, (2009, [17:40]). 
 
To lose the ability to design is to lose everything. Here is the distinction between, for 
instance, the homeless who make a world for themselves from whatever they find on 
the street and those who totally abandon their very being to its fate and reach their 
historical end (Fry, 2013, p. 48). 
8.1 REFLECTIONS 
This has been a thesis about  design and software and the manner in which 
software can be understood as material storied artefact, entangled, as Hodder (2012) 
says, in Ricœur’s (1984) mimetic process, the stories, story-ing and re-story-ing of 
the cultural world. The research narrative encompasses and connects two disciplines 
– education (in the form of critical pedagogy) and design (specifically interaction 
design and HCI) embodied by the researcher and subjective, personal history (see 
Chapter 1, section 1.2). The publications submitted as the basis for the research 
narrative are published in interaction and HCI conferences and journals and, as a 
result, the voice of the educator, while implicit throughout, has been subsumed by 
the voice of the designer. This final chapter takes the opportunity to address 
educational concerns and literacy practices more overtly in order to complete the 
research journey and clarify the actionable reflection that the research sets out to 
achieve. The guiding principle of the research is recognition of the power of stories; 
the overriding goal of the research is to unveil the manner in which design and its 
artefactual outcomes act to story and re-story in order to illuminate possibilities for 
Freire’s transformative action and Ricœur’s hope-full endeavour; to find the vital 
opportunity to ‘de-story’ in order to tell stories. As Adichie (2009, [17:40]) observes, 
“Stories have been used to dispossess and to malign, but stories can also be used to 
empower and to humanise. Stories can break the dignity of a people, but stories can 
also repair that broken dignity.” 
The storied nature of an apparently intangible artefact, particularly the software 
used to construct spatial representations that purport to offer interactive possibilities 
and ways of ‘escaping’ the tyrannies of more formal software, is highlighted and 
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deeply problematised when the stories told are not those of the culture of its origin. 
The research narrative as a whole presented in this thesis has explored some of the 
issues, and the stories that give rise to them, from the perspective of Freire’s critical 
pedagogy (1972) and Ricœur’s (1984) concept of the mimetic process. In so doing, 
in keeping with its critical hermeneutic methodology, the result is not a final 
conclusion but rather an opening of more doors, and more questions to consider. 
The research narrative in this work arises when a game engine is used to create 
a simulation of landscape in order to re-present indigenous knowledge and stories. 
The research is instigated by an Australasian CRC for Interaction Design (ACID) 
project called the Digital Songlines Experience (DSE), which ran between 2005 and 
2007 (see Chapter 1, section 1.2). This laudable endeavour recognised that 
Australian Indigenous stories are not those of the post-industrial western view and 
that implementing them in a digital simulation of ‘country’ is a more appropriate 
approach than formal digital collection and archival approaches. However, as the 
current research has demonstrated (Chapters 4, 5 & 6), putting the knowledge and 
stories into a digitally simulated landscape does not avoid the translation of non 
western, non post-industrial stories but that the temptation of simulation and 
navigable digital worlds introduces further layers of story-ing: the story-ing of 
software culture, materiality and design. 
Backgrounding this ‘problematic’ of software culture (Chapter 2) and its 
material entanglements in the light of the translation dilemma leads to a further 
discussion about design as culture (Chapters 4, 5, 6 & 7). This final discussion 
clarifies the central contribution of the thesis; that the stories of design and its 
material outcomes are important considerations for critical literacy practices in the 
area of ‘new media’ and ‘new literacies’ and the fields of design and education that 
engage in these practices. The thesis emphasises the potential dangers of uncritical 
use of such media in educational and participatory settings where post-colonial and 
indigenous contexts are a focus. In addition, the critical hermeneutic methodologies 
(see Chapter 3) applied to the apparent problems and dilemmas give rise to further 
reflections on criticality in (and about) design itself. 
8.1.1 Beyond functional literacies: the right to story and story-ing 
Stories, as the contextual review (Chapter 2) and the first publication included 
in the current thesis announce, are important (Turner, 2006a, Chapter 4, this volume). 
Telling stories and active story making is an important aspect of functional literacy 
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where the “ability to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate and 
compute, using printed and written materials associated with varying contexts” is 
enshrined by the United Nations as a basic human right (UNESCO, 2004, p. 13). 
However, in post-colonial contexts this functional pragmatic view is problematised 
in terms of whose ‘understandings’ are communicated. Function literacy, whether in 
terms of writing or coding, has the goal of enabling all members of a socio-cultural 
group to function within the wider community; in this sense, functionality is actually 
at odds with Freire’s (1972) goals of critical awareness (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3). 
For example, Chimamanda Adichie, whose call to understand the danger of a story told 
about a culture opens the introduction of this thesis (Chapter 1, section 1.1.2), describes 
(2009, [0:39]) her early attempts at writing whilst growing up in south-eastern Nigeria:  
I wrote exactly the kinds of stories I was reading: All my characters were 
white and blue-eyed, they played in the snow, they ate apples, and they 
talked a lot about the weather, how lovely it was that the sun had come out. 
Adichie’s point is that she was vulnerable to the stories she was surrounded by, even 
as an Igbo child living in a country where people ate mangoes and never talked about 
the weather “because they didn’t have to”. As a child learning the functional 
mechanics of writing, she framed her self-identity by incorporating the received 
cultural identity of the stories she read and subsequently tried to reconstruct that 
constituted identity. If stories are powerful, as King (2003) declares and Ricœur 
carefully explains (1984), understanding whose story is actually being told is a 
critical aspect of literacy. The corollary is that understanding how one’s own story is 
transformed through functional literacies is also vital for those who are not members 
of the dominant culture and for those whose traditional cultural forms of meaning 
making might include other forms that are not included in the normatised practices 
imposed by colonial encounter. 
The second chapter in the current volume discusses what the thesis refers to as 
asymmetrical storied worlds (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2) with reference to post-
colonial commentators (Bhabha, 1994; Fanon, 1963; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988; 
Thiong’o, 1986) who assert that the translation of identity through story is more 
vulnerable for groups whose identity is pre-figured by the dominant culture of the 
coloniser. As Ricœur (1984, p. 75) remarks: 
We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being 
narrated. This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to 
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save the history of the defeated and the lost. The whole history of suffering 
cries out for vengeance and calls for narrative. 
The ‘saving’ of the history of the defeated further problematises projects like the 
Digital Songlines Environment, which purport to ‘protect’ and ‘preserve’ Australian 
Indigenous knowledge and stories of meaning making directly and within ‘their 
natural environments’ (Leavy, 2007; Turner, 2006a, see Chapter 4, this volume). The 
simplistic equation between experienced and simulated realities obscures the manner 
in which the artefact is itself a storied object; an object that is also active in 
contributing to the dynamic pre-figuring of stories and hence identity.  
Fanon’s (1963) critique of the relationship between the encounter of coloniser 
and the colonised and the subsequent re-framing of identities as a result is a core 
insight behind Paulo Freire’s theory in his work Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972) 
and his critical pedagogic practice. Where Fanon observes an inevitable duality 
between coloniser and colonised, Freire’s project seeks opportunity for praxis (action 
and realisation) in conversation and communication between the two poles. He posits 
that this conversation or dialogue is the core function of educational practice in post-
colonial situations; that education should do more than deliver knowledge but should 
strive to enable understanding about the nature of the knowledge it discusses. In 
effect, where Fanon and other post colonial commentators critique the ways in which 
colonialism works to create a post-colonial identity, Freire seeks opportunity for 
intervention through an education that has the potential to liberate individuals and 
communities from the cycle. 
Freire’s theory of critical education as a means of liberatory practice arises out 
of his work with the illiterate poor and rural workers and his insight that in order to 
become literate they must also realise whom they are in relation to the world (see 
Chapter 1, section 1.4.2 and Chapter 2, section 2.2.3) has import beyond the site of 
its inception. Literacy in terms of both being able to comprehend meaning and to 
create meaning is always more than the functional pragmatics of being able to ‘read’ 
and ‘write’. Freire writes (1972, p. 71) that the marginalised or ‘oppressed’ in his 
terms must become: 
… aware of their activity and the world in which they are situated, acting in 
functions which they propose, having the seat of their decisions located in 
themselves and in their relations with the world and with others, infusing the 
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world with their creative presence by means of the transformation they effect 
upon it. 
As Freire explains, the duality of oppressor – oppressed, or coloniser – colonised, is 
continually confirmed by social institutions such as ‘traditional’ education that 
provide knowledge as constructed by the one in a superior or dominant position; the 
one with the loudest voice. This creates the situation critiqued by Fanon where, as 
Freire (1972, p. 48) observes, “Knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider 
themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing.” 
As African gamer discusses (Turner, 2015, Chapter 6, this volume), the act of 
‘giving’ is also an act of defining. Freire continues to argue that this same act of 
donating knowledge from the perspective of the dominant view is akin to “projecting 
an absolute ignorance on to others” and so confounds the idea that education should 
be a process of inquiry. Rather, this kind of inclusion of the other treats them as 
Freire (1972) and Spivak’s (1993) marginals, who must be taught the ways of being 
and meaning making of the more powerful in order to be integrated into civilised 
society. They must learn the culture of the coloniser, absorb its stories and make 
them their own in order to have any voice or recognition. Thus, the colonised, as well 
as the coloniser, actively implement the duality critiqued by Fanon (1963). To return 
to Thiong’o’s searing indictment (1986) and Mishra and Hodge’s (1991) paradox 
(Chapter 3, section 3.1.1), the colonised are allowed to tell their own stories but they 
do so in the language and using the onto-epistemic categories of the coloniser. The 
publication African gamer (Turner, 2015, Chapter 6, this volume) discusses how the 
colonised are effectively ‘othered’ through inclusion and any potential for a plurality 
of literacies is negated. Here culture and cultural production as a process is unveiled. 
The process of meaning making does not only take place in the traditional contexts 
of reading and writing. It is also found in the world and other creative acts such as 
the making of music or writing of poetry (Freire & Macedo, 1987) and, as the current 
thesis argues, the process is also found in the design of software artefacts and in 
designing itself. 
The 2004 UNESCO position paper on the ‘plurality’ of literacy also recognises 
that these basic aspects of literacy include a notion of literacy as a plurality that is not 
a static prescription but is recognised as a dynamic set of practices in multiple 
different contexts throughout an individual’s, and a community’s, lifetime 
(UNESCO, 2004, p. 13): 
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The plurality of literacy refers to the many ways in which literacy is employed 
and the many things with which it is associated in a community or society and 
throughout the life of an individual. People acquire and apply literacy for 
different purposes in different situations, all of which are shaped by culture, 
history, language, religion and socio-economic conditions… Rather than seeing 
literacy as only a generic set of technical skills, it looks at the social dimensions 
of acquiring and applying literacy. It emphasizes that literacy is not uniform, but 
is instead culturally and linguistically and even temporally diverse… 
Constraints on its acquisition and application lie not simply in the individual, 
but also in relations and patterns of communication structured by society. 
Literacy is not merely about functional skills then, it is also about identity and 
culture. The UNESCO description of literacy as being culturally and linguistically 
and even temporally diverse resonates with Bhabha’s concept of hybridity (1994) 
and its consequences (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2) as well as Freire’s demand for 
critical literacy (see Chapter 1, section 1.4.2 and Chapter 2, section 2.2.3) and his 
insistence that his subjects must be “aware of their activity and the world in which 
they are situated” (1972, p. 71). In effect, this means literacy must also arise from an 
idea of amelioration of social injustice and unequal power relations and must enable 
heterogeneity and diversity, as the UNESCO paper (2004, p. 14) advises, 
“Individuals and groups in subordinate positions may construct their own forms of 
literacy in their own language(s), articulating their own – officially unacknowledged 
– meanings, knowledge and identity.” 
Critical literacy, then, allows for multiple voices and asserts the rights of the 
silenced (or drowned out) to tell their own stories. Indeed, the act of telling one’s 
own story is vital in terms of becoming Freire’s (1972) ‘beings for themselves’, 
where the telling of a story on behalf of someone is effectively an act of silencing 
(Star, 1991). This essential right to tell one’s own story includes an ownership or 
right and title of literacy itself. The UNSECO position paper (2004, p. 17) continues 
to advise that, “Rather than imposing a foreign literacy on an indigenous culture and 
so undermining existing modes of thought and social organization, literacy policies 
and programmes should respect these and build upon local knowledge and 
experience.” The UNESCO statement echoes Márquez’s (1982, para. 7) warning 
used as a sign post in Chapter 1 (Chapter 1, section 1.1), where he announces, “To 
interpret our reality through schemas which are alien to us only has the effect of 
making us even more unknown, ever less free, ever more solitary.” 
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There is a strong resonance between the rights to plurality articulated in the 
2004 UNESCO paper and recognition that the right to voice and identity is 
problematised in post-colonial contexts. In post-colonial contexts, identity and 
meaning making arise out of the experience of colonisation and are not discrete items 
that can be picked up and dusted off intact as they once existed prior to cultural 
change and imposition of the view from the centre. Imposition is problematised as 
‘interpretation’ or even ‘translation’ with its potential for what Spivak (1988) and 
Moreton-Robinson (2005) refer to as ‘epistemic violence’ or the violence of 
reformatting in modes that are not of the culture (for example, the act of translating 
oral forms into a written form that arises out of an ‘alien’ culture’s historical 
trajectory). To return to Mishra and Hodge’s (1991) example of the Australian 
Indigenous author writing in the language of the coloniser using the labelling of the 
view from the centre, or announced marginality (Spivak, 1993); meaning making is 
enabled by the dominant culture. Further, this enabling is through the voice of the 
dominant culture, on terms laid down by the dominant culture’s normative values 
and legitimisation mechanisms. This violence, which is a product of ‘permission’ as 
Said argues (1984), is not the violence of denial of rights but rather the violence of 
homogeneity where in order to have voice the ‘other’ must become the object of the 
single story and mute their own heterogeneity; they must claim the label of 
marginality in order to be included. Bhabha (1994) might add that there is a choice 
between marginality and mimicry. Either option enacts the violence of translation 
that Moreton-Robinson (2005) describes (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2). 
This is the point where the idea of giving a voice to the voiceless and silenced 
via the telling of stories using technology is exposed as problematic. The use of 
western post industrial, digital technologies to re-present oral stories and fragile 
intangible cultural knowledges raises multiple questions about the material culture of 
the artefact and what translations the ‘already storied’ (Irani et al., 2010) artefact 
might enact. So, in ACID’s Digital Songlines Environment (DSE) project, for 
example, as the publication Through the looking glass presented in this thesis 
discusses (see Turner & Bidwell, 2007b, Chapter 4, this volume), a glaring 
translation is the use of the western mode map to represent Australian Indigenous 
relationship with ‘country’. Whereas the western-mode map is in the service of 
measurement and science as Alpers (1983) opines, Australian indigenous 
communities have complex and interwoven relationships with their lands, connecting 
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their own stories with country; re-telling stories through country and framing country 
as a living entity and active participant in their stories and knowledges (Rose, 1996). 
The temptation of the ‘virtual reality’ environment created using a digital game 
engine is the seduction of dis-emplacement and ‘objective’ view from nowhere that 
Haraway criticises as “the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity” (1991, 
p. 195). This is effective translation from a specific cultural view of country as 
‘someone’ to landscape, territory seen from above. The stories and experiences of the 
communities who contributed to the DSE are not merely transcribed into a virtual 
environment; they are translated and re-formatted. As Spivak (1988) and Star (1991) 
advise, those who are in most need of a voice and whose stories are most urgent are 
also those whose identity is most vulnerable to reformation and translation or the 
interpretation of Márquez’s alien schemas. This insight is where the research story 
presented in the current thesis opens. 
Asking questions about the storied nature of digital space and exposing the 
ways in which cultural artefacts contribute to Ricœur’s storied world has been shown 
to create an ‘impasse’ for indigenous and post-colonial peoples (see Turner, 2015, 
Chapter 6). When the digital artefact is shown to be storied and heavily imbricated in 
a western onto-epistemic perspective with its trajectories in the scientific and 
technological aspirations of the Enlightenment, how can we enable access to the 
power of story-ing with technological artefacts on equal footing? The current study 
has exposed the dilemmas and unpacked the multiple stories of the artefact; in so 
doing, it has shown how densely entangled these stories are. It has exposed the 
potential to set up the same binary choice, critiqued in the African gamer publication 
(Turner, 2015, Chapter 6, this volume) between retaining a mythical pre-
technological state and ‘faithful’ commitment to a construction of pre-colonisation 
identity, and engaging with the potentially disruptive translation that the digital 
artefact embodies. As African gamer observes (2015, p. 33): 
These two perspectives on the story … expose two dominant views on 
Indigenous knowledges and technologies: ICTs as progress for indigenous 
peoples and ICTs as disruptive and exploitative. Neither position, however, 
allows for the claiming of digital technology by indigenous communities, 
indeed both views position indigenous cultures as being outsiders. 
There is, as I have remarked (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.2), a dreadful tension 
embedded in this view; a stark choice constructed in part by the storied nature of the 
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artefact and its design legacies that prioritise use but, more critically, by the effective 
disappearance of the way that design and the designing of artefacts are themselves 
story-ing acts that contribute to Ricœur’s (1984) mimetic cycle (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.3). The way that design understands itself, the way that design is also 
designed as Willis (2006) says and as the publication Performing design (Turner & 
Moyes, 2012, see Chapter 7) explains, means that non western, non post-industrial 
cultures are positioned as story receivers, interpreters at best, and not story tellers (or 
artefact makers). They are caught up in what we might call ‘pedagogies of the 
impressed’; they are not alone, rather the focus on non western non post-industrial 
contexts serves to highlight the manner in which design itself is also caught up in 
pedagogies of the impressed. 
8.1.2 Beyond the black box 
The publication Designing spatial story-telling software (Turner & Browning, 
2009, Chapter 5, this volume) argues that to allow people to tell their own stories is 
to give them a voice and so enable Freire’s (1972) individual creativity and 
empowerment. In this work, we take issue with disembodied story telling practices 
and propose a software artefact that has potential to allow story tellers to re-affix 
spatial experience to images and so, in theory, re-envision embodied memories. 
However, on reflection (see Chapter 5, section 5.4), the act of creating ‘easily 
accessible’ software does very little to reveal the manner in which the design process 
and the software artefact itself contribute to the storied world. In effect, software as a 
material storied artefact remains ‘black boxed’. 
Flusser’s idea of the black box (1983), used as a banner in Chapter 2 of the 
current thesis (see Chapter 2, section 2.1), and runs through the discussion of 
methodologies, is salutary (see Chapter 3). Particularly, his challenge to literacy that 
posits, “Any criticism of technical images must be aimed at an elucidation of its 
inner workings” (1983, p. 16). While not overtly directed at critical pedagogy, 
Flusser offers a succinct distinction between what it means to be functionally literate 
with a technological artefact and critically literate in the ways that a designed artefact 
works. Like Freire (1972, see Chapter 1, section 1.4.2 and Chapter 2, section 2.2.3), 
Flusser is concerned with creativity and the hopeful endeavour35. For Flusser 
                                                
 
35 Flusser, a displaced person and exile as a result of the rise of Nationalism in Germany, sees 
creativity arising out of displacement from the comfortable storied world, to use Ricœur’s 
terminology. Creativity, for Flusser, is born of need and broken mimesis. See Flusser (2002). 
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(writing of the camera) the distinction between functional and critical literacy is 
about creativity and the difference between being able to use the artefact (to take an 
image) and understanding the ways in which the artefact is designed to structure the 
act of reproduction in specific ways through its internal mechanisms and processes 
(an image taken courtesy of the camera). Flusser proposes (2011) that the camera 
(and other image production artefacts) is a tool that reverses the human – hammer 
relationship described by Heidegger (1962, see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2). A hammer 
is an extension of the hand but a camera is not an extension of the eye in the same 
way. In the case of the hammer, according to Flusser, the human is constant and the 
tool is the variable (the hammer in my home is often as not a lump of hardwood). 
However, when the artefact is a complex machine, Flusser argues that the roles are 
reversed and the interactor finds him- or her-self acting as a function of the machine 
and its affordances. The artefact offers possibilities which are a priori to the act of 
using them (2011, p. 198) and the user can only “‘decide’ within them”. The user is 
thus constrained by the ideologies of design and the ideologies of what Flusser calls 
techno-science. In order to be literate and open the black box one must also be 
literate in the ideologies that pre-figure the design of the artefact. Haraway (1991) 
makes a resonant argument when she critiques the techno-scientific approach as 
having the certainty of objectivity and so creating the illusion of a view from 
nowhere or eternally disembodied point of view (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3) that 
simultaneously priorities its own knowledge as non ideological and constructs the 
subjective knowledge of others as potential subjects for application of its knowledge, 
thus further removing and silencing those whose stories are already silenced. As 
Thiong’o (1993) describes it, the view from the centre that assumes ‘universal 
reality’ also acts to construct homogeneity and negate diversity. Finding criticality in 
artefacts is thus more complex than simply understanding the pragmatic process of 
their mechanisms and looking beyond the surface. As Bardzell & Bardzell ask, 
“What does it mean to ‘look beneath the surface’? What sort of things are you 
supposed to find under there? And how do you know when you’ve identified the 
most important things under that surface?” (2013, p. 3300). 
In an article entitled Opening the black box and finding it empty, Winner 
(1993) takes issue with this in the case of those theories that are inspired by Bijker 
(1995) and material network approaches (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.3). These 
approaches recognise that artefacts are part of the storied world, being shaped by the 
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socio-cultural contexts and in turn acting within socio-cultural contexts (Bijker, 
1995; Pinch & Bijker, 1984). While Winner concedes that placing artefacts – 
technological things – in the spotlight is an important contribution to understanding 
the social, his critique descries a manifest lack of any critical dimension. So, they 
might explain how technologies arise in the cultural context but avoid any comment 
on broader concerns as a result of the process. For example, Macnamara’s (2010b) 
metaphor of the vehicle (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.2) is evocative but fails to 
recognise any manifest dilemmas associated with ‘vehicles’ such as constructs of 
mobility, pollution, production practices or economic interests. They fail to deal with 
the consequences of technological artefact histories or any deeper cultural 
ramifications – particularly in terms of the goals of critical literacy that asks 
questions about whose interests and voices are prioritised and whose might have 
been silenced and marginalised. Further, while perhaps illuminating Hodder’s (2012) 
deeply entangled world of people and things, merely opening the black box does not 
actually enable active engagement or Freirean dialogue with its storied nature. It does 
not allow opportunity to de-story.  
If Flusser’s black box only has to be opened in order to engage actively in the 
cycle of action and reflection that Freire advises must include everyone equally and 
fully, ‘outsiders’ will need to either go back in time to an instigating point or find 
themselves inculcated post-reflection; this is the creation of an impasse. Initial points 
are themselves only visible in retrospect, as Benjamin (1968) has declared36, and 
fallacious, in that ‘an initiating point’ represents the imposition of a formal desire to 
categorises and classify as Ingold (2007) observes. For example, where would one 
start to re-imagine and engage with the long trajectory of the design of programming 
languages? Do they commence when Ada Lovelace first explored the potential of 
Babbage’s mechanical computer to do more than calculate? Should the focus be on 
the accident of binary arising out of Leibnitz’ interest in The I-Ching and his pre-
                                                
 
36 Paul Klee’s (1920) Angelus Novus print is immortalised by Walter Benjamin in his Theses on the 
philosophy of history and the angel described as “looking as though he is about to move away from 
something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. 
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a 
chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls 
it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that 
the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his 
back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call 
progress” (Benjamin, 1968, p. 253). 
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occupation with creation ex nihilo or creation out of nothing (Lai, 1998, see Chapter 
2, section 2.3.2)? Or, as a colleague’s musings on programming and oral languages 
eventually considers, does the very idea of writing instructions that must be 
performed by a ‘something’ arise out of writing itself. Her answer is to consider 
potential for oral programming languages. Harrell (2007) also explores subversion of 
programming design habits. Inspired by Thiong’o’s (1993) argument for an African 
sensibility in literature and a move away from the centrality of European languages, 
he explores the possibility of enabling the performative execution of African oral 
traditions through the design of software that generates poetry and enables the 
essential qualities of oral traditions rather than those of literary traditions. 
Others recommend that the digital artefact should be subverted and broken 
from the current moment. In the specific case of digital games, Anthropy (2012a) 
argues for the ‘breaking’ of accepted understandings of digital games as play and the 
re-framing of their affordances to telling personal stories (see Chapter 1, section 
1.3.2 and Turner, 2015, Chapter 6). Westecott (2013) takes her cue from Haraway’s 
(1991) search for feminist spaces within technologies to argue for a dismantling of 
game making practice as a production process and a re-framing of such practices as 
craft. Another approach is that of designers such as Dunne and Raby (2001) who take 
the act of designing and critique the act itself through designed works, asserting that 
if the ‘language’ of design is designing, then the language of design criticality is also 
designing. There is a great deal of power in Dunne and Raby’s insight. However, 
here we encounter a different set of dilemmas; after all, the ‘language’ of design is 
another deeply storied space (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3). 
To return to the specific context that instigates the current research (see 
Chapter 1, section 1.1.2) and the UNESCO (2004, p. 14) position paper that 
stipulates, “Rather than imposing a foreign literacy on an indigenous culture and so 
undermining existing modes of thought and social organization, literacy policies and 
programmes should respect these and build upon local knowledge and experience”, 
how can a critical design literacy be achieved without imposing the systems, values 
and process of design on indigenous (and post-colonial) cultures? The final question 
that is now raised is how we can engage critically with design and its material 
artefacts in order to enable Freire’s (1972) conscientização or critical awareness; or 
rather, how can we (as designers and educators) enable access to the internal 
designed workings of the black box so that those who are not inside the assumed, 
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normatised, homogenised culture of design are enabled to become active and 
engaged and make their own meaning without becoming ambiguous through 
‘permission’ to design to paraphrase Said (1984)? Indeed, as the Performing design 
publication discusses (Turner & Moyes, 2012, see Chapter 7, this volume), how can 
we enable access to the storied nature of design and its artefacts for those who are 
ostensibly within the culture of design and yet remain ‘glamoured’ by the stories that 
design tells itself about itself? In short, where is Freire’s (1972) transformative 
opportunity and access to the power of design (Bidwell, Radoll & Turner, 2007); 
where is Ricœur’s (2008) hope-full endeavour? 
8.1.3 Beyond design 
As I declared in the introductory chapter of the current thesis (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.2), I am a practising educator, teaching game and interaction design at 
tertiary level, and a practising designer. My educational practice is framed by my 
own background as a critical literacy practitioner and I believe that my core 
responsibility is to enable my students and project participants to explore how design 
itself works in the world so that they can make their own meanings as critically 
aware individuals. The publication, Performing design (Turner & Moyes, 2012, see 
Chapter 7, this volume), while discussing a context that is clearly situated ‘in the 
centre’ of a western post-industrial, mediatised storied world, offers opportunity to 
reflect on designing as a story-ing act, one that is conflated with its material 
outcomes and processes to achieve those outcomes (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2). 
The small teaching experiment or intervention that we describe is very much within a 
cultural storied world that has a tendency to frame itself as a service industry, albeit 
one that makes works for the purposes of play. Squire’s (2008) commentary on ‘the 
business of designing and making games’ having its own legitimising processes (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.3.3) is entirely accurate in terms of the way that game design 
tends to frame itself as an industry predicated to consumerist outcomes. Squire’s 
response focuses on the player experience with the designed works. He proposes a 
literacy of performance (2006, 2008) that encourages players to reflect on the 
designed experience, a notion that is also useful in the area of game design education 
but still abdicates responsibility to deal with design itself (this is discussed further in 
the current chapter, see section 8.2.1). If games are designed experiences as Squire 
(2006) observes, then as an educator who scaffolds students and project participants 
into designing and making games, my questions are about design. 
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As a work written for an audience of academics and other game design 
educators, Performing design (Turner & Moyes, 2012) argues that game design is so 
caught up in its own mimetic cycle that it doesn’t generally perceive itself as a design 
activity. We propose that game design needs to realise that its material artefacts are 
cultural storied works (see Chapter 2, section 2.3) and so, as an area, will benefit 
from more critical understandings of what it means to design. To this end, we discuss 
critical approaches to design (Dunne, 1999; Dunne & Raby, 2001) as potential 
opportunities to breaking open the black box of game design (Turner, Browning & 
Moyes, 2012) and implement a critical literacy technique used by Augusto Boal 
(2000) as a potential means to unveil the way game design ‘works’ (see Chapter 3, 
section 3.3.1). Given Squire’s (2008) argument that the study of games is ultimately 
the study of game performance, it seems appropriate to use Boal’s performance 
approach to Freire’s critical awareness in the project of unveiling design. In addition, 
taking performance as a technique, (as opposed to a phenomenon), offers opportunity 
for a confluence of both design and literacy concerns. The project, initiated with the 
same western post-industrial contexts that are already enabled by membership to 
participate within digital environments, is firmly situated within Thiong’o’s (1986) 
‘central’ perspective. Its aims are those of the tertiary institution and digital games as 
a cultural sector within the post-industrial experience. The exercise makes use of the 
affordances of Jenkins (2006) participatory culture and Manovich’s (2001) software 
culture (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3), however, the central goal of the Performing 
design project is essentially critical pedagogic practice that endeavours to find a way 
to unveil design, beyond the functional literacy of Flusser’s (1983) black box. 
In terms of the current research narrative, the inclusion of the Performing 
design paper is important food for thought. The discussion in the paper circles 
around two relevant themes: critical pedagogy and criticality in design. Freire’s 
critical pedagogy (1972) arises in his own practice as a literacy educator (see Chapter 
1, section 1.4.2); his focus is on the word. The particular power for game design in 
using Boal’s version of critical pedagogic practice is the sense of access to ‘below 
the surface’. Boal’s fourth wall constructed by stage and his demand that his students 
invade and transform the stage itself in order to make their own meaning and initiate 
dialogue is enticing. It has resonance with Laurel’s (1993) conceptualisation of the 
computer interface wherein both users and digital elements engage in activity (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.3.1), although where Laurel actively advises employing 
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Aristotelian principles of theatre, Boal advocates finding Aristotle’s coercive 
structures and dismantling them. Here, there is a potentially useful tool for design to 
delve below the surface of the black box. Certainly reframing Boal’s approach to 
critical pedagogy provides a useful tool for revealing design through emphasis on 
illuminating design as opposed to ‘learning’ design.  
There is potential here for the hope-full endeavour and transformative action. 
For example, in the African gamer publication (Turner, 2015, see Chapter 6, this 
volume), I suggest that the contemporary claiming of digital games as a form to tell 
stories in post-industrial contexts (Anthropy, 2012a, see Chapter 6, section 6.3.12) is 
potentially powerful in post-colonial contexts and indeed becoming more common. 
However, the examples of locally produced games discussed in African gamer 
remain imbricated in the mimetic stories of design as service. They represent a 
movement towards claiming the means of story telling but, rather like Thiong’o’s 
(1986) authors who expect to publish in the languages of the coloniser, digital games 
like Njeru and Kirore’s Ma3Racer (Planet Rackus, 2011) exploit the practices of 
design as established in the western context. Exploring critical literacy practice such 
as Boal’s version of Freire’s critical pedagogy might indeed prove powerful and 
empowering, allowing the re-claiming of a cultural form that is not only pervasive 
but endemic to humanity (Huizinga, 1949). Still, this optimism remains open to 
being confounded by the stories of design.  
Without Freire and Boal’s emancipatory intent and goal of transformation, 
there is a danger that such critical approaches can be abducted in the service of 
design. After all, the teaching experiment described in Performing design is 
essentially an abduction; the context and the parameters of the situation are framed 
by the wider goals of education in a post-industrial culture. Empowerment and 
understanding the power of design in the construction of experiences, as Squire 
(2006) puts it, is re-purposed for the goals of design. One might ask how the 
Performing design project is distinct to the use of role-play as a participatory design 
tool in projects such as those described by Simsarian (2003), where taking part in 
Laurel’s (1993) ‘theatrical interface’ as a physically embodied actor is used in order 
to further discussions about outcomes and framed as problem solving, albeit problem 
solving using generative themes rather than traditional methods.  
This reflective insight is a harbinger of the second theme in Performing design 
(Turner & Moyes, 2012) that frames the overall discussion; the idea of design as a 
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culture in its own right. In Performing design, inspired by Archer’s (1979) call to 
understand design as a discipline distinct from ‘monolithic practices’ of the arts and 
sciences, we critique the idea that designing and making digital games straddles two 
disciplines, arguing that this has the potential to dismantle the power of the form as a 
cultural artefact and maintain either the perpetuation of the product driven approach 
of engineering or the elitist bailiwick of art. Instead we suggest that framing game 
design as a design activity will re-enable the idea of ‘craft’ and the joy of making 
meaning through the form. We advocate a focus on creativity, rather than innovation. 
The distinction is important. As we say (Turner & Moyes, 2012, para. 13):  
Innovation is to do with implementation of a new or novel concept. It has 
strong connections with the business of industry: an innovative idea may not 
be particularly creative but might well enhance a product. Creativity, which 
arises out of that same subjective experience, that is the (very general) goal 
of an education, does not have to be practical, or have an industry outcome. 
Creativity is about acquiring and refining a knowledge base and being able 
to engage with ideation and process. 
Education in this sense is very much the education proposed by Freire (1972, p. 56), 
where the focus is on problem posing that enables and “stimulates … reflection and 
action upon reality”. The discussion is framed by its situated concerns and audience 
but it also draws attention to an idea of a centralised repository for information and 
some intimation of legitimised meaning (a knowledge base). A concern in the 
Performing design project is that emerging designers need opportunity to become 
critical thinkers; to break the mimetic process that Schön (1983) describes (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.3.3 and Chapter 3, section 3.3.2). In order to achieve this 
disruption of mimesis, the Performing design project advocates an understanding of 
design that is inspired by Dunne and Raby’s (2001) critical design practice and 
Horkheimer’s (1982) call for critical theory as a methodology for emancipation. 
Reflecting on this call towards the end of the current research journey is 
salutary. In the context of an educational role, I have suggested that one way to foster 
understandings of design as a culturally entangled process is to engage with design 
itself as a creative act and encourage a more reflective process that scaffolds deeper 
understanding about design. This is perhaps appropriate in the specific context of the 
Performing design project. However, in terms of the current research narrative, 
reflecting on the project in the light of the discussions about design and its artefacts 
 260 Chapter 8: Reflections and implications: pedagogies of the impressed 
as contributors to Ricœur’s mimetic cycle (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.1) and the 
story-ing of the world opens a pathway for deeper interrogation of the meaning of 
criticality in design. A reflective appraisal of the Performing design project and the 
very hermeneutic act of reflecting on our earlier reflections (see Chapter 7, section 
7.2.9) evidences an interesting dilemma. So, we posit that the critical (in design 
education contexts) is usually undertaken as a theoretical exercise, rather than a 
creative act and that a useful response is the fostering of criticality through critical 
pedagogic practice in the design process. Implicit in these discussions is a notion of 
criticality that is highly influenced by my own background as a critical literacy 
practitioner, that is, an assumption that criticality itself is a hope-full endeavour. As I 
have argued (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1), Freire’s critical pedagogy, while 
espousing the critical theory of Habermas (1971, 1988) is more akin to critical 
hermeneutic practice through its emphasis on transformative action and subjective 
meaning making. Freire’s endeavour frames the potential non-actionability and 
negativity of critical theory as affirmative action; problem posing in order to make 
opportunity to create and transform. The critical design thinking proposed in the 
Performing design project has more in common with the problem solving endeavour 
because of the manner in which it echoes the functionality of critical thinking as a 
means of being a more efficient (and so more useful and more effective) citizen 
(Burbules & Berk, 1999); in effect, critical thinking as a functional ‘literacy’.  
This insight reveals a dilemma in conceptualisations of the critical in design 
itself, particularly the abduction of the critical project from its legacies in 
Horkheimer’s (1982) emancipation from ideologies that ‘enslave’ and its reframing 
as a method or tool in the service of design. Criticality, thus misused has some 
powerful implications in terms of design and what it might mean to hand over the 
power of design – or indeed wrest that power away from the centre. 
8.2 IMPLICATIONS 
Dourish (2006a) muses on the notion of ‘implications’ as a section in Human 
Computer Interaction (HCI) and design publications. He problematises the abduction 
of methodologies that have no concrete verifiable outcomes but seek, as Geertz 
(1973) has put it, to explore meaning. Dourish takes the use of ethnographic 
approaches as example, and critiques the manner in which design as practice (see 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.2) is not infrequently guilty of turning a methodology (with its 
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onto-epistemic assumptions and perspectives) into a method or tool in the service of 
design itself.  
This section takes its own critical hermeneutic methodologies with the goals of 
understanding and Dourish’s critique to heart and so avoids any discussion of what 
the insights gained from the critical hermeneutic approach taken in the thesis might 
mean for design as process. Instead, the implications discussed here remain 
steadfastly theoretical and focus on unveiling meaning, with a view to enabling the 
hope-full endeavour. The following discussions offer reflections on some of the 
themes that have been problematised by the research in the thesis in the form of 
implications, or considerations: the dilemmas of software culture as they can be 
revealed in new literacies, conceptualisations of participatory culture and 
participatory design, and criticality in designing itself. 
8.2.1 Beyond literacies of use 
Critical literacy practice after Freire (1972) recognises that a ‘text’ can be an 
image, moving image, audio, or any communication media form. The growth of 
internet and communications technologies (ICTs) as a communication media during 
the 1990s has resulted in critical literacy practice framing its purview more overtly to 
include notions of multiple literacies (Cazden et al., 1996; Luke, 1997; Kellner, 
1999; Kellner, 2000) where text, audio and image are combined and presented 
through the medium of the computer screen. The burgeoning growth and presence of 
digital technologies in the global context and the advent of ‘new’ media (Manovich, 
2001) led to the use of the term ‘new’ literacies (Kellner, 1999; Knobel & Lankshear, 
2007; Lankshear & Knobel, 2008) to refer to multimodal (Kress, 2003) literacy 
forms made possible by digital technologies. Literacy practices using digital 
technologies are also sometimes referred to as information literacies, digital literacies 
(Lankshear & Knobel, 2008) and less commonly in the current era of mobile 
technology (Harper et al., 2008), computer literacies. As Coiro, Lankshear, Knobel 
and Leu point out (2008, p. 10), these terms “are used to refer to phenomena we 
would see as falling broadly under a new literacies umbrella”. Commonly recognised 
examples of new literacies include practices such as conducting and collating online 
searches, processing and evaluating online information, using web-based forums and 
discussion lists, using blogs, participating in social networking services such as 
Twitter, creating and sharing fan fiction, music, audio, images, creating digital 
‘mashups’ and creating or ‘modding’ digital games (Knobel & Lankshear, 2007). An 
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overarching approach (although not the only approach), is a sociocultural perspective 
that examines these new literacies as aspects of literacy that can only be understood 
in “the contexts of social, cultural, political, economic, historical practices to which 
they are integral, of which they are a part” (Lankshear & Knobel, 2006, p. 1). With 
this statement, Lankshear and Knobel clearly position themselves within the social 
constructionist view espoused by Pinch and Bijker (1984, see Chapter 3, section 
3.3.3). These contexts are very much Manovich’s ‘contemporary society’ (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.4) where Macnamara’s (2010b) announcement that digital 
technologies are merely ‘vehicles which enable activity’ and Merholz’s (2005) 
statement that ‘it is about attitude, not technology’ are accepted as cultural norms. 
Merholz’ emphasis on ‘attitude’ is echoed in those fields concerned with the 
manifestations of digital media in society and culture. As Coiro et al. announce in 
their opening sentence of the Handbook of research on new literacies, we live 
“during a period when the internet has deeply altered our literacy lives” (2008, p. xi) 
and later, “Educators, policy makers, employers, and the public at large all recognize 
that these new literacies of the Internet will be central to the most important literacy 
and learning issues of our generation,” (2008, p. xi). The work offers a wide-ranging 
collection of commentary on research and literacy with contributions from authors 
looking at the ramifications of this ‘deep change’ from many different perspectives 
and methodological viewpoints. Like Macnamara (2010b), the editors have qualms 
about the expression of ‘new’ and ‘newness’, however, they argue that interpretation 
and creation – and the social practices around these basic elements of literacy – are 
“sufficiently distinct” to demand theoretical reframing under the heading ‘new’. 
Under this heading, Coiro et al. (2008) propose a set of four characteristics: in the 
first instance, that digital technologies require new social practices, skills and 
strategies for effective use; secondly, new literacies should be prioritised as being 
central to egalitarian concerns; thirdly, that they are changing transactionally, and; 
finally, that new literacies are multimodal. Even these tentative characteristics 
expose a resonance with Merholz’s (2005) claim that ‘it is about attitude’. 
Transactionality embeds an idea of exchange and evolution. That is to say, the users 
of digital technologies are enabled and empowered, through the form itself, to 
influence the way that the form might develop, if they are skilled in its use. 
The idea of social practices, skills and strategies for effective use has much in 
common with Manovich’s DJ or re-mixer (2001) and Jenkins’ (2006) participant (see 
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Chapter 2, section 2.4.1). For example Leu, Kinzer, Coiro and Cammack (2004) 
offer the following list of new literacies: using a search engine effectively to locate 
information; evaluating information in relation to purpose; participating effectively 
in social networks; knowing how to use e-mail to communicate effectively; and 
inferring information that may be found at a hyperlink in a web page. Black (2008, p. 
117) expands this notion of use to networked software and highlights something 
more akin to Jenkins’ (2006) conceptualisation of participation when she says that 
young people are learning “how to use new ICTs” in order to create communities and 
connections, and in order to access various tools and technologies.  
The evaluation of new literacy practices as transactional once again resonates 
with those commentators (Johnson, 2001; Jenkins, 2006; Macnamara, 2010b), who 
observe that there is a two-way flow of information that is endemic to the digital, if 
not inherent. Leu et al. (2004, p. 1591) call this two-way flow ‘envisionment’ and 
argue “that we are entering a period of literacy as technological deixis”, by which 
they mean context dependent. Elsewhere, for example in Coiro et al. (2008), digital 
technologies as a whole are referred to as deictic, implying the presence of a subject 
user via the use of a term more normally used in linguistics to refer to words such as 
‘here’, ‘today’ and ‘come’. During this period of technological deixis, Leu et al. 
(2004) argue, the forms and functions of literacy change rapidly as new technologies 
for information and communication emerge and as individuals construct new 
‘envisionments’ for their use. In essence, Manovich’s (2001) cultural software (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.4.1) is re-framed as softwares (plural) that are made available 
and re-remediated through use, piece-meal. Each piece of software encapsulates ‘a 
new potential literacy’. Coiro et al. (2008, p. 5) announce: 
A global network such as the Internet makes it possible to develop and 
immediately disseminate a new technology of literacy to every person who 
chooses to access it online. We have seen the beginning of this process 
recently as new technologies such as blogs, wikis, massively multiplayer 
online games, social networking technologies, and video and music-
dissemination technologies (e.g., YouTube and Bebo) have rapidly spread by 
means of the Internet, each with additional, new literacy forms and functions 
that are reshaped by social practices. 
Setting aside the use of the word ‘choice’ as a rather bland dismissal of what choice 
actually involves and who might actually have such choice (Mills, 2009), here Corio 
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et al. herald their meaning of the fourth characteristic of new literacies, its 
multimodality in the sense of software variety. Varieties of software – web-based 
forums, blogs, and wikis are listed as ‘literacy technologies’; the focus being on 
contemporary use and ‘participation’ in the sense that Jenkins (2006) uses the term 
(see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3) with the variety of software interfaces. For example, 
Black’s (2007) research into fan fiction37 culture and adolescent language learners 
that examines the personal meaning making enabled by the phenomenon, particularly 
enabled by web-based forums. Her research subjects are active users of software. She 
writes (2007, p. 584): 
Most students today are accustomed to active participation in such 
information-based economies, where graphic art and online publishing 
software enable new forms of semiotic engagement and symbolic 
manipulation of media. Many of them are also well versed in new ICTs such 
as synchronous chatting, webcams, avatars, blogs, and personal Web sites 
that make possible the sort of public performance of self that provides social 
and intellectual cachet in today’s multicultural, multilingual, and 
multitextual networked spaces. 
Overviews of these ‘literacy technologies’ reflect this tendency to focus on 
software use as literacy practice. Knobel and Lankshear’s (2007) introduction to a 
‘sampler’ of new literacy practice clarifies the notion of new literacy as one that 
conforms to Manovich’s characteristic of automation, the selection and sequencing 
of elements as opposed to original design ‘from scratch’ (Manovich, 2001, see 
Chapter 2, section 2.4.1). The authors explain (Knobel & Lankshear, 2007, p. 7): 
Basically, programmers write source code that is stored as binary code 
(combinations of 0s and 1s) which drives different kinds of applications (for 
text, sound, image, animation, communications functions, etc.) on digital-
electronic apparatuses (computers, games hardware, CD and mp3 players, 
etc.). Someone with access to a fairly standard computer and internet 
                                                
 
37 Fanfiction, or Fan fiction, is generally the practice of re-presenting stories, both as re-mix culture 
but more typically as ‘original’ work inspired by settings and characters in fictional work. Fanfiction 
is essentially amateur in the sense that it is rarely authorised by the original work creator, owner or 
publisher, it does not have access to formal publishing process and its audience is other fans who will 
recognise references to the universe and canon of the original fiction. For example the first Star Trek 
fanzine, Spockanalia (1967), printed using offset printing and mimeograph machines, included fan 
written pieces about characters in the fictional universe of the TV series. It was mailed to other fans 
and sold at science fiction conventions (Verba, 1996). As access to digital networks and the two-way 
flow of social network software interfaces became more common-place, the production of fan fiction 
has become very popular. 
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connection, and who has fairly elementary knowledge of standard software 
applications can create a diverse range of meaningful artefacts using a strictly 
finite set of physical operations or techniques (keying, clicking, cropping, 
dragging), in a tiny space, with just one or two (albeit complex) “tools.” They 
can, for example, create a multimodal text and send it to a person, a group, or 
an entire internet community in next to no time and at next to no cost. 
New literacy is clearly about abilities to use software applications made by 
programmers. Further in the same introduction, Manovich’s variability quality, his 
fourth characteristic of new media and its manifestation as re-mix culture (2001, see 
Chapter 2, section 2.4.1) is re-framed as an aspect of literacy practice for ‘ordinary 
people’ (Knobel & Lankshear, 2007, p. 8): 
Diverse practices of “remixing”—where a range of original materials are 
copied, cut, spliced, edited, reworked, and mixed into a new creation—have 
become highly popular in part because of the quality of product it is possible 
for “ordinary people” to achieve. 
Between these quotations from the New Literacies Sampler introductory section, a 
clear phenomenon arises; the designer and material considerations are disappeared 
from the discussion. This disappearance has some important ramifications. 
In the first instance, the storied world is one in which ‘fairly’ is used to denote 
the expected norms of post-industrial societies38. A ‘fairly’ standard computer is 
(presumably) a standard established by cycles of consumption and a ‘fairly’ 
elementary knowledge of ‘standard’ software applications is, one assumes, the level 
of knowledge expected in the contemporary story-world of post-industrial, 
mediatised consumer culture. This use of terminology declares a complicity with the 
legitimising processes of design and production that Squire (2008) has warned new 
literacy practitioners against (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.2 and Chapter 2, section 
2.3.3). As the analysis in African gamer (Turner, 2015, see Chapter 6, this volume) 
clarifies, such assumptions about access and availability of material artefacts and 
familiarity with use of “standard software” is an aspect of a pre-figured storied world 
that is deeply imbricated with the histories of western technological production. 
                                                
 
38 Knobel and Lankshear’s (2007) ‘sampler’ is an overview of new literacy practices for an audience 
of educational practitioners. To be fair, their use of the term ‘fairly’ is directed towards a situated 
audience with a situated understanding of the world. 
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In the second instance, those who make the software, the programmers who 
write source code, are situated in much the same manner as Huizinga (1949) 
positions the craftsman or maker when he denies any materiality of play and 
creativity (see Chapter 2, sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.3, also Chapter 3, section 3.3.2). This 
positioning of programming as a ‘service to use’ further acts as an implicit denial of 
design itself as a contributor to the mimetic process (Ricœur, 1984); the digital 
version of Heidegger’s hammer (see Chapter 3, sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.2) is merely 
‘available for use’, de-storied by its apparent readiness to hand. The interest is in the 
creativity enabled by their (the designer’s and programmer’s) work. Kress (2003) 
confirms this when he argues that new technological forms allow erstwhile ‘readers’ 
to become designers (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3). Additionally, the somewhat 
conciliatory acknowledgement that some of this re-mixing might involve dealing 
with some ‘complex tools’ and the observation that “ordinary people” can now 
achieve a quality product announces a somewhat ‘extraordinary’ removal by 
distinction of those makers and designers who ‘normally’ create artefacts.  
Knobel and Lankshear’s (2007) distinction between users and creators is 
further clarified as being the result of a commercial production change in perspective 
from production of software as one-directional to production of software as enacting 
Johnson’s (2001) two-way flow (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3). The authors cite Tim 
O’Reilly’s (2005) commentary on Web 2.0, a term for the change that he and his 
company popularised39. According to O’Reilly, where the old Web – Web 1.0 – was 
characterised by packaged software, websites where users get what they are given, 
both text and links, search engines that organised according to preset taxonomies, or 
web-based encyclopaedias, for example, the ‘new’ web is characterised by ‘active’ 
participation with the software. 
This is the distinction, for O’Reilly, between the static web page of Web 1.0, 
whether personal or corporate and published, which is offered to the user and the 
incremental blog of Web 2.0, which is simultaneously offered to the user while at the 
same time encouraging direct comment and participation from the user via comments 
options, tracebacks and various social network connectors – the inevitable ‘Like this 
page via facebook’ option. Like Jenkins (2006, see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3), 
O’Reilly also argues for a kind of group intelligence that emerges from the 
                                                
 
39 O’Reilly Media held a conference called Web 2.0 in 2004. The original use of the term to describe 
the growth of two way interaction is attributed to Darcy DiNucci. 
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collaboration of many; the resultant networks of blogs, the blogsphere, and its 
participants act as a “the voice we hear in all of our heads” (O’Reilly, 2005, p. 3). 
Wikipedia in particular is cited as an instance of Lévy’s (1998) collective intelligence 
being an encyclopaedia created by participation which, as O’Reilly announces, 
“embraces the power of the web to harness collective intelligence” (2005, p. 2). An 
‘old’ web browser such as Netscape’s Navigator (1994) that was marketed under the 
banner ‘the web for everyone’ is deemed as framing the web in terms of the 
computer desktop, simply remediating (Bolter & Gruisin, 1999) the older form. 
O’Reilly calls this browser ‘an artefact, produced by traditional software industry 
process and values’. In comparison, for O’Reilly, Google is ‘native’ to the web and 
described as ‘a service’. O’Reilly (2005, p. 1) argues, “None of the trappings of the 
old software industry are present. No scheduled software releases, just continuous 
improvement. No licensing or sale, just usage.” O’Reilly’s conceptualisation of 
‘trappings’ is somewhat simplistic, and ultimately, confounded by the realities of the 
contemporary digital production environment where such practices might have 
indeed evolved to accommodate new audience forms but where licensing and sales 
have actually become far more pervasive albeit no longer as visible. Framing Google 
as a service might indeed be valid but it is a ‘service’ that operates within a software 
environment that is ultimately ‘made’ by someone. The software industry has 
evolved, not disappeared. 
However, the myth of ‘participation’ is seductive. Using O’Reilly’s punditry as 
a basis for technological aspects of new media, Knobel and Lankshear compare the 
old web with the ‘new’ and argue for a distinction. They write (2007, p. 16), “The 
logic is of use rather than participation; of reception and/or consumption rather than 
interactivity and agency.” There is an echo here of de Certeau’s substitution of the 
term ‘user’ for the term ‘consumer’. As de Certeau (1984, pp. xi-xii) writes, “…the 
models of action characteristic of users whose status as the dominated element in 
society (a status that does not mean they are either passive or docile) is concealed by 
the euphemistic term ‘consumers’.” Other commentators also observe a ‘change’ in 
the activity of consumption in new media environments. Bruns (2008) argues that 
new media and O’Reilly’s web 2.0 are transforming knowledge production and the 
way that culture is generated, offering the portmanteau term ‘produsers’ for those 
who simultaneously use and produce within new media environments. A question 
that arises is where the creative act sits in this participatory re-mix culture. If use and 
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subsequent re-mix, participation or produsage are merely creative acts enabled by 
new media tools, then we can reasonably suggest that the creative act remains with 
the designers and makers of the software (and hardware) who support the 
participation in new media environments. If, as Hannah Arendt (1958) muses (see 
Chapter 1, sections 1.2.2 and 1.4), there is potential tragedy in finding satisfaction in 
terms of activity using things (rather than making them), then there is surely even 
more profound tragedy in assuming that criticality lies in the activity enabled by 
using things? Freire’s (1972, p. 98) warning that those who are allowed to be 
participants within the structures of power will “merely imagine that they have 
reached power” echoes uncomfortably.  
8.2.2 Beyond permission to design 
Knobel and Lankshear’s (2007, p. 13) argument that ‘ordinary people’ can be 
seen as being engaged in practices beyond participation and re-mix, and they are 
“turning the consumption of popular culture into active production: the production of 
consumption” deals with artefact use. However, as Buckingham warns in his 
overview of ‘digital literacies’ (2007), “Media literacy involves ‘writing’ the media 
as well as ‘reading’ them.” He also advocates (2007, pp. 114-115) for understanding 
how media ‘work’: 
[T]he element of theoretical reflection – the dynamic relationship between 
making and critical understanding that is crucial to the development of 
‘critical literacy’. In the context of media education, the aim is not primarily 
to develop technical skills, or to promote ‘self-expression’, but to encourage 
a more systematic understanding of how the media work, and hence to 
promote more reflective ways of using them.  
The focus of the discussion in Buckingham’s critique is concerned with production 
values in digital media artefacts. He argues that understanding the designed aspects 
of digital media should be included in new literacy reflections and suggests 
(Buckingham, 2008, p. 82) that such reflections and evaluations should include 
deeper examination of “sociological issues to do with production and audience that 
are important concerns for media teachers”. He asserts that while the phenomenon of 
convergence means a clear relationship can be seen between all media forms, for 
example, a book that is made into a film and then turned into a game; each form has 
its own specific form of representation, discourse, authorship and production process 
and audience experience. 
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Buckingham further argues that it is important to realise these aspects of 
specificity through the experience of media production (as opposed to merely 
through use of different media). Like Flusser (1983), he alerts us to the problem of a 
‘quasi-literacy’ approach that only looks at the surface and warns that the specific 
affordances of the actual media form should also be taken into account. Here, there is 
an echo of Hayles’ (2004) demand for a media specific analysis and her dictum that 
“print is flat, code is deep” and Freire’s (1972) warning that those who assume that 
they are active within an ‘allowed’ structure only imagine that they have attained 
power (see section 8.2.1 and Chapter 1, section 1.2.3). 
Mills (2011) puts it more pragmatically when she calls for inclusion of 
functional (new media) literacy in combination with criticality. Mills’ focus is on 
making animations with primary schoolers. Like Buckingham (2007), her project 
demands a specific focus on the designed nature of the specific media (in her case, 
stop-go animation or ‘claymation’) and a clarification through making animation of 
“the secrets” (Mills, 2011, p. 36) of design and construction of new media artefacts 
rather than using them. Mills frames this as an act of empowerment, she ends her 
discussion with a student’s comment and a call to ‘harness the power of the moving 
image’ (2011, p. 36): 
I asked a student: ‘How has making this movie changed the way you think 
about movies that you watch? Do you think differently about them at all?’ She 
confidently replied, ‘Yes...Now I know their secrets!’ It is time to harness the 
power of the moving image for the benefit of students. 
Mills’ project is to reveal design through unveiling production practice and moving 
image designing and a focus on the functional literacy skills of technological 
production. Her project uses digital cameras and digital editing software and so, in 
the end, exhibit a dependency on the already designed and made. The assumptions 
about software tools and their availability are more evident when the cultural media 
form is a digital game and ‘making’ requires multiple functional literacies, including 
its ‘invisible’ code (Fuller 2003, 2008), which creates the interactive ‘magic’ that 
Abbate (2008) tells us is ‘hidden from view’ (see Chapter 2, section 2.4). 
Where Manovich (2001) announces ‘programmability’ as a central distinction 
between digital and previous media forms, programming new media software is only 
occasionally (Kafai, 1992; Kafai, 1995; Kafai, 2006; Kafai & Resnick, 1996; 
Resnick & Rusk, 1996) included in discussions which, like Mills, assert the need for 
 270 Chapter 8: Reflections and implications: pedagogies of the impressed 
combining functional literacy with criticality. Manovich’s (2001) dismissal of the 
need to program ‘from scratch’ as being unnecessary is simply assumed as the norm 
and his resultant affordances of modularity, variability, automation and transcoding 
are fore-fronted. For example, Knobel and Lankshear (2007, p. 14) use the practice 
of game modding as a manifestation of Manovich’s new media characteristics of 
modularity, automation and variability, arguing that the practice illustrates the 
disruption of supposed power relationships between production and consumption. 
They explain: 
This can be illustrated nicely by game “modding,” which involves the use of a 
video game’s image and strategy engines to create fan driven “modifications” 
to or extensions of the game itself. These modifications remain “true” to the 
game’s “universe” (i.e., how characters can move, act, solve problems and 
what kinds of challenges are put in place, etc. within the world of the game), 
but add, say, a new mini-adventure or quest for characters to complete. Such 
additions may expand a level by adding new skills or qualities to the game, or 
create an entirely new level for players to complete that adds a layer of 
difficulty or complexity to the game.  
Game modding then, is a practice that can indeed position some as actual makers. 
However, the rather blithe equation of a game engine with a designed user interface 
such as a blog or a wiki ‘disappears’ the fact that the game engine is not the same 
sort of participation as writing fan fiction and posting it to a forum. The act of 
‘writing’, to use Buckingham’s emphasis, is now an act of programming and, as 
Sotamaa (2003) observes, is an act that blurs boundaries between gamers and game 
designers because the particular form demands acquaintance with both design and 
programming. 
This boundary is important. Indeed, Squire (2008) in his overview of digital 
games as literacy environments advises against the actual making of games per se 
because “few outside the gaming industry—certainly few academics—would be 
literate in how games are designed and constructed” (2008, p. 657) and further, the 
definition of what the literacy in question might actually be is problematised by a 
notion of what defines a game. So would the definition of game design be that of the 
formal industry? Should it be the players? Creating a mod involves varying degrees 
of the same understanding of programming so easily dismissed as unnecessary. 
Critically, a modded work requires the original game to run. There are degrees of 
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modding, from the use of included Software Development Kits (SDK) to add fresh 
game assets or perhaps alter a game world or map, to total conversions that can result 
in an entirely different game from the original (Champion, 2012). However, the 
majority of game mods are actually partial mods rather than total conversions.  
There is an important distinction hidden behind the terminology here. So a 
game mod might involve the creation of new game assets, characters or building 
perhaps, for example, changing the historical scenarios in Civilisation III (Firaxis 
Games, 2001) to the fictional scenarios of Martin’s (1996) A game of thrones. This 
kind of modding is enabled by the game creators through provision of an editor that 
allows relatively easy inclusion of digital items made by users. Other mods are more 
substantial and involve more than small edits or production of new assets. For 
example, DayZ (Hall, 2012), a multiplayer survival horror mod for the tactical 
shooter game ARMA 2 (Bohemia Interactive, 2009) changes the scenario and 
introduces realistic experiences into a fictional post-zombie outbreak world.  
Where many of the new literacies of participatory/remix culture are enabled by 
the use of the internet, mod creation is highly structured by the specific game engine 
used. Where fan fiction typically ‘remains true’ to the universe of the specific fan 
culture as an expression of the cultural knowledge of the writer or artist, the ‘truth’ of 
the universe created in a mod is actually rather more authoritative because the 
modders must eventually present their work through the auspices of the original 
game. Modding is typically allowed, and is part of the producer’s intended use of the 
software. Here, the universe is closer to de Certeau’s (1984) city scape (see Chapter 
2, section 2.3) and, without the skill sets of the architects, modding can only ever be 
partial, akin to the tactics of the walkers in de Certeau’s city. There is a strong sense 
here of what Said (1984), writing of the denial of access to international media for 
the Palestinian people but the ‘allowable’ academic critique, calls ‘permission to 
narrate’. Some forms of acceptable communication are allowed but the power to 
communicate their own history on their own terms is negated. 
Interactivity and agency, posited as a distinction of Web 2.0 media by Knobel 
and Lankshear (2007, see section 8.2.1) are problematised by the productive process 
that enable the software (and hardware), as Sotamaa (2003, p. 22) says in his 
overview of modding as participatory culture, the participants’ power always remains 
partial: “A participant is never fully independent in her actions but operates only 
through collaboration and negotiation” with the makers and publishers of the game. 
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Jenkins, too, admits (2006, p. 133, emphasis added), “The constraints on interactivity 
are technological. In almost every case, what you can do in an interactive 
environment is prestructured by the designer” (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3). 
Squire (2008) goes further to argue that actual design (understood as an aspect 
of development and artefact production) is outside of the purview of literacy when he 
equates the making and production of a digital game with the publishing of a book, 
and queries whether or not literacy should include such aspects of the storied world 
(see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3). He continues to remark that a focus on design and 
development is actually a risk when he remarks (2008, p. 658), “… by attempting to 
tie to the commercial games industry, may risk focusing on issues (profitability, 
market share) while overlooking others (underrepresented voices)”. 
The designers and makers are pushed into the background, enacting a service 
that is at once enabling and suspect. The “production” of media, in this instance, the 
design and making of digital games is announced as the commercial ‘business’ of 
production. Its ‘legitimacy’ defined by the development companies who produce, the 
players who purchase and play, or if we are fortunate, the theorists who analyse. 
From the perspective of new literacy practices in western post-industrial, mediatised 
contexts, the designing and making of artefacts is a pragmatic aspect of the 
production process. The digital artefact is already an aspect of the pre-figured world 
that, as Ricœur (1991) advises, anchors us in a historical and cultural world (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.2.1); the process of its production being an aspect of wider 
functional systems. However, when the artefact in question, be it a book or a digital 
game, is exported or transposed onto a culture that is not an equal member of the 
same historical legacies of systems and values, then “the economics, politics, and 
social ramifications” (Squire, 2008, p. 658) of the design and making process warrant 
attention. 
Knowledge about the politics of publishing is only unimportant where the right 
to publish is assumed; many books are banned in many countries and access to 
artefacts that can present the written word has not always been a universal human 
right. The act of writing a ‘book’ and a ‘work of literature’ is a particular form of 
expression that is very much part and parcel of Haraway’s (1991) individualistic post 
Enlightenment onto-epistemic narrative. Hayles (2004, p. 86) puts it more firmly:  
… we can see the view that the text is an immaterial verbal construction as an 
ideology that inflicts the Cartesian split between mind and body upon the 
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textual corpus, separating into two fictional entities what is in actuality a 
dynamically interacting whole. Rooted in the Cartesian tradition, this ideology 
also betrays a class and economic division between the work of creation—the 
privileged activity of the author as an inspired genius—and the work of 
producing the book as a physical artifact, an activity relegated to publishers 
and booksellers. 
There are more assumptions, the way a book ‘works’ is established by tradition 
rather than inherent rules, one has only to look at ancient Chinese scrolls or 
contemporary ‘artist books’ to see the assumed form re-imagined, not to mention the 
use of narrative ‘structuring mechanisms’ proposed by Aristotle in his Poetics that 
stipulate adherence to ‘unity of form’, a prescription that Boal (2005) actively rails 
against (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1). Further, even a textual work presented in 
codex form does offer physical specificity, from the weight of the paper and font 
styles that can affect the reading experience to the carefully crafted use of front cover 
imagery (to contribute to the book’s sales and aimed at a specific demographic). 
Critically, as Thiong’o (1986) points out, the formal business of publishing in 
post-colonial contexts expects the language of the coloniser. Thiong’o explains: 
“Even at their most radical and pro-African position in their sentiments and 
articulation of problems they still took it as axiomatic that the renaissance of African 
cultures lay in the languages of Europe” (1986, p. 5). Thiong’o’s criticism is not 
about the operational aspects of publishing books; it is about how the act of writing 
and making a book ‘works’ in the post-colonial context to further impose the values 
and systems of the coloniser. Moreover, to return to Buckingham’s call (2007) to 
avoid quasi-literacy and promote a systematic understanding of how a media form 
works or Mills’ (2011) advocation of functional literacy in the designing and making 
of digital media, it becomes apparent that this is not a facile objective in the case of 
digital games, in part because the making of games is not infrequently conflated with 
the ability to program. 
Even a simple mod demands a degree of programming and knowledge of 
Hayles’ (2004) deep world of code (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2). For example, even 
the ‘ultimate beginners’ guide to modding, Persson’s (2009) Minecraft, starts by 
insisting on the importance of understanding code (Fig. 9).  
 274 Chapter 8: Reflections and implications: pedagogies of the impressed 
 
Figure 9. Opening paragraph, Surseance (2012) Minecraft modding – The ultimate guide for beginners. 
Frasca (2001b) makes the expectation of and reliance on functional 
programming skills plain in his discussion of modding practices that use games like 
Will Wright’s The Sims (Maxis, 2000). This game is an open-ended work where the 
player is in control of virtual characters and their lives. It is described as a toy by its 
creator because it offers similar opportunity for imaginative play that a physical 
dollhouse might. However, as Frasca observes, the dolls and their houses are all 
characters from the stereotyped American suburb. The game goals, while apparently 
open to creative play, are conflated with consumerist ideology. As Frasca (2001, p. 
168) observes, “The consumerist principles behind the simulation are nothing short 
of disturbing – literally, the number of friends that you have is in direct proportion to 
the amount of things that you own.” Frasca takes the invasive opportunity enabled by 
game modding and reflects on the potential of using The Sims as an environment that 
might allow for a digital version of Boal’s (1979) forum theatre, a The Sims of the 
Oppressed in his terms. However, Frasca observes that the player has the choice in 
terms of use of the digital work; the designer – and the power of design – still create 
the artefact. As he muses (Frasca, 2001b, p. 17): 
Nevertheless, a simulation like “The Sims of the Oppressed” would carry 
several design issues. The most obvious one is that such an open-ended 
system would make easy for players to create certain characters and behaviors 
that may be problematic, such as “Benny’s Pedophile Clown version 1.2”. … 
Personally, I think that since the goal of this technique is to encourage critical 
thinking, I would not censor any opinion. Still, this would be a major problem 
for the company that produces the software package. No matter how much 
you stress the fact that the content is created by the users, I do not think that 
there is any company on Earth that wants to be known as the “one that 
provided a platform for creating a simulator where you force young children 
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to work in factories for ten cents a day”. The only way that I can think of 
overcoming this problem would be to release the whole package as a 
collaborative, open-source project. 
In the end, Frasca too returns to the designers and makers of the digital work. 
Someone needs to make the artefact and prepare the structure so that interactors are 
enabled to become critically aware. However, Frasca’s insights, while pertinent to 
criticality, do not go deeply enough into the storied nature of design and designing. 
As we argue in the Performing design publication (Turner & Moyes, 2012, see 
Chapter 7), emerging game designers (who might subsequently work in a game 
making studio or company) do not typically see themselves as ‘designers’ in the 
wider sense of the term, but are very much caught up in Ricœur’s mimetic cycle and 
the storied world of design as service (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3). 
It is appropriate to re-examine Jenkins’ appropriation of de Certeau’s term 
‘poachers’ to describe the actions of those engaged in participatory culture (1992) 
and take the stories and mythologies offered by media in order to re-make it into 
something of their own. De Certeau actually wrote, “Every day life invents itself by 
poaching in countless ways on the property of others,” (de Certeau, 1984, p. xii) and 
one must ask where the poachers or users actually are positioned in the world of 
digital participatory culture and more importantly, what kind of participation they are 
allowed. Participatory culture, for all the rhetoric about tension between top-down 
and bottom-up (see Sotamaa, 2003; Jenkins, 2006) and ‘opportunities’ for active 
meaning making, would appear to be framed by an agreement that ‘the invisible 
glue’ (Fuller, 2008; Manovich, 2001, see Chapter 2, section 2.4) is out of reach, the 
property of established others. 
There are exceptions to the situation described above, however, whilst arguing 
for engagement and understanding, they exhibit a tendency to prioritise functional 
literacy with a view to becoming literate within the established systems of 
production. Resnick and Rusk’s (1996) work with informal education and ‘The 
computer clubhouse’ model argues for ‘fluency’ and functional understanding of the 
‘invisible glue’. Resnick and Rust argue for using more than tools and the 
importance of making things in order to become literate (1996, p. 2):  
Technological fluency means much more than the ability to use technological 
tools; that would be equivalent to understanding a few common phrases in a 
language. To become truly fluent in a language (like English or French), you 
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must be able to articulate a complex idea or tell an engaging story — that is, you 
must be able to “make things” with language. Analogously, our concept of 
technological fluency involves not only knowing how to use technological tools, 
but also knowing how to construct things of significance with those tools.  
Resnick and Rust and others (Kafai, 1992; Kafai, 1995; Kafai, 2006; Kafai & 
Resnick, 1996) deal specifically with a western post-industrial technologically 
storied world. They are informed by Papert’s (1980) educational philosophy, a 
philosophy based on Piaget’s (1952) theory of knowledge that states that knowledge 
is constructed through experience in the world and that learning is an active process 
within the world as experienced. To this Papert adds the notion that people construct 
new knowledge more effectively when they are making something that is personally 
meaningful. The computer clubhouse model takes this philosophy and implements it 
in non-formal out of school sites, particularly inner city locations where the local 
catchment area is predominantly a lower socio-economic demographic and where 
scaffolded opportunities to explore creativity (such as music lessons etc.) are 
constrained by financial circumstances.  
As the name suggests, the computer clubhouse model frames creativity as 
opportunity provided by digital software. In addition the model argues, after Papert, 
that learning is about meaningful making and expression through use of software 
tools. The original clubhouse was founded by Resnick and Rust of MIT’s Media Lab 
in Boston in 1993 and the project now boasts over 100 centres located in 20 counties 
(Peppler & Kafai, 2007). It has been additionally funded by the American 
multinational Intel Corporation since 2000. Resnick, Rusk & Cooke (1998, p. 264) 
describe the project and its goals: 
At the Clubhouse, young people become designers and creators - not just 
consumers - of computer-based products. Participants use leading-edge 
software to create their own artwork, animations, simulations, multimedia 
presentations, virtual worlds, musical creations, Web sites, and robotic 
constructions. 
They are also encouraged into what Resnick and Rusk (1996) call a ‘design spiral’ – 
a version of Schön’s (1983) iterative design process (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2) 
that encourages the steps of imagination, creation, experimentation, sharing, 
reflection and then further design imaginings. Resnick and Rust emphasise the 
process and explain that where a participant starts with a simple project, such as 
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basic photo manipulation, they then gain confidence with software tools – become 
fluent in Resnick’s terminology – and proceed to more complex projects.  
Projects are scaffolded by volunteer ‘mentors’, professionals who donate their 
time to come and work with the clubhouse or clubhouse participants who have 
gained confidence also act as mentors to other participants. Resnick and Rusk (1996, 
p.432) offer a snapshot of a typical clubhouse participant: 
Essam, a ninth grader from Roxbury, designs and programs his own computer 
games at the clubhouse. He usually uses the Logo programming language, but 
Michael, a student from Wentworth Institute, is mentoring him to program in 
C, a professional programming language that Essam wanted to learn. Essam’s 
work has attracted the interest of other clubhouse participants, and he is in turn 
helping other youth learn to design and program their own games. Michael is 
also gaining confidence and learning from his experience as a mentor. 
However, even here, the activity is framed by prioritising ‘youth interests’ (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.4.2), and creating communities of creativity that arise out of 
those interests. The central concern is in exploiting an interest in digital games in 
order to encourage programming; the outcomes are framed as powerful learning 
outcomes that can be transferred to other learning contexts. Doleck (2014, para. 2) 
comments:  
With a large proportion of children playing games on a regular basis, one way 
to motivate them to start programming could be by exploiting their interest in 
games. This could be achieved by providing a pedagogical activity around the 
act of programming their own games. 
The computer clubhouse model has been very successful in creating communities of 
learners, however, as Kafai, Peppler and Chiu (2007) explain, while communities of 
learners do gather around professional software tools such as Adobe’s Photoshop, 
the same cannot be said for programming. They argue that this is because the 
perceived ‘culture’ of programming is valued because it fosters “algorithmic and 
abstract thinking and problem solving skills” (Kafai et al., 2007, p. 547). The 
researchers found this narrow perception was both at odds with the clubhouse 
mission and the emphasis on creative maker culture that the clubhouse espouses. The 
response was a reframing of programming as a creative environment and a focus on 
the artefacts that programming can create. As they write (Kafai et al., 2007, p. 548), 
“Thus we started with addressing the overly narrow notion of programming by 
 278 Chapter 8: Reflections and implications: pedagogies of the impressed 
focusing on the cultural artefacts that it could produce.” This insight led to the 
development of the Scratch programming framework (Resnick et al., 2009) that is 
based on a Lego-like collection of graphical programming blocks that can be 
snapped together and also a subsequent program called Stencyl (Chung, 2011), 
designed specifically to make games. 
In terms of creating a learning environment and creating a ‘programming 
culture’ then, the Scratch and Stencyl projects are very successful. The projects and 
the computer clubhouse model have spawned numerous similar ‘maker groups’ and 
‘CoderDojos’ similarly aimed at young people with a view to engaging them in 
Hayles’ (2004) deep coding as a creative activity. However, the interest in 
contemporary projects like the CoderDojo project arises out of an awareness not 
dissimilar to Kafai’s observation, that coding is perceived as an option lacking in 
creativity. This has the effect of creating a functional skills gap; a lack of interest in 
programming in educational contexts leads to a lack of skilled programmers ready to 
join the industry. A powerful motivation then, is to add to the ranks of the industry 
and continue the opportunity for the stabilised legitimisation that Squire (2008) 
questions. Indeed, if the hope expressed in a recent Irish Independent article 
(O’Connor, 2014) is eventuated, it is more likely that clubhouse and CoderDojo 
participants actually join the ranks of those who make the software and confirm the 
legitimisation process that is (apparently) external to literacy concerns. As one of the 
CoderDojo founders states, “Coding is the fundamental value generator for nearly 
every company on Earth” (O’Connor, 2014, para. 9). That such programming culture 
experiences are seen as “teaching children a vital skill” and are supported by large 
multinational companies such as Microsoft, IBM, Autodesk and, in Ireland, Barclays 
Bank, is testament to the dream of ameliorating the so-called digital divide 
(Warschauer, 2004, see Chapter 6, this volume) and recognition of Manovich’s 
(2001) statement on the pervasive nature of software, and its culture, as an 
underpinning layer of glue in contemporary cultures. The goal of fluency and the 
project to engage young people with programming is part of a wider educational goal 
to support critical functionality and ‘higher-level’ thinking is part of the overall 
project of western post-industrial ‘progress’ and the wider stories of the globalised 
consumer society40. De Certeau (1984) might observe that engaging future generations 
                                                
 
40 As I write in the spring of 2015, the Australian Federal Government has endorsed the teaching of 
coding in schools. Education Minister Christopher Pyne is quoted as saying, “We know that as 
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of programmers in the skills of the craft is akin to training the builders and carpenters 
who construct the city scape wherein his walkers walk. These craftspeople are not 
necessarily any more in control of the designed urban environment than the walkers; 
they are not the architects and planners whose designs envision the city.  
8.2.3 Beyond participation within design 
The image of those who use software as being given ‘permission’ to create and 
those who learn the functional literacies of programming as being given permission 
to build is powerful. However, it raises further questions about ‘the architects’ and 
the designers themselves. As the publication Performing design (Turner & Moyes, 
2012, see Chapter 7, this volume) observes, the teaching of design as a craft is not 
the same as empowering critical awareness of how ‘design works’; it is a functional 
literacy that does nothing to encourage any critical thinking about the process of 
meaning making itself but rather re-inscribes culture and cultural stories through 
process (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3). The corollary of the disappearance of the 
designer (see section 8.2.1) and the mimetic process of designing, Bolter and 
Gromala’s (2003) ‘secret choreographer’ of experience, is that many designers and 
game designers in particular are not aware that they are party to a specific onto-
epistemic perspective; that they are not so much designing but participating within 
design. As I have argued in chapter two (p. 65) of the current research:  
To adapt Ricœur’s (1984) framing of the creation of identity, the designers 
design from within the pre-figured culture. They configure their designing as 
members of the culture; they create and implement the known as they know 
it, and so become complicit in the re-configuring.  
As Willis (2006, p. 80) remarks, “Design is something far more pervasive and 
profound than is generally recognized by designers, cultural theorists, philosophers 
or lay persons.” Willis’ comment is salient and of particular import when design is 
abstracted and applied as disembodied process. 
The idea of design as process is becoming increasingly popular, a response to 
the realisation that nearly all socio-cultural-technological problems are in fact 
                                                                                                                                     
 
computer-driven smart technology expands into every aspect of our recreational and working lives, 
there is an ever growing need for highly skilled workers in this global growth industry,” and “All 
children will need to understand is computational thinking and how it can contribute to their future.” 
According to an article in The Australian, this new implementation will also see more culturally 
critical subjects such as History and Geography replaced as stand-alone curriculum subjects. 
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complex or ‘wicked’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973) and resist ‘logic’ and clear pathways 
to resolution (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2). This is recognised in pedagogical 
practices. For example, Kafai’s work (1995; 2006) with the computer clubhouse 
(section 8.2.2) explains the potential of designing digital games as an activity that 
allows learners to become engaged and construct their own meaning through process 
rather than focusing on the product. Kafai’s conceptualisation of design and her 
interest is in what she calls ‘overlaps’ between learning processes and design 
processes where both are concerned with making sense of an uncertain situation. In 
his evaluation of ‘literacy in the new media age’, Kress (2003) proposes that the 
multimodal presentations of new media require a ‘new kind’ of literacy that involves 
the meaning maker in a design activity. Thus, where a text is constructed for the 
screen and combined with image within a navigable architecture, the interpreter of 
the whole (text and image and space) is no longer presented with a clear path as in a 
codex work, but they must find their own way. He says (2003), “The new opposition 
… is that between reading the world as told – reading as interpretation – and reading 
the world as shown – reading as imposing salience and order, reading as design.” 
These approaches still focus on design as a form of problem solving, albeit a form 
that demands personal construction of the problem in the first instance. There is a 
tempting resonance with Freire’s (1972) notion of education as a problem posing 
activity (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1) but misunderstands the essentially hermeneutic 
nature of his critical pedagogy, abducting a methodological approach and reframing 
it as a method or tool and further prioritising of the idea of universality that Haraway 
(1991) critiques as being one of certainty or an external disembodied point of view.  
Design is not critiqued but rather its understood methodologies are 
appropriated. This has the potential to re-instantiate Winner’s (1993) complaint about 
‘opening the black box but finding it empty’ and to further exacerbate Fry’s (2009, p. 
34) criticism of design that does not understand that it is “a world-shaping force”, 
which is also part of Ricœur’s storied world and actively contributes and re-
configures its own stories through its process and its material artefacts (see Chapter 
3, section 3.3.2). To return to Ingold’s (2013, p. 20) pronouncement on design 
understood as problem solving, “Perhaps, far from specifying solutions, it is design 
that sets the rules of the game.” Abstracting design from its physical artefactual 
reality does little to unveil any cultural values in what design actually does and 
makes; it does far less to unveil the way that design and its artefacts act in the world. 
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If this accusation can be levelled at practices that abduct the methods of design, then 
there are further implications in practices that assume the methods of design in order 
to design. In particular, lack of critical awareness, Freire’s (1972) conscientização or 
critical consciousness, of how design actually works as a story-ing process to 
produce storied artefacts has profound implications in design practice that seeks to 
incorporate potential users in the design process. 
Early participatory design practice arose from critiques such as Suchman’s 
(1987) and Winograd and Flores’ (1986) on the dislocation of designing from its 
location and its users. Suchman’s now notorious description of people struggling 
with a copy machine and failing to understand what it ‘wanted of them’ (see Chapter 
3, section 3.3.2) is a harbinger of the practice. Contemporary participatory design 
emphasises opportunity for potential artefact users to have voice in the design 
process rather than positioning them as end-users and asking for feedback once the 
process is nearly complete. Design that involves participation is well intentioned and 
extremely powerful in post-industrial contexts where it deals with participants who 
are members of the design culture themselves. There are echoes of Jenkins’ (2006) 
enthusiasm for participatory culture (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3) in statements such 
as Sanders’ (1999, p. 6) when she announces what she calls ‘Postdesign’ or design 
that includes its participants in an active role:  
Postdesign is a new mindset. It transcends the traditional domain of design 
by making user experience (as opposed to artifacts, interfaces, systems or 
spaces) the focus for design inspiration and ideation. It is easy to see that 
people are ready for the Postdesign mindset. Just look at the Internet. New 
computer tools and applications have made self-expression through personal 
websites accessible to everyone with the time and desire to build one. 
The goals of this form of ‘participation within design’ are the same goals that 
Dyson (1998, see Chapter 7, section 7.2.5) refers to when he announces the need for 
innovation; they are the goals of design-as-service, to the consumer as well as itself. 
The act of designing in this weak or ‘participation within design’ sense remains 
pragmatic (Coyne, 1995) and predicated to the idea of design as a producer of 
artefacts that Archer (1979) announces (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2), Kress (2003) 
admires (see sections 2.3.3 and 8.2.1) and Haraway (1991) problematises. Squire’s 
(2008) concerns about the ‘legitimising process of design’ are well founded (see 
sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2). Participation is compromised in this sense and there is a 
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clear need to distinguish between levels of participation. As Arnstein observes (1969, 
p. 216), “There is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of 
participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process.”  
Arnstein’s conceptualisation of ‘real power’ is a guiding principle in what 
might be referred to as ‘high level’ participatory design, that is participatory design 
that is either instigated by the potential end-users of the designing or includes them 
from the earliest stages of conception. This approach, denoted as distinct by 
capitalisation (e.g. Participatory Design) evolved in ‘highly politicised’, 
‘homogenous’ (Merritt & Stolterman, 2012) Scandinavian counties in the 1970s and 
as a result of this, has tended to emphasise ideological issues, rather than cultural. 
Participatory Design allows users to add their own knowledge to the hermeneutic 
cycle that Schön’s (1983, see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2) process describes and so 
demonstrates a strong Freirean influence in its methodological grounding, 
particularly the emphasis on mutual learning and reciprocity (Gregory, 2003). 
Bødker (2003, p. 89) announces the essential ideal of Participatory Design practice 
when she writes: 
...we commit to working with people, groups or organisations to explore 
what current and future technologies may support them in their particular 
setting. Not so much to build their future technology but to help them realize 
that they have a choice. 
Bødker’s clarification of intent is important, particularly in contexts where 
participants suffer from asymmetrically storied worlds (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2). 
An example of such Participatory Design is found in Bidwell, Reitmaier, Marsden 
and Hansen’s project (2010) that engages participants from rural Southern Africa in 
the early conceptualisation of artefacts to share stories. The Digital Songlines 
Environment is put in a better light because, even though the participants were 
positioned as consultants and informants (see Chapter 1, section 1.2 and Chapter 4, 
section 4.1.3), the project itself was instigated in part by the Australian Indigenous-
owned media studio, CyberDreaming (Leavy, 2007). However, from the perspective 
of Freire’s (1972) critical pedagogy, even this ‘high level’ form of participatory 
design is redolent with dilemmas. 
The core tenet of Participatory Design is “an unshakable commitment to 
ensuring that those who will use information technologies play a critical role in their 
design,” (Simonsen & Robertson, 2012, p. 2). Here, participation is understood as 
 Chapter 8: Reflections and implications: Pedagogies of the impressed 283 
involving interactive participation in decision making and analysis of the design 
problem and even taking initiative, in essence towards the top level of what is 
sometimes referred to as ‘a ladder of participation’ (Adnan, Barrett, Alam & 
Brustinow, 1992; Arnstein, 1969; Pretty, 1995). To this end, the design approach 
typically announces two core principles; the first being that those who will use the 
design outcomes are empowered to have some voice in its designing without needing 
to ‘speak the language of professional design’. The second principle is that these 
participants may not be aware of the languages and processes of design and so 
professional design practitioners in participatory situations must engage in ‘mutual’ 
learning.  
Simonsen and Robertson’s (2012) second principle resonates with Freire’s call 
for teachers to realise that, “There is, in fact, no teaching without learning. One 
requires the other” (1998, p. 31). However, it is also perhaps the principle that is 
most open to interpretation and misunderstanding. After all, what does it mean to 
advocate for ‘mutual learning’ when at least one of the parties is (presumably) 
already a professional practitioner? The implication is that the designer will learn 
about the community ways of being and knowing in order to understand more about 
design themselves. Simonsen and Robertson explain (2012, p. 6): 
Mutual learning is an ongoing activity throughout the Participatory Design 
process. Users need knowledge of potential technological options as well as 
of how these options can be provided. Designers are the source of this 
knowledge, as well as of relevant design expertise. The designers need 
knowledge about the users, their practices and the use situation (often the 
work domain) in question. 
In the contexts of post-industrial western culture, where both parties share the pre-
figured world Ricœur (1991) insists must be considered as an aspect of identity and 
meaning making, this is not a particular issue. As Mainsah and Morrison (2014) 
comment, Participatory Design works within assumptions about its artefact laden 
context, that is, it assumes a kind of equality of membership of a particular post-
industrial cultural pre-figured environment, even where membership may be 
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marginalised41, and it is ill-equipped to deal with the asymmetrically storied worlds 
of post-colonial contexts. 
In the post-colonial context, for example, the designing and making of the 
Digital Songlines Environment that inspired the research in the current thesis (see 
Chapter 1, section 1.2) and the design experiments described in the early publications 
(see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), the idea of ‘mutuality’ is seriously problematised. 
Shades of Bhabha’s ambivalence abound in this simplistic assumption of equal 
relationship (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2). So, where Bhabha’s (1994) concept of 
ambivalence arises out of the need for those with power to construct an image of the 
subject, it also acts to re-frame the culture of authority, whose ways are reflected 
back at them through their understanding of their (colonised) subjects. Such a 
realisation is disquieting. As Bidwell (2014, para. 4) writes: 
Thus, a postcolonial orientation may relieve a sense of colonial or 
“metaphysical guilt” (Biko, 1969-77), but cannot guarantee that scholars are 
equipped to engage with the moral and ethical issues that arise in 
engagements between coloniser and colonised, or are motivated to use their 
privilege to disrupt the status quo.  
While the second principle of Participatory Design is discussed above, it is best 
understood as problematic because the first principle, according to Simonsen and 
Robertson (2012), does much to actively disenfranchise the right of participants to 
become critically literate. Thus, the idea that those who will use the design outcomes 
are empowered to have some voice in its designing without needing to ‘speak the 
language of professional design’ is potentially a denial of access to design as 
designed.  
The language of design that Simonsen and Robertson (2012) are actually 
referring to is, one assumes, the formal language of the profession as it is expressed 
in the design process and design’s ways of doing and designing (see Chapter 3, 
section 3.3.2). However, in the terms of critical literacy (Lankshear, 1993) this 
formal language of the profession, redolent with potential ‘tyrannies’ of normatised 
understandings of process (Cooke & Kothari, 2001), is only the functional aspect of 
the language. As such, it represents Archer’s call to understand design (Archer, 1981, 
                                                
 
41 Mills (2009) observes that even within a supposedly homogenous culture within a single Australian 
classroom, there are multiple memberships and different accesses to membership. This is particularly 
true in the case of membership of communities of practice with digital technologies. 
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p. 35) as a “way of looking at the world and imposing structure upon it” (see Chapter 
3, section 3.3.2) and uncomfortably echoes Lankshear’s (1993) description of 
functional literacy as having utilitarian goals and being patronising and ‘mean-
spirited’ (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3). To teach the functional language would be to 
“integrate” and “incorporate” to use Freire’s (1972, p. 48) terms.  
Participatory Design as practice is not unaware of the potential problematic 
mismatch between intent and the reality of asymmetrically storied worlds. Robertson 
and Wagner (2012, p. 65) declare that, “Participatory Design has important political 
agendas expressed by its close collaboration with identifiable political movements 
that are informed and underpinned by ethical discourses around human rights and a 
robust civil society.” In order to achieve this, the authors also attest to the importance 
of different voices in dialogue and communication. However, to return to Smith 
(1999, see Chapter 3, section 3.1.1) and her critique of the ‘well intentioned 
endeavour’ that does much to re-inscribe the conceptualisations of a western view 
‘from the centre’ as Thiong’o (1993) puts it, the very concept of civil society is a 
western concept, implicitly re-iterating constructs that differentiate between 
‘civilised’ and ‘pre-civilised’ (see Turner, 2015, Chapter 6, this volume) and that 
embed perspectives on progress. Smith (1999) observes that even those with the best 
‘liberatory’ intentions are often bringing their own values and morals to bear on the 
situation that they perceive is in need of emancipatory practice. Van der Velden 
(2014) suggests that this is a result of the ways Participatory Design projects focus 
on the local, situated context, framing their bailiwick in terms of the specificity of the 
participating community and bracketing their purview in terms of the local. This has 
the effect of dealing with local contexts and local problem situations but leaves any 
wider concerns and ideological issues unaddressed. In effect, while the intent of 
(high level) Participatory Design practices seems to be in tune with Freire’s (1972) 
demand for dialogue and action and reflection or praxis, the fact that design practice 
arises from within an already storied world and cultural perspective undermines his 
statement on praxis. He explains (1972, p. 99), “Let me emphasize that my defence 
of the praxis implies no dichotomy by which this praxis could be divided into a prior 
stage of reflection and a subsequent stage of action. Action and reflection occur 
simultaneously.” 
Freire’s criticality (see Chapter 1, section 1.4.2 and Chapter 3, section 3.3.1) 
demands that “one must read the world in which words exist” (1997, p. 211) and 
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while he respects the local as a site of reflection and reinvention, his demands are 
actively political and encompassing of the whole. That is to say, ‘breaking the 
silence’ is inclusive of all stakeholders, it cannot be donated but must include both 
the ‘teacher’ and the ‘student’ – or the designer and the participant. Breaking the 
silence includes ‘silences’ experienced by all parties within the dialogue. As he says 
(1972, p. 44, emphasis added), “Teachers and students (leadership and people), co-
intent on reality, are both Subjects, not only in the task of unveiling that reality, and 
thereby coming to know it critically, but in the task of re-creating that knowledge.” 
Criticality, as Freire advocates, is the transformation of the structure, not mere 
inclusion in something that has already been included through its very nature as a 
structure and system. In his view, this is not integration or incorporation with its 
paternalistic overtones that Bhabha abhors but rather, as Freire (1972, p. 48) puts it, 
transformation of the structure and re-creating it “so that they can become ‘beings for 
themselves’”. Transformation is not change but critical awareness of the structures 
that create the world as experienced; opportunity to understand the ways stories 
work, potential to de-story in order to re-story afresh. As Shor explains (1992, p. 
129), gaining critical consciousness or criticality demands examination of: 
Habits of thought, reading, writing, and speaking which go beneath surface 
meaning, first impressions, dominant myths, official pronouncements, 
traditional clichés, received wisdom, and mere opinions, to understand the 
deep meaning, root causes, social context, ideology, and personal 
consequences of any action, event, object, process, organization, experience, 
text, subject matter, policy, mass media, or discourse. 
It is time to add design and its material artefactual outcomes to Shor’s list. As Willis 
argues (2006), design and designing do much to create the world, their values are 
deeply hidden and invisible; yet we all live in a world that is the result of designing. 
There is (yet another) potential impasse here (see sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2). 
Recognition of asymmetries and application of post-colonial theory can easily repeat 
the failures of critical theory to be any more than explanation and description. 
Reiterating Ricœur’s (1970) hermeneutics of suspicion and, as Corradetti (2012, see 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.1) says, doing much to create non-derivable descriptions 
without any resolution or pathways to action; a ‘hope-less’ endeavour imbricated in 
Freire’s ‘world’ and the methodologies and onto-epistemic approaches with roots in 
a western tradition of objectivity (Smith, 1999). Finding this situation untenable and 
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arguing that the very idea of contrary positions is a gross over-simplification of 
complex heterogeneous socio-cultural-economic relationships, Philip, Irani and 
Dourish (2012) offer a series of what they call ‘tactics’42 towards ‘postcolonial 
computing’. By ‘postcolonial’ the authors mean designing in and for the contexts that 
the current thesis refers to as asymmetrically storied worlds (see Chapter 2, section 
2.2.2), contexts where Ricœur’s dynamic mimetic process of pre-figuring, 
configuring and re-configuring (1984) is skewed by asymmetrical power 
relationships. The central concern is moving beyond horizons established by 
“regretful contemplation of past biases” (Philip et al., 2012, p. 3) towards what the 
current thesis refers to as the hope-full endeavour.  
For Philip et al. (2012) the hope-full endeavour is framed by three guiding 
concepts. Firstly, the very idea of binary categories is problematic: there is no deixis 
or design that happens in the centre (here) versus design that happens in 
asymmetrically storied worlds (there). Like Fry (2013), whose argument that 
everyone designs because the act of designing is fundamental to being human opens 
the current chapter, and the UNESCO position paper on the plurality of literacies 
(2004, see section 8.1.1), Philip et al. (2012) recommend that the heterogeneous 
nature of designing is recognised and differences are applauded. As they write (2012, 
p. 7), “The seams among differences are not simply a source of undesirable 
unevenness and aberration, but also sites of creativity and possibility.” Secondly, 
Philip et al. advocate against adaptation and assumptions of portability of design 
practices. That is, the authors build on their dismissal of deixis and recognise that 
design itself is value laden when they say, “Postcolonial Computing does not seek to 
transform design methods ‘there’ by adapting supposedly culture-free Western 
design to supposedly culture-laden non-Western contexts” (2012, p. 7). Thirdly, 
Philip et al. ask for critical attention to “the processes and methods of design” (2012, 
p. 8) and deeper critique of design as an activity that is entangled with its material 
outcomes and the sites of its activity.  
                                                
 
42 The authors propose a definition of ‘tactics’ as “piecemeal, opportunistic interventions in response 
to relations of dominance” (2012, p. 25). Their definition makes mention of Foucault but to my own 
reading seems to have more in common with de Certeau’s definition of tactics undertaken by walkers 
in the city where he stipulates (1984, p. 37) that a tactic “...makes use of the cracks that particular 
conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers. It poaches in them. It creates surprises 
in them. It can be where it is least expected. It is a guileful ruse.” 
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The ‘postcolonial computing’ call is powerful. The tactics listed by Philip et al. 
range from seeking improvisational and generative practices rather than focusing on 
innovation and the “eternally new” of the design as service model (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.3.3) through looking at the designed artefact in terms of its infrastructures 
and “the conditions of its possibility” (2012, p. 10) to disassembling the very idea of 
classification (Bowker & Star, 1999; Star, 1999) and taxonomies that describe and so 
define or identify, as Star might say (Star, 1991, see Turner, 2015, Chapter 6, this 
volume). In essence, Philip et al. (2012, p. 23) demand criticality and resistant 
practices, stipulating that, “Postcolonial computing is a way of asking questions, a 
mode of investigating and a form of conversation.” 
In terms of the current thesis and the aim of revealing design and its artefactual 
outcomes as story-ing contributors to Ricœur’s (1991) tangle of stories and Hodder’s 
(2012) entanglement, Philip et al.’s call is resonant with the Freirean critical 
endeavour at multiple levels. This is particularly the case in their denial of deixis and 
affirmation that there is no ‘out there’ (Taylor, 2011). To reiterate a phrase of 
Freire’s that has been used throughout the current thesis (1972, p. 48), “The truth is, 
however, that the oppressed are not ‘marginals’, are not living ‘outside’ society. 
They have always been ‘inside’ the structure which made them ‘beings for others’.”  
In this sense, discussions such as Philip et al.’s (2012) do much to move 
beyond ‘participation within design’ and towards participating with design itself. 
From the critical perspective that frames the current thesis, the authors also highlight 
the possibility that design is actually ‘the structure’ and one final entanglement to 
consider, the nature of criticality in design methodologies. If a tactical approach to 
design in post-colonial contexts does indeed enable participation with design itself, 
the final query for a theoretical research that claims criticality as its framework must 
be, how does design understand itself and how does design frame criticality? 
8.2.4 Beyond functional criticality for design 
Archer’s work in design during the 1970s did much to establish design as a 
research discipline that enacts its research “through the medium of practitioner 
activity” (1995, p. 11). While Archer’s hope for a design that involves ‘systematic 
investigation through practical action to produce communicable knowledge’ is 
problematised through its dependence on rationalism and ‘logical approaches’ (see 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.2), his exhortation to understand design research as a 
discipline that researches through practitioner activity has enduring consequences. 
 Chapter 8: Reflections and implications: Pedagogies of the impressed 289 
The most notable consequence (from the perspectives of the current research story) is 
the disappearance of design as designed and deeply entangled in the storied world in 
favour of design as activity and design predicated to use. Fry’s (2011) call to 
understand design as an ideological ‘world making’ discipline is pertinent, 
particularly his advocation of an understanding of design as an ideological, political 
act and his insistence that design and its material outcomes must also reframe itself 
as enacting ideologies within a world structured by ideologies. In Freirean terms, this 
structured world demands the application of criticality. However, in order to avoid 
what Freire calls ‘the empty blah’ or meaningless ‘verbalism’, what is generally 
understood as criticality in design must be interrogated. 
For Agre (1997b), writing about the specific technological artefacts of 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), the starting point is in critical reflection of the discipline 
itself through “something more like hermeneutics” (1997, p. 154). Agre questions the 
established traditions in his field, ostensibly through the lens of Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic circle (1962) in order to find room to escape from the manacles of a 
‘tradition’ that stipulated pragmatism in programming and an assumed rationalist 
model of the world, whereby its goals (producing models of the mind and ‘artificial 
intelligences’) were untroubled by any philosophical doubts or queries as to the 
embodied social nature of being and knowing. As an alternative, Agre proposes a 
more situated approach to the design research process, where the research into the 
designing of technological artefacts is re-framed from a simple outcome model to 
one that is welcoming of failure and ambiguity as potential spaces for critical 
appraisal of its own methodologies. Critical in this sense is very much the already 
problematised criticality of analysis (see section 8.1.3), as Agre writes, “Some of 
these critical tools will draw on the methods of institutional and intellectual analysis 
that have served generations of philosophers, sociologists, and literary critics” (Agre, 
1997, p. 154). Agre’s idea of this ‘critical’ technical practice43 re-focuses attention 
from the black box as design outcome to the actual values and assumptions that 
posited the designing of a black box in the first instance and which define the 
processes that produce black boxes in the world. The hermeneutic aspects of critical 
technical practice are embedded in a socially constructed understanding of the world 
                                                
 
43 Agre’s critical technical practice is usually written with capitals: Critical Technical Practice or CTP. 
As I mention in the front matter to the current work, the current research has generally avoided the 
capitalisation of different approaches except where authors are cited or I am referring to a specific 
commentator’s work. 
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and the critical aspects are not overtly political but rather critique undertaken from 
within a perspective that takes design for granted as an optimistic project, albeit one 
entangled in hidden values and assumptions. Agre (1997, p. 155) puts it thus: 
“Technical impasses can be overlooked for many reasons… Critical methods might 
be helpful in discovering other ways in which technical troubles can be inadvertently 
hidden from view.” Critical technical practice thus remains firmly within what Fry 
(2011) calls ‘a world’; Gadamer (1975, see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2) might approve 
of the awareness of an established horizon where design remains within its 
traditional realm of problem solving. 
Design as a problem solving paradigm is the focus for the critique in critical 
design approaches that arose in the 1960s and 1970s under a general umbrella idea 
that uses designed artefacts as physically embodied critiques of social values and 
ideologies. The term ‘Critical Design’ is first used in Dunne (1999) as a term which 
covers design activities that do not aim to solve a perceived problem but rather aim 
to uncover design itself as an invisible aspect of everyday life. The design approach 
was further developed in Dunne and Raby (2001) and more recently evolved in 
Dunne and Raby (2013). The approach differentiates itself from what the authors 
term ‘affirmative design’ or design that reinforces the status quo and instead 
proposes design as a speculative process that can challenge assumptions about the 
roles designed products actually play in everyday life. The critical aspect of the 
critical design approach informed by critical theory (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1) 
where the critical is about “critical thinking, that is, not taking things for granted, 
being sceptical, and always questioning what is given” (Dunne & Raby, 2013, p. 35). 
In a vein not dissimilar to Flusser, Dunne proposes a focus on artefacts, particularly 
contemporary electronic artefacts, and the “role they play in shaping our 
experiences” (1999, p. xv). “Design research”, Dunne argues, “should draw attention 
to how products limit our experiences and expose to criticism and discussion their 
hidden social and psychological mechanisms.” Dunne’s project arises in optimism 
and the potential of designing to create artefacts that do not continue their invisible 
service and propagate the ideologies so inscribed, but which are themselves ‘material 
tales’ that can engage others in a dialogue about possibilities. In order to achieve this 
dialogue, critical design as design practice offers artefacts that challenge and demand 
interpretation; an enclosed ‘daybed’ that evokes legacies in industrial design but 
places the human in an uncomfortable confined space in order to escape ubiquitous 
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radio signals that demand the audience elucidate their own meaning. Of his designs, 
Dunne writes (1999, p. 67), “They dismantle conceptual models that limit the way 
we use artifactual reality to extend our scope for action. They challenge how we 
think about extensions to our ‘selves’ …” and, “They are simply stories, but stories 
that allow complex interactions between reality and imagination.” Dunne’s intent can 
be understood as an interruption of the mimetic cycle described by Ricœur (1984) as 
it has become concretised in the process of designing that Schön (1983) so applauds. 
However, this is perhaps not the kind of critical consciousness that Freire (1972) 
proposes because it is not only about itself but it also addresses an audience who are 
members of the design culture. Bardzell and Bardzell (2013) comment that Critical 
Design, as Dunne and Raby frame their practice, is aimed at using design to make 
consumers more critical about their lives surrounded by objects. Their practice, while 
espousing affinities with the radical, is evocative rather than the practical 
intervention that Freire’s project proposes. As such, Critical Design as a design 
approach requires membership of the culture that it critiques because in order to ‘get 
the joke’ one must be already a member of the pre-figured world to which it refers. 
Indeed, to return to Huizinga’s (1949, p. 169) reflection on the distinction between 
the mere making of things as prosaic labour and the making of ‘works of art’ that are 
“received in the social milieu” (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2), the concepts and 
artefacts of critical design seem to fit more comfortably with the latter. Further, as 
has already been highlighted in reflections on the Performing design project (see 
section 8.1.3), the critical in Critical Design has a strong resonance with criticality as 
an important functioning quality in critical thinking where, as Burbules and Berk 
(1999, p. 46) put it, “People do not sufficiently analyze the reasons by which they 
live, do not examine the assumptions, commitments, and logic of daily life.” 
An approach with resonant understandings of the entangled nature of design 
and its artefacts in the world, but with more pragmatic attitudes to the work of design 
as construction of usable artefacts is the reflective design approach. In this approach, 
artefacts and particularly technological artefacts are understood as being deeply 
entangled in the fabric of post-industrial culture. They are understood as shaping the 
“micro-texture of people’s everyday experiences” (Sengers, Boehner, David & Kaye, 
2011, p. 49) and that the designing of artefacts should be the subject of critical 
reflection. Reflective design draws on Schön’s ‘reflection in action’ (1983), Agre’s 
(1997) critical technical practice, on ideas and principles in participatory design 
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approaches, and Dunne and Raby’s critical design. Reflective design recognises that 
the designing of artefacts is a construction of values in material forms and that this 
can be powerfully used in participatory design approaches. Sengers et al. (2005, p. 
49) ask, “As designers, we are left to wonder: what values, attitudes, and ways of 
looking at the world are we unconsciously building into our technology, and what are 
their effects?” and suggest that critical reflection should be a core principle in 
technological design.  
Sengers et al.’s (2005) reflective approach recognises that Dunne and Raby’s 
critical design can backfire if misunderstood, and that critical design’s provocations 
may even be used as evidence in support of the self same values and assumptions 
that are being critiqued through the designs. Further, they note that critical design is 
often directed at designers as a means of defamiliarisation and a way of opening up 
design spaces. This is, for Sengers et al., the powerful aspect of critical design. To 
this they add Gaver’s (2002, see Chapter 7, section 7.2.8) call to design for people as 
playful creatures who are predisposed to explore and engage playfully in order to 
make new meanings, and propose a set of principles that will enable critical 
reflection on the process of designing and the experience of the designed artefact in 
the world. Critical reflection, they argue, is not just a means of opening up new 
approaches for designers, but a means to “support new awareness and freedom for 
users as well” (2005, p. 50). In this intent, Sengers et al. explicitly announce a 
connection to critical theory (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1), which they define as a 
theory that argues “that our everyday values, practices, perspectives, and sense of 
agency and self are strongly shaped by forces and agendas of which we are normally 
unaware, such as the politics of race, gender, and economics”. In this view, critical 
reflection enables awareness and so has the opportunity to enhance individual 
freedom. Critical reflection is about “bringing unconscious aspects of experience to 
conscious awareness, thereby making them available for conscious choice”, it is, as 
the authors continue to explain, “folded into all our ways of seeing and experiencing 
the world” and a vital aspect of unveiling assumptions about behaviours and 
practices. This view of critical reflection shares much with participatory design, and 
indeed critical design, in that there is an underlying assumption that ‘we are all in 
this together’ and that criticality in design is an optimistic and educational goal 
generally purposed towards improving human lives and experiences.  
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Sengers et al., however, clarify a ‘different commitment’ towards unveiling 
practices and questioning values. They point to a need to actually critique values and 
assumptions that designers and participants might share, “values which we may 
unconsciously hold in common” (2005, p. 51) and to engage participants with the 
same critique. They suggest, “Designers may need to introduce values issues which 
initially do not interest users or make them uncomfortable,” and propose a model for 
reflective design that, in their own words, draws attention to Heidegger’s hammer. 
There is an homage of sorts to Habermas and Freire in this emphasis, particularly in 
the challenge to design artefacts that both ‘work’ and ask for “action, immediately 
folded back into our experiences, actions, identities, and practices” (2005, p. 56). 
However, there is also a strong undercurrent of Gadamer’s approach to hermeneutics 
and the sanctity of discipline horizons that situates their critical endeavour within the 
more pragmatic approach of critical thinking. As the authors write, “We look to more 
clearly delineate where, when, and how reflective design can be used effectively in 
HCI” (2005, p. 58) and, “We do recognize the boundaries in our approach are clearly 
drawn in terms of the scientific goals of validity and generalizability.” As Bowen 
(2009, p. 117) observes, criticality in reflective design involves researchers and 
designers “reflecting on the assumptions and values inherent in their practices to 
ensure the products of those practices are not limited by them”. 
The aforementioned Bowen (2009, 2010) also offers a critical approach to 
design, differentiating between reflective design, which involves critical reflection on 
the practice of design and his ‘critical artefact design’ methodology that aims to 
“inform design activity” (2009, p. 162) with the aim of “producing ‘better’ design 
solutions”. Like Sengers et al. (2005), Bowen frames questions about criticality in 
design from the perspective of Bijker’s (1984) social construction understandings of 
people and technological artefacts (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.3). Criticality in 
design, he argues, should “recognise the need to understand technology within its 
social context and attend to that social context to explore which problems to address 
and solutions to offer” (2009, p. 14). Bowen proposes that the best way forward for 
design practice is to understand that the designer should become a co-creator in 
designing. He draws on Freire’s critical pedagogy somewhat, particularly Freire’s 
condemnation of the banking method of ‘education’ or knowledge communication as 
it might be understood in design practices, even those which profess criticality. For 
Bowen, the ‘critical’ aspects of critical design and reflective design do much to re-
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enact the dilemmas of Horkheimer’s (1982) critical theory (see Chapter 3, section 
3.2.1): its descriptive habits, judgemental tendencies, the focus on explanation and 
critique without opportunity for action, its lineage in European thought and the 
manner in which understandings of emancipation are framed by the ideological 
position of the theorist. Bowen asks pointedly who “is enlightened and, therefore, 
emancipated?” (2009, p. 118) and suggests that in the case of Agre’s critical 
technical practice, Dunne and Raby’s critical design and Sengers et al.’s reflective 
design, the practitioners themselves are the ones who are actually enlightened and 
‘emancipated’ from the ‘oppression’ of design tradition. He does agree that there is 
potential in critical design to include users in the emancipation opportunity but that 
such opportunity is more in the vein of the visitor to the art gallery who is at least 
cognisant of the positioning of the designed outcomes. Reflective design too, Bowen 
concedes, aims to emancipate its users by presenting designed artefacts as critiques 
and engaging more directly with them in the process.  
The actual form of engagement is what Bowen turns to in his own approach. 
Here, he takes the general criticality of critical theory in the sense of critical thinking 
as a pragmatic tool kit to examine, question, reflect and consider – in effect the 
hermeneutic approach of moving from the parts to the whole and back again in order 
to gain understanding. Bowen’s work announces and explains his critical theory as 
drawing on the Horkheimer and Habermas but he actually enacts a more 
Gadermerian position (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2) and prioritises the functioning 
citizenship goals of critical thinking (see section 8.1.3), as he declares, “An 
engagement with ‘artefacts-as-critiques’ (‘critical artefacts’) as readers leads to this 
enlightenment and emancipation” (2009, p. 125). Thus Bowen’s critical artefact 
design method remains an approach to engaging participants as readers within the 
design process. For example, though presentations of raw design concepts (a rug that 
can let someone know if an elderly person is still able to walk around their home by 
sending ripples to an image), the designer process itself is revealed and participants 
are invited to question, critique and reflect on the designs. The participant responses 
are then taken away and considered by the design team and used as material to create 
more designs and the process is re-iterated.  
There is indeed much that is resonant with Freire’s critical pedagogy in 
Bowen’s approach, the Freirean sense of teachers and students working together; 
Freire’s emphasis on dialogue and the importance of participants bringing their own 
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meaning into situations (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1). Bowen observes, “The 
designer is not suggesting what’s ‘better’ (as could be said of critical design), rather 
designer and stakeholders together are working out what is relevant.” Freire 
advocates (1972) the use of what he calls ‘generative themes’ or moments and 
experiences taken from the daily lives of people that then become the material for 
discussion about ‘reality’ and so provide opportunity from their experience (as 
opposed to the nature of the world as described in a text book for example). However 
as Bowen attests, his critical artefact design approach is firmly based in an idea of 
design innovation and the development of new product ideas. It is not about handing 
over the actual power of design, nor does it delve into questions about the materiality 
of the outcomes and the designed artefacts (whether conceptual or implemented) as, 
not merely surfaces ‘to be read’ as Bowen says, but deeply entangled, and 
entangling.  
In terms of implications in design and criticality, there is perhaps a deeper, 
more profound dilemma in the move to exploit criticality in design practices. As 
Dourish (2006a) has noted in regard to the ethnographic turn in design methods, 
where hermeneutic ethnographic approaches normally used to draw explanatory 
conclusions are abducted in service of data collection and purposed to production 
rather than understanding (see section 8.2), criticality becomes a set of terms and 
processes and so loses the force of its meaning and intent. Bardzell, Bardzell, 
Forlizzi, Zimmerman and Antanitis (2012, p. 296) make a salient point in their 
overview of critical design and critical theory when they say, “Like other design 
practices, critical design depends for its success on the experience and expert 
judgment of the designers who undertake it: it cannot be reduced to a simple recipe.” 
In this sense, critical design – and by association, critical theory – has become 
another discipline in service to design, separated from its cultural context and its 
radical ideologies. The designed artefact, the result of designing and its stories, has 
been dismantled only to assist in its re-envisioning in another form and design has 
merely abducted a version of criticality with a view to the perpetuation of its own 
designed nature, design remains functional. Boal’s admonishments (see Chapter 3, 
section 3.3.1 and Turner & Moyes, 2012, Chapter 7) on the dangers of this separation 
and disappearance are relevant and worth re-iterating, “The structure of the system 
may vary in a thousand ways, making it difficult at times to find all the elements of 
its structure, but the system will nevertheless be there, working to carry out its basic 
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task” (2000, p. 46). As Dourish (2015) has recently remarked, this is design as elitist 
mysticism, where Nelson’s (1987, see Chapter 3, section 3.3.3) software making 
digital ‘priesthood’ are now design practitioners curtained and made invisible 
through emphasis on their process. 
Such disappearance in the service of the predominant theoretical approaches of 
western philosophy, as Smith (1999) observes, does much to dispossess those who 
are ‘away’ from the centre of any opportunity to add their own voices and create 
their own meaning making through design. Even design approaches that declare 
‘criticality’ continue to frame design as production of artefacts that are then used, the 
sanctity of design as service is critiqued, evaluated but maintained and Archer’s 
(1995) ‘practitioner activity’ prioritised and confirmed. In essence, if design acts to 
create worlds and that it is in design itself that a critical opportunity might arise 
wherein Freire’s (1972) ‘structure’ can be transformed. Ingold’s pronouncement on 
the topic is incisive (2011, p. 210): 
… overthrow the model itself, and to replace it with an ontology that assigns 
primacy to processes of formation as against their final products, and to 
flows and transformations of materials as against states of matter. …. My 
purpose, in short, is to restore to life a world that has been effectively killed 
off in the pronouncements of theorists for whom…. the road to 
understanding and empathy lies in ‘what people do with objects’ …. 
Ricœur’s conceptualisation of the mimetic process, re-envisioned to include designed 
artefacts is only a way stage to including the very processes of designing, beyond 
awareness of its values and assumptions and towards dismantling its very being.  
Where Freire warns that those who are not engaged as part of the design 
process, fully involved in the action and reflection that is the actual way that design is 
stabilised and legitimised, are only given imaginary power and voice, Ingold 
critiques the damage done through a focus on “what people do with objects” and 
demands attention to the processes themselves. This, then, is the moment where 
Freire’s structure (1972) is concretised: no longer the word, but the materiality and 
the designing of the world. This must also become the site of the hope-full 
endeavour. As the paper Redisplacement by design (Bidwell et al., 2007, see 
Appendix A) explains, “The most challenging and rewarding insight is truly handing 
over the power of design before it is too late, rather than using design to exploit 
country and people even more.” 
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8.3 BEYOND GAME WORLDS: RE-MATERIALISING DESIGN FOR THE 
HOPE-FULL ENDEAVOUR 
This has been a research thesis about stories in the world, in software and in 
design. The research narrative presented has been ‘a journey’ and the development of 
actionable reflection as ongoing process. Journeys and stories do not have clean 
beginnings or endings, we are tangled within them and it is hard to finalise a research 
narrative that employs Ricœur’s critical hermeneutics, every insight opens reflective 
opportunity and every reflection opens itself to further insights and reflections. As 
Ricœur (2008, p. 127) notes, “The object of interpretation is open to the world and to 
possibilities, the object itself redescribes and remakes the world.” This is particularly 
so when the research opens with an apparently simple problem of participation in a 
digital approach to telling stories and communicating identity and then, scaffolded by 
the theoretical framework of Freire’s critical pedagogy and the re-envisioning of 
Ricœur’s mimetic process to include design and its material outcomes, finds itself 
unveiling potential dilemmas in the wider fields of participatory culture, participatory 
design and contemporary approaches to designing. Such reflections reveal further 
entanglements, however, all stories must at least pause in order to take their part in 
the mimetic process. 
The current thesis contributes to knowledge as Freire understands it: distinct 
and always partial, based in the world and arising and developing with experience in 
the world. The contribution is therefore hermeneutic, opening the doors to more 
reflection and further exploration. This is the essence of the hope-full endeavour, not 
that problems are solved but that problems are posed. The idea of the critical is 
powerful, not in terms of solving problems but in unveiling the existence of 
dilemmas in order to enact the hope-full; to build upon insights and so enable the 
transformative opportunity. In this spirit, the current research has critically examined 
software as material artefact entangled in the world and design as a process that 
contributes its own stories to the world. As a result of this scrutiny, the thesis has 
problematised notions of participatory culture and educational practices that purport 
to engage participatory culture under the heading of new literacies. The research has 
taken insights from the problematising of participatory culture and continued to pose 
questions about participatory design practices. This questioning and problem posing 
has resulted in further problematising of design and the ways that the concept of 
criticality is used in contemporary design practices. In this way, the research 
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endeavour has opened the doors to future research for others who might be working 
in educational and/or design contexts, highlighting the need to consider material 
understandings of software as a designed outcome and to ‘re-materialise’ design 
itself. Such a contribution is of vital import, particularly in the non western, non post-
industrial contexts that inspired the thesis. Adichie (2009) attests that stories are 
powerful and that the power to tell stories can repair damage done. This research has 
re-framed Adichie’s declaration to include design and its artefactual outcomes as 
stories capable of creating worlds. If, as Fry (2013, p. 48) says, “To lose the ability to 
design is to lose everything”, then it is design and its stories that must be re-
materialised and unveiled in any critical endeavour and the story-ing of design itself 
that must be interrogated.  
 
Everybody should have a chance to play – Cwi Nqane (2011) 
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Appendix A 
Redisplacement by design 
The Redisplacement by design paper (Bidwell, Radoll & Turner, 2007) is included in 
the thesis appendix rather than the body of the work because the methodology behind 
the discussion in the short article is actually somewhat tangential to the 
methodologies used in the current thesis. The intent of the article and its central 
argument is sufficiently relevant to include it here. 
Originally published as:  
Bidwell, N. J., Radoll, P., & Turner, J. (2007). Redisplacement by design. 
interactions, 14(2), 12-14. doi:10.1145/1229863.1229878 
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